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Abstract	
With	 the	 overall	 aim	 of	 contributing	 to	 the	 peace	 efforts	 in	 Cyprus	 and	 facilitating	
transformative	 peace	 on	 the	 island,	 this	 thesis	 explores	 the	 relationship	 between	
(de)securitisation,	ontological	security	and	reconciliation	in	protracted	conflict	environments.	
The	theoretical	framework	is	built	upon	this	trilateral	nexus	and	uses	Cyprus	as	a	single	case	
study	for	its	application.		
In	 line	 with	 the	 overall	 aim,	 the	 thesis	 improves	 to	 the	 theorisation	 of	 institutionalised	
securitisations	by	complimenting	the	Copenhagen	School	with	the	Paris	School,	enriches	the	
concept	of	(de)securitisation	with	ontological	security	literature	and	broadens	the	dual-ethnic	
approach	 to	 the	Cyprus	Problem	by	adding	 the	Turkish	 settlers/immigrants	 to	 the	empirical	
analysis.	 Underpinned	 by	 both	 theoretical	 and	 empirical	 contributions	 to	 the	 relevant	
literature,	 the	 thesis	 provides	 a	more	 nuanced	 understanding	 of	 identity	 and	 friend-enemy	
configurations	 by	 analysing	 the	 securitisation	 dynamics	 that	 go	 beyond	 the	 primary	 self	 to	
include	other-others,	other-selves	and	othered-selves	through	a	strategic	blend	of	quantitative	
and	qualitative	methods.		
Finally,	 the	 thesis	 suggests	 that	 we	 need	 to	 couple	 the	 concept	 desecuritisation	 with	
ontological	security	considerations	in	order	to	fully	understand	and	explore	its	potential	as	a	
facilitating	tool	for	transformative	peace.	More	specifically	for	the	case	of	Cyprus,	the	thesis	
argues	that	securitisation	of	Turkish	immigrants	as	a	threat	creates	ontological	dissonance	and	
peace-anxieties	for	the	two	main	communities	in	Cyprus;	thus,	calls	for	their	desecuritisation	
and	inclusion	in	peacebuilding	efforts.			
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Introduction:	Research	Puzzle	
Inception	of	the	thesis	
Achieving	 transformative	peace1	in	protracted	non-violent	 conflict	environments	has	proven	
very	 evasive	 globally.	 Unfortunately,	 it	 is	 hard	 to	 find	 inspiring	 peace	 stories	 in	 a	 World	
inflicted	with	conflict	and	crisis.	Thus,	the	departure	point	of	this	thesis	is	instituted	in	the	lack	
of	 success	 stories	 in	 conflict	 resolution	 and	 peacebuilding	 studies	 and	 seeks	 to	 unpack	 the	
relationship	between	 (de)securitisation,	ontological	 security	and	 reconciliation	 in	protracted	
conflict	 environments.	 A	 theoretical	 framework	 built	 on	 this	 nexus	 can	 help	 the	 conflict	
resolution	 and	 peacebuilding	 literatures	 that	 so	 far	 have	 mostly	 failed	 to	 engage	 with	
ontological	 security,	 to	provide	a	nuanced	understanding	of	 identity	and	 to	break	 free	 from	
the	 inherent	 essentialisation	 of	 identities	 as	 ‘rival’	 or	 homogeneous	 ‘opposing	 sides’.	 The	
departure	point	of	the	thesis	can	be	summarised	under	three	sections:	theoretical,	empirical	
and	methodological,	and	personal.		
Theoretically,	instead	of	locating	itself	in	conflict	resolution	and	peacebuilding	literatures,	the	
thesis	is	broadly	situated	in	security	and	identity	studies.	More	specifically,	it	aims	to	explore	
the	implications	of	the	securitisation	of	identities	on	the	ontological	security	of	salient	parties,	
and	 subsequently	 on	 reconciliation	 efforts	 in	 non-violent	 protracted	 conflict	 environments.	
Locating	 the	 research	 questions	 outside	 of	 the	 conflict	 resolution	 and	 peacebuilding	
literatures	helps	me	expand	my	analysis	beyond	a	focus	on	ethnicity;	it	equips	me	with	more	
tools	 to	 unpack	 the	 nuances	 of	 identity	 and	 reinforces	 the	 foundations	 of	 the	 thesis	 that	
challenges	 the	 conflict	 resolution	and	peacebuilding	 literatures	 for	 treating	 identities	within	
singular	categories	(i.e.	ethnic)	that	focuses	on	the	 language	of	difference	and	assumes	that	
compromise	 can	 be	 achieved	 based	 on	mediation	 of	 ‘objective’	 resources	 and	 rights.	 As	 a	
result,	we	obstruct	reconciliation	of	identities	within	the	categories	by	assuming	a	problematic	
singularity	and	completeness	while	simultaneously	viewing	those	identities	that	fall	outside	of	
these	categories	as	irrelevant	or	less	relevant.	This	is	partly	the	reason	why	conflict	resolution	
1	Transformative	peace	mainly	refers	to	altering	the	entire	structure	of	a	polity,	rather	than	merely	ending	violence.	See	
Mitchell,	A.	(2015).	Ontological	(in)security	and	violent	peace	in	Northern	Ireland.	In	this	thesis,	I	use	it	the	concept	more	
holistically,	to	also	include	societal	reconfiguration	of	friend-enemy	distinctions,	where	peace	is	not	only	signed	on	paper	
by	the	leaders	but	is	internalised,	accepted	and	routinised	in	social	relationships	as	well.	As	such,	peace	reaches	beyond	
a	political	agreement,	and	becomes	a	transformative	politically	and	socially.		
15	
and	 peacebuilding	 literatures	 had	 largely	 excluded	 Turkish	 immigrants	 from	 their	 analysis.	
Within	 this	 framework	 that	 establishes	 a	 nexus	 between	 (de)securitisation,	 ontological	
security	and	reconciliation,	the	thesis	adopts	a	normative	commitment	to	desecuritisation	as	a	
transformative	 tool	 for	 reconciliation.	 The	 central	 theoretical	 argument	of	 the	 thesis	 is	 that	
we	cannot	fully	theorise	and	understand	the	potential	of	desecuritisation	as	a	transformative	
tool	 for	 reconciliation	without	 a	 consideration	 for	 ontological	 security	 and	 a	more	nuanced	
understanding	of	identity.		
Overall,	 the	underlying	 theoretical	objectives	of	 the	thesis	are	 threefold:	1)	 to	contribute	to	
debates	 about	 desecuritisation	 and	 institutionalised	 securitisations	 by	 providing	 a	 more	
nuanced	understanding	 for	 the	concept	of	 identity	with	the	help	of	ontological	security	and	
through	 empirical	 application;	 2)	 to	 contribute	 to	 the	 ontological	 security	 literature	 by	
providing	 an	 empirical	 analysis	 based	 on	mixed-methods	 and	 by	 demonstrating	 its	 integral	
role	 for	 peacebuilding;	 and	 3)	 considering	 the	 rapidly	 growing	 literature	 on	 ontological	
security,	 desecuritisation	 and	 peacebuilding,	 peace	 research	 in	 general	 and	 peacebuilding	
efforts	in	Cyprus	in	particular	can	learn	from	the	findings	of	the	research,	which	can	facilitate	
reaching	 a	 comprehensive	 solution	 on	 the	 island.	 To	 that	 end,	 the	 theoretical	 research	
questions	of	the	thesis	are	as	follows:	
1. How	 can	 we	 broaden	 the	 concept	 of	 securitisation	 to	 make	 it	 more	 receptive	 to
context	 and	 better	 theorise	 institutionalised	 securitisations	 and	 the	 role	 of	 the
audience	in	the	process?
2. What	can	securitisation	theory	learn	from	the	ontological	security	literature	to	explore
the	 limits	 and	 prospects	 of	 desecuritisation	 for	 producing	 transformative	 effects
towards	reconciliation?
The	empirical	and	methodological	approach	works	within	this	framework	but	also	expands	it	
by	adopting	mixed-methods,	which	is	not	often	employed	by	securitisation	or	by	ontological	
security	 literatures.	 As	 such,	 the	 fieldwork	 combines	 quantitative	 opinion	 surveys,	 focus	
groups	and	online	civil	 society	 representative	 surveys.	Empirically,	 the	 thesis	 is	built	upon	a	
single	case	study:	Cyprus.	Numerous	peacemaking	and	peacebuilding	efforts	since	the	1970s	
have	persistently	failed	to	bring	about	a	comprehensive	solution	to	what	is	widely	known	as	
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the	Cyprus	Problem.	The	central	empirical	argument	of	the	thesis	suggests	that	securitisation	
of	Turkish	immigrants2	as	a	threat	creates	ontological	dissonance	and	peace-anxieties	for	the	
two	main	communities	in	Cyprus,	and	in	turn	hinders	the	peace	process,	suggesting	that	their	
desecuritisation	would	facilitate	peacebuilding	and	transformative	peace	on	the	island.	Thus,	
the	 empirical	 analysis	 focuses	 on	 the	 securitisation	 of	 Turkish	 immigrants	 (people	 from	
mainland	 Turkey	 living	 in	 the	 northern	 part	 of	 Cyprus)	 by	 the	 host	 communities	 (Greek-
Cypriots	and	Turkish-Cypriots),	and	the	implications	of	this	securitisation	on	the	peace	process	
and	 reconciliation	 efforts	 on	 the	 island.	 Exploring	 the	 role	 of	 Turkish	 immigrants	 on	 host	
communities’	 identity	 narratives	 and	 ontological	 security,	 the	 thesis	 asks	 the	 following	
empirical	questions:		
1. What	are	the	key	junctures	that	resulted	in	shifts	in	the	identity	narratives	of	the	two
main	communities	in	Cyprus?
2. What	are	the	securitisation	dynamics	and	perceptions	of	threat	in	relation	to	Turkish
immigrants	living	in	the	northern	part	of	Cyprus?
3. What	are	the	implications	of	this	securitisation	on	the	ontological	security	of	Turkish-
Cypriots	and	Greek-Cypriots?
4. Can	desecuritisation	of	the	Turkish	 immigrants	facilitate	a	comprehensive	solution	 in
Cyprus	 or	 would	 further	 securitisation	 bring	 Cypriots	 closer	 together	 against	 a
common	‘enemy’	and	reinforce	the	urgency	for	a	solution?
Last	but	not	 least,	 the	departure	point	of	 this	 thesis	 is	very	personal	as	well.	As	a	Cypriot,	 I	
grew	 up	 with	 the	 Cyprus	 Problem	 as	 part	 of	 both	 my	 social	 and	 professional	 life,	 and	 I	
dedicated	 over	 nine	 years	 to	 bicommunual	 initiatives	 and	 reconciliation	 efforts.	 Thus,	 the	
choice	to	do	a	PhD	on	 identity	and	conflict	was	also	a	personal	choice	to	better	understand	
my	 self-identity	 that	 felt	 trapped	 between	 Turkishness	 and	 Cypriotness,	 as	 well	 as	 other	
identity	 narratives	 and	 dynamics	 in	 Cyprus.	 Professionally,	 I	 grew	 frustrated	 with	 the	
repetitive	peacebuilding	and	reconciliation	efforts	I	was	involved	in;	and	with	the	amount	of	
money	 spent	 on	 bicommunal	 projects	 that,	 for	 the	 most	 part,	 failed	 to	 reach	 beyond	 the	
‘usual	suspects’	in	the	civil	society.	I	also	grew	frustrated	with	the	concept	of	‘bicommunality’	
2	Turkish	 migrants	 refer	 to	 those	 who	 emigrated	 to	 the	 northern	 part	 of	 Cyprus	 from	 mainland	 Turkey	 after	 1974,	
including	both	the	economic	migrants	and	the	settlers.		
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engrained	 in	 peacebuilding	 efforts	 in	 Cyprus,	 which	 provides	 a	 framework	 too	 narrow	 for	
many	people	who	call	Cyprus	home.	It	also	perpetuates	the	‘ethnic’	divide	based	on	a	binary,	
assuming	two	homogeneous	communities	divided	along	ethnic	lines.	Thus,	recognising	that	I	
was	 ‘building-peace’	 in	 a	 comfortable	 bubble	 that	 no	 longer	 innovated	 or	 provided	me	 the	
room	 to	 grow,	 I	 decided	 to	 start	my	 PhD	 as	 a	way	 to	 continue	 to	 contribute	 to	 the	 peace	
process	in	Cyprus	in	a	different	way.		
Securitisation	and	ontological	security:	Theoretical	framework	and	contributions	
Securitisation	theory	became	increasingly	popular	in	the	1990s	with	the	works	of	Barry	Buzan,	
Ole	Wæver	and	Jaap	de	Wilde.	In	their	book	titled	“Security:	A	New	Framework	for	Analysis”,	
the	authors	introduced	a	regimental	analytical	tool	that	rests	on	three	main	components:	the	
speech-act,	the	securitising	actor	and	the	audience,	and	that	needed	to	complete	three	steps	
to	be	deemed	successful:	 identification	of	existential	 threats;	emergency	action;	and	effects	
on	inter-unit	relations	by	breaking	free	of	rules	(Buzan,	Wæver	et	al.	1998).	At	the	core	of	the	
theory,	 the	 authors	 called	 for	 deepening	 and	 widening	 of	 the	 traditional	 security	 agenda	
beyond	 states	 as	 the	 referent	 objects	 and	 to	 sectors	 other	 than	 the	 military,	 based	 on	 a	
constructivist	 approach	 that	 focused	 on	 speech-acts.	 Yet,	 the	 concept	 of	 security	 remained	
anchored	on	the	assumption	that	the	desire	for	survival	 is	ultimate	and	 inescapable.	Hence,	
while	 security	 agendas	 and	 security	 analysis	 were	 deepened	 and	 widened,	 the	 concept	 of	
security	itself	remained	narrow	(Huysmans	1998).	
However,	 the	Copenhagen	 School’s	 (CS)	 securitisation	 theory	has	 grown	much	broader	 and	
looser	 than	 its	 inception	 in	 the	 past	 decade.	 The	 term	 securitisation	 has	 almost	 become	 a	
catch-all	 phrase	 for	 anything	 that	 is	 expressed	 as	 a	 threat	 or	 a	 security	 issue.	 Processes	 of	
securitisation	 are	 now	 analysed	 beyond	 discursive	 speech-acts	 and	 beyond	 the	 regimental	
components,	 steps	 and	 facilitating	 conditions	 initially	 prescribed	 by	 Buzan,	Wæver	 and	 de	
Wilde.	 Securitisation	 theory	 in	 this	 thesis	 is	 not	 limited	 to	Copenhagen’s	 initial	 theorisation	
and	to	discourse	analysis;	it	rather	takes	the	constructed	and	discursive	nature	of	security	as	a	
starting	point	and	pragmatically	fuses	it	with	the	Paris	School’s	(PS)	notion	of	‘insecuritisation’	
that	focuses	on	the	performative	nature	of	security	and	places	the	emphasis	on	practices	and	
technologies	of	securitisation	rather	than	speech-acts.		
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I	argue	that	the	securitisation	of	collective	identities	in	protracted	conflict	environments	can	
become	 institutionalised	 and	 entrenched	 to	 an	 extent	 that	 they	 go	 beyond	 speech-acts,	
seeping	into	routines,	daily	interactions,	slang,	satire,	prejudices,	and	hence,	into	self-identity;	
but	 I	 do	 not	 necessarily	 treat	 the	 discourse	 and	 performances	 of	 security	 as	 two	 distinct	
‘domains’.	 When	 institutionalised,	 securitising	 actors	 and	 securitisation	 practices	 blur	 and	
multiply,	 and	 a	 top	 down	 (political	 elite,	 professionals	 of	 security	 or	 governmental/policy	
level)	analysis	cannot	help	us	fully	understand	the	relationship	between	fear	and	threat,	and	
routines	and	 identity.	 In	other	words,	 institutionalised	 securitisations	 in	protracted	 conflicts	
can	 escape	 both	 the	 power	 holders	 and	 the	 discourse,	 and	 become	 multi-directional	
(horizontal	and	bottom-up),	multi-actored	(with	the	 involvement	of	media,	civil	 society,	and	
individuals)	and	multi-layered	(discursive,	performative	and	routinised).		
	
That	being	said,	the	underling	objective	of	the	thesis	is	not	to	delve	deep	into	how	the	Turkish	
immigrants	are	securitised	and	to	trace	these	securitisation	practices,	but	to	explore	how	this	
securitisation	plays	into	the	ontological	security	and	identity	narratives	of	Greek-Cypriots	and	
Turkish-Cypriots	and	in	turn	constrains	reconciliation	on	the	island.	As	such,	 institutionalised	
securitisations	 that	 are	 performative	 and	 routinised,	 become	 intricately	 embedded	 into	
identity	narratives,	and	hence,	 into	ontological	security.	Ontological	security,	which	 is	about	
security-as-being	 rather	 than	 security-as-survival,	 is	 ultimately	 about	 our	 basic	 trust	 in	 our	
own	biographical	continuity.	Giddens	explains	that	while	self-identity	is	the	development	of	a	
consistent	feeling	of	a	self-biography,	ontological	security	is	about	our	basic	trust	in	our	social	
and	material	environment	that	we	will	continue	to	be	as	who	we	are	(Giddens	1991).		
	
Bahar	 Rumelili	 argues	 that	we	 cannot	 properly	 theorise	 the	 identity-security	 nexus	without	
distinguishing	between	ontological	security	and	physical	security	(Rumelili	2013).	This	means,	
without	ontological	 security	and	a	more	nuanced	understanding	of	 identity,	we	cannot	 fully	
understand	 the	 role	 of	 securitisation	 on	 identity	 narratives	 and	 its	 relationship	 with	
ontological	security,	and	we	cannot	fully	explore	the	prospects	and	limits	of	desecuritisation.	
Thus,	 the	 (in)securitisation	 literature	 will	 provide	 a	 loose	 but	 well	 established	 theoretical	
framework	 to	 make	 sense	 of	 the	 empirical	 data	 in	 terms	 of:	 a)	 locating	 the	 forces	 and	
processes	of	securitisation	(i.e.	historical	events);	b)	local	discourse	and	practices	(i.e.	speech-
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acts,	images,	daily	routines)	portraying	the	Turkish	immigrants	as	an	existential	threat;	c)	the	
role	 of	 different	 actors	 in	 creating	 this	 discourse	 and	 practices;	 and	 c)	 its	 effects	 on	 public	
perception	and	identity	narratives,	and	hence	on	ontological	security.		
	
Copenhagen’s	 securitisation	and	CS’s	 insecuritisation,	 though	based	 in	distinctive	 literatures	
and	fields,	share	the	basic	‘DNA’	in	terms	of	the	way	we	‘feel’	securitisation.	This	relates	to	our	
existentiality	 and	 survival,	 and	 the	 way	 we	 practice	 it,	 which	 is	 subjective	 and	 socially	
constructed,	hence	it	is	more	about	perception	than	objectifiable	threats.	These	‘schools’	are	
more	 complementary	 than	 their	 lack	 of	 ‘communication’	 suggests,	 and	 securitisation	
literature	 has	 become	 bigger	 than	 the	 sum	 of	 both	 (see	 Collective	 2006).	 Bridging	
(in)securitisation	with	ontological	security,	adding	flesh	to	institutionalised	securitisations,	and	
contributing	to	the	 increasingly	popular	ontological	security	and	peacebuilding	 literature	are	
the	 main	 theoretical	 contributions	 of	 the	 thesis.	 Although	 this	 is	 not	 the	 first	 attempt	 at	
marrying	 (de)securitisation,	 ontological	 security	 and	 reconciliation,	 this	 emergent	 literature	
can	 benefit	 from	more	 empirical	 application	 and	 theorising	 (see	 Zarakol	 2010,	 Croft	 2012,	
Celik	2013,	Browning	and	Joenniemi	2015,	Rumelili	2015).	Moreover,	the	mixed-methods	that	
combine	quantitative	and	qualitative	research	can	provide	an	important	added-value	to	these	
literatures	that	mainly	rely	on	qualitative	research	and	discourse	analysis.		
	
The	case	of	Cyprus:	Empirical	significance	and	contributions		
The	Cyprus	Problem	has	long	attracted	the	attention	of	scholars,	researchers,	politicians	and	
international	organisations.	The	literature	on	the	Cyprus	Problem	and	Cypriot	identities	is	by	
no	means	 thin.	Nevertheless,	 even	 the	most	 static,	 protracted	 and	normalised	 conflicts	 are	
not	 immune	 to	 the	 dynamic	 nature	 of	 society,	 identity	 and	 realpolitik;	 considering	 the	
complexity	 and	multiplicity	of	 the	actors	 involved,	 certainly	Cyprus	 is	 no	exception.	Despite	
many	obstacles,	external	factors	and	myriad	players,	finding	a	comprehensive	solution	to	the	
Cyprus	 Problem	 is	 imperative	 and	 the	 case	 of	 Cyprus	 is	 pertinent	 for	 the	 advancement	 of	
peacebuilding	and	reconciliation	literature	due	to	six	main	reasons:		
1) The	 prolongation	 of	 the	 conflict	 presents	 myriad	 human	 rights	 violations	 for	 the	
communities	of	Cyprus;	the	accession	of	the	Republic	of	Cyprus	(RoC)	to	the	European	
Union	(EU)	without	the	inclusion	of	the	Turkish-Cypriots	and	without	a	comprehensive	
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settlement	 places	 the	 conflict	 within	 the	 borders	 of	 the	 EU.	 It	 also	 presents	 a	
significant	challenge	 for	EU	governance	across	a	diverse	 range	of	 issues,	and	 the	EU	
objective	of	achieving	stability	in	the	eastern	Mediterranean	(Christou	2012);	
2) The	 ramifications	of	 the	 conflict	on	 the	NATO–EU	 relationship	and	European	energy
policy	 is	 disconcerting	 due	 to	 newly	 discovered	 gas	 resources	 in	 Cyprus,	 competing
claims	over	these	resources	and	the	fact	that	Turkey’s	geographical	location	makes	it
an	important	corridor	in	particular	for	gas	and	oil	for	the	EU3;
3) Even	though	the	Justice	and	Development	Party’s	(AKP)	intentions	with	regards	to	full
EU	membership	 can	be	contested,	non-resolution	of	 the	Cyprus	 conflict	presents	an
obstacle	for	Turkey’s	EU	accession	as	well	as	being	a	persistent	bitter	thorn	in	Turkey–
EU	relations;
4) The	 peace	 negotiations	 were	 resumed	 after	 independent	 left-wing	 presidential
candidate	Mustafa	Akıncı	assumed	office	in	the	northern	part	of	Cyprus	in	April	2015.
Known	for	his	pro-solution	and	Turkey	defying	stance	and	surprisingly	clean	political
slate,	 many	 accounts	 consider	 that	 the	 Anastasiades–Akıncı	 duo	 creates	 a	 very
favourable	environment	and	that	the	stars	are	perfectly	aligned	this	time,	bringing	the
island	closer	 than	ever	 to	 reaching	a	comprehensive	settlement	 (Foster	2015,	Taylor
2016).	 In	 such	 an	 encouraging	 environment,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 consider	 ontological
security	 of	 the	 collective	 identities	 on	 the	 island	 to	 facilitate	 a	 comprehensive
settlement	and	to	achieve	transformative	peace	in	a	post-settlement	scenario.
5) Following	the	financial	crises	that	hit	the	RoC	in	2012,	the	economic	concerns	of	the
communities	have	gradually	pushed	 the	Cyprus	Problem	behind	other	 concerns	and
priorities,	 specifically	 unemployment,	 inflation	 and	 increasing	 crime	 rates
(Eurobarometer	 2013,	 Eurobarometer	 2014).	 However,	 the	 public	 was	 once	 again
engaged	 with	 the	 peace	 process	 from	 early	 2015,	 which	 could	 contribute	 to	 the
‘favourable’	environment	by	providing	an	opportunity	for	creating	a	more	convincing
prosperous	‘vision’	for	the	future	of	Cyprus	without	‘the	Problem’.
6) Considering	Cyprus’	geographical	proximity	 to	Syria	and	 Iraq	 in	particular	and	to	 the
Middle	East	and	North	Africa	in	general,	 it	could	be	argued	that	the	instability	 in	the
region	 (including	 Turkey),	 and	 the	 subsequent	 ‘refugee	 crisis’	 are	 additional	 factors
3	http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-07-219_en.htm	
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contributing	to	the	‘favourable’	environment	as	they	add	to	the	urgency	for	finding	a	
comprehensive	 solution	 to	 the	 protracted	 conflict.	 The	 Cyprus	 Problem	 is	 a	 non-
violent,	 ‘normalised’,	 and	 ‘comfortable’	 conflict	 (see	 Adamides	 and	 Constantinou	
2011),	thus	the	regional	dynamics	can	help	cultivate	a	sense	of	urgency	for	reaching	a	
comprehensive	 solution,	 which	 may	 in	 turn	 contribute	 to	 increased	 stability	 in	 the	
region,	as	 it	would	not	only	 ‘reconcile’	Greek-Cypriots	and	Turkish-Cypriots	but	ease	
much	pressure	off	Turkey,	Greece	and	the	EU	as	well.		
	
Numerous	 diplomatic	 efforts	 have	 been	 made	 both	 domestically	 and	 internationally	 to	
enhance	 different	 forms	 of	 peaceful	 unity	 since	 the	 emergence	 of	 the	 Cyprus	 Problem	
(Anastasiou	 2008).	 Over	 the	 decades,	myriad	 negotiations	 and	 peace-talks	 have	 begun	 and	
have	 been	 halted,	 fast-tracked,	 and	 revisited.	 There	 is	 substantial	 literature	 on	 the	 Cyprus	
Problem	that	cannot	be	overlooked;	books	and	journal	articles	focusing	on	identity,	ethnicity,	
EU	accession,	conflict	resolution	are	very	rich4.	However,	this	by	no	means	 indicates	that	all	
aspects,	 angles	 and	approaches	have	been	 covered	and	addressed.	 For	 example,	 the	 socio-
dynamics	 of	 civil	 society’s	 willingness	 to	 cooperate	 and	 work	 together;	 the	 influence	 and	
impact	of	civil	society	on	Track	1	level	diplomacy;	the	transformation	of	civil	society	following	
EU	accession;	interaction	between	local	identities	and	migrant	identities	and	their	effects	on	
reconciliation;	 the	 general	 impact	 of	 immigration	 on	 perceptions	 nationalism	 and	 ethnic	
identity;	and	the	effects	of	the	recent	regional	dynamics	(in	the	EU,	Middle	East	and	Turkey)	
on	the	Cyprus	Problem,	are	only	some	of	the	gaps	in	the	literature	that	can	be	enriched	and	
thickened	(Bulent	and	Dagli	2016).		
	
Historically,	 the	 Cyprus	 Problem	 is	 usually	 boiled	 down	 to	 competing	 ethno-nationalisms	
between	 Turkish-Cypriot	 and	 Greek-Cypriot	 communities	 (TCc/GCc)	 in	 the	 literature;	 it	 is	
usually	read	in	tandem	with	the	‘motherland’	nationalism	in	Turkey	and	Greece,	is	entrenched																																																									
4	For	example,	see	Constantinou,	C.	M.	(2007).	Aporias	of	identity	-	Bicommunalism,	hybridity	and	the	'Cyprus	problem’;	
Loizides,	G.	N.	 (2007).	 Ethnic	 nationalism	and	 adaptation	 in	 Cyprus;	Michael,	M.	 S.	 (2007).	 The	Cyprus	 peace	 talks:	A	
critical	appraisal,	Anastasiou,	H.	(2008).	The	Broken	Olive	Branch:	Nationalism,	Ethnic	Conflict,	and	the	Quest	for	Peace	
in	Cyprus;	Hatay,	M.	and	Bryant,	R.	(2008).	The	Jasmine	Scent	of	Nicosia:	Of	Returns,	Revolutions,	and	the	Longing	for	
Forbidden	Pasts;	Volkan,	V.	 (2008).	Trauma,	 Identity	and	Search	 for	a	Solution	 in	Cyprus;	Diez,	T.	and	N.	Tocci	 (2009).	
Cyprus:	 a	 conflict	 at	 the	 crossroads;	Aktar,	A.,	N.	 Kızılyürek	and	U.	Ozkırımlı,	 Eds.	 (2010).	Nationalism	 in	 the	 troubled	
triangle:	Cyprus,	Greece	and	Turkey;	Christou,	G.	(2010).	The	European	Union,	borders	and	conflict	transformation:	The	
Case	of	Cyprus.	
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in	 the	 1960s	 constitution	 along	 consociational	 lines	 and	 traced	 back	 to	 the	 decolonisation	
period	 in	 the	 1950s	 (Papadakis,	 Peristianis	 et	 al.	 2006,	 Hadjipavlou	 2007,	 Akçalı	 2010,	
Trimikliniotis	 and	Bozkurt	 2012).	At	one	 time	or	 another,	 both	 communities	 in	Cyprus	have	
linked	their	destinies	to	those	of	their	ethnic	kin,	to	that	of	the	large-group	outside	the	island.	
Owing	to	Turkey	and	Greece’s	involvement	since	its	early	stages,	the	conflict	has	had	a	distinct	
regional	dimension	 for	many	years	and	since	2004,	 the	EU	became	more	directly	embroiled	
when	 Cyprus	 acceded	 as	 a	 still	 divided	 island.	 Cyprus,	 who	 hosts	 one	 of	 the	 longest	 UN	
Peacekeeping	missions	 (UN	 2016),	 has	 effectively	 been	 divided	 into	 two	 since	 1974,	where	
Greek-Cypriots	live	in	the	southern	part	under	the	legally	recognised	RoC	and	Turkish-Cypriots	
live	 in	 the	 northern	 part	 under	 the	 unrecognised	 self-declared	 administration	 called	 the	
‘Turkish	Republic	of	Northern	Cyprus’	(TRNC).		
This	 thesis	 challenges	 the	 narrow	 binary	 approach	 to	 the	 Cyprus	 Problem	 that	 locates	 it	
between	 Turkish/Turkish-Cypriot	 and	 Greek/Greek-Cypriot	 positions	 based	 on	 rival	 ethno-
nationalisms.	 It	 unpacks	 the	 concept	 of	 identity	 and	 security	 by	 breaking	 the	 dual-ethnic	
analysis	and	by	extending	the	framework	to	include	Turkish	immigrants	too.	In	doing	this,	the	
thesis	 seeks	 to	add	value	 to	 the	existing	 literature	 through	arguing	 that	 Turkish	 immigrants	
occupy	 a	 fundamentally	 important,	 yet	 surprisingly	 unrecognised,	 role	 in	 Cypriot	 identity	
narratives	 as	well	 as	 in	 the	discourses	 and	dynamics	 underpinning	 the	 conflict.	However,	 it	
does	not	attempt	to	explain	the	Cyprus	Problem	as	a	single-issue	conflict,	nor	does	it	promote	
an	alternative	‘root	cause’	to	ethno-nationalism.	The	Cyprus	Problem	cannot	be	reduced	to	a	
single	cause;	 it	 is	an	elaborate	set	of	 issues,	actors,	dynamics	and	forces	that	established	an	
intricate	and	multi-layered	web	across	temporal	and	spatial	lines.	The	two	main	communities	
living	on	the	either	side	of	the	de	facto	divide	share	existential	security	concerns	vis-à-vis	the	
Turkish	 immigrants	 living	 in	 the	 northern	 part	 of	 the	 island.	 Greek-Cypriots	 securitise	 this	
group	as	 the	primordial	 enemy	of	 the	Hellenic	world	as	well	 as	 the	occupier	 and	divider	of	
Cyprus.	 They	 tend	 to	 see	 the	 Turkish	 military	 on	 the	 island,	 Turkish	 government	 and	 by	
extension	 people	 form	 Turkey	 as	 the	 aggressor,	 intimidator	 and	 an	 immediate	 threat	 to	
peace.	On	the	other	hand,	their	co-ethnic	Turkish-Cypriots	securitise	Turkish	immigrants	as	a	
threat	to	their	own	distinct,	more	‘superior’,	more	European	and	secular	identity	despite	the	
mainstream	nationalistic	discourse’s	commitment	to	Kemalism	and	Turkish	nationalism.	
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Even	 though	 the	 literature	 on	 the	 Cyprus	 Problem,	 Turkish-Cypriot	 and	 Greek-Cypriot	
identities	and	contemporary	Cypriot	politics	is	very	rich,	the	literature	on	the	Turkish	migrants	
rarely	goes	beyond	a	debate	about	their	numbers.	The	literature	that	takes	the	debate	about	
people	 from	 Turkey	 beyond	 a	 discussion	 about	 mere	 numbers	 are	 mainly	 limited	 to	 the	
works5	of	 Mete	 Hatay	 (2005;	 2007;	 2008),	 Neophytos	 Loizides	 (2015),	 Yeal	 Navaro-Yashin	
(2006),	Hatice	Kurtuluş	and	Semra	Purkis	(2012)	and	Hüseyin	Çakal	(2013).	Other	works	that	
touch	upon	people	 from	Turkey	 limit	 their	analysis	 to	what	 is	on	 the	negotiation	 table,	and	
provide	a	general	view	about	the	Turkish	military	and	Turkish	immigrants	vis-à-vis	the	Cyprus	
Problem	(both	of	which	are	ultimately	about	numbers,	how	many	will	be	allowed	to	stay,	how	
many	will	be	given	citizenship	and	etc.)	or	look	at	general	attitudes	toward	migrant	groups	in	
Cyprus	(See	Tocci	2002,	CIVICUS	2011,	Loizides	2011,	Trimikliniotis	and	Bozkurt	2012).	
However,	 despite	 Turkish	 immigrants’	 securitisation	 as	 an	 existential	 threat	 and	 a	 major	
obstacle	 for	 reaching	a	solution	and	despite	 the	controversies	about	 their	numbers	and	 the	
demographics	 of	 the	 northern	 part	 of	 Cyprus,	 the	 conflict	 resolution	 and	 peacebuilding	
literature	 has	 been	 strictly	 defined	 around	 the	 main	 two	 communities	 of	 the	 island.	
Consequently,	 it	 failed	 to	 include	 the	 Turkish	 immigrants	 in	 its	 analysis,	 limiting	 the	
understanding	 of	 the	 conflict	 between	 Turkish-Cypriots	 and	 Greek-Cypriots.	 The	 official	
discourses	 of	 the	 RoC,	 ‘TRNC’,	 Turkey,	 Greece	 as	 well	 as	 the	 discourses	 of	 international	
organisations	and	the	majority	of	the	literature	on	the	Cyprus	Problem	see	only	two	sides	to	
the	 conflict;	 “the	 Turkish	 side”	 and	 “the	 Greek	 side”,	 focusing	 on	 the	 language	 of	 ethnic	
difference	(Navaro-Yashin	2006).	Mainstream	conflict	resolution	and	peace	research	has	also	
remained	 narrowly	 empirical,	 not	 reflecting	 on	 its	 ontological	 foundations,	 epistemological	
premises,	 or	 the	 origins	 and	 implications	 of	 its	 concepts	 (Rytövuori-Apunen	 1990,	 Aradau,	
Balzacq	et	al.	2006).	
The	conflict	resolution	and	peacebuilding	efforts	in	Cyprus	neutered	the	conflict,	reducing	and	
isolating	 the	 problem	 to	 the	 two	 main	 communities	 on	 the	 island.	 However,	 the	 Cyprus	
Problem	has	grown	not	only	bigger	than	the	sum	of	the	two	main	communities	on	the	island,	
it	 is	 also	 more	 fluid	 and	 complex	 than	 the	 peacebuilding	 efforts	 assume;	 more	 fluid	 and	
5	I	have	scanned	486	pieces	of	literature	including	articles,	books	and	reports	on	Cyprus	and	the	Cyprus	Problem.		
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complex	than	the	negotiation	chapters	the	community	leaders	are	focusing	on;	and	more	fluid	
and	complex	than	the	exclusive	memories	and	traumas	of	 the	two	communities	about	each	
other.	 These	memories	 and	 traumas	 include	 other	 actors	 and	 hence	 other	 ‘enemy	 others’	
than	 the	 Turkish-Cypriots	 and	 Greek-Cypriots.	 There	 is	 no	 doubt	 that	 one	 of	 these	 major	
actors	that	keep	coming	up	in	the	memories	and	traumas	of	the	two	main	communities	on	the	
island	 and	 on	 the	 negotiation	 table	 are	 Turkish	 immigrants	 living	 in	 the	 northern	 part	 of	
Cyprus.	 Neophytos	 Loizides	 confirms	 that	 the	 increasing	 presence	 of	 Turkish	
settlers/immigrants	 has	 triggered	 domestic	 insecurities	 and	 is	 seen	 as	 an	 obstacle	 to	 the	
future	reunification	of	Cyprus	particularly	by	the	GCc	(Loizides	2015).	Thus,	it	is	necessary	to	
take	the	analysis	beyond	a	mere	agreement	on	how	many	people	from	Turkey	will	get	to	stay	
in	Cyprus	 after	 a	 settlement,	 to	how	 this	 impacts	 the	 reconciliation	process,	 perceptions	of	
threat	and	security,	anxieties	about	the	future	and	identity	narratives	in	Cyprus.		
Exclusive	 and	 essentialist	 approaches	 can	 undermine	 the	 analysis	 by	 simplifying	 the	
complexity	 of	 the	 actors	 involved	 and	 disregard	 the	 multiplicity	 of	 broader	 concerns	
specifically	 with	 regards	 to	 identity.	 Failing	 to	 understand	 and	 consider	 the	 nuances	 of	
identity,	its	link	with	ontological	security	as	well	as	the	latter’s	relationship	with	reconciliation,	
has	kept	the	Cyprus	Problem	in	a	deadlock	for	over	four	decades;	and	arguably	resulted	in	the	
rejection	of	the	Annan	Plan	by	the	GCc	in	the	2004	referendum	(Bulent	and	Dagli	2016).	The	
thesis	 attempts	 to	 close	 this	 gap	 by	 empirically	 focusing	 on	 the	 implications	 of	 the	
securitisation	of	Turkish	immigrants	for	Turkish-Cypriot	and	Greek-Cypriot	identity	narratives	
and	ontological	security,	and	by	breaking	free	of	the	dual-ethnic	analysis.	
The	case	of	Cyprus:	Conceptualisation	of	‘conflict’	
The	protracted	conflict	in	Cyprus	has	proven	its	intractability	over	the	past	50	years	since	the	
communal	 division	 following	 the	 gaining	 of	 independence	 in	 1960	 and	 then	 the	 physical	
division	 after	 1974.	 Today,	 the	 popular	 tourism	 destination	 is	marketed	 as	 the	 last	 divided	
capital	in	Europe.	Even	though	the	two	main	communities	of	the	island	can	now	travel	across	
the	check-points	 freely	and	have	 increased	 interactions	 since	20036,	 the	 island(ers)	 remains	
6	On	21st	April	2003,	Turkish-Cypriot	leadership	announced	that	they	were	easing	restrictions	on	movement	across	the	
Green	Line,	allowing	Cypriots	to	cross	the	dividing	line	for	the	first	time	in	nearly	30	years	(See	BBC	World	News.	(2003).	
Emotion	as	Cyprus	border	opens.)		
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divided;	 the	 southern	 part	 (RoC)	 has	 enjoyed	 full	 EU	membership	 since	 2004	 while	 in	 the	
northern	 part	 (‘TRNC’)	 the	 acquis	 communautaire	 is	 suspended.	 Although	 negotiations	
resumed	 in	2015	and	 it	 can	be	said	cautious	optimism	 is	more	prevalent	now	 following	 the	
election	 of	 Turkish-Cypriot	 president	 Mustafa	 Akıncı,	 many	 Cypriots	 express	 high	 levels	 of	
desire	 but	 low	 levels	 of	 hope7	towards	 reaching	 a	 comprehensive	 settlement	 since	 the	
simultaneous	referendum	in	April	2004	over	the	reunification	plan	put	forward	by	UN	General	
Secretary	Kofi	Annan	(a.k.a.	Annan	Plan).	Many	studies	still	point	to	the	lack	of	trust	between	
the	communities	and	towards	 the	political	elite	and	the	negotiations	 (Cyprus-2015-Initiative	
2009,	2010,	2011).		
Cyprus	can	be	described	as	a	non-violent	protracted	conflict.	Even	though	the	literature	on	the	
Cyprus	Problem	overwhelmingly	defines	it	as	an	ethnic	conflict	(See	Volkan	1980,	Turk	2006,	
Wolff	 2006,	Anastasiou	2008),	 I	would	 intentionally	 avoid	 that	definition.	 There	 is	no	 single	
category	 of	 ethnic	 conflicts;	 indeed	 there	 is	 a	 problem	 of	 over-categorisation,	 where	
everything	 that	 is	not	a	 civil	war	or	 regular	warfare	 can	potentially	 fall	 under	 this	 category.	
Myriad	variations	of	similar	categorisations	such	as	‘ethnopolitical	conflicts’	(See	Gurr,	Harff	et	
al.	1993,	Gurr	1994,	Byrne	and	Ayulo	1998),	‘communal	conflicts’	(See	Gurr	2000,	Weiss	2003),	
‘protracted	social	conflicts’	(See	Azar	and	Farah	1981,	Azar	1990),	‘deep	rooted	conflicts’	(See	
Burton	1987,	Harris	and	Reilly	1998,	Redekop	2002)	and	‘identity-based	conflicts’	(See	Fisher	
2001,	Erik	and	Kristian	2006)	all	incorporate,	to	some	degree,	the	variable	of	ethnicity	in	their	
definitions.	An	‘ethnic’	conflict	usually	refers	to	one	where	incompatible	goals	are	defined	in	
‘ethnic’	 terms	 and	 the	 confrontation	 is	 due	 to	 ethnic	 distinctions	 (Kaufmann	 1996,	 Wolff	
2006).	Questioning	 the	 usefulness	 of	 the	 term,	Gilley	 cautions	 that	 the	 existence	 of	 ‘ethnic	
markers’	 in	 a	 political	 conflict	 are	 not	 sufficient	 to	 label	 them	 as	 such,	 and	 that	 the	 term	
‘ethnic	 conflict’	 is	 not	 particularly	 useful,	 unless	 ethnicity	 is	 the	 actual	 cause	 of	 a	 conflict	
(Gilley	2004).		
My	contestation	of	 the	 ‘ethnic	conflict’	category	 for	 the	case	of	Cyprus	 is	based	on	the	 fact	
that	 it	 narrows	 and	 over-simplifies	 the	 analysis,	 pigeonholing	 different	 communities	 and	
7	The	Cyprus-2015-Initiative	(a.k.a.	SeeD)	public	opinion	poll	survey	revealed	that	while	68%	of	Greek-Cypriots	and	65%	
of	Turkish-Cypriots	express	high	desires	for	a	solution	only	10%	and	12%	respectively	express	high	hopes	that	a	solution	
will	be	reached	(See	Cyprus-2015-Initiative	2010).	
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dynamic	 identities	 into	strictly	ethnic	black	and	white	 (or	 rather	Greek	and	Turk)	categories	
with	no	practical	leverage	or	theoretical	added-value.	These	ethnic	signifiers	can	in	time	turn	
into	 self-fulfilling	 labels.	 Categorising	 the	Cyprus	Problem	as	 an	ethnic	or	 an	ethno-national	
conflict	automatically	 limits	our	analysis	to	a	binary	that	reifies	Greekness	(and	by	extension	
Greek-Cypriotness)	 and	 Turkishness	 (and	 by	 extension	 Turkish-Cypriotness)	 as	 two	 poles	 or	
rivals	that	are	locked	in	historical	enmity.	That	is	exactly	what	this	thesis	tries	to	criticise	with	
regards	to	the	conflict	resolution	and	peacebuilding	literature	in	Cyprus,	which	strictly	limited	
itself	to	a	binary	dual-ethnic	analysis.	Costas	Constantinou,	for	example,	highlights	that	prior	
to	 independence	 in	 1960,	 communities	 in	 Cyprus	 were	 divided	 according	 to	 their	 religious	
beliefs	rather	than	their	ethnic	origin,	but	notes	that	religious	beliefs	and	ethnic	origins	have	
at	times	been	conflated	(Constantinou	2007).	He	presents	a	similar	criticism	for	the	1960	RoC	
constitution	that	does	not	allow	for	one	to	be	simply	Cypriot	without	a	binary	ethnic	signifier.	
For	 Constantinou,	 the	 dominant	 bicommunal	 framework	 (that	 the	 reconciliation	 efforts	 are	
built	 upon),	 which	 reduces	 Cyprus	 to	 two	 competing	 ethnicities,	 is	 a	 result	 of	 the	 colonial	
legacy	that	has	bestowed	an	aporia	to	the	bearer	of	Cypriot	identity8.	
	
However,	my	categorical	avoidance	does	not	mean	I	reject	that	there	are	ethnic	elements	or	
roots	in	the	conflict;	rather	my	contention	is	that	an	ethnic	perspective	provides	a	window	too	
small	to	account	for	the	changing	dynamics	and	fluid	identities	since	the	start	of	the	conflict;	it	
reifies	 our	 positions	 and	 identities.	 Debates	 about	 security	 remain	 limited	 to	 military	 (i.e.	
guarantors	 and	 troops	 on	 the	 ground)	 and	 political	 (i.e.	 governance	 and	 consociational	
institutions)	 realms	 and	 security	 is	 approached	 mainly	 from	 an	 objectifiable	 perspective,	
seeking	 a	 political	 compromise	 without	 a	 nuanced	 understanding	 of	 identity	 and	 without	
much	regard	for	entrenched	friend-enemy	narratives	that	can	become	a	source	of	ontological	
security.	Loizides	argues	that	“identities	and	their	political	manifestations	often	tend	to	move	
at	 a	 faster	 pace	 than	 related	 mediation	 formulas	 in	 the	 stagnant	 Cypriot	 peace	 process”,	
which	 in	 turn	 pose	 a	 significant	 challenge	 for	 mediators	 in	 divided	 societies,	 who	 are																																																									
8	“The	most	disturbing	 thing	 about	being	 a	Cypriot	 is	 that	one	 can	only	be	a	Greek	or	 a	 Turkish	Cypriot.	 Postcolonial	
Cypriot	identity	is	quintessentially	and	inescapably	hyphenated;	and	hyphenated	across	a	fixed	Greek–Turkish	axis.	Being	
simply	and	singly	Cypriot	 is	a	constitutional	 impossibility	 (RoC	Constitution,	Article	2).	Who	 is	Turk	or	Greek	has	been	
decided	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 religious	 beliefs	 and	 less,	 or	 not	 at	 all,	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 language	 or	 other	 cultural	 markers.	
Maronites,	 Latins	 and	 Armenians	 had,	 collectively,	 to	 choose	 at	 independence	 to	 be	 members	 of	 either	 the	 Greek-
Cypriot	or	the	Turkish-Cypriot	community.”	(Constantinou	2007:248)	
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simultaneously	dealing	with	multiple	and	shifting	identities	during	contested	peace	processes	
(Loizides	 2015:73).	 Identities	 and	 self-narratives	 are	 (re)constructed	 and	 (re)negotiated	 in	
tandem	with	the	conflict	and	the	peace	processes,	and	 in	time,	 they	become	dependent	on	
the	conflict.	Considering	the	past	 five	decades	and	the	failed	referendum	in	2004,	 it	 is	clear	
that	 such	 exclusive	 approaches	 undermine	 peacebuilding	 efforts	 and	 the	 road	 to	
transformative	peace,	and	“deprive	 them	of	both	 inclusivity	and	the	opportunity	 to	address	
wider	identity	and	security	concerns”	(Loizides	2015:88).	
My	 choice	 of	 two	 descriptors	 (non-violent	 and	 protracted)	 for	 the	 case	 of	 Cyprus	 are	
significant	 for	 the	 theoretical	 framework	 as	 it	 helps	 to	 contextualise	 the	 broad	 concept	 of	
‘conflict’:	Firstly,	 ‘non-violent’	 is	 self-evident,	as	apart	 from	the	 two	Greek-Cypriots	and	one	
Turkish-Cypriot	that	were	killed	in	1996,	the	Cyprus	Problem	has	kept	its	non-violent	(at	least	
in	physical	sense)	status	since	1974.	This	is	a	significant	descriptor	because	lack	of	immediate	
physical	threats	and	concerns	about	security-as-survival	(as	opposed	to	security-as-being	that	
relates	 to	ontological	 security)	 provides	 a	 favourable	 ground	 to	 analyse	ontological	 security	
and	 desecuritisation	 dynamics	 for	 reconciliation	mainly	 for	 three	 reasons:	 1)	 it	 is	 easier	 for	
individuals	and	collectives	to	establish	daily	routines	and	a	sense	of	normality9	in	non-violent	
environments;	2)	ingroup	and	outgroup	consolidation	in	the	face	of	physical	threats	and	fear	
about	 survival	 reifies	 exclusive	 identities	 and	 positions	 at	 the	 extremes	 (see	 Kinnvall	 2004,	
Volkan	 2006),	 making	 it	 even	 harder	 for	 reconciliation	 or	 reconfiguration	 of	 friend/enemy	
relationships10;	and	3)	in	violent	conflicts,	it	is	usually	not	possible	to	pursue	reconciliation	and	
peacebuilding	before	ending	the	violence	and	achieving	peacemaking	(Fisher	1993).	Thus,	the	
non-violent	nature	of	the	conflict	provides	an	enabling	environment	to	explore	the	ontological	
security,	(de)securitisation	and	reconciliation	nexus.		
Secondly,	 the	 temporal	 descriptor	 ‘protracted’	 does	 not	 suggest	 a	 clear-cut	 timeline	 for	 a	
9	According	to	Giddens,	having	answers	and	basic	trust	to	our	material	environment	is	very	important	for	our	ontological	
security	 (Giddens	1991).	 In	parallel	with	Giddens,	Mitzen	argues	 that	when	an	actor	has	no	 idea	what	 to	expect,	 she	
cannot	 systematically	 relate	 ends	 to	means,	which	 in	 turn,	 creates	 deep	uncertainty	 that	 renders	 the	 actor	 insecure.	
Actors	are	therefore	motivated	to	create	cognitive	and	behavioural	certainty,	through	daily	routines	(Mitzen	2006).	
10	This	 is	 because	 it	 is	 easier	 to	 replace	 the	undefined	anxiety	on	an	ontological	 level	with	an	objectified	 fear,	 as	 it	 is	
easier	to	focus	and	mobilise	around	a	known	threat	that	is	outside	to	the	self,	than	an	anxiety	that	is	internal	to	the	self,	
which	is	not	always	experienced	on	the	level	of	consciousness	(Giddens	1991).	Focusing	on	the	outside	of	the	self,	on	the	
enemy	other	that	is	defined	and	objectified	also	consolidates	the	sense	of	self.	
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conflict	to	be	considered	‘protracted’;	but	rather	it	refers	not	only	to	its	intractability	but	also	
its	‘institutionalisation’	over	time.	Over	five	decades,	two	generations	of	Cypriots	have	grown	
up	 with	 a	 sense	 of	 defensive	 positioning	 vis-à-vis	 enemy	 ‘other(s)’,	 which	 has	 become	
inherent	 to	 their	 identity	 narratives.	 Their	 perceptions	 of	 fear	 and	 threat	 are	 engrained	 in	
their	 identities	and	have	seeped	into	their	daily	mundane	routines.	Institutionalised	conflicts	
and	 institutionalised	 securitisations	 create	 a	 fertile	 environment	 for	 propaganda,	 fear	 and	
manipulation.	 Identities	 also	 become	 dependent	 upon	 conflict	 producing	 routines,	 which	
make	it	particularly	hard	to	desecuritise.	However,	it	 is	the	protracted-ness	of	a	conflict	that	
calls	for	a	marriage	between	ontological	security	and	desecuritisation	as	a	facilitating	tool	for	
transformative	 peace.	 Thus,	 conceptualisation	 of	 the	 Cyprus	 Problem	 as	 a	 non-violent,	
protracted	 conflict	 underpins	 the	 theoretical	 framework	 that	builds	upon	 (de)securitisation,	
ontological	security	and	reconciliation	nexus.	
Case	of	Cyprus:	Politics	of	labels	
The	 (il)legality	 and	 legitimacy	 issue	with	 regards	 to	 the	 ‘TRNC’11,	makes	 talking	 and	writing	
about	 the	 Cyprus	 Problem	 difficult	 even	 for	 the	 most	 ‘politically	 sensitive’	 actors,	 as	 the	
chosen	words	are	assumed	to	be	politically	charged.	Labels	are	abundant	in	Cyprus;	you	can	
identify	 yourself	 as	 a	 Turk,	 Greek,	 Turkish-Cypriot,	 Greek-Cypriot,	 just	 Cypriot,	 refugee,	
Internally	 Displaced	 Person	 (IDP),	 settler	 and	 so	 on	 and	 so	 forth.	 In	 Cyprus,	 these	 simple	
sounding	 labels,	geographical	descriptions,	even	simple	directions	have	political	significance;	
they	are	charged	with	presumptions	that	identify	you	as	a	peace	supporter	or	a	peace	spoiler.	
Some	 words	 and	 phrases	 have	 become	 so	 sensitive	 that	 not	 using	 the	 ‘correct’	 political	
terminology	would	push	you	 into	one	or	more	categories.	For	example,	 if	you	are	someone	
who	capitalises	‘N’	when	writing	north	Cyprus,	you	may	be	suspected	of	seeking	recognition	
for	 ‘the	 North’;	 if	 you	 say	 ‘occupied	 areas’	 you	 are	 probably	 a	 Greek-Cypriot	 or	 Greek	
nationalist;	 if	 you	use	 the	EU	accepted	political	 terminology	of	 saying	 ‘the	northern	part	of	
Cyprus’,	you	are	definitely	taken	as	someone	involved	in	bicommunal	activities.	If	you	use	the	
11	Following	Turkey’s	military	 intervention	 in	1974,	 ‘Turkish	 Federated	 State	of	North	Cyprus’	was	proclaimed	 in	1975	
and	was	succeed	by	Turkish	Republic	of	Northern	Cyprus	(‘TRNC’)	in	1983;	neither	administration	was	recognized	by	the	
international	 community,	 except	 the	 Republic	 of	 Turkey.	 3	 Days	 after	 the	 unilateral	 proclamation	 of	 TRNC,	 United	
Nations	 Security	 Council,	 reaffirming	Resolution	 365	(1974)	 and	Resolution	 367	(1975),	 adopted	 the	 Resolution	 541	
(1983),	asserting	that	the	unilateral	decision	to	declare	independence	is	legally	invalid	and	the	Republic	of	Cyprus	is	the	
sole	authority	on	the	island.	
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EU	 legal	 terminology	 (Protocol	 10,	 2003)	 to	describe	where	 you	 live,	which	 is	 “the	 areas	 in	
which	 the	 Government	 of	 Cyprus	 does	 not	 exercise	 effective	 control”,	 you	 are	 probably	 a	
person	from	the	marginalised	left.	 Ironically,	 if	you	are	a	Greek-Cypriot	and	you	refer	to	the	
north	as	‘TRNC’,	you	are	a	true	peace	supporter,	but	if	you	are	a	Turkish-Cypriot	who	refers	to	
‘TRNC’	 in	a	bicommunal	 setting,	 you	would	be	an	outcast.	 Yet	another	example	 is	how	you	
define	the	events	of	1974;	if	you	describe	the	event	as:	an	'invasion'	you	are	a	Greek	(Cypriot)	
nationalist	or	again,	a	Turkish-Cypriot	from	the	marginalised	left;	'intervention'	if	you	are	from	
the	UN	or	 from	an	NGO	 involved	 in	bicommunal	 activities;	 and	 'peace	operation'	 is	 for	 the	
Turkish	(Cypriot)	nationalists.	If	you	try	to	remain	apolitical	by	saying	‘the	events	of	1974’,	you	
probably	 studied	 abroad	and	definitely	 fell	 prey	 to	 ‘imperialist	 hands’12.	At	 times,	 the	deep	
concerns	 about	 being	 politically	 sensitive	 reaches	 uncomfortable	 extremes	 at	 bicommunal	
interactions.	One	good	example	is	a	personal	experience	at	a	bicommunal	meeting	where	the	
RoC	Minister	for	Education,	being	so	concerned	over	how	to	address	me,	kept	referring	to	me	
as	“the	girl	from	the	north	with	a	small	n”,	rather	than	my	first	name.		
The	way	you	 talk	about	 the	history	as	well	as	 the	present	 immediately	 labels	you	 in	one	or	
more	 categories	 in	 Cyprus.	 The	 reason	 why	 I	 feel	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 highlight	 these	 labels	
attached	to	words	and	phrases	that	are	used	within	the	context	of	the	Cyprus	Problem	is	to	
somewhat	acknowledge	that	my	own	descriptions	in	this	thesis	with	regards	to	‘the	Problem’,	
‘the	 northern	 part	 of	 Cyprus’	 and	 ‘Turkey’s	 intervention’	 cannot	 be	 immune	 to	 my	 own	
political	standpoint	and	choices.	Beyond	recognising	an	element	of	banal	researcher’s	bias,	it	
is	also	 important	to	recognise	how	‘loaded’	these	terminologies	and	labels	have	become	for	
Cypriots,	and	how	‘presumptuous’	they	can	make	daily	human	interactions.	For	example,	I	too	
make	presumptions	about	someone’s	political	convictions	and	stance	towards	a	solution	on	
the	island	depending	on	how	they	refer	to	1974	or	to	the	administration	in	the	north.	In	the	
above	 example,	 being	 referred	 to	 as	 the	 girl	 from	 the	 north	 with	 a	 small	 ‘n’	 in	 essence	
attaches	 me	 to	 a	 geographical	 location	 that	 is	 an	 alienated	 home	 and	 denies	 both	 my	
individual	identity	as	Ilke	as	well	as	my	collective	identity	as	a	Turkish-Cypriot.	Given	the	nexus	
12	Following	 a	 visibility	 campaign	 about	 a	 bi-communal	 basketball	 event	 titled	 Play	 for	 Peace	 (in	 partnership	 Peace	
Players	International,	funded	by	Anna	Lindh	Foundation)	that	I	had	the	opportunity	to	work	as	the	project	coordinator,	I	
was	personally	attacked	by	a	local	newspaper	(see	25	May	2008,	Afrika	Newspaper)	in	the	northern	part	of	Cyprus	for	
choosing	apolitical	terminology	in	my	outreach	material,	where	a	columnist	accused	me	of	being	brainwashed	by	and	a	
collaborator	for	the	imperialist	powers.		
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built	for	this	thesis	is	(de)securitisation,	ontological	security	(and	identity)	and	reconciliation,	
these	 labels,	 their	 use	 in	 our	 interactions	 and	 their	 influence	on	our	 relationships	 becomes	
even	more	significant.	
Turkish-Cypriots	and	Greek-Cypriots	are	not	each	other’s	only	 ‘different’	other	charged	with	
political	 discontent.	 A	 similar	 trait	 could	 be	 observed	 in	 the	 way	 Cypriots	 refer	 to	 Turkish	
immigrants.	 Among	 Turkish-Cypriots,	 they	 go	 by	 many	 different	 names	 ranging	 from	
‘karasakal’	 (blackbeard)	 to	 ‘fica’	 (seaweed)	 or	 ‘fellah’	 (Arabic/black	 peasant);	 and	 among	
Greek-Cypriots	they	are	known	as	‘Atilla’	(the	Hun),	 ‘έποικος/έποικοι	(settler),	 ‘η	κουβαλητή	
του	 Denktaş’	 (the	 ones	 Denktaş’	 carried),	 ‘Κύλιξήρι/Κουλλούφι’13 	(dirty,	 poor,	 homeless,	
uncivilised	gypsy).	 	While	sometimes	 these	derogatory	 terms	simply	stem	from	xenophobia,	
they	also	orientalise	Turkish	immigrants	and	carry	political	connotations	about	an	individual’s	
opinion	with	regards	to	issues	such	as	property	and	citizenship	in	a	post-settlement	scenario	
(i.e.	their	 illegality	as	settlers,	backward	nature,	and	their	repatriation	after	unification).	 It	 is	
widely	accepted	that	Turkish	immigrants	have	become	the	scapegoats	for	many	Cypriots,	who	
are	 discontented	 with	 their	 current	 situation	 (see	 Hatay	 2008,	 Hatay	 and	 Bryant	 2008,	
Kurtulus	and	Purkis	2012).		
Loizides	agrees	that	the	presence	of	Turkish	immigrants	is	prevalently	perceived	as	a	threat	to	
the	peaceful	relations	between	Greek-Cypriots	and	Turkish-Cypriots	and	to	the	demographic	
structure	 of	 the	 country	 (Loizides	 2011,	 Loizides	 2015).	 The	 contested	 demography	 in	 the	
northern	part	of	the	island,	the	issue	of	the	Turkish	immigrants	and	their	numbers	has	been	a	
big	 part	 of	 the	 negotiations	 and	 yet	 they	 are	 excluded	 from	 the	 peace	 process	 and	
reconciliation	efforts.	While	the	growing	number	of	the	Turkish	immigrants	is	perceived	as	an	
existential	threat	to	the	distinct	Turkish-Cypriot	identity,	the	pervasive	presence	of	Turkey	on	
the	 island	has	turned	them	into	scapegoats	for	all	Cypriots	seeking	a	different	future	(Hatay	
2008,	Hatay	and	Bryant	2008).	They	are	seen	as	the	responsible	party	for	all	that	is	wrong	with	
society	 in	 the	 northern	 part	 of	 Cyprus	 and	 as	 one	 of	 the	main	 obstacles	 to	 a	 solution.	 For	
example,	 in	 a	public	opinion	 survey	conducted	 in	2011,	69%	of	Turkish-Cypriots	 stated	 that	
13	 ‘Κύλιξήρι/Κουλλούφι’originally	 refers	 to	 particular	 Roma	 groups,	 but	 is	 also	 used	 for	 Turkish	 immigrants	 as	 a	
derogatory	 term	 that	 means	 dirty,	 poor,	 homeless,	 uncivilised,	 gypsy	 and	 unruly,	 which	 is	 the	 closest	 equivalent	 to	
‘fellah’.	
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‘foreigners’	 (the	 big	 majority	 of	 whom	 are	 people	 from	 Turkey)	 have	 a	 negative	 effect	 on	
crime	rates,	and	33%	stated	that	they	do	not	want	people	from	Turkey	as	neighbours14	(Yücel	
2011).	 Similarly,	 in	 his	 research	 for	 the	Oxford	 Centre	 for	 the	 Study	 of	 Intergroup	 Conflict,	
Hüseyin	 Çakal	 observed	 that	 over	 85%	 of	 Turkish-Cypriot	 participants	 reported	 very	 high	
levels	of	threat	posed	to	real	assets	Turkish	Cypriots	control	(i.e.	political	power	and	economic	
resources)	and	to	symbolic	values	(i.e.	social	values,	traditions	and	cultural	practices)	by	Turks	
(Cakal	2013:9).		
On	 the	 other	 hand,	 an	 opinion	 poll	 conducted	 in	 2009	 shows	 that	 59%	 of	 Greek-Cypriots	
prioritise	‘the	issue	of	the	people	from	Turkey’	for	the	Track	1	negotiations,	while	another	out	
in	 2011	 shows	 79%	 of	 Greek-Cypriots	 thought	 repatriation	 of	 all	 people	 who	 came	 from	
Turkey	 after	 1974,	 including	 their	 descendants,	 after	 a	 settlement	 as	 highly	 desirable	 or	
absolutely	necessary	 for	a	 settlement	 (Cyprus-2015-Initiative	2009,	2010).	 Thus,	 considering	
the	 securitisation	of	 this	 group	as	 an	existential	 threat	by	both	Turkish-Cypriots	 and	Greek-
Cypriots,	 the	 thesis	 seeks	 to	 extend	 the	 dual-ethnic	 approach	 to	 the	 Cyprus	 Problem	 by	
exploring	 the	 role	 of	 Turkish	 immigrants	 in	 Cypriot	 identity	 narratives,	 their	 sense	 of	
ontological	security	and	the	implications	of	these	dynamics	on	reconciliation.		
Chapter	outline	
This	 thesis	 consists	 of	 nine	 chapters	 in	 addition	 to	 an	 introduction	 and	 a	 conclusion.	 The	
chapters	are	organised	under	three	parts:	theoretical,	contextual	and	empirical.	The	first	four	
chapters	 in	 Part	 I	 establish	 the	 conceptual	 and	 theoretical	 dimensions	 of	 the	 thesis	 and	
explain	 the	 methodology	 of	 the	 fieldwork.	 The	 next	 two	 chapters	 in	 Part	 II	 present	 an	
overview	of	 the	 ‘history	of	Cyprus’	and	contextualises	 the	case	study.	The	three	chapters	 in	
Part	 III	 focus	 on	 the	 analysis	 of	 my	 empirical	 findings,	 and	 reflects	 on	 the	 underlying	
arguments	of	the	thesis	and	its	implications	for	further	research.		
The	 thesis	 begins	 by	 examining	 the	 theory	 of	 securitisation	 and	 critically	 looks	 at	 the	
Copenhagen	and	Paris	Schools	of	security.	By	providing	a	literature	review	and	amalgamating	
14	In	 parallel,	 Kurtulus	 and	 Purkis’	 study	 shows	 that	 64%	 of	 Turkish	 immigrants	 expressed	 that	 Turkish-Cypriots	 have	
negative	attitudes	towards	them,	or	that	they	‘do	not	like’	them	(Kurtulus	and	Purkis	2012).	
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the	 two	 schools	 and	by	broadening	 their	 approach	 and	 application,	 the	 chapter	 establishes	
the	 first	 pillar	 of	 the	 theoretical	 framework.	 The	 theoretical	 framework	 is	 enriched	 in	 the	
second	 chapter,	 where	 ontological	 security	 literature	 is	 added	 as	 the	 second	 pillar.	 These	
theoretical	considerations	are	expanded	in	the	third	chapter,	which	bridges	the	two	pillars	by	
establishing	 a	 nexus	 between	 (de)securitisation,	 ontological	 security	 and	
reconciliation/peacebuilding.	 Part	 I	 of	 the	 ends	 with	 Chapter	 4,	 which	 explains	 the	
methodological	choices	and	their	justifications,	and	relates	these	to	the	research	questions.		
The	two	chapters	that	make	up	Part	II	of	the	thesis	analyse	the	shifting	identity	narratives	in	
Cyprus	on	a	temporal	timeline	and	contextualise	the	theoretical	framework	with	an	overview	
that	 focuses	on	 significant	 historical	milestones.	 Linking	 these	milestones	 to	 the	 theoretical	
framework	and	bringing	the	timeline	up	to	2015,	chapters	5	and	6	set	the	stage	for	Part	III.		
Chapters	7	and	8	of	Part	 III	analyse	the	empirical	findings	pertaining	to	the	TCc	and	the	GCc	
respectively.	The	empirical	discussion	is	particularly	focused	on	their	perceptions	of	threat	and	
feelings	 of	 anxiety	 vis-a-vis	 the	 Turkish	 immigrants	 and	 a	 potential	 solution	 to	 the	 Cyprus	
Problem.	 The	 last	 chapter	 of	 Part	 III	 and	of	 the	 thesis	 provides	 a	 comparative	 analysis	 that	
searches	for	convergences	in	order	to	explore	the	potential	for	desecuritisation	with	the	aim	
of	alleviating	peace-anxieties	and	ontological	dissonance	of	the	two	main	communities	on	the	
island.		
Lastly,	 the	 conclusion	 summarises	 reiterates	 the	 primary	 theoretical	 and	 empirical	 thesis	
contributions	 and	 summarises	 the	 underlying	 theoretical	 and	 empirical	 arguments.	 Before	
discussing	 the	 broader	 research	 implications,	 I	 also	 consider	 potential	 desecuritisation	
strategies	and	make	some	recommendations	to	inform	peacebuilding	efforts	in	Cyprus.		
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Part	1:	Theoretical	Framework	and	Methodology	
Chapter	1.	Theoretical	Framework:	Broadening	Securitisation	
1.1	Introduction:		Securitisation,	what	do	we	mean?	
In	Europe	there	 is	a	vibrant	debate	over	a	number	of	competing	schools	 in	security	studies.	
The	 Copenhagen	 (securitisation),	 Aberystwyth/Welsh	 (critical	 security	 studies)	 and	 Paris	
(Bourdieu	 inspired	work	 of	 Didier	 Bigo	 and	 Thierry	 Balzacq,	 also	 known	 as	 insecuritisation)	
Schools	 are	 among	 the	 most	 debated	 and	 critiqued	 new	 approaches.	 However,	 beyond	 a	
common	 opposition	 to	 realism	 and	 traditional	militarist,	 statist	 approaches	 to	 security,	 the	
non-traditional	wider	and	deeper	approaches	often	 fundamentally	deviate	 from	each	other.	
They	differ	on	what	the	referent	object	of	security	should	be,	whether	security	is	negative	or	
positive,	 whether	 the	 objective	 should	 be	 to	 securitise	 or	 desecuritise,	 and	 whether	 the	
emphasis	should	be	on	normative	or	explanatory	theory.		
This	 chapter	 amalgamates	 the	 CS’s	 securitisation	 theory	 focused	 on	 discourse	 and	 security	
speech-acts	with	the	CS’s	more	sociological	approach	focused	on	practices,	governmentality	
and	technologies	to	enrich	the	literature	and	contribute	to	its	normative	value	with	empirical	
application.	While	the	CS	argues	that	security	issues	are	the	political	outcome	of	illocutionary	
speech-acts	 and	 that	 one	 of	 the	 most	 effective	 ways	 of	 analysis	 is	 through	 the	 discursive	
practices	 in	 different	 security	 sectors,	 the	 CS’s	 work	 has	 been	 concerned	with	 practices	 of	
security	 shifting	 the	 focus	 from	political	 agency	 to	 institutions	and	professionals	 involved	 in	
the	definition	of	threats	and	the	technologies	to	govern	them	(Buzan	1983,	Buzan,	Wæver	et	
al.	1998,	Bigo	2002,	Collective	2006).	Nevertheless,	both	schools	do	not	account	for	the	role	of	
institutionalised	perceptions	of	threat	on	identity	narratives	and	hence	fail	to	understand	the	
interplay	between	(de)securitisation	and	ontological	security.		
Though	 rooted	 in	 different	 fields	 and	 criticised	 for	 their	 varying	 weaknesses,	 these	 two	
schools	 of	 thought	 have	 different	 strengths	 in	 terms	 of	 their	 analytical,	 normative	 and	
practical	utility	and	can	in	fact	be	complementary.	Even	though	the	dialogue	between	the	two	
schools	 has	 so	 far	 been	 minimal,	 the	 CS’s	 emphasis	 on	 practices	 is	 highly	 significant	 for	
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explaining	 the	under-theorised	concept	of	 institutionalised	 securitisations	where	 the	 role	of	
the	speech-act	and	the	enunciator	diminishes	by	default,	and	where	the	perceptions	of	threat	
and	feelings	of	fear	seep	into	identity	narratives	and	daily	routines.	As	such,	the	securitisation	
process	 becomes	 multi-actored	 (i.e.	 elites,	 media,	 civil	 society),	 multi-directional	 (i.e.	 top-
down,	bottom-up,	horizontal),	and	multi-layered	(i.e.	discourse,	 imagery,	routines),	escaping	
discourse	to	encompass	performative	forms	of	communication.		
Even	though	the	CS’s	securitisation	 is	probably	the	most	widely	applied	and	fully	developed	
study	 of	 securitisation	 processes,	 it	 is	 also	 widely	 criticised	 and	 its	 application	 and	
interpretation	 varied.	 However,	 since	 its	 initial	 inception	 based	 on	 a	 more	 regimental	
prescription	of	rules	and	conditions,	securitisation	as	a	concept	and	as	a	process	today	is	more	
flexible	in	its	meaning	and	application.	Often,	the	concept	of	securitisation	is	 largely	defined	
as	a	“process	by	which	threats	get	constructed”	(Coskun	2011:8),	and	boiled	down	to	a	broad	
constructivist	tool	for	analysing	the	construction	of	threats	and	the	feelings	of	insecurity	and	
fear	in	the	literature.	On	the	one	hand,	it	could	be	argued	that	securitisation	theory	has	been	
thinned	out	to	an	extent	that	it	has	lost	its	rigour	and	analytical	value;	on	the	other	hand,	it	
could	also	be	argued	that	it	provides	a	popular	loose	framework	that	can	be	contextualised	to	
different	realities	to	explore	how	something	registers	as	a	security	issue	and	translates	into	a	
political,	emotional	and	performative	reaction	based	on	fear.		
Without	a	strict	commitment	to	either	the	Copenhagen	or	the	Paris	School,	I	use	securitisation	
as	a	broad	constructivist	tool	for	understanding	the	construction	of	threats	and	the	feelings	of	
fear,	because	my	main	objective	is	not	to	trace	these	constructions	but	to	analyse	their	role	in	
identity	 narratives	 and	 in	 turn	 their	 implications	 for	 peacebuilding	 and	 reconciliation.	 In	
parallel	with	Adener,	Chapman,	and	Theodossopoulos’	concept	of	‘hollow	categories’,	I	treat	
securitisation	as	a	‘hollow	signifier’	(see	Ardener	and	Chapman	1989,	Theodossopoulos	2007).	
Just	 as	 hollow	 identity	 categories	 are	 forever	 incomplete	 and	malleable	ways	 of	 seeing	 the	
world,	and	need	to	be	supplemented	with	spatial	and	temporal	information	to	acquire	more	
specific	meaning;	 securitisation	 as	 a	hollow	 signifier,	 gives	us	 a	 general	 loose	 framework	of	
analysis,	which	is	about	construction	and	articulation	of	security	issues	and	hence,	conception	
of	 a	 prevalent	 perception	 that	 something/someone	 is	 a	 ‘threat’	 to	 us.	 Hollowness	 in	 this	
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interpretation	is	not	a	value	judgement	on	validity	or	importance	of	the	signifier,	but	reflects	
the	subjectivity	and	externality	of	the	image	produced	for	the	threat,	and	multiplicity	of	ways	
a	 threat	 can	 be	 produced.	 The	 threat	 can	 be	 reinvented,	 reproduced,	 accumulated,	
reinterpreted,	 negotiated	 at	 different	 levels	 by	 different	 actors	 through	different	means.	 In	
other	words,	without	 temporal	and	spatial	 context	 that	adds	meaning	 to	 the	security	 issue,	
and	 helps	 us	 understand	 the	 process	 that	 shapes	 perceptions	 around	 the	 threat,	
‘securitisation’	 itself	 is	 a	 hollow	 signifier.	 As	 such,	 (de)/(in)securitisation	 simply	 denotes	 a	
process	 where	 an	 issue	 is	 constructed	 somehow	 by	 someone	 as	 a	 security	 issue	 and	 is	
perceived	as	a	threat	to	something	by	some	group	somewhere.		
	
The	aim	of	 this	chapter	 is	 therefore	 to	present	my	approach	to	 the	securitisation	 literature.	
The	 first	 section	 of	 the	 chapter	 will	 provide	 a	 brief	 literature	 review	 for	 the	 securitisation	
framework	with	 a	 particular	 focus	 on	 critiques	 and	 its	weaknesses.	 Theorising	 ‘institutional	
securitisation’	as	a	process	that	is	located	both	within	discursive	practices	of	actors	and	within	
routinised	acts	or	performances,	the	second	section	will	discuss	how	marrying	two	schools	of	
securitisation	 can	 benefit	 the	 framework	 and	 help	 its	 application	 in	 conflict	 environments.	
Empirically,	the	fieldwork	data	as	well	as	secondary	sources	clearly	establish	the	constructed	
existential	threat	(i.e.	Turkish	immigrants	and	Turkishness	perceived	as	an	existential	threat	by	
Cypriots)	that	the	thesis	focuses	on	(Hatay	2008,	Loizides	2015).	Thus,	instead	of	tracing	this	
construction	 through	 discourse	 analysis	 or	 looking	 at	 governmentality	 of	 insecuritisation,	 a	
pragmatic	moulding	 of	 the	 Copenhagen	 and	 Paris	 Schools	will	 assist	 the	 thesis	 in	 exploring	
how	institutionalised	threat	perceptions	relate	to	identity	narratives,	ontological	security	and	
in	 turn	 to	 peacebuilding	 on	 the	 island.	 Calling	 for	 a	 pragmatic	 amalgamation	 of	 the	 two	
schools	to	help	securitisation	be	more	amenable	(responsive	to	context)	and	to	add	depth	to	
our	 understanding	 of	 institutionalised	 securitisations,	 the	 chapter	 aims	 to	 remedy	 the	
overreliance	on	speech-acts	that	neglect	the	social	and	performative	aspects	of	securitisation.	
Finally,	 the	 concluding	 section	 that	 emphasises	 the	 importance	 of	 routinised	 practices,	
imagery	 and	 the	 role	 of	 civil	 society	 and	 media	 for	 institutionalised	 securitisations	 and	 its	
intricate	relationship	with	collective	identity	narratives	sets	the	scene	for	the	next	theoretical	
chapter	that	adds	ontological	security	to	the	theoretical	framework	of	the	thesis.	
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1.2	The	‘theory’	of	securitisation	
	
Some	consider	the	CS’s	securitisation	theory	as	“one	of	the	most	important	and	controversial	
contributions	to	a	vibrant	body	of	new	security	theories	since	the	1990s”	(Stritzel	2007:357).	
Securitisation	theory	rests	on	three	main	components:	the	speech-act,	 the	securitising	actor	
and	the	audience.	According	to	Wæver,	the	main	premise	of	securitisation	theory	is	that	it	is	
not	an	objective	condition	but	a	speech-act:	“It	is	by	labelling	something	a	security	issue	that	
it	becomes	one”	(Wæver	2004:13).	“The	utterance	itself	 is	the	act.	By	saying	 it	something	 is	
done”	(Wæver	1995:55).	In	other	words,	a	securitising	actor	identifies	a	threat	that	threatens	
the	existence	of	a	referent	object	(nation,	environment,	society,	group	etc.)	and	labels	it	as	a	
security	issue.		
	
Realising	the	risk	of	incoherency	with	the	widening	of	the	concept	of	security	and	to	prevent	
anything	 from	 becoming	 a	 subject	 of	 security	 analysis	 and	 diluting	 or	 overwhelming	 the	
approach,	the	CS	emphasises	the	need	to	conceptualise	security	in	terms	of	something	more	
than	 just	 any	 problem	 or	 vulnerability.	 Security	 is	 essentially	 about	 “survival	 in	 the	 face	 of	
existential	 threats”	 (Buzan,	 Wæver	 et	 al.	 1998:27)	 and	 not	 about	 anything	 bad	 that	 can	
happen.	 Framing	 something	 as	 an	 existential	 threat	 is	 a	 prioritisation	 choice,	 “if	 we	 don’t	
tackle	this	everything	else	will	be	irrelevant	because	we	will	not	be	here/free	or	deal	with	it	in	
our	own	way”	(Buzan,	Wæver	et	al.	1998:24).		
	
However,	not	every	security	utterance	is	considered	a	successful	securitisation,	which	needs	
to	complete	three	steps:	identification	of	existential	threats;	emergency	action;	and	effects	on	
inter-unit	relations	by	breaking	free	of	rules	(Buzan,	Wæver	et	al.	1998:6).	In	other	words,	first	
a	 securitising	 actor	 claims	 a	 right	 to	 extraordinary	measures	 to	 safeguard	 the	 survival	 of	 a	
referent	object	by	stating	that	the	existence	of	a	particular	referent	object	is	threatened;	and	
second,	the	actor	needs	to	convince	an	audience	about	the	reality	of	the	identified	threat	and	
mobilise	 support	 in	 order	 to	 legitimise	 emergency	 actions	 (e.g.	 military	 action,	 secrecy,	
imposing	 taxes,	 limitations	 on	 inviolable	 rights)	 and	 move	 the	 issue	 out	 of	 the	 sphere	 of	
‘normal’	 politics	 into	 the	 realm	 of	 emergency	 politics	 (Taureck	 2006).	 Inspired	 by	 Austin’s	
concept	of	‘felicity	conditions’,	securitisation	theory	also	offers	three	facilitating	conditions	for	
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a	successful	securitisation	practice:	(1)	The	demand	internal	to	the	speech-act	(the	grammar	
of	security),	point	of	no	return	and	a	possible	way	out;	(2)	the	social	capital	of	the	enunciator,	
(the	capacity	of	the	securitising	actor);	and	(3)	conditions	historically	associated	with	a	threat.	
In	themselves	they	do	not	guarantee	the	success	or	the	failure	of	a	securitising	move	but	they	
are	definitely	facilitating	conditions	(Buzan,	Wæver	et	al.	1998:33).	According	to	the	theory,	if	
there	 is	 no	 resonance	with	 the	 audience	 and,	 importantly,	 no	 consequent	 security	 practice,	
that	is	merely	a	securitising	move	(Buzan,	Wæver	et	al.	1998).	
	
In	theory,	a	securitising	move	is	an	option	open	to	any	agent	(unit	or	individual)	because	we	
can	 only	 identify	 a	 case	 of	 securitisation	 when	 an	 actor	 has	 convinced	 an	 audience	 of	 its	
legitimate	need	to	go	beyond	otherwise	binding	rules	and	regulations.	In	practice	however,	a	
securitising	move	as	conceived	by	the	CS,	 is	heavily	based	on	the	actors’	social	and	political	
power	and	capability	to	construct	a	threat	(Taureck	2006).	Even	though	the	CS	does	not	claim	
that	 authority	 is	 essential	 for	 the	 success	 of	 a	 securitising	 act,	 the	 underlying	 top-down	
relationship	between	the	securitiser	and	the	audience	and	the	need	for	a	‘legitimate’	security	
practice	means	that	the	social	capital	of	the	agent	carries	more	weight.	It	is	this	notion	about	
the	 capacity	 to	 legitimise	 security	 practices	 that	 suggests	 a	 top-down	 directionality	 and	
assumes	a	distinction	between	the	securitiser	and	the	audience.	For	Aradau,	 it	 is	difficult	 to	
see	 how	 agents	 without	 authority	 can	 legitimise	 emergency	 actions	 outside	 generally	
accepted	democratic	norms	since	 the	success	of	a	 securitising	move	 is	dependent	upon	the	
position	the	securitising	actor	vis-à-vis	the	audience	and	their	capacity	to	reinforce	a	particular	
reading	of	reality	(Aradau	2004).	Aradau,	who	asserts	that	securitisation	has	an	exclusionary	
and	 non-democratic	 logic,	 points	 out	 that	 the	 institutional	 knowledge	 and	 capabilities	 of	
security	 professionals	 with	 regards	 to	 threats	 results	 in	 monopolisation	 of	 securitisation,	
making	 them	 impermeable	 to	 the	 criticism	 of	 ‘amateurs’	 such	 as	 civil	 society	 organisations	
(CSOs)	(Aradau	2004).		
	
Successful	 securitisation	 of	 an	 issue	 allows	 for	 the	 introduction	 of	 security	 practices,	which	
would	 not	 be	 introduced	 under	 ‘normal’	 conditions	 (Buzan,	 Wæver	 et	 al.	 1998).	 Thus,	 a	
certain	level	of	support	from	an	audience	is	necessary	to	deem	a	securitising	move	successful.	
Here,	while	 the	 theory	assumes	a	 start	and	an	end	point	 for	 the	 securitisation	process	 (the	
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move/speech-act	and	the	security	practice),	it	is	rather	vague	when	it	comes	to	the	role	of	the	
audience	before	and	after	the	‘security	practice’.	What	if	the	audience	accepts	the	securitising	
move	but	there	are	no	security	practices?	And	if	the	acceptance	of	the	audience	is	integral	to	
the	process,	what	is	the	role	of	the	audience	in	shaping	the	speech-act(s)?	Or	what	if	there	is	a	
security	 practice	 despite	 a	 strong	 opposition	 from	 the	 audience?	 Or,	 when	 do	we	 deem	 a	
securitising	move	successful;	when	the	audience	accepts	 the	securitising	move,	or	when	we	
can	 see	 a	 relevant	 security	 practice/policy,	 or	 do	we	 need	 to	 fulfil	 both	 conditions?	 If,	 for	
example,	the	Republican	audience	is	convinced	that	Muslims	citizens	are	a	security	threat	and	
they	 support	 and	 legitimise	 Donald	 Trump’s	 emergency	measures	 to	 brand	 and	 register	 all	
Muslims	in	the	USA,	but	this	emergency	measure	cannot	be	implemented	due	to	opposition,	
do	we	have	a	case	of	successful	securitisation	where	a	particular	audience	has	accepted	and	
legitimised	 the	 security	 discourse,	 or	 a	 case	 of	 a	 mere	 securitising	 move	 because	 the	
emergency	measure	was	not	implemented?	If	we	strictly	remain	within	the	boundaries	of	the	
securitisation	theory,	the	answer	would	probably	be	the	 latter.	However,	 if	we	focus	on	the	
audience	 and	 the	 performative	 nature	 of	 securitisation,	 we	 can	 see	 that	 despite	 lack	 of	
emergency	 measures,	 there	 is	 a	 significant	 shift	 in	 attitudes,	 understandings	 and	
performances	 of	 security,	 where	 a	 particular	 audience	 feels	 existentially	 threatened	 and	
where	we	need	desecuritisation	to	address	the	feelings	of	fear.		
	
As	such,	if	we	apply	a	strict	interpretation	of	this	sophisticated	tool	of	analysis	that	is	limited	
to	a	speech-act	in	a	given	time,	which	results	in	a	legitimised	security	practice,	the	instances	of	
successful	securitising	moves	would	be	very	rare.	On	the	other	hand,	if	we	look	at	speech-acts	
that	are	accepted	by	an	audience	without	resulting	in	a	security	practice,	we	would	drown	in	
successful	 securitising	 moves.	 Nevertheless,	 for	 the	 purposes	 of	 this	 thesis,	 I	 do	 not	
necessarily	need	a	regimental	and	tight	‘equation’	about	how	threats	are	constructed	to	study	
how	the	constructed	threat	perceptions	influence	identity	narratives,	neither	do	I	think	such	
an	 equation	 is	 ‘desirable’	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 studying	 such	 a	 contested	 and	 constructed	
concept.	 For	 the	purposes	of	 this	 thesis,	 securitisation	 is	 treated	as	 a	 ‘hollow	 signifier’	 that	
refers	 to	 social	 construction	of	 threats,	which	 can	be	multi-layered,	multi-directional	 and	 is	
open	to	multiple	actors.		
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Even	though	the	main	weaknesses	and	critiques	of	securitisation	theory	will	be	discussed	 in	
more	detail	later	on,	it	is	important	to	note	here	that	the	role	of	the	audience	stirs	up	debates	
about	 contradicting	 premises	 of	 the	 theory.	 These	 contradicting	 premises	 are	 about	
securitisation	claiming	to	be	founded	upon	illocutionary	speech-acts	(performing	a	function	at	
the	moment	 of	 speech	 –	what	 is	 done	 in	 saying	 security)	while	 at	 the	 same	 time	 requiring	
acceptance	 by	 the	 audience	 which	 rather	 invokes	 a	 perlocutionary	 (necessary	 for	 enabling	
particular	actions	–	what	is	done	by	saying	security)	approach	to	the	speech-act	where	there	is	
an	intended	effect	on	and	relationship	with	the	audience	rather	than	simply	doing	something	
by	mere	utterance	(McDonald	2008,	Stritzel	2011,	Roe	2012).	Perlocutionary	acts	are	external	
to	 the	 performative	 aspect	 of	 the	 speech-act	 and	 thereby	 correspond	not	 to	 the	 utterance	
itself	 but	 to	 its	 effects.	 By	 mixing	 perlocutionary	 and	 illocutionary	 acts	 together	 the	 CS	
obscures	the	role	of	audience(s)	in	securitisation	theory.	This	may	be	due	to	the	objective	of	
providing	a	tight	tool	for	the	security	analyst	where	s/he	can	trace	a	starting	and	an	end	point	
for	 the	 securitisation	 process,	 rather	 than	 creating	 a	 cyclical	 inter-subjective	 process	 that	
spirals	in	many	directions,	temporally	and	spatially.		
	
The	 narrow	 focus	 on	 the	 speech-act	 also	 highlights	 the	 political	 decision	 to	 securitise;	 For	
Wæver,	 while	 the	 historical	 conditions	 that	 enable	 securitisation	 are	 significant	 (felicity	
condition	3),	securitisation	can	not	be	reduced	to	the	conditions	of	its	social	accomplishment,	
the	focus	is	on	the	decision	to	securitise	(the	speech-act),	which	is	an	explicit	political	choice	
(Wæver	2000).	Criticising	this	emphasis	on	decision,	Michael	Williams	points	that	focusing	too	
narrowly	on	“the	search	for	singular	and	distinct	acts	of	securitisation	might	well	lead	one	to	
misperceive	 processes	 through	 which	 a	 situation	 is	 being	 gradually	 intensified,	 and	 thus	
rendered	 susceptible	 to	 securitsation,	 while	 remaining	 short	 of	 the	 actual	 securitising	
decision”	(Williams	2003:521).		
I	take	the	position	that	securitisation	is	an	inter-subjective	socially	constructed	process,	and	it	
can	be	cyclical	and	the	starting	points	we	choose	can	in	fact	be	arbitrary,	but	not	necessarily	
unjustified	depending	on	our	research	questions.	Securitisation	as	an	inter-subjective	process	
is	dependent	on	construction	of	a	certain	reality	in	terms	of	a	threat/security	issue;	focusing	
on	the	 ‘audience’	 rather	 than	a	speech-act	given	at	a	particular	moment	 in	 time	can	be	the	
key	 in	 analysing	 institutionalised	 securitisation	 processes.	 This	 makes	 perlocution	 central	
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rather	 than	 tangential	 to	 understanding	 how	 a	 particular	 issue	 is	 turned	 into	 a	 security	
problem	 (Balzacq	 2012:60-61).	 Allowing	 the	 possibility	 that	 speech-acts	 are	 perlocutionary	
gives	a	more	significant	role	to	the	audience	than	actually	theorised	by	the	CS,	and	the	over-
emphasis	 on	 the	 speech	 and	 the	 enunciator	 fails	 to	 account	 for	 institutionalised	
securitisations.	
	
Conflict	environments	provide	a	fertile	ground	for	institutionalised	securitisations,	where	it	is	
not	hard	 to	observe	multiple	 and	at	 times	opposing	 securitisation	practices	 at	play.	Certain	
security	 issues	 in	conflict	environments	may	be	historically	embedded	and	taken	granted	as	
threats,	which	 renders	 the	 securitising	 speech-act	 or	 the	 authority	 of	 the	 securitising	 actor	
redundant	 because	 the	 role	 of	 the	 speech-act	 shifts	 from	 convincing	 an	 audience	 that	 a	
specific	 issue	 is	 an	 existential	 threat,	 to	merely	 reminding	 them,	 as	 the	 threat	 is	 a	 central	
element	 of	 the	 ‘political	 normality’	 they	 live	 in.	 Contrary	 to	 the	 CS’s	 initial	 focus	 on	
securitisation	practices	that	are	top-down	and	elite	driven	based	on	specific	security	speech-
acts	 aimed	 at	 a	 particular	 audience	 with	 a	 particular	 political	 intent	 (Buzan,	 Wæver	 et	 al.	
1998),	 in	conflict	environments,	 this	process	can	be	more	 implicit	and	ambivalent	given	 the	
myriad	insecurities	and	threats	 inherent	to	the	conflict	 itself.	For	example,	the	audience	can	
assume	 the	 role	 of	 the	 securitising	 actor	 while	 at	 the	 same	 time	 demanding	 further	
securitisation	or	emergency	measures	 for	 the	 identified	 threat,	or	 there	are	often	opposing	
securitisation	forces	that	create	dissonance15.	Engrained	hostilities,	self-enemy	relationships,	
myths,	collective	histories	and	self-narratives	can	be	effectively	reproduced	by	a	wide	range	of	
practices	 and	 actors,	 because	 the	 conflict	 serves	 as	 a	 reference	 point	 for	 the	 threat	 and	
feelings	of	fear	to	‘stick’.	As	a	result,	with	the	involvement	of	multiple	actors	(i.e.	civil	society,	
business	people,	teachers,	media)	and	blurring	 lines	between	the	securitising	actors	and	the	
audience,	 directionality	 of	 securitisation	 practices	 can	 become	 bottom-up	 and	 horizontal	
(Adamides	2012),	and	securitisation	process	can	be	reproduced	with	‘actions’	other	than	the	
speech-act.	
	
Salter,	who	also	suggests	non-state	actors	must	be	included	in	securitisation,	agrees	that	the	
CS’s	 securitisation	 model	 is	 too	 statist/elitist	 and	 hence	 cannot	 match	 the	 complexity	 of																																																									
15	For	example	political	elite	securitising	one	side	of	the	conflict,	peace-builders/mediators	securitising	another.	
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contemporary	 social	dynamics	of	 security	 (Salter	2008).	 In	order	 to	be	able	 to	measure	 the	
success	 or	 failure	 of	 a	 securitising	 move	 within	 different	 audiences,	 Salter	 adds	 temporal	
dimensions	to	considerations	of	securitisation;	meaning	the	duration	of	the	securitisation	and	
the	 entropy	 of	 the	 public	 imagination,	 which	 is	 similar	 to	 my	 point	 that	 small	 securitising	
moves	 can	 accumulate	 or	 some	 securitising	 moves	 can	 ‘stick’	 depending	 on	 the	 historical	
narratives	 and	 the	 context.	 The	 construction	 of	 security	 cannot	 be	 comprehensively	
understood	 in	 isolation	 from	the	 role	of	 the	audience	and	 the	 social,	political	and	historical	
contexts	in	which	particular	discourses	of	security	become	possible.	Neither	can	it	be	limited	
to	speech-acts.	Language	is	only	one	means	through	which	meaning	is	communicated	(Möller	
2007).	 Especially	 in	 the	 contemporary	world,	 there	 are	multiple	ways	 and	mediums	where	
stories	and	particular	narratives	can	go	viral	and	reach	a	wide	audience,	where	discourse	can	
escape	both	the	‘speech-acts’	and	the	‘power	holders’.	Even	though	the	CS	acknowledges	that	
a	 focus	 on	 speech	 alone	 is	 far	 too	 narrow	 and	 notes	 that	 	 ‘the	 security	 speech-act	 is	 not	
defined	 by	 uttering	 the	 word	 security’	 (Buzan,	 Wæver	 et	 al.	 1998:27),	 how	 an	 issue	 is	
designated	 as	 an	 existential	 threat	 beyond	 speech-acts	 remains	 almost	 entirely	 untouched,	
and	the	analysis	remains	almost	exclusively	focused	on	discourse	created	by	power	holders.	
	
As	Michael	Williams	argues,	securitisation	is	not	reducible	to	a	purely	linguistic	rhetoric,	but	it	
needs	to	be	understood	as	a	broader	performative	act	that	is	negotiated	through	a	variety	of	
contextual,	institutional,	and	symbolic	resources	for	its	effectiveness	(Williams	2003).	Williams	
criticises	 this	 narrow	 focus,	 arguing	 that	 the	 hermeneutic	 approach	 to	 security	 is	 a	
deterministic	understanding	of	the	‘moment’,	when	threats	are	constructed	(Williams	2003).	
For	Bigo,	securitisation	does	not	occur	only	at	particular	instances,	security	issues	can	become	
institutionalised	as	existential	threats	without	dramatic	moments	of	intervention	(Bigo	2002).	
He	explains	that	“security	 is	constructed	and	applied	to	different	 issues	and	areas	through	a	
range	 of	 often	 routinised	 practices	 rather	 than	 only	 through	 speech-acts	 that	 enable	
emergency	measures”	(Bigo	2002:65).	For	example,	Bigo	argues	that	immigration	as	a	security	
threat	 in	 Europe	was	 the	 product	 of	 long-term	processes	 of	 institutionalisation	 and	 related	
heavily	 to	 the	 incorporation	 of	 immigration	within	 the	 jurisdiction	 of	 security	 professionals	
such	as	the	police	and	customs	officers	(Bigo	2000).	Persuading	an	audience	to	see	the	world	
in	a	specific	way,	creating	a	feeling	of	danger	and	insecurity,	and	thus	acting	in	tandem	with	
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the	constructed	reality	is	best	done	with	a	range	of	actors	and	tools	with	different	capacities,	
knowledge	 and	 relationship	 to	 the	 audience(s).	 A	 theory	 so	 reliant	 on	 discourse	 for	 its	
explanatory	power	hence	fails	to	address	the	dynamics	of	social	construction	of	meaning	in	a	
world	where	meaning	is	increasingly	bound	with	images,	social	media,	the	role	of	CSOs,	mass	
movements,	and	even	satire.		
	
We	can	problematise	the	reduction	of	securitisation	to	a	purely	linguistic	rhetoric	by	drawing	
on	 Michel	 Foucault.	 For	 Foucault,	 the	 meaning	 is	 constituted	 within	 material	 and	 textual	
realms,	for	they	are	not	mutually	exclusive	(Foucault	1981).	He	holds	that	discursive	practices	
verge	 on	 the	 territory	 of	 materiality,	 becoming	 intrinsically	 linked	 with	 performances	 of	
meaning;	 thus	an	over-concentration	on	 language	signals	a	myopic	understanding	of	 text	 in	
isolation	 from	the	material	arrangements	of	power	 (Foucault	1981).	Recognising	 the	 role	of	
material	and	performative	dynamics	in	the	generation	of	meaning	of	security	and	threat,	and	
the	productive	power	of	such	dynamics,	demand	an	acceptance	that	security	exists	outside	of	
the	 speech-act.	 In	 parallel,	 Lene	 Hansen	 agrees	 that	 the	 speech-act	 framework	 of	 security	
neglects	 performative	 dynamics,	 which	 can	 produce	 and	 communicate	 the	 meaning	 of	
security	 in	 their	own	right	 (Hansen	2000).	For	example,	seeing	sunflower	seed	shells	on	the	
beach	 or	 in	 a	 park	 in	 north	 Cyprus	 is	 latent	with	meaning	 for	 Turkish-Cypriots.	 It	 serves	 to	
remind	them	that	a	person	from	Turkey	was	there,	and	reproduces	the	oriental	and	inferior	
threat	narrative	attached	to	this	group,	where	their	daily	routines	create	nuisance	on	Turkish-
Cypriots’	daily	routines.	Thus,	the	speech-act	is	just	one	dynamic	of	the	securitisation	process,	
the	 role	of	audience(s),	other	 forms	of	 communication,	performatives	and	daily	 routines	all	
have	a	role	to	play	in	the	way	an	existential	threat	is	constructed	and	experienced.		
	
Securitisation	 exists	 within	 the	 interplay	 between	 self-identity	 and	 the	 construction	 of	
meaning	across	all	social	structures.	Therefore,	the	securitisation	approach	taken	in	this	thesis	
sees	 securitisation	 as	 a	 broader	 communicative	 process	 than	 the	 speech-act	 uttered	 by	 a	
securitising	actor,	as	one	that	includes	how	meaning	is	conveyed	by	images,	media,	multiple	
actors	and	multiple	practices;	and	broadens	 ‘consequent	security	practices’	 to	 include	more	
than	emergency	measures	such	as,	social	movements	and	practices	that	demonstrate	the	way	
audience	accepts	and	interprets	the	securitising	move.	
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Although	 its	 analytical	 utility	 is	 very	 attractive,	 the	 CS’s	 securitisation	 theory	 has	 attracted	
many	 criticisms;	 these	 can	 be	 categorised	 under	 four	 main	 captions:	 epistemological,	
conceptual,	 empirical	 and	 normative.	 Epistemological	 criticisms	 focus	 on	 the	 meaning	 of	
security	as	defined	by	the	CS,	 its	philosophical	foundations	and	the	speech-act	theory.	If	the	
meaning	of	 security	 is	dependent	on	questions	of	epistemology,	ontology	and	methodology	
underlying	 the	 respective	 school	 of	 thought	 and	 for	 securitisation	 theory	 the	 definition	 of	
security	 is	what	securitising	actors	make	of	 it	then	it	can	be	argued	that	the	epistemological	
foundations	 of	 the	 theory	 is	 fallacious.	 For	 Balzacq,	 securitisation	 theory	 suffers	 from	
‘detrimental	 effects	 of	 an	 inconsistent	 mixture	 of	 ontology	 and	 epistemology’	 where	
constructivism	 is	wedded	with	 post-structuralism.	 Instead,	 the	 link	 between	 the	 speech-act	
approach	 to	 security	 and	 post-structuralism	 bears	 directly	 on	 a	 central	 problem	 in	 the	
epistemology	of	discourse	analysis.	(Balzacq	2012:59-60).		
	
The	conceptual	critiques	refer	primarily	to	the	concepts	used	in	the	structure	of	securitisation	
theory	 such	 as	 its	 use	 of	 speech-act	 theory,	 audience,	 social	 identity,	 ‘normal’	 politics	 and	
exceptional	measures.	 It	 is	often	argued	that	these	concepts	are	under-developed	by	the	CS	
(Theiler	 2003,	Williams	 2003,	 Huysmans	 2006,	 Ciuta	 2009,	 Roe	 2012).	 For	 example,	 Theiler	
identifies	three	underlying	weaknesses	for	the	concept	of	social	identity	as	developed	by	the	
CS:	a	tendency	to	reify	societies	as	independent	social	agents,	vague	definition	of	identity,	and	
failure	to	demonstrate	that	social	security	matters	to	individuals	(Theiler	2003).		
	
On	 the	 other	 hand,	 securitisation	 theory	 is	 also	 criticised	 for	 not	 defining	 ‘normality’	 and	
‘normal’	politics	sufficiently.	Although	it	has	been	suggested	that	the	normal	politics	 implied	
by	securitisation	theory	is	that	of	liberal	democracy	(Aradau	2004,	Huysmans	2004),	it	remains	
undefined	in	the	CS	(Collective	2006).	If	‘normal’	politics	is	how	things	are	ordinarily	done	in	
liberal	democracies,	then	extraordinary	politics	is	what	normal	politics	is	not	(Roe	2012).	Even	
though	 securitisation	 theory	 seems	 contextually	 excellent	 as	 it	 studies	 securitisation	where	
and	when	it	happens,	for	Ciuta,	we	cannot	conceptualise	a	de-contextualised	security	(Ciuta	
2009).	 Conditions	 of	 exceptionality	 and	 normality	 as	 well	 as	 what	 counts	 as	 a	 threat,	 are	
highly	contextual.	For	example,	environmental	policies	that	are	‘normal’	within	the	EU	can	be	
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regarded	 as	 exceptional	 elsewhere.	Or,	what	 the	 audience	 deems	 ‘normal’	may	 not	 be	 the	
normality	endorsed	by	the	political	elites.		
	
Consequently,	 the	 third	 criticism	 of	 securitisation	 theory	 is	 its	 ‘inconsistent’	 empirical	
application	 and	 its	 lack	 of	 emphasis	 on	 the	 context	 of	where	 and	 under	what	 conditions	 a	
securitising	move	is	being	done.	Similar	to	the	pragmatic	approach	taken	in	this	thesis,	where	I	
open	and	expand	the	actors,	securitising	moves,	and	security	practices,	and	use	the	concept	
more	 like	 a	 ‘hollow	 signifier’	 rather	 than	 a	 rigorous	 theory,	 empirical	 application	 of	
securitisation	as	a	theory	had	to	rely	on	different	interpretations	to	help	the	theory	become	
receptive	 to	 context.	 Different	 scholars	 filled	 the	 gaps	 left	 by	 the	 CS	 (i.e.	 the	 role	 of	 the	
audience,	scope	of	 the	speech-act,	directionality	of	 the	securitisation	process,	 the	vitality	of	
the	 emergency	 measures	 for	 the	 success	 of	 the	 securitising	 move	 and	 institutionalised	
securitisations)	 with	 different	 interpretations	 to	 help	 the	 travel	 of	 the	 theory	 to	 different	
contexts	and	normalities	(see	Coskun	2007,	Doty	2007,	Floyd	2007,	Wilkinson	2007,	Barthwal-
Datta	 2009,	MacKenzie	 2009,	 Kinnvall	 and	 Nesbitt-Larking	 2010,	 Bilgin	 2011,	 Hansen	 2011,	
Adamides	2012,	Corry	2012).	
	
Other	scholars	such	as	Stritzel	and	Vuori	join	this	debate	which	links	with	the	normative	and	
empirical	 debate	 about	 securitisation	 theory	 being	 limited	 to	 Western	 democracies,	 their	
‘normalities’	 and	 their	 understanding	 of	 legitimacy	 and	 power	 (Vuori	 2008,	 Stritzel	 2011).	
There	is	a	‘democratic	bias’	in	the	‘pragmatic	understanding’	of	the	theory	where	the	practice	
of	 securitisation	 involves	 moving	 of	 certain	 issues	 beyond	 the	 democratic	 processes	 of	
government	and	public	deliberation	into	‘special	politics’	 in	order	to	deal	with	the	identified	
existential	threats	(Huysmans	1998,	Laustsen	and	Wæver	2000,	Balzacq	2005).	This	 inherent	
push	towards	democracy	and	thus	the	normative	preference	for	desecuritisation	should	not,	
however,	 limit	 the	 application	 of	 securitisation	 to	 liberal	 democracies.	 If	 in	 democracies	
securitisation	relieves	decision-makers	of	the	democratic	mechanisms,	in	other	regimes	it	can	
suspend	some	other	constraints	such	as	morality.		
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Although	 the	 CS	 developed	 ‘facilitating	 conditions’	 (felicity	 conditions16 )	 to	 address	 the	
concerns	about	the	context	and	offer	a	more	specific	framework	for	empirical	analysis,	these	
do	 not	 necessarily	 remedy	 the	 alleged	 insensitivity	 and	 limitation	 of	 securitisation	 theory	
outside	of	liberal	democracies.	(Buzan,	Wæver	et	al.	1998:33).	Vuori	introduces	what	he	calls	
the	fourth	felicity	condition	to	overcome	the	democratic	bias	limitation	and	explores	speech-
acts	from	a	linguistic	and	philosophical	point	of	view	to	allow	for	the	travel	of	the	theory	to	
non-democratic	 systems	 without	 conceptual	 stretching.	 He	 highlights	 that	 even	 non-
democratic,	 authoritarian	 regimes	need	 to	 legitimise	 their	 extraordinary	measures	 and	gain	
the	acceptance	of	the	audience.	Thus,	the	fourth	felicity	condition	is	“conditions	related	to	the	
audience	 of	 securitisation”	 (Vuori	 2008).	 This	 means,	 as	 well	 as	 identifying	 the	 specific	
existential	 threat,	 referent	object,	 securitising	actor(s)	and	emergency	measures,	 identifying	
the	audience	will	help	the	empirical	application	of	the	securitisation	theory	in	broader	range	
of	cases.		
	
Overall,	 securitisation	theory	can	benefit	 from	a	stronger	 focus	on	the	role	of	 the	audience.	
Even	with	the	fourth	felicity	condition,	focusing	on	illocutionary	power	of	securitising	speech-
acts	 of	 actors	 with	 social	 capital	 who	 have	 an	 identifiable	 audience	 and	 an	 emergency	
measure	in	mind,	still	assumes	distinctive	categories	of	securitising	actors	and	the	audience,	
implies	a	top-down	relationship,	and	necessitates	emergency	measures	to	deem	a	securitising	
move	successful.	It	assumes	a	linear	starting	and	an	end	point,	where	a	speech-act	given	at	a	
moment	 in	 time	 is	 taken	 as	 the	 arbitrary	 starting	 point	 and	 the	 adoption	 of	 a	 particular	
security	policy/emergency	measure	as	the	end	point	of	the	securitisation	process.	As	a	result,	
it	 fails	to	account	for	the	perlocutionary	affect	the	existential	threat	has	on	the	audience(s),	
daily	 practices,	 interactions	 and	 identity	 narratives,	 or	 sufficiently	 theorise	 negotiated	
accumulated	securitisation	practices	that	become	institutionalised.		
	
																																																								
16	1)	The	grammar	of	security,	meaning	that	the	speech-act	includes	an	existential	threat,	point	of	no	return	and	a	way	
out	 as	 well	 as	 specific	 discourse	 particular	 to	 the	 sector	 such	 as	 identity	 for	 the	 societal	 sector,	 sovereignty	 for	 the	
political	 sector	 and	 sustainability	 for	 the	 environmental	 sector;	 2)	 the	 social	 conditions	 regarding	 the	 position	 of	
authority	for	the	securitising	actor,	meaning	the	capabilities	of	the	speaker	and	their	relationship	to	the	audience;	and	3)	
the	features	of	the	alleged	threats	that	either	facilitate	or	impede	securitisation,	meaning	how	the	threat	is	understood	
within	a	given	context	and	historical	past.	
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Perhaps	the	most	vigorous	critics	fall	under	the	last	category	about	normative	implications	of	
securitisation	theory.	While	for	the	Welsh	School	security	is	a	normative	concept,	that	when	
reconfigured	as	emancipation	frees	people	from	the	physical	and	human	constraints	providing	
true	security,	 for	 the	CS,	securitisation	theory	does	not	“entail	conducting	opinion	polls	and	
asking	 people	what	 they	 think	 security	means,	 nor	 asking	 philosophers	what	would	 be	 the	
most	 logically	 consistent	 definition,	 but	 analysing	 actual	 linguistic	 practices	 to	 see	 what	
regulates	 discourse”	 (Wæver	 2004:8).	 The	 security	 analyst	 is	 only	 concerned	 about	 what	
security	does,	as	opposed	to	what	it	can	or	ought	to	do	(Floyd	2007).	Neither	does	the	analyst	
seek	to	examine	the	intentions	of	the	securitising	actors	or	whether	the	identified	existential	
threats	are	real	or	not.	As	a	securitisation	process	itself	constitutes	a	social	reality,	assessing	
the	‘reality’	of	a	threat	in	any	objective	sense	is	not	possible.	Rather,	the	securitisation	analyst	
is	concerned	about	what	is	articulated,	what	is	being	securitised,	under	what	conditions	and	
with	what	effects.	Although	lacking	a	normative	commitment	in	itself	is	not	a	weakness	since	
the	 theory’s	 objective	 is	 to	 ultimately	 provide	 an	 analytical	 tool,	 the	 CS	 does	 voice	 a	 clear	
preference	for	desecuritisation,	where	issues	are	dealt	with	in	‘normal’	politics	of	deliberation	
rather	than	emergency	politics.		
		
According	to	critics	that	fall	into	the	‘normative’	category,	the	claim	that	securitisation	theory	
should	only	be	 thought	of	 as	 an	analytical	 approach	outside	any	political	 project,	 is	 at	 best	
controversial.	 For	 Aradau,	 shifting	 the	 understanding	 of	 security	 from	 the	 traditional	 state-
centric,	military	definition	to	a	constructivist	broader	concept	amputated	its	critical	edge,	and	
failed	to	engage	with	the	political	 implications	of	the	concept	 (Aradau	2004).	While	Taureck	
supports	 the	 position	 of	 the	 CS	 by	 asserting	 that	 securitisation	 theory	 is	 not	 a	 political	
statement	on	the	part	of	the	analyst,	but	rather	a	theoretical	tool	of	analysis	(Taureck	2006),	
Aradau	 insists	 that,	 “analysis	 is	 not	 extraterritorial	 to	 politics	 but	 is	 directly	 linked	with	 the	
space	of	politics”	(Aradau	2006:83).	This	is	what	Huysmans	called	the	‘normative	dilemma	of	
speaking	and	writing	security’	(Huysmans	1995:69).	The	normative	dilemma	refers	to	the	idea	
that	 the	security	analyst	 in	speaking	and	writing	about	a	particular	securitisation	executes	a	
speech-act	and	in	part	re-constitutes	and	reproduces	that	security	issue.	Although,	if	applied	
to	 the	prescribed	 securitisation	equation,	 it	 is	hard	 to	argue	 that	 the	analyst	 can	become	a	
securitiser;	however,	within	a	broader	perspective	of	speech-acts,	practices	and	actors	where	
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securitisation	 is	 negotiated,	 argumentative	 and	 accumulative,	 the	 normative	 dilemma	
becomes	a	bigger	problem	for	the	CS.		
	
The	second	normatively	defined	debate	about	securitisation	theory	is	about	the	conception	of	
security	as	a	negative	concept	and	normative	preference	 for	desecuritisation	 (Aradau	2004,	
Gad	 and	 Petersen	 2011,	 Roe	 2012).	 The	 CS	 explicitly	 voices	 their	 preference	 for	
desecuritisation	as	the	ideal	and	emphasise	that	“security	should	be	seen	as	a	negative,	as	a	
failure	to	deal	with	 issues	of	normal	politics”	 (Wæver	1995:29).	Since	securitisation	disrupts	
the	 democratic	 processes,	 desecuritisation	whereby	 issues	 are	moved	 out	 of	 “the	 threat—
defence	sequence	and	into	the	ordinary	public	sphere”	(Buzan,	Wæver	et	al.	1998:29)	where	
‘normal’	 politics	 and	 democratic	 norms	 apply	 is	 naturally	 favourable.	 Although	 I	 agree	 that	
securitisation	creates	a	binary	and	exclusionary	 logic,	a	 logic	trapped	 in	realist	 relative	gains	
and	 win-lose	 scenarios	 and	 reproduces	 existential	 insecurities	 that	 can	 incapacitate	
audience(s),	 it	 is	 not	 easy	 to	 condone	 the	 power	 of	 securitisation,	 which	 can	 trigger	
mobilisation	of	resources	to	address	the	issue	in	a	more	responsive	and	urgent	way.	However,	
Bigo	 argues	 that	 the	 securitisation	 of	 societal	 issues	 raises	 the	 issue	 of	 protection	 by	
insecuritising	 the	 audience,	 hence	 creating	 a	 security	 trap	 (Bigo	 1995).	 In	 other	words,	 the	
more	one	tries	to	securitise	an	issue	to	assure	the	‘security’	of	a	referent	object,	the	more	one	
creates	(intentionally	or	unintentionally)	a	feeling	of	insecurity.	As	a	logical	consequence,	the	
politics	 of	 maximal	 security	 are	 also	 politics	 of	 maximal	 fear	 (Collective	 2006).	 In	 short,	
security	is	contested	and	complex;	it	does	different	things	at	different	times	and	in	different	
places	(Browning	and	McDonald	2011).		
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1.3	Wedding	Copenhagen	and	Paris	
	
The	 CS	 distinguishes	 between	 state	 security	 that	 is	 military,	 political,	 economic,	 and	
environmental	 threats	 to	 sovereignty,	 and	 societal	 security,	 which	 relates	 to	 threats	 to	 a	
cultural	identity.	While	state	security	concerns	itself	with	the	organisational	stability	of	states,	
systems	of	government	and	ideologies,	societal	security,	is	about	“the	ability	of	the	society	to	
persist	 in	 its	 essential	 character	 under	 changing	 conditions	 and	 possible	 or	 actual	 threats...	
Societal	 security	 is	 about	 situations	 when	 societies	 perceive	 a	 threat	 in	 identity	 terms”	
(Waever,	 Buzan	 et	 al.	 1993:23).	 However,	 when	 trying	 to	 categorise	 security	 issues	 under	
different	 sectors	 for	 analysis,	 it	 becomes	 very	 apparent	 that	 in	 some	 sense	 all	 security	 is	
political	 as	 all	 threats	 and	 defences	 are	 constructed	 from	 a	 political	 position.	 Since	
politicisation	 is	 political	 by	 definition,	 by	 extension	 securitisation	 is	 also	 an	 act	 of	 politics.	
Though	very	closely	related,	according	to	the	CS’s	securitisation	framework,	societal	security	
and	political	security	are	nonetheless	distinct.		
	
While	the	political	sector	is	ultimately	about	threats	to	state	sovereignty	that	are	non-military	
and	 about	 political	 threats	 concerned	 with	 giving	 or	 denying	 recognition,	 support	 or	
legitimacy	either	internally	or	externally,	societal	security	issues	are	ultimately	about	identity	
and	 culture	 (Buzan,	 Wæver	 et	 al.	 1998).	 This,	 however,	 by	 no	 means	 implies	 that	 sectors	
always	 exist	 as	 discrete	 domains	 of	 insecurity.	 It	 is	 difficult	 to	 draw	 the	 borders	 of	 societal	
security.	 Threats	 to	 a	 cultural	 identity	 may	 be	 manifested	 through	 different	 languages,	
ethnicities,	 and	 religions,	 but	 reaction	 to	 security	 issues	 often	 merge	 gradually	 with	 the	
political	sphere,	making	the	distinction	ambiguous	(Waever,	Buzan	et	al.	1993).	The	CS	warns	
that	societal	security	should	not	be	confused	with	social	 security,	which	 is	about	 individuals	
and	 is	 largely	 economic	 while	 societal	 security	 is	 about	 collectives	 and	 their	 identity.	 For	
example,	 unemployment	 and	 crime,	which	 are	 threats	 in	 society	 but	 affect	 individuals,	 can	
become	societal	security	issues	only	if	they	threaten	the	breakdown	of	society	as	a	whole.		
	
Jeff	 Huysmans	 supports	 the	 sectoral	 analysis	 of	 securitisation	 by	 suggestion	 that	 since	
insecurities	 differ	 depending	 on	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 threat	 and	 the	 referent	 object	 that	 is	
threatened,	 they	 can	 be	 organised	 into	 different	 security	 sectors	 at	 least	 for	 analytical	
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purposes	(Huysmans	2006).	Nevertheless,	the	opening	of	securitisation	to	the	societal	sector	
and	the	referent	object	to	that	of	identity	led	to	a	major	controversy	towards	the	end	of	the	
1990s	 (McSweeney	 1996,	 Buzan	 and	Wæver	 1997,	 McSweeney	 1998,	 Williams	 1998).	 The	
most	serious	criticism	against	the	societal	security	concept	is	about	reification.	The	CS	is	often	
criticised	 for	 treating	 societies	 as	 fixed	 variables	 rather	 than	 as	 entities	 that	 are	 constantly	
reconstructed,	reimagined	and	renegotiated.	McSweeney	accuses	the	CS	of	regarding	‘society’	
and	 ‘identity’	 as	 objective	 realities	 and	 not	 treating	 communities	 from	 a	 deconstructionist	
sociological	 angle	 (McSweeney	 1998).	 McSweeney	 argues	 that	 treating	 identity	 as	 a	 fixed	
entity,	would	be	theoretically	inadequate	as	identity	is	always	fluid	and	contingent,	based	on	
the	discursive	 constructions	of	 ‘imagined	 communities’	 (Anderson	1991,	McSweeney	1998).	
He	stresses	that	identity	is	not	a	fact	of	society	but	a	process	of	negotiation	among	people	and	
interest	 groups	 (McSweeney	 1996:83-85).	 Buzan	 and	 Wæver	 defend	 their	 position	 by	
asserting	that	even	though	they	treat	societies	as	fixed	variables	in	the	societal	security	logic,	
social	constructivism	does	not	imply	that	the	social	world	is	always	unpredictable	and	volatile	
(Buzan	 and	Wæver	 1997).	 They	 affirm	 that	 once	 constructed,	many	 social	 practices,	 beliefs	
and	institutions	become	deeply	embedded	and	change	only	very	slowly.	Theiler	supports	this	
position	by	deepening	our	understanding	with	 social	 identity	 theory	and	by	 reiterating	 that	
the	 “Copenhagen	 school	 uses	 societal	 security	 as	 a	 conceptual	 tool	 to	 try	 to	 account	 for	
specific	events	that	have	occurred	at	specific	points	 in	time	in	specific	contexts…In	 line	with	
this,	it	stands	on	solid	methodological	ground	when	it	treats	the	social	constructs	concerned	
as	de	facto	stable	and	fixed	over	the	limited	periods	relevant	to	the	analysis	of	these	events,	
as	long	as	there	is	no	evidence	to	the	contrary”	(Theiler	2003:254).	
	
Furthermore,	in	response	to	the	criticism	about	reification,	it	 is	important	to	emphasise	that	
the	 processes	 and	 practices	 people	 and	 groups	 employ	 to	 construct	 their	 self-image	 and	
identity	 also	 includes	 securitising	 moves.	 Thus,	 the	 criticism	 that	 the	 concept	 of	 societal	
security	assumes	society	has	a	fixed	identity	misses	the	CS’s	understanding	of	security,	where	
securitising	 moves	 are	 the	 precise	 attempts	 at	 declaring	 a	 monolithic	 form	 of	 identity	 by	
reifying	the	self-image	and	the	image	of	the	‘threat’	(Williams	2003).	As	such,	securitisation	of	
identities	 challenges	 their	 negotiability	 and	 flexibility,	 which	 invokes	 a	 Schmittian	 logic	 of	
friends	 and	 enemies	 based	 on	 a	 politics	 of	 exclusion.	 As	 Williams	 asserts,	 “a	 successful	
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securitisation	of	an	 identity	 involves	precisely	the	capacity	to	decide	on	the	limits	of	a	given	
identity…”(Williams	2003:519).	
	
Even	 though	 I	 agree	 with	 Theiler	 and	 Williams	 to	 a	 certain	 extent,	 I	 maintain	 that	
securitisation	of	such	a	personal,	self-referential	and	multi-layered	concept	such	as	identity	is	
more	inter-subjective	and	negotiated	than	located	in	a	speech-act	at	a	given	moment.	Societal	
security	 as	 a	 sectoral	 analysis	 needs	 a	 more	 social	 level	 analysis	 that	 expands	 our	
understanding	 of	 securitisation	 beyond	 the	 political	 discourse,	 political	 speech-acts	 and	
political	 elites	 to	 include	 performatives	 and	 other	 platforms	 where	 meaning	 of	 security	 is	
created.	Hence,	the	central	problematique	is	the	casting	of	securitisation	merely	in	terms	of	a	
linear	 speech-act-legitimation-emergency	 measure	 sequence.	 Whilst	 alluding	 to	 the	 inter-
subjective	 nature	 of	 security,	 the	 focus	 on	 the	 speech-act	 defines	 security	 less	 as	 a	 site	 of	
negotiation	 and	 more	 as	 one	 of	 articulation	 (McDonald	 2008).	 The	 negotiation	 on	 the	
construction	 of	 a	 security	 issue	 is	 not	 necessarily	 linear	 or	 organised,	 it	 can	 be	 disorderly,	
where	 various	 counter-narratives	 and	 actors	 negotiate	 and	 reproduce	 the	 meaning	 of	 the	
threat	through	various	performatives	and	mediums.	
	
Similarly,	 Stritzel,	 who	 critiques	 the	 under-theorisation	 of	 the	 speaker-audience	 relations,	
argues	 “too	much	weight	 is	 put	 on	 the	 semantic	 side	 of	 the	 speech-act	 articulation	 at	 the	
expense	of	its	social	and	linguistic	relatedness	and	sequentiality”	(Stritzel	2007:358).	Stritzel’s	
embedded	 analysis	 situates	 the	 securitisation	 within	 a	 relationship	 between	 speaker–
audience	 and	 within	 a	 context	 that	 predates	 the	 actual	 securitising	 act.	 His	 proposal	 to	
consider	 the	 performative	 force	 of	 the	 articulated	 threat	 texts	 and	 their	 embeddedness	 in	
existing	discourses	is	particularly	helpful	for	analysing	institutionalised	securitisation	and	can	
be	complimented	by	Balzacq’s	approach	(Stritzel	2007).	Arguing	that	securitisation	processes	
are	constrained	by	history,	memory,	and	discursive	tropes,	and	inline	with	Salter’s	point	that	
“securitising	 moves	 occur	 within	 the	 universe	 of	 the	 audience	 imagination”,	 Balzacq	
underlines	 the	 social	 aspect	of	 securitisation	 focusing	on	 “the	psycho-cultural	disposition	of	
the	audience,	and	the	power	that	both	the	speaker	and	the	listener	bring	to	the	interaction”	
(Balzacq	2005:172,	Salter	2008:330).	
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This	is	exactly	where	the	CS	can	lend	a	helping	hand.	The	CS	concedes	that	securitisation	is	an	
argumentative	 process	 rather	 than	 a	 pure	 speech-act	mechanism;	 a	 discursive	 approach	 to	
securitisation	gives	an	incomplete	picture	because	it	fails	to	account	for	variations	of	intensity	
within	 the	process	of	 securitisation,	 thus	 looking	at	 the	 functions	and	 implications	of	policy	
instruments	 are,	 at	 least,	 equally	 important	 (Bigo	 2002,	 Balzacq	 2008).	 Arguing	 that	 the	
securitsation	process	is	more	about	routinised	practices	of	professionals	of	security	than	it	is	
about	speech-acts,	 the	CS	can	provide	 insights	 into	how	the	audience	can	participate	 in	 the	
securitisation	 process	 (Bigo	 2002).	 For	 example,	 Balzacq	 looks	 at	 political	 tools	 and	
instruments	 that	 unpack	 securitisation	 dynamics	 and	 allow	 us	 to	 explore	 the	 way	
securitisation	evolves	both	 in	 scope	and	 scale.	 For	him,	not	only	 securitisation	can	occur	or	
evolve	without	the	assent	of	an	identifiable	audience	and	securitisation	practices	(tools)	can	
pre-date	 a	 speech-act,	 but	 also	 a	 securitising	 move	 successful	 in	 obtaining	 the	 audience’s	
support	 results	 in	 some	 sort	 of	 cognitive	 and	 behavioural	 change	 among	 the	 audience	
(Balzacq	2005,	Balzacq	2008).	Theiler	supports	this	position	by	asserting	that	the	intensity	of	a	
given	 inter-group	 conflict	 does	 not	 only	 depend	 on	 factors	 such	 as	 the	 strength	 of	 initial	
securitising	moves,	the	discursive	power	of	the	‘securitisers’	or	their	capacity,	“Instead,	once	
the	dialectic	between	group	defence	and	group	affirmation	has	 taken	hold,	 it	 can	acquire	a	
dynamic	 of	 its	 own	 and	 escape	 the	 control	 of	 the	 ‘securitisers’	 who	 initially	 unleashed	 it”	
(Theiler	 2003:265).	 Thus,	 once	 the	 ‘cognitive	 and	 behavioural	 change’	 occurs,	 the	 audience	
believing	 in	 that	 they	 need	 to	 defend	 themselves,	will	 reproduce	 the	 perceived	 threat	 and	
demand	 emergency	measures	 to	 address	 the	 perceived	 existential	 threat.	 As	 a	 result,	 it	 is	
irrelevant	whether	we	complete	all	the	securitisation	steps	(i.e.	step	2,	emergency	action	and	
step	 3,	 effects	 on	 inter-unit	 relations	 by	 breaking	 free	 of	 rules)	 because	once	 the	 audience	
accepts	that	there	is	an	existential	threat,	threatening	their	very	survival,	desecuritisation	will	
still	be	necessary	to	address	the	perceived	existential	insecurities	and	feelings	of	fear.		
	
Drawing	 on	 Bourdieu,	 the	 CS	 circumscribes	 the	 problem	 raised	 by	 the	 CS,	 whereby	 the	
emergence	of	speech-acts	was	underspecified	and	their	effects	too	broad,	in	comparison	with	
other	 practices	 of	 power.	 For	 the	 CS,	 to	 study	 securitisation	 is	 to	 focus	 on	 the	 creation	 of	
networks	 of	 professionals	 of	 (in)security,	 the	 systems	 of	 meaning	 they	 generate	 and	 the	
productive	 power	 of	 their	 practices;	 it	 is	 to	 explore	 the	 relations	 among	 security	 agencies,	
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their	 status,	 roles,	 activities	 and	 institutional	 settings	 (Bigo	 2000,	 Bigo	 2006).	 According	 to	
Bigo,	those	who	speak	security	must	have	the	capacity	to	produce	a	discourse	on	the	image	of	
the	 enemy	 and	 be	 able	 to	 impose	 their	 own	 interpretation	 of	 the	 threat;	 their	 success	
depends	 on	 the	 positions	 and	 the	 symbolic	 capital	 they	 hold,	 as	well	 as	 on	 the	 capacity	 to	
produce	a	discourse	which	supports	and	reinforces	a	particular	reading	of	reality	(Bigo	2002,	
Aradau	2004).	This	 is	not	very	different	than	Austin’s	 felicity	conditions	proposed	by	the	CS.	
The	difference	is	rather	on	the	emphasis	the	CS	puts	on	the	‘speech-act’,	than	the	facilitating	
conditions,	 whereas	 the	 CS	 emphasises	 practices,	 audiences	 and	 contexts	 that	 enable	 and	
constrain	the	production	of	specific	forms	of	governmentality;	and	locates	securitisation	at	an	
institutional	 level	 rather	 than	 in	 political	 agency	 (See	 Bigo	 2000,	 Balzacq	 2005).	 The	 CS	
suggests	a	different	understanding	of	securitisation	where,	instead	of	analysing	security	as	an	
essential	 concept,	 it	 treats	 security	 as	 a	 ‘technique	 of	 government’	 (Bigo	 2000,	 Collective	
2006,	 Huysmans	 2006).	 As	 such,	 even	 though	 the	 focus	 is	 broader	 than	 the	 speech-act,	
securitisation	 is	 still	 conceived	 as	 a	 top-down	 process,	 and	 the	 performative	 side	 of	 the	
securitisation	process	is	located	within	governmental	institutions.	
	
In	 conflict	 environments,	 the	 actors	 reproduce	 their	 historic	 narratives	 and	 maintain	 their	
protracted	 fears,	 which	 become	 engrained	 into	 their	 identity	 narratives,	 routines	 and	
language.	 Actions,	 images,	 experiences	 and	 interactions	 become	 the	 primary	 ways	 ‘the	
securitisation’	 survives	 rather	 than	 speech-acts.	 However,	 the	 CS’s	 emphasis	 over	 the	
performative-ness	 of	 securitisation	 is	 found	 in	 the	 ‘managers	 of	 unease’	 (security	
professionals),	who	compete	over	budgets	and	missions	and	transformation	of	 technologies	
(data	banks,	surveillance	etc.)	 (Bigo	2002,	Bigo	2006).	For	example,	Bigo	 is	 interested	 in	 the	
ways	 the	 security	 professionals	 and	 their	 habitus	 are	 “correlated	 with	 the	 globalisation	 of	
technologies	of	surveillance	and	control	going	beyond	the	national	borders”	 (Bigo	2002:65).	
This	 particular	 focus	 on	 governmentality	 and	 technologies	 of	 security	 does	 not	 effectively	
apply	 to	 the	 case	 of	 Cyprus	 and	 securitisation	 of	 people	 from	 Turkey	 by	 Turkish-Cypriots,	
because	 the	 relationship	between	 the	 ‘TRNC’	 and	 the	Republic	of	 Turkey	 is	 a	paternal	one,	
where	Turkey	is	the	mother	and	the	‘TRNC’	is	the	babyland.	Its	governmentality	and	security	
professionals	are	dependent	on	the	motherland,	where	sovereignty	over	‘national’	borders	or	
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even	 the	 concept	 of	 the	 ‘national’	 (the	 distinction	 between	 Turkish-Cypriotness	 and	
Turkishness)	is	contested.		
	
Securitisation	of	Turkishness	and	Turkish	immigrants	in	north	Cyprus	is	multi-directional,	and	
not	endorsed	by	the	political	elite	or	the	government.	The	‘TRNC’	 is	politically,	economically	
and	militarily	dependent	upon	Turkey,	is	legally	considered	as	the	subordinate	administration	
of	Turkey	and	is	not	recognised	by	any	other	state	than	Turkey	(See	UNSC	2001).	In	fact,	the	
national	anthem	or	the	currency	of	the	‘TRNC’	is	that	of	the	Republic	of	Turkey.	Fiscal	policies,	
banks,	 GSM	 operators	 are	 almost	 exclusively	 headquartered	 in	 Turkey,	 and	 the	 official	
discourse	 (with	 the	 exception	 of	 historically	 marginalised	 small	 left-wing	 parties)	 depicts	
Turkey	as	the	‘motherland’,	and	emphasises	historical	heritage,	brotherhood	and	lineage	with	
Turkey	(See	'TRNC'	Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs	2011).	While	the	mainstream	identity	narratives	
and	history	books	treat	Turkish-Cypriots	as	Turks	who	were	born	in	Cyprus,	major	institutions	
that	 embody	 the	 security	 professionals	 (i.e.	 police	 and	 military)	 are	 constitutionally	
established	under	 the	Turkish	Armed	Forces.	Thus,	Bigo’s	understanding	of	 securitisation	as	
“…structured	by	the	habitus	of	the	security	professionals”	(Bigo	2002:65)	cannot	explain	the	
institutionalised	securitisation	of	Turkish	immigrants	and	Turkishness	as	an	existential	threat	
to	Turkish-Cypriots’,	as	the	‘habitus’	draws	its	legitimacy	and	conviction	from	bottom-up	and	
individual	perceptions	of	threat	and	identity,	rather	than	a	reinterpretation	of	a	professional’s	
own	‘mandate’.		
	
Bigo’s	 underlying	 argument	 is	 that	 “securitisation	 of	 migration	 is	 a	 transversal	 political	
technology,	 used	 as	 a	 mode	 of	 governmentality	 by	 diverse	 institutions	 to	 play	 with	 the	
unease,	…	so	as	to	affirm	their	role	as	providers	of	protection	and	security	and	to	mask	some	
of	 their	 failures”	 (Bigo	2002:65).	However	 in	 north	Cyprus,	 as	 the	 empirical	 analysis	 shows,	
securitisation	 is	 not	 travelling	 from	 the	 institution	 or	 the	 institutional	 mandate	 to	 the	
professional,	but	rather	from	the	individual	to	the	institution;	it	is	not	the	institutions	interest	
and	 mandate	 being	 interpreted	 by	 the	 security	 professionals	 and	 hence	 shaping	 their	
routines,	but	it	is	the	individuals	convictions	and	perceptions	about	the	threat	that	is	shaping	
the	daily	routines	(whether	professional	or	personal).	The	CS’s	emphasis	on	migration	though	
closely	related	to	the	case,	lacks	the	tools	and	the	nuances	to	explore	why	people	from	Turkey	
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and	by	extension	Turkishness	are	perceived	as	more	of	a	threat	to	the	Turkish-Cypriot	identity	
compared	 to	 other	 migrants.	 Turkish-Cypriots,	 despite	 their	 shared	 ancestry,	 ethnicity,	
religion	and	language,	securitise	people	from	Turkey	as	an	existential	threat	to	their	distinct	
self-identity,	 which	 can	 neither	 be	 solely	 explained	 by	 analysing	 security	 professionals	 and	
transversal	technologies,	nor	by	security	speech-acts	that	fit	the	prescribed	felicity	conditions.		
	
Many	 scholars	 would	 agree	 that	 Copenhagen’s	 articulation	 of	 securitisation	 resembles	
Schmitt’s	 focus	 on	 the	 sovereign	 exceptionalism	 (see	 Bigo	 2002,	 Williams	 2003,	 Collective	
2006,	 Hansen	 2011).	 Although,	 it	 is	 not	 subsumed	 by	 traditional	 state	 security,	 the	
illocutionary	 logic	 and	 the	 decisive	 power	 of	 the	 sovereign	 does	 imply	 a	 top-down	
understanding	of	the	process	(Doty	2007).	Wæver	suggests	“security	is	articulated	only	from	a	
specific	place,	 in	an	institutional	voice,	by	elites”	(Wæver	1995).	However,	securitisation	can	
happen	at	another	level,	a	more	social	level	where	the	primary	directionality	is	not	top-down,	
where	 the	 focus	 is	 not	 on	 securitising	 actors	 with	 social	 capital,	 speech-acts	 and	 security	
policies.	 This	 is	 somewhat	 different	 than	 the	 sectoral	 analysis	 of	 societal	 securitisation	
provided	 by	 the	 CS	 and	 different	 than	 the	 CS’s	 emphasis	 on	 performative-ness	 of	
securitisation	located	in	the	mandates	and	technologies	of	security	professionals;	in	addition	
to	 discourse	 and	 governmentality,	 it	 is	 also	 about	 the	 way	 securitisation	 is	 lived	 and	
performed	socially,	and	the	way	it	shapes	identity	narratives.	
	
‘The	 exception’	 in	 a	 Schmittian	 sense	 is	 a	 situation	 of	 radical	 danger	 and	 contingency	 for	
which	no	prior	law,	procedure	or	anticipated	response	is	adequate	(Collective	2006).	It	brings	
about	a	fundamental	existential	need	for	unlimited,	unconstrained	and	exceptional	measures.	
However,	 institutionalised	securitisation	processes	can	escape	the	Schmittian	understanding	
of	exceptionalism	created	by	a	monolithic	sovereign	authority.	When	the	general	acceptance	
and	fear	around	an	identifiable	threat	is	widespread,	the	enemy	is	‘known’,	and	the	danger	is	
objectified,	 securitisation	 can	 become	 ‘viral’,	 and	move	 bottom-up	 from	 the	masses.	 Once	
widely	accepted	and	taken	for	granted	by	the	audience,	the	perception	of	a	threat	can	move	
freely,	not	only	bottom-up	 (from	the	audience	to	 the	elites)	but	also	horizontally	 (from	one	
audience	 to	 another),	 penetrating	 into	public	discourse,	 civil	 society,	 and	business	 relations	
(Adamides	2012).	This	shapes	and	shifts	the	public	opinion	around	the	existential	threat.		
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As	 a	 result,	 the	 threat	 becomes	 performative	 and	 embedded	 into	 collective	 identity	
narratives.	 In	such	situations,	we	do	not	need	to	track	down	a	specific	speech-act	given	at	a	
particular	moment	by	a	particular	securitising	actor	with	‘enough’	social	capital,	neither	do	we	
need	 security	 policies	 to	 call	 it	 a	 case	 of	 successful	 securitisation.	 The	 audience,	 genuinely	
scared	for	their	existence,	can	become	the	securitiser,	demanding	emergency	measures	and	
policies	 and	 changing	 the	 directionality	 of	 the	 securitisation	 process.	 Now	 institutionalised	
and	 performative,	 the	 threat	 is	 ‘visible’	 and	 reproduced	 in	 daily	 routines	 and	 interactions,	
adding	a	different	layer	of	meaning.	For	example,	seeing	someone	paying	with	food	vouchers,	
seeing	a	woman	with	a	headscarf	at	the	supermarket,	at	work,	or	in	traffic,	or	hearing	about	
an	incident	in	a	particular	neighbourhood,	is	all	read	through	the	lens	of	a	securitised	public	
opinion	with	added	meaning,	validating	the	existence	of	the	threat,	 the	feeling	of	 insecurity	
and	the	self/other	relationship	based	on	enmity.	
	
The	case	of	Turkish-Cypriots,	suggest	that	it	is	possible	to	have	a	case	of	securitisation	without	
a	‘sovereign’	or	an	elite	discourse.	As	a	result,	the	audience	can	exert	bottom-up	pressures	for	
emergency	 measures	 to	 mobilise	 a	 response	 or	 resources	 against	 the	 threat	 (i.e.	
demonstrations,	press	releases	and	petitions)	to	influence	those	that	are	traditionally	seen	as	
the	securitising	actors	and	professionals.	This	is	not	to	suggest	that	it	is	not	possible	to	go	back	
in	 history	 to	 a	 point	 where	 we	 can	 trace	 elite	 security	 speech-acts	 to	 the	 institutionalised	
securitisation	 processes.	 Rather,	 the	 argument	 here	 is	 that	 once	 institutionalised	 and	
engrained,	the	directionality	of	the	securitisation	process	as	well	as	the	role	of	the	audience	
changes	 considerably.	 Leaving	 securitisation	 of	 an	 issue	 open	 “to	 varied	 and	 dispersed	
locales”	 does	 not	 mean	 that	 elites	 or	 security	 professionals	 are	 not	 ‘participants’	 in	 the	
securitisation	 process;	 but	 rather	 that	 they	 are	 not	 always	 the	 only	 or	 the	most	 significant	
actors	(Doty	1998:73).		
	
Roxanne	 Doty,	 who	 examines	 immigration	 as	 a	 security	 threat	 that	 has	multiple	modes	 of	
securitisation,	argues	that	there	can	be	more	than	one	understanding	of	security	that	may	be	
operative	in	any	particular	case,	and	that	there	is	no	single	logic	to	security	(Doty	1998).	Doty	
does	not	necessarily	disagree	with	 the	CS	or	 the	CS;	 she	rather	argues	 that	securitisation	 in	
the	societal	sector	does	not	only	emerge	from	successful	speech-acts	of	political	 leaders,	or	
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from	 a	 range	 of	 administrative	 practices	 and	 technologies	 of	 security.	 Her	 point	 is	 that	
securitisation	 is	 not	 limited	 to	 these	 emergence	points	 alone,	 neither	 are	 these	 emergence	
points	 the	most	significant	ones	 in	all	 cases	 (Doty	2007).	Looking	at	 the	Mexico-USA	border	
and	 the	 civilian	 border	 patrols,	 Doty	 asks	 a	 question	 that	 is	 highly	 relevant	 to	 the	 case	 of	
Cyprus	as	well:	“…what	happens	when	 it	 [threat]	 is	perceived	by	a	significant	portion	of	the	
populace	that	the	sovereign17	does	not	 in	fact	recognise	the	enemy,	thus…	refusing	to	make	
the	necessary	decisions?”	 (Doty	2007:116).	Hence,	 she	questions	 the	 locus	of	 the	 ‘decision’	
and	by	extension	the	locus	of	the	‘sovereign’.		
	
Influenced	by	Schmitt,	 securitisation	 theory	mostly	conceives	 the	securitising	actor	 (i.e.	 ‘the	
sovereign’)	 and	 speech-act	 (i.e.	 the	 ‘decision’	 on	 the	 exception),	 as	 something	 that	 comes	
from	 a	 unified	 entity	 and	 moves	 top-down	 (Doty	 2007).	 Doty	 expands	 the	 concept	 of	 the	
‘sovereign	 who	 decides’	 and	 takes	 the	 ‘decision’	 beyond	 an	 official	 governmental	
understanding.	 In	 this	 analysis,	 the	 decision(s)	 on	 the	 exception	 can	 predate	 the	 security	
policies	 and	 the	 sovereign	 can	 be	 found	 in	 social	 forces.	 By	 examining	 the	 anti-immigrant	
movement	 and	 self-organised	 border	 vigilante	 groups,	 she	 illustrates	 how	 securitisation	
practices	 can	 originate	 from	actors	who	 are	 not	 necessarily	 ‘power	 holders’	 or	 strategically	
positioned	political	or	institutional	agents	(Doty	2007).	This	supports	my	argument	about	the	
multi-directional	nature	of	 institutionalised	securitisations,	where	securitisation	can	become	
dispersed	 and	 amorphous,	 neither	 controlled	 nor	 initiated	 by	 the	 elites,	 and	 the	 state	 of	
exception	can	simultaneously	prompt	multiple	‘smaller’	or	‘unofficial’	decisions,	be	it	vigilante	
groups,	demonstrations,	boycotts	or	personal	discriminatory	interactions	shaped	and	justified	
by	‘the	exception’.		
	
Leaving	 the	directionality	and	 the	emergence	of	a	 securitisation	practice	open	gives	a	more	
significant	role	to	the	audience	than	actually	theorised	by	the	CS.	In	parallel	with	the	CS,	it	also	
allows	us	to	see	securitisation	as	an	argumentative	process	of	negotiating	existential	threats	
between	 and	 among	 securitising	 actors	 and	 audiences.	 More	 importantly,	 it	 goes	 a	 step	
further	than	the	CS,	allowing	us	to	study	performatives	beyond	the	security	professionals	as																																																									
17	In	this	case	the	sovereign	refers	to	the	Schmittian	understanding	and	refers	to	the	logic	behind	the	securitising	actors,	
meaning	in	their	decision	in	creating	discourse	that	decides	who	the	enemy	and	where	the	existential	danger	is.	
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well.	As	such,	securitisation	becomes	better	equipped	to	theorise	institutionalised	processes.	
Institutionalised	securitisations	open	and	expand	the	securitising	move	to	different	actors	and	
underscore	 the	 role	 of	 the	 audience(s),	where	 different	 actors	may	 assume	 the	 role	 of	 the	
audience	 as	 well	 as	 the	 securitising	 actor	 simultaneously.	 Furthermore,	 institutionalised	
securitisation	 processes,	 where	 perceived	 threats	 are	 internalised	 and	 reproduced	
independently	by	the	audience,	who	can	simultaneously	become	the	securitiser,	would	have	
significant	 implications	 for	 possible	 desecuritisation	 practices	 as	 well	 as	 their	 potential	
effectiveness.			
	
According	to	the	CS	‘securitisation	can	be	either	ad	hoc	or	institutionalised’,	stating	that	when	
a	 given	 threat	 is	 persistent	 or	 recurrent	 the	 response	 and	 sense	 of	 urgency	 become	
institutionalised	 (Buzan,	 Wæver	 et	 al.	 1998:211).	 In	 parallel,	 Vuori	 notes	 how	 the	
identification	 of	 threats	 can	become	 institutionalised	 through	 the	 use	 of	 ‘master	 signifiers’,	
which	“decrease	the	need	for	elaborate	arguments	about	the	‘securityness’	of	specific	cases”.	
Certain	 words	 like	 ‘terrorism’,	 ‘automatically	 bring	 the	 logic	 of	 danger	 ...	 whereby	 the	
necessity	to	combat	them	does	not	have	to	be	argued	every	time’	(Vuori	2010:259).	Turkish-
Cypriots	use	 the	word	 ‘Anatolisation’	 to	 imply	 that	north	Cyprus	 is	being	 colonised	and	 the	
demography	 is	 being	 changed	 by	 Turkey.	 They	 use	 the	 words	 ‘fica’	 (seaweed),	 ‘karasakal’	
(black-beard)	or	‘gaco’	and	‘fellah’	(peasant/gypsy)	to	attach	parasitic,	criminal	and	backward	
connotations	 to	 Turkish	 immigrants.	 As	 such,	 we	 can	 see	 that	 the	 context	 plays	 a	 very	
significant	 role	 in	 institutionalised	 securitisations.	 For	 the	 audience	 to	 internalise	 the	
perceived	threat	on	a	collective	level,	engrain	it	into	its	routines	and	identity,	there	need	to	be	
collective	experiences	that	are	‘sticky’.	These	collective	experiences,	such	as	the	social	trauma	
caused	by	the	9/11	terrorist	attacks,	create	a	reference	point	for	the	securitisation	to	 ‘stick’	
and	 become	 institutionalised.	 Considering	 that	 protracted	 conflicts	 nurture	 internalised	
perceptions	 of	 ‘enemy	 others’	 and	 ‘us	 vs.	 them’	 dichotomies,	 they	 provide	 an	 auspicious	
ground	for	securitisations	to	‘stick’	and	to	become	institutionalised.		
	
However,	 in	 line	 with	 Doty’s	 argument,	 ‘institutionalised’	 securitisation	 processes	 have	
multiple	loci.	Without	a	particular	focus	on	the	audience	and	performatives,	hunting	down	an	
arbitrary	speech-act	as	the	discourse	 ‘unleashing’	securitisation	process	does	not	provide	us	
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with	added-value.	 Institutionalised	securitisations	do	not	simply	happen	 following	a	speech-
act	 and	 a	 brief	 inter-subjective	 process,	 nor	 do	 securitisation	 practices	 simply	 become	
institutionalised	 after	 the	 securitising	 speech-act	 is	 merely	 repeated	 ‘enough’	 times.	 Even	
though	 it	 is	 hard	 to	 ‘measure’	 institutionalised	 securitisations	 without	 using	 combined	
qualitative	 and	quantitative	methods,	where	opinion	polls	 are	 corroborated	with	data	 from	
interviews	 and	 focus	 groups,	 or	 even	 observational	 work	 to	 show	 the	 degree	 of	
internalisation,	 considering	 how	 internalised	 and	 engrained	 the	 perception	 of	 security	 is,	
especially	in	conflict	environments,	they	are	not	hard	to	‘find’.		
	
The	 exclusionary	 logic	 of	 securitisation	 becomes	 even	 more	 apparent	 when	 we	 analyse	
societal	security	where	the	enemy-other	becomes	another	society	or	an	ethnic	group,	and	the	
security	of	one	more	often	than	not	means	 insecurity	of	 the	other.	We	cannot	speak	about	
societal	 security	 without	 identifying	 the	 source	 of	 the	 threat,	 ‘the	 other’.	 In	 other	 words,	
societal	“securitisation	is	rooted	in	the	identity	politics	of	Self	and	Other”	(Buzan	and	Waever	
2009:261).	Thus,	‘societal’	survival,	or	rather	the	survival	of	collective	identities	may	be	sought	
in	expense	of	others,	when	others	are	presented	as	existential	threats	to	a	society’s	identity.	
As	such,	securitisation	in	the	societal	sector	makes	the	kind	of	politics	that	defines	the	self	on	
the	 basis	 of	 hostility,	which	 necessitates	 the	 process	 of	 identifying	 and	 excluding/defeating	
the	threatening	other	(Huysmans	1998).	There	is	a	common	tendency	in	IR	to	lock	self/other	
relationships,	which	are	ultimately	based	on	difference,	into	a	win-lose	logic	and	understand	
them	from	a	mode	of	aversion	and	exclusion	(Browning	and	Joenniemi	2013).		
	
It	can	be	argued	that	institutionalised	securitisation	of	the	Turkish	immigrants	in	Cyprus	goes	
beyond	 the	 persistence	 of	 threats,	 evolving	 into	 something	 socially	 diachronic	 and	 holistic	
(from	the	masses),	despite	the	mainstream	political	discourse.	Institutionalised	securitisation	
of	 the	 Turkish	 immigrants	 by	 Turkish-Cypriots	 shows	 itself	 in	 widespread	 hate	 speech,	
nongovernmental	 actions	 such	 as	 Toplumsal	 Varolus	 Platformu	 (Communal	 Existence	
Platform),	polarisation	and	‘othering’	of	the	Turkish	immigrants	by	the	media	and	the	like.	In	
the	minds	of	the	many,	the	performatives	of	securitisation	are	politically	and	socially	justified	
as	 ‘resistance’	 or	 ‘self-defence’,	 because	 the	 political	 elite	 being	 dependent	 on	 Turkey	 in	
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myriad	ways	is	 ineffective	or	unwilling	to	address	the	existential	threat	and	protect	the	very	
survival	of	Turkish-Cypriots.	
	
Adamides	and	Balzacq	explain	that	securitising	practices	and	choices	are	influenced	by	specific	
set	of	dispositions	unique	to	the	social	context,	which	means	that	identity,	political	positions	
and	 social	 norms	 of	 both	 the	 actors	 and	 the	 audiences	 have	 a	 deciding	 role	 on	 how	 the	
process	 develops	 (Balzacq	 2005,	 Adamides	 2012).	 This	 is	 what	 Balzacq	 calls	 the	 audience’s	
‘psycho-cultural	 disposition’	 (2005:172).	 In	 conflict	 environments,	 the	 psycho-cultural	
dispositions	can	usually	be	traced	back	to	a	reference	point	 (i.e.	a	collective	trauma).	 In	the	
case	 of	 Cyprus,	 this	 reference	 point	 for	 Greek-Cypriots	 is	 the	 events	 of	 1974,	which	was	 a	
collective	 trauma	 reproducing	 Turkey	 and	 people	 from	 Turkey	 as	 the	 ‘enemy	 other’.	 For	
Turkish-Cypriots,	 it	 is	 harder	 to	 point	 to	 a	 single	 pivotal	 event	 that	 securitised	 Turkey,	 the	
motherland	who	saved	them	from	their	‘enemy	other’.	Institutionalisation	and	internalisation	
of	 the	 threat	 for	 Turkish-Cypriots	 occurred	 over	 time	 accumulating	 gradually	 with	 their	
frustration	over	non-recognition	both	politically	and	in	terms	of	identity	(not	being	recognised	
as	having	a	distinct	 identity	but	as	a	continuation	of	Turkey,	as	Turks	who	happen	to	 live	 in	
Cyprus)	 and	 their	 isolation,	 which	 is	 caused,	 at	 least	 partly,	 by	 Turkey.	 Thus,	 rather	 than	
tracing	 it	 back	 to	 a	 single	 event,	 it	 is	 also	 possible	 to	 go	 back	 in	 history	 to	 analyse	 the	
contributing	collective	and	personal	experiences	of	the	audience.	While	1974	was	a	collective	
trauma	for	all	Greek-Cypriots	and	securitisation	faced	no	resistance	and	opposition	from	the	
public	 or	 the	 elite	 (Adamides	 2012),	 Turkish-Cypriots’	 securitisation	was	 incremental	 as	 not	
only	was	there	no	single	event	affecting	 ‘everybody’	but	 there	was	also	resistance	 from	the	
political	elite.	Thus,	while	the	institutionalisation	of	the	threat	is	more	event-based	for	Greek-
Cypriots,	it	is	accumulated	for	Turkish-Cypriots.		
	
Even	though	the	CS	notes	that	the	persistence	or	recurrence	of	specific	threats	could	lead	to	
institutionalisation	 of	 the	 sense	 of	 urgency	 (Buzan,	 Wæver	 et	 al.	 1998:27),	 which	 in	 turn	
reduces	 the	 need	 for	 questions	 concerning	 legitimacy,	 the	 process	 of	 institutionalised	
securitisations,	 its	effects	on	actors	and	audiences	and	what	 it	means	 for	desecuritisation	 is	
left	unexplored.	More	attention	has	been	given	to	what	Scott	Watson	calls	‘episodic	forms	of	
securitisation’	 than	 institutionalised	 forms	 mainly	 due	 to	 a	 general	 commitment	 to	 the	
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speech-act	 and	 the	 importance	 of	 discursive	 practices	 (Watson	 2009).	 According	 to	 the	
mainstream	 securitisation	 theory,	 securitisation	 follows	 a	 top-down	 elite	 driven	 process,	
facilitated	by	three	felicity	conditions	that	try	to	incorporate	the	social	context	into	the	theory	
(Buzan,	Wæver	et	al.	1998:33,	Vuori	2008).	However,	while	the	third	felicity	condition	plays	an	
important	 role	 in	 institutionalisation	of	 security	 threats,	 the	 first	 and	 the	 second	conditions	
exclusively	indicate	to	an	elite	driven	top-down	approach	and	are	not	very	helpful,	specifically	
because	 institutionalised	 securitisations	 no	 longer	 necessitate	 the	 security	 speech-act	 to	
justify	 their	 status.	 Thus,	 the	 CS’s	 focus	 that	 is	 almost	 exclusively	 on	 discourse	 created	 by	
power	 holders	 can	be	 expanded	 to	 include	 the	 performative	 side	 of	 securitisation	with	 the	
help	of	 the	CS,	and	 the	 role	of	 institutionalised	 securitisations	on	 identity	narratives	 can	be	
unpacked	 with	 the	 ontological	 security	 literature,	 to	 help	 us	 escape	 the	 conflation	 of	
difference	with	threatening.		 	
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1.4	Conclusion	
	
From	 a	 larger	 system	or	 international	 level	 perspective,	 the	 CS	 provides	 a	more	 prescribed	
toolkit	and	a	broader	 look	at	security	 from	a	sectoral	analysis	 to	gain	more	 insight	 to	wider	
“European	 security	 problematic	 in	 flux”	 (Huysmans	 1998:480).	On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 CS’s	
general	 interest	 lies	within	the	European	migration	problematique,	with	a	particular	 interest	
in	 insecuritisation,	 policing	 as	 a	 structuring	 practice	 and	 the	 politicisation	 of	 societal	
insecurities	(such	as	hooligans,	migration	and	border	controls),	 from	a	more	unitary	 internal	
security	 perspective	 (Guild	 and	 Bigo	 2005).	 Both	 Schools	 however,	 have	 a	 constructed	 and	
negative	 view	 of	 (in)securitisation,	 where	 they	 voice	 preference	 for	 the	 normative	 twin	 of	
desecuritisation	(Buzan,	Wæver	et	al.	1998,	Bigo	2002).	
	
Overall,	 this	 chapter	 provided	 a	 literature	 review	 of	 the	 Copehangen	 and	 Paris	 schools	 of	
security	and	argued	that	we	need	to	further	contextualise	our	understanding	of	securitisation	
processes	 and	 expand	 our	 analysis	 to	 include	 multiple	 actors	 (civil	 society,	 media,	 elites),	
multiple	 layers	 (discourse,	 performances,	 routines)	 and	 multiple	 locus	 and	 directionalities	
(bottom-up	 and	horizontal).	 The	 chapter	 also	 amalgamated	both	 schools	 to	 better	 theorise	
institutionalised	 securitisation	 processes,	 which	 lack	 a	 linear	 logic	 and	 can	 be	 cyclical,	
dispersed	 and	 amorphous.	 Usually,	 linked	 to	 a	 collective	 societal	 trauma,	 which	 creates	 a	
‘sticky’	 environment	 for	 spreading	 fears,	 the	 threat	 becomes	 internalised	 with	 limited	
scrutiny.	 The	 multi-faceted	 and	 multi-directional	 nature	 of	 institutionalised	 securitisations	
that	reach	beyond	political	discourse	and	that	are	taken	for	granted	can	shape	and	reshape	
the	attitudes	and	reconfigure	identity	narratives	based	on	enemy	others.		
	
If	 we	 see	 securitisation	 as	 an	 argumentative	 negotiation,	 that	 can	 happen	 through	
accumulation	of	small	securitising	speech-acts	and	performatives,	and	acknowledge	that	the	
distinction	 between	 securitisers	 and	 the	 audience	 can	 be	 fuzzy,	 then	 it	 is	 not	 only	 the	
institutional	 knowledge	 or	 the	 technological	 means	 to	 deal	 with	 them	 that	 makes	
securitisation	 ‘impermeable’	 (see	 Aradau	 2004);	 the	 audience	 simultaneously	 being	 the	
securitiser,	 without	 ‘institutional	 knowledge’,	 or	 despite	 the	 institutional	 knowledge,	 can	
reproduce	the	perceived	threat	creating	an	unquestioned	reality	and	a	bottom-up	demand	for	
	 62	
emergency	measures.	As	a	 result,	 (de)securitisation	becomes	closely	 linked	with	ontological	
security	 and	 (re)configuration	 of	 self	 and	 other	 relationships.	 To	 better	 understand	
institutionalised	 securitisations,	 we	 need	 to	 focus	 both	 on	 the	 discourse	 around	 security	
(however	 small	 or	 big)	 and	 on	 how	 the	 language	 of	 security	 translates	 into	 day-to-day	
practices	and	routines,	which	reconfigure	identities	and	also	shape	the	experiences	with	the	
enemy	other	on	a	daily	basis.		
	
Securitisation	in	the	societal	sector	defines	the	other	as	a	threat	to	one’s	identity	and	reifies	
the	 identity	 of	 the	 self,	 leaving	 little	 or	 no	 room	 for	 the	 reconfiguration	 of	 the	 self/other	
relationship	and	thus	making	desecuritisation	very	difficult.	Securitising	an	 identity	against	a	
threat	 entails	 (re)drawing	 of	 those	 identity	 boundaries	 that	 may	 or	 may	 not	 have	 existed	
before	the	process	of	securitisation.	Thus,	the	room	left	for	desecuritisation	to	reconfigure	the	
self/other	 relationship	 within	 this	 understanding	 of	 identity	 that	 conflates	 difference	 with	
threat,	 is	 very	 small.	 A	 broader	 and	more	 critical	 approach	 to	 securitisation	 processes	 can	
provide	 the	basis	 to	 contribute	 to	 the	peace	 research	 literature	and	 the	case	of	Cyprus	can	
provide	the	empirical	foundations	to	understand	under-theorised	concepts	of	institutionalised	
securitisation	 and	 desecuritisation.	 Sharing	 both	 School’s	 preference	 for	 desecuritisation,	 I	
add	the	ontological	security	literature	to	the	mixture	in	the	next	chapter,	in	order	to	establish	
a	theoretical	framework	that	can	better	explain	institutionalised	securitisation	processes	and	
better	 understand	 how	 identities	 that	 are	 securitised	 as	 existential	 threats	 become	 part	 of	
social	 reality	 and	 play	 into	 identity	 narratives	 of	 Cypriots,	 and	 into	 reconciliation	 and	
peacebuilding	efforts.		
	
For	this	thesis,	empirical	contributions,	normative	commitments	to	transformative	peace	and	
informing	 policy-making	 and	 peacebuilding	 efforts	 in	 Cyprus	 are	 as	 important	 as	 the	
theoretical	 contributions	 to	 securitisation	 and	 ontological	 security	 literatures.	 Thus,	 even	
though	I	would	agree	that	both	Schools	have	sufficient	coherence	and	continuity	to	warrant	
that	 label	 as	 such	 (McSweeney	 1996,	 Huysmans	 1998,	 Collective	 2006),	 this	 categorisation	
does	not	imply	that	the	two	approaches	are	incompatible,	or	that	they	are	totally	distinct	and	
competing.	 Given	 that	 the	 ‘theory	 of	 securitisation’	 has	 evolved	 into	 something	 more	
receptive	and	 flexible	 since	 its	 inception,	 the	authors	of	Case	Collective	 too	assert	 that	 this	
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categorisation	 can	 be	 misleading	 if	 taken	 too	 seriously	 (Collective	 2006:447).	 As	 such,	
considering	that	securitisation	grew	to	encompass	both	schools	and	beyond,	this	thesis	treats	
securitisation	 as	 a	 ‘hollow	 signifier’	 that	 assumes	meaning	with	 the	 context	 and	 the	 actors	
involved,	amalgamates	discursive	and	performative	approaches	 inherent	 in	 the	Copenhagen	
and	Paris	Schools	of	security,	and	expands	its	analysis	to	include	the	‘social’	level.	
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Chapter	2.	Theoretical	Framework:	Adding	ontological	security		
2.1	Introduction:	Just	another	‘security’?	
	
Even	 though	 ontological	 security	 is	 not	 a	 new	 concept	 in	 psychology	 and	 sociology,	 its	
application	in	IR	is	rather	recent,	though	ever	growing.	Especially	in	the	last	two	decades,	non-
traditional	 approaches	 to	 security	 have	experienced	a	boost.	We	 talk	 about	 environmental,	
economic,	 political,	 military,	 cyber,	 human	 and	 societal	 security.	 Thus,	 it	 is	 important	 to	
establish	how	ontological	security	is	different	than	other	non-traditional	security	approaches	
that	take	the	concept	of	security	beyond	states	and	military.		
	
Ontological	security	neither	has	a	normative	commitment	to	emancipation	like	critical	security	
theories,	nor	does	it	prioritise	survival	over	everything	else.	Basic	trust,	which	is	at	the	core	of	
‘hope’	and	 ‘the	courage	 to	be’,	 is	 the	crucial	difference	ontological	 security	provides	 to	our	
understanding	 of	 security	 and	 self-identity	 that	 we	 cannot	 find	 in	 other	 non-traditional	
security	 studies	 (See	 Tillich	 1962,	Giddens	 1991).	 In	 simple	 terms,	 ontological	 security	 is	 “a	
security	of	being,	a	sense	of	confidence	and	trust	that	the	world	is	what	it	appears	to	be”	and	
a	sense	of	basic	trust	in	our	biographical	continuity	as	who	we	are	(Kinnvall	2004:30).		
	
However,	security	studies	 in	 IR,	 including	the	critical	approaches	 in	security,	have	fallen	 into	
the	pitfall	of	conflating	ontological	security	with	security-as-survival	(physical	security).	Mainly	
due	 to	 the	 rationalistic	 approaches	 to	 security,	 and	 the	prevalent	Hobbesian	understanding	
where	 survival	 is	 seen	 as	 the	 primary	 concern	 of	 actors,	 ontological	 security	 has	 been	
sidestepped	 particularly	 in	 conflict	 and	 peace	 studies.	 Many	 security	 scholars	 focus	 on	
discourses	 and	 practices	 of	 security-as-survival,	 where	 identity	 constructions	 depend	 on	
difference	 and	 difference	 automatically	 translates	 into	 danger,	 threat	 and	 behavioural	
othering	(Wæver	1998,	Williams	2003,	Roe	2004).		
	
For	 example,	 Roe’s	 analysis	 draws	 a	 direct	 relationship	 between	 the	 maintenance	 of	
distinctive	 identities	 and	 securitisation.	 Arguing	 that	 desecuritisation	 of	 minorities	 would	
undermine	 their	 distinctiveness,	 Roe	 reads	 identity	 configurations	 from	 an	 essentially	
‘securitised’	 lens,	 where	 the	 us/them	 dichotomy	 inherently	 becomes	 a	 securitised	 relation	
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based	 on	 survival	 (Roe	 2006).	 Conversely,	 desecuritisation	 of	 minority	 rights	 would	 not	
necessarily	undermine	their	collective	distinctiveness,	but	it	can	end	the	reproduction	of	this	
distinctiveness	 through	 the	 representation	 of	 the	 majority	 as	 a	 threat	 (Rumelili	 2013).	
Similarly,	 Behnke,	 argues	 that	 ‘inclusion	 and	 community	 can	 only	 be	 had	 at	 the	 price	 of	
exclusion	 and	 adversity’	 (Behnke	 2006:65).	 Consequently,	 this	 conflation	 of	 ontological	
security	 and	 security-as-survival	 in	 the	 literature	 reduces	 identity	 to	 a	 subject	 position	
constituted	 by	 discourses	 of	 fear	 and	 danger	 and	 ultimately	 locks	 desecuritisation	 into	 a	
vicious	circle,	where	disrupting	the	friend/enemy	dichotomy	would	undermine	self-identity.	
	
Fortunately,	discourses	of	 security	 are	not	necessarily	 an	 inescapable	 tool	 for	 (re)producing	
identity	narratives.	Rumelili,	 Steele,	Huysmans	and	Mitzen	all	 stress	 that	actors	do	not	only	
seek	 survival,	 and	 in	 fact	 they	may	 often	 seek	 actions	 that	 jeopardise	 their	 very	 survival	 in	
their	 pursuit	 for	 ontological	 security	 (Steele	 2005,	 Mitzen	 2006,	 Rumelili	 2015).	 As	 such,	
us/them	dichotomies,	which	rely	on	understanding	of	identity	based	on	difference,	does	not	
have	to	become	a	securitised	relationship	(Rumelili	2011).	For	Christopher	Browning,	“There	is	
nothing	natural	or	self-evident	about	 the	prioritisation	of	physical	security	 in	 IR,	and	 indeed	
such	prioritisation	arguably	does	 little	 to	account	 for	either	 the	emergence	or	 resolution	of	
many	physical	security	issues”	(Browning	2016:160).	In	parallel,	Bahar	Rumelili	argues	that	we	
cannot	 properly	 theorise	 the	 identity-security	 nexus	 without	 distinguishing	 between	
ontological	security	and	physical	security	(Rumelili	2013).	She	contends	that	desecuritisation	
especially	in	the	societal	sector,	“is	only	possible	because	ontological	security	is	distinct	from	
and	not	reducible	to	physical	security”	(Rumelili	2011:8).			
	
A	 lens	 that	 cannot	 imagine	 identities	 out	 of	 a	 relationship	 based	 on	 survival	 leaves	 no	
theoretical	space	for	alternative	identity	constructions	that	would	enable	desecuritisation	in	a	
normative	 way,	 where	 difference	 is	 celebrated,	 or	 is	 simply	 seen	 as	 different	 without	
antagonistic	 connotations	 located	 in	 a	 zero-sum	 game	 (see	 Browning	 and	 Joenniemi	 2013,	
Rumelili	2013).	Thus,	in	the	absence	of	this	critical	differentiation	between	‘security-as-being’	
and	‘security-as-survival’,	the	literature	fails	to	account	for	the	role	of	securitisation	in	identity	
narratives	and	for	ontological	security,	and	underestimates	the	potential	of	desecuritisation	in	
reconfiguring	self/other	relationships	and	its	transformative	effects	for	reconciliation.		
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The	 aim	 of	 this	 chapter	 is	 to	 conceptualise	 ontological	 security,	 discuss	 whether	 it	 can	 be	
effectively	scaled	up	for	collective	and	state	 level	analysis	and	establish	 its	relationship	with	
identity.	Differentiating	ontological	 security	 from	societal	 security,	 the	chapter	will	establish	
the	analytical	utility	and	added-value	of	ontological	security	for	the	theoretical	 framework.	 I	
will	then	offer	my	own	understanding	of	ontological	security	as	a	spectrum	rather	than	a	fixed	
state	of	being.	Lastly,	the	chapter	will	provide	a	forward	looking	conclusion	about	whether	the	
desecuritisation	 of	 Turkish	 migrants	 and	 Turkishness	 can	 be	 used	 as	 a	 facilitating	 tool	 for	
reconciliation	in	Cyprus.	
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2.2	What	is	it	and	how	does	it	relate	to	identity?	
	
Conceptualisation	of	ontological	security	in	the	literature	can	be	conflicting	and	elusive,	which	
can	 prompt	 us	 to	 ask	whether	 ontological	 security	 provides	 us	with	 extra	 utility	 or	 added-
value	 for	 our	 understanding	 of	 conflict,	 identity	 politics	 and	 societal	 security.	 How	 is	 it	
different	than	societal	security	or	human	security?	How	is	it	linked	to	self-identity	or	different	
than	 identity	 politics?	 Can	 we	 scale	 it	 up	 and	 extrapolate	 it	 to	 collectives	 and	 states?	 Is	
ontological	 security	 something	 actors	 have?	 Is	 it	 a	 state	 of	 being?	 A	 spectrum?	 Is	 it	
endogenously	 or	 exogenously	 constructed?	 And	 what	 does	 it	 mean	 to	 be	 ontologically	
(in)secure?		
	
Unlike	securitisation	that	views	security	as	a	negative,	where	security	and	insecurity	share	the	
same	security	problematique	and	do	not	constitute	a	binary	opposition,	ontological	security	
can	be	 seen	as	a	positive	 security,	meaning	 that	actors	desire	 it.	 In	Wæver’s	definition,	 the	
state	of	security	suggests	a	situation	marked	by	the	presence	of	a	security	issue	that	includes	
a	 response,	 where	 the	 state	 of	 insecurity	 suggests	 that	 there	 is	 a	 security	 issue	 but	 no	
response	(Wæver	1995).	In	this	understanding,	actors	do	not	desire	a	situation	conceptualised	
in	security	terms;	when	there	 is	no	security	 issue	(asecurity),	security	becomes	an	irrelevant	
concern.	Unlike	 security-as-survival,	 the	 concept	 of	 ontological	 security	 is	 something	 actors	
aspire	 for;	 it	 is	 about	 feeling	 secure	 in	who	we	were,	who	we	are	and	who	we	wish	 to	be.	
When	we	are	[ontologically]	 insecure,	we	feel	uncomfortable	with	who	we	are	on	 least	one	
level	of	our	identity	or	another.		
	
Ontological	 security	 was	 first	 coined	 by	 psychiatrist	 Ronald	 D.	 Laing,	 who	 described	 it	 as	
having	a	constant	sense	of	presence	in	the	world	as	real,	alive	and	whole,	and	noted	that	in	
the	absence	of	ontological	security	actors	would	be	crushed	under	the	burdens	and	anxieties	
of	everyday	 life,	 feeling	a	 continual	 and	deadly	 threat	 (Laing	1971).	Within	 the	discipline	of	
sociology,	 the	term	is	most	closely	coupled	with	Anthony	Giddens,	who	defined	 it	as	having	
the	 confidence	 in	 the	 continuity	 of	 the	 self.	 For	 Giddens,	 “to	 be	 ontologically	 secure	 is	 to	
possess,	on	the	level	of	the	unconscious	and	practical	consciousness,	answers	to	fundamental	
existential	 questions	 which	 all	 human	 life	 in	 some	 way	 addresses”,	 which	 allows	 actors	 to	
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manage	 the	 inherent	 anxieties	 of	 everyday	 life	 (Giddens	 1991:47).	 He	 explains	 that,	 self-
identity	 is	 the	 development	 of	 a	 consistent	 feeling	 of	 a	 self-biography,	whereas	 ontological	
security	 is	 about	 the	 confidence	 an	 individual	 has	 in	 sustaining	 a	 biographical	 continuity	
through	 establishing	 a	 system	of	 basic	 trust	 for	 the	 real	world	 and	 for	 social	 relations	with	
others	(Giddens	1991).	
	
Self-biography	 is	the	form	of	 ‘discursive	consciousness’	manifested	 in	self-narrative,	through	
which	 agents	 create	 meanings	 for	 their	 actions	 (Giddens	 1984:374).	 Self-narratives	 add	
meaning	 to	 actors	 self-identity;	 they	 are	 the	 expressions	 of	 our	 ‘reality	 production’	 (Steele	
2008:11).	 Individuals	 have	 multiple	 identities	 (i.e.	 gender,	 ethnic,	 religious,	 sex,	 national,	
ideological,	 occupational	 and	 so	 on),	 thus	 we	 constitute	 our	 self-identity	 through	 multi-
layered	 identity	 narratives.	 As	 a	 result,	 self	 gains	 coherence,	 at	 least	 to	 some	 extent.	
Alternatively,	 for	 Neumann,	 “the	 making	 of	 selves	 is	 a	 narrative	 process	 of	 identification	
whereby	 a	 number	 of	 identities	 that	 have	 been	 negotiated	 in	 specific	 contexts	 are	 strung	
together	into	one	overarching	story...”	(Neumann	1999:218).	Thus,	self-narratives	are	central	
to	the	study	of	ontological	security.		
	
Mostly	 drawing	 on	 Giddens’	 work,	 the	 concept	 of	 ontological	 security	 has	 given	 birth	 to	 a	
growing	body	of	 literature	in	IR	(McSweeney	1999,	Kinnvall	2004,	Steele	2005,	Mitzen	2006,	
Roe	 2008,	 Steele	 2008,	 Zarakol	 2010,	 Lupovici	 2012,	 Browning	 and	 Joenniemi	 2013).	 Even	
though	there	is	no	consensus	among	IR	scholars	on	whether	states,	collectives	or	groups	are	
primarily	driven	by	ontological	security	seeking/producing	practices,	McSweeney,	Huysmans,	
Mitzen	 and	 Steele	 have	 all	 convincingly	 argued	 that	 collectives	 care	 about	 their	 ontological	
security	as	much	as	–	if	not	more	than	–	their	physical	security	(Huysmans	1998,	McSweeney	
1999,	Steele	2005,	Mitzen	2006).	Along	similar	 lines,	other	scholars	 from	the	constructivists	
tradition,	 such	 as	Wendt,	 assert	 that	 states,	 like	 individuals,	 have	 both	 physical	 and	 social	
motivations	(Wendt	1999).		
	
I	take	the	position	that	ontological	security	can	be	extrapolated	to	collective	or	state	level,	not	
simply	because	it	is	common	in	IR	to	personify	states,	but	because	both	collectives	and	states	
narrate	 their	 biographies	 and	 value	 their	 existence	 as	 per	 those	 biographies.	 A	 sense	 of	
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belonging	to	a	nation,	ethnicity	or	group	 is	consolidated	based	on	a	narrative	that	promises	
continuation,	 without	 which	 ‘membership’	 cannot	 acquire	 meaning.	 Therefore,	
collectives/states	 would	 naturally	 seek	 actions	 that	 may	 alleviate	 challenges	 to	 their	 self-
narrative.	Kinnvall,	who	centralises	the	role	of	narrative,	suggests	that	organising	history	in	a	
particular	 way	 constructs	 a	 salient	 narrative	 for	 group	 self-identity	 (Kinnvall	 2004).	 Steele	
maintains	 that	we	can	extrapolate	 individual	 feelings	 to	states,	and	 for	 the	purposes	of	 this	
thesis,	 to	collectives,	not	because	everyone	does	 it,	but	because	 individuals	are	attached	to	
their	collective	identities	and	states	(Steele	2008).		
	
Self-identity	has	an	 intimate	relationship	with	group	 identities	 (be	 it	 social,	political,	 familial	
groups);	we	feel	a	certain	 level	of	attachment	to	the	narrative	our	collectives/states	provide	
for	our	own	self-identity.	Ontological	security	is	as	much	about	memory	and	history	of	being	
as	it	is	about	the	future	of	being	(continuity	of	being).	Thus,	it	is	not	far-fetched	to	argue	that	
collective	 identities	 and	 states,	 that	 too	 construct	 their	 narratives	 on	 their	 pasts,	 seek	
ontological	 security	 as	 much	 as	 individuals.	 Collective	 identities	 and	 states	 can	 provide	
individuals	 with	 ancestry	 that	 reaches	 beyond	 their	 lifetime	 and	 add	 meaning,	 a	 sense	 of	
immortality,	to	their	existence.	However,	the	argument	here	is	not	that	ontological	security	is	
an	alternative	account	for	understanding	collective	or	state	behaviour,	but	that	it	provides	us	
with	a	more	complete	picture	especially	when	we	are	studying	security	and	conflict.		
	
Mitzen	 defends	 the	 argument	 about	 scaling	 up	 ontological	 security,	 contending	 that	
assumptions	about	individuals	help	us	explain	macro-level	patterns	and	ontological	security	of	
collectives/states	 reinforce	 the	 ontological	 security	 of	 its	 members	 (Mitzen	 2006).	
Conceptually,	 the	 idea	 of	 a	 group,	 collective	 or	 a	 state	 cannot	 exist	 without	 a	 story	 that	
develops	 a	 sense	 of	 continuity	 for	 its	 members;	 collectives	 and	 “states	 have	 a	 historical	
account	 of	 themselves	 that	 has	 been	 built	 up	 through	 the	 narrative	 of	 agents	 of	 the	 past,	
present	 and	 the	 future”(Steele	 2008:20).	 In	 his	 book	 ‘Modernity	 and	 Self-Identity’,	Giddens	
points	that	“people	in	all	cultures	including	the	most	resolutely	traditional,	distinguish	future,	
present	 and	 past,	 and	 weigh	 alternative	 courses	 of	 action	 in	 terms	 of	 likely	 future	
considerations”	 (Giddens	 1991:48).	 At	 the	 very	 least,	 collectives	 and	 states	 have	 identity	
commitments	based	on	their	narratives,	and	by	extension	they	can	experience	challenges	to	
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these	 identity	 commitments,	 which	 means	 they	 too	 seek	 ontological	 security.	 Steele	
eloquently	 stresses	 that	 “the	 process	 of	 the	 construction	 of	 self	 for	 any	 individual	 and	
collective	 is	 so	 complex	 that	 it	might	 defy	 understanding,	 yet	we	 can	 investigate	 particular	
components	of	that	construction”,	such	as	narrative,	history,	memory	or	actions	and	routines	
that	reflect	those	narratives	(Steele	2008:49).	As	such,	this	thesis	accepts	the	assumption	that	
ontological	security	and	identity	are	important	for	collectives	as	well	as	individuals.	
	
The	concept	of	identity	is	ambiguous	and	frustratingly	complex.	According	to	McSweeney,	the	
human	 and	 moral	 connotations	 of	 identity	 make	 it	 a	 popular	 subject	 and	 “its	 apparent	
subjectivity	makes	everyone	an	expert”	because	its	fundamental	character	as	an	“inalienable	
human	property	blocks	all	criticism	and	makes	it	a	secure	possession”	(McSweeney	1996:86,	
87).	 It	 is	 almost	 a	 self-declaration	 or	 a	 self-revelation,	 not	 always	 on	 the	 level	 of	
consciousness,	with	many	layers,	some	lax	and	some	more	rigid	but	it	is	fundamental	to	who	
we	 are.	 Even	 though	 the	 epistemology	 of	 identity	 is	 highly	 disputed,	 one	 thing	 that	 most	
scholars	 can	 agree	 on	 is	 that	 identity	 is	 not	 a	 fact	 of	 society	 but	 it	 is	 rather	 fluid	 and	
amorphous	(Giddens	1991,	Campbell	1998,	Kinnvall	2004,	Lupovici	2012).	Collective	identity	is	
not	 ‘out	 there’	 waiting	 to	 be	 discovered;	 rather	 what	 is	 ‘out	 there’	 is	 identity	 discourse	
entailing	the	process	of	constructing,	negotiating	and	affirming	a	response	to	the	demand	for	
a	collective	image	(McSweeney	1996).	
	
Giddens	explains	that	“the	identity	of	the	self…	presumes	reflexive	awareness	…	It	is	the	self	
as	reflexively	understood	by	the	person	in	terms	of	her	or	his	biography”	(Giddens	1991:52-
53).	For	states	and	collectives,	this	self-biography	is	their	historical	narrative	interpreted	and	
(re)produced	 over	 time.	 Identity	 is	 not	 a	 property	 or	 a	 fact	 of	 society;	 it	 is	 a	 process	 of	
negotiation,	 a	 choice,	 a	 construct	 made	 by	 people,	 politicians,	 and	 historians	 alike.	 The	
collective	question,	'Who	are	we?'	cannot	be	answered	simply	by	reference	to	opinion	polls,	
ancient	 myths,	 folk	 music	 or	 other	 measures	 of	 collective	 history.	 For	 McSweeney,	 being	
English,	Irish,	Danish	is	a	consequence	of	political	and	social	processes,	and	“it	is	that	process,	
not	the	label	symbolising	it,	which	constitutes	the	reality	that	needs	explication”	(McSweeney	
1999:85-90).	Although,	 ‘we	are	who	we	choose	to	be’	overstates	our	freedom	in	the	matter	
and	 disregards	 the	 social,	 material	 and	 political	 relationships	 that	 are	 integral	 to	 shaping	
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identity	narratives,	collective	identity	 is	not	a	property	of	society	that	transcends	agency.	As	
such,	we	cannot	decide	on	the	status	or	the	relevance	of	identity	a	priori,	identity	can	be	the	
cause	of	a	conflict	but	it	is	just	as	likely	to	be	its	effect	(McSweeney	1996).		
	
Nonetheless,	we	cannot	deny	our	need	for	a	secure	stable	self-identity	or	our	need	to	belong	
to	some	group,	community	or	society.	Nor	can	we	deny	that	some	sense	of	common	identity	
is	a	product	of	living	together	in	common,	or	that	national	or	ethnic	identities	can	become	a	
security	 problem	 (McSweeney	 1999).	 In	 fact,	 social	 psychologists	 such	 as	 Herbert	 Kelman	
assert	 that	 identity	 is	 both	 a	 psychological	need	in	 itself	 and	 a	mobilising	 force	 toward	 the	
fulfilment	of	needs	 (Kelman	2007).	Similarly,	according	to	 Janice	Stein’s	simple	but	effective	
definition,	identity	is	the	way	in	which	a	person	is,	or	wishes	to	be	known	by	others,	meaning	
it	is	the	conception	of	self	in	relation	to	others	(Stein	2002).		
	
Even	 though	 there	 is	 somewhat	 of	 a	 consensus	 among	 scholars	 that	 identity	 is	 a	 social	
construct,	 the	 literature	 is	 divided	 on	 how	 scholars	 view	 identity	 construction;	 while	 some	
scholars	 like	Steele	and	Wendt	argue	 that	 it	 is	an	endogenous	process	 (Wendt	1999,	Steele	
2008),	 others	 like	 Rumelili	 and	 Mitzen	 maintain	 that	 identity	 is	 dependent	 on	 difference,	
hence	the	process	 is	exogenous	 (Rumelili	2004,	Mitzen	2006).	Steele	stresses	 that	 identities	
can	 emerge	 endogenously,	 not	 just	 “in	 the	 dialectic	 between	 self	 and	 other	 but	within	 the	
internal	dialectic	 that	arises	 from	the	ontological	security-seeking	process”	 (Steele	2008:32).	
In	 his	 analysis,	 I	 must	 first	 know	 self	 before	 I	 can	 relate	 it	 to	 an	 other.	 Similarly,	 Wendt	
downplays	the	role	of	difference	in	identity	formation	by	arguing	that	corporate	identities	are	
“constituted	 by	 self-organising	 homeostatic	 structures”,	 and	 therefore	 are	 “constitutionally	
exogenous	to	otherness”	(Wendt	1999:224).	On	the	contrary,	Mitzen	claims	that	identities	are	
constituted	and	sustained	through	social	relationships	rather	than	being	intrinsic	properties	of	
actors	 (Mitzen	2006:35).	Adopting	a	middle	ground,	 Zarakol,	 argues	 that	 it	 is	 a	 chicken	and	
egg	situation,	identity	is	both	endogeneously	and	exogenously	constructed.	For	example,	she	
points	out	that	it	is	difficult	to	identify	whether	it	is	the	identity-challenging	interactions	that	
are	the	main	source	of	ontological	 insecurity,	or	whether	 insecure	 interactions	are	merely	a	
symptom	of	an	actor’s	uncertainty	about	its	self-identity	(Zarakol	2010).	Although	this	sounds	
like	a	problematique	in	establishing	a	causal	relationship	rather	than	a	problematique	about	
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the	 ontology	 of	 identity	 construction,	 Prozorov	 underlines	 that	 internal	 and	 external	
processes	of	identity	construction	cannot	be	disassociated	from	each	other,	and	that	temporal	
(self-narratives)	 and	 spatial	 (relations	 with	 others)	 identity	 formations	 cannot	 be	 detached	
(Prozorov	2011).	Yet,	I	maintain	that	self	does	not	come	into	existence	without	relating	to	an	
other;	it	cannot	be	assumed	independent	of	an	other,	or	the	social	and	material	environment.	
Make	no	mistake,	the	other	does	not	have	to	be	external	to	the	self,	but	can	be	an	othered-
self	 established	within	 an	 internal	 dialectic	 through	 reflexivity	 (see	 Rumelili	 2004).	 In	 other	
words,	 however	 internal,	 the	 process	 of	 identity	 construction	 cannot	 exclusively	 be	
endogenous	devoid	of	a	relational	relationship	based	on	a	different	other.	
	
We	are	who	we	are	because	we	draw	the	boundaries	of	our	identities	based	on	what	we	are	
not.	The	world	is	built	upon	relative	dichotomies,	however	minor	they	may	be.	Identities	are	
always	constituted	in	relation	to	difference	because	a	thing	can	only	be	known	by	what	 it	 is	
not.	We	would	not	 know	who	we	are	 if	we	 lacked	any	 kind	of	 interaction	with	 the	outside	
world	 where	 we	 could	 establish	 reference	 points	 of	 difference	 to	 establish	 our	 own	
distinctiveness.	 In	 Wibben’s	 words,	 “we	 cannot	 understand	 what	 it	 means	 to	 be	 inside	
without	 at	 the	 same	 time	 understanding	 who	 or	 what	 is	 outside”	 (Wibben	 2013:86-88).	
Giddens,	who	notes	 that	 “learning	what	 is	not	me”	 is	 the	origin	of	 self-identity,	 affirms	 the	
discursive	necessities	that	make	 identity	dependent	on	difference	(Giddens	1991:42).	At	the	
same	 time	 however,	 Giddens	 also	 points	 to	 endogenous	 formations	 of	 identity	 and	 asserts	
that	 self-identity	 is	 “…something	 that	 has	 to	 be	 routinely	 created	 and	 sustained	 in	 the	
reflexive	 activities	 of	 the	 individual”	 (Giddens	 1991:52).	 Still,	 a	 reflexive	 approach	 to	 self-
identity	and	an	emphasis	on	relationships	are	not	mutually	exclusive	approaches	 to	 identity	
construction.	 In	 fact	 they	 overlap	 to	 an	 extent	 that	 it	 becomes	 impossible	 to	 separate	
reflexivity	 from	 relation.	 Self-narratives	 always	 need	 the	 rule	 of	 relativity/difference	 to	 be	
produced	and	sustained	even	 if	 that	difference	 is	reflexively	created.	As	 long	as	 identity	has	
boundaries,	whether	flexible	or	rigid,	there	are	those	that	are	in	and	those	that	are	out,	which	
means	those	that	are	out	are	different	to	the	‘self’	–	an	old	self,	a	worse	self,	an	othered-self	
or	a	different	other.		
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Rumelili,	 using	 the	 EU	 as	 a	 case	 where	 its	 own	 confrontational	 war-torn	 past	 is	 othered,	
asserts	that	a	relationist	ontology	does	not	presume	the	other	be	external	to	self;	hence	it	is	
compatible	with	Steele’s	 idea	of	 ‘internal	dialectic’	 (Rumelili	2004).	Even	 though	ontological	
security	requires	differentiation	and	in	that	sense	presupposes	an	other,	these	may	be	minor	
distinctions	 that	 are	 recognised	 in	 the	 context	 of	 similarity,	 positive	 identification	 and	
friendship	or	they	may	be	major	distinctions	that	situate	the	self	and	other	as	polar	opposites	
(Rumelili	2004).	Therefore,	although	actors	need	to	distinguish	themselves	from	other	actors	
to	be	able	to	exist,	difference	need	not	to	always	appear	as	negative	(Browning	and	Joenniemi	
2013).	Embracing	a	relationist	approach,	I	concede	the	interaction	of	the	self	with	the	social	
and	material	environment	cumulatively	constructs	the	subjective	biographical	narrative	of	the	
self.	 However,	 this	 construction	 is	 “not	 destined	 to	 translate	 into	 mutually	 exclusive	 and	
incompatible	 categories	 of	 subjectivity”	 (Browning	 and	 Joenniemi	 2013:493).	 Browning	
emphases	 that	 “the	 very	 notion	 of	 friendship	 (at	 both	 the	 individual	 and	 inter-state	 level)	
suggests	 alternative	 options	 are	 available	 for	 anchoring	 ontological	 security	 that	may	 even	
(and	 often	 does)	 include	 an	 active	 appreciation	 of	 difference.	 …Rather	 than	 being	 built	 on	
antagonism,	it	[friendship]	is	a	positive	form	of	difference	premised	on	equality,	respect	and	
solidarity”	(Browning	2016:169).			
	
In	 order	 to	 better	 understand	 how	 ontological	 security	 is	 interlinked	 but	 different	 than	
identity,	 we	 should	 turn	 back	 to	 Giddens;	 he	 explains	 that	 to	 ‘be’	 is	 to	 have	 ontological	
awareness;	 though	 closely	 related,	 ontological	 awareness	 is	 not	 the	 same	 as	 awareness	 of	
self-identity	(Giddens	1991).	For	him,	ontological	security	is	about	having	an	element	of	trust	
in	the	continuity	of	identity	not	only	for	the	present	but	also	for	the	future.	In	a	sociological	
and	 psychological	 context,	 ontological	 security	 develops	 with	 self-identity	 and	 trust,	 as	 a	
continuance	of	life,	self	and	the	existence	of	the	real	world.	The	two	are	closely	related	in	the	
developing	 experience	 at	 infancy.	 Drawing	 on	 Erik	 Erikson	 and	 Donald	Winnicott,	 Giddens	
centralises	 the	 concept	 of	 ‘basic	 trust’	 for	 self-identity,	 which	 emerges	 from	 “the	 original	
nexus	 that	 combines	 emotive-cognitive	 orientation	 towards	 others	 and	 the	 object-
world”(Giddens	1991:38).	The	concept	of	‘basic	trust’	is	integral	for	both	the	concept	of	‘hope’	
and	 what	 Tillich	 calls	 ‘the	 courage	 to	 be’	 (Tillich	 1962)	 as	 it	 acts	 as	 a	 shield	 to	 block	 off	
negative	possibilities	that	loom	in	the	background	of	actors’	daily	lives	.	
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Developing	 a	 sense	 of	 ‘basic	 trust’	 starts	 at	 infancy	 for	 individuals,	 and	 this	 infancy	 can	
translate	to	the	 inception	of	group	 identities	 (i.e.	nation-building).	The	 infant,	who	 is	on	the	
brink	 of	 unimaginable	 anxiety	 is	 called	 into	 existence	 by	 the	 environment	 provided	 by	 the	
caretaker;	as	such,	the	infant	develops	a	self	in	response	to	the	social	and	material	context	it	
experiences	(Giddens	1991).	 	 In	Giddens’	words	“The	‘struggle	of	being	against	non-being’	 is	
the	 perpetual	 task	 of	 the	 individual,	 not	 just	 to	 accept	 reality,	 but	 to	 create	 ontological	
reference	points	as	an	integral	aspect	of	‘going	on’	in	the	contexts	of	day-to-day	life.	In	‘doing’	
everyday	 life,	all	human	beings	 ‘answer’	 the	question	of	being…”	(Giddens	1991:48).	Hence,	
routines	 become	 integral	 for	 ontological	 security,	 as	 they	 nourish	 the	 trust	we	 have	 in	 our	
social	 and	material	 environment,	 and	 help	 us	 manage	 endless	 possibilities	 that	 can	 create	
chaos	 and	 anxiety.	 Mitzen,	 for	 example,	 resembles	 ontological	 security	 to	 a	 immunity	
vaccination	 against	 all	 that	 can	 possibly	 go	 wrong,	 stating	 that	 it	 serves	 “the	 important	
emotional	 function	 of	 ‘inoculating’	 individuals	 against	 the	 paralytic,	 deep	 fear	 of	 chaos”,	
without	which	we	would	 feel	 a	 deep	 sense	 of	 incapacitating	 anxiety	 (Mitzen	 2006:347).	 At	
some	 level,	 ontological	 security	 is	 concerned	 with	 repetition,	 which	 creates	 a	 coping	
mechanism	and	provides	stability	and	predictability	(Browning	and	Joenniemi	2013).	
	
According	 to	 Giddens,	 to	 be	 ontologically	 secure	 is	 to	 possess	 answers	 to	 fundamental	
existential	 questions	 about	 life	 and	 it	 is	 based	on	our	 ability	 to	 be	 recognised	 as	 belonging	
(Giddens	 1991).	 Thus,	 “the	 responses	 of	 the	 other	 are	 necessary	 to	 the	 sustaining	 of	 an	
‘observable/accountable’	 world”	 (Giddens	 1991:52).	 Once	 again,	 this	 indicates	 that	
ontological	 security	 cannot	 be	 separated	 from	 the	 self/other	 configurations.	 Goffman	 and	
Butler	 assert	 that	 the	 self	 always	 needs	 an	 audience.	 The	 ‘presentation	 of	 self’	 is	 always	
designed	for	an	audience,	even	if	that	audience	is	imaginary	or	self	observing	(Goffman	2012).	
In	other	words,	 identity	 is	about	becoming	 intelligible	to	one’s	self	and	to	others	(Wetherell	
2009),	and	according	to	Butler	being	intelligible	includes	engaging	with	current	forms	of	social	
recognition	(Butler	2004).	Similarly,	Kinnvall	supports	that	ontological	security	is	essentially	a	
quest	 for	 a	 stable	 narrative	 about	 the	 self	 but	 stresses	 the	 “intersubjective	 ordering	 of	
relations”	 (Kinnvall	 2004:748),	 which	 refers	 to	 the	 way	 individuals	 or	 collectives	 define	
themselves	in	relation	to	others.		
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Consequently,	self-identity	and	ontological	security	is	dependent	on	and	in	part	the	property	
of	 our	 relationships	 with	 others;	 basic	 trust	 in	 the	 nature	 of	 those	 relationships	 and	
acknowledgement	 of	 others	 is	 necessary	 to	 reproduce	 and	 bolster	 self-identity	 and	
ontological	security.	As	Browning	and	Joenniemi	points	out,	our	basic	trust	in	relating	to	the	
other(s)	is	not	dependent	on	an	assessment	about	how	‘trustworthy’	the	other	is,	but	rather	
how	predictable	the	relationship	itself	 is	(Browning	and	Joenniemi	2013).	In	other	words,	do	
we	know	what	to	expect	from	those	relationships	and	how	much	do	we	trust	in	the	nature	of	
the	 relationship,	 whether	 it	 is	 based	 on	 enmity	 or	 friendship?	 In	 its	 simplest	 form,	 our	
relationship	 and	 experience	of	 the	 social	 and	material	world	 reflexively	 constructs	 our	 self-
narrative,	and	the	sense	of	basic	trust	provides	us	with	a	sense	of	continuity,	which	is	key	to	
our	understanding	of	ontological	security	as	linked	but	distinct	from	self-identity.		 	
	 76	
2.3	How	is	ontological	security	any	different?	
	
Ontological	security	revolves	around	concepts	such	as	trust,	hope,	shame	and	anxiety	rather	
than	 survival,	 power,	 risk	 and	 fear	 as	 the	 locus	 of	 its	 ontology	 is	 in	 psychology	 rather	 than	
politics.	 These	 distinctions	 are	 particularly	 critical	 for	 understanding	 the	 added-value	 of	
ontological	security	in	security	studies.	In	addition	to	the	concept	of	‘basic	trust’,	which	is	the	
anchor	 of	 an	 ontologically	 secure	 individual	 that	 allows	 her	 to	 deal	 with	 the	 challenges	 of	
every	day	life	and	existential	anxieties,	the	concept	of	anxiety	as	opposed	to	fear,	as	well	as	
the	 concept	 of	 shame	 as	 opposed	 to	 guilt,	 is	 integral	 to	 our	 understanding	 of	 ontological	
security.		
	
Giddens	 distinguishes	 anxiety	 from	 fear,	 and	 guilt	 from	 shame.	 He	 explains	 that	 fear	 is	 a	
response	 to	 an	 identified	 threat	 and	 thus	 has	 a	 definite	 object,	 where	 as	 anxiety	 is	 a	
generalised	state	of	the	emotions,	not	always	on	the	level	of	consciousness	and	has	no	object	
(Giddens	1991).	For	example,	the	two-layer	approach	to	societal	security	proposed	by	Rumelili	
(Rumelili	2011,	Rumelili	2013),	where	she	calls	 for	a	separation	between	security-as-survival	
and	 security-as-being,	 is	 rooted	 in	 this	 differentiation	 of	 fear	 and	 anxiety.	 Similarly,	 shame	
does	not	depend	on	identified	rules	and	laws,	 it	occurs	when	there	is	a	disconnect	between	
our	 actions	 and	 our	 self-narrative.	 Young	 defines	 shame	 as	 “…a	 self-directed	 adverse	
judgement,	 tied	 to	 the	 idea	 that	 this	 individual	 now	 feels	 he	 is	 not	 the	 kind	 of	 person	 he	
assumed	himself	 to	be,	hoped	to	be	or	ought	 to	be;	and	an	audience	before	which	he	now	
feels	 degraded”	 (Young	 1997:220).	 In	 other	 words,	 it	 is	 an	 internal,	 private	 sense	 of	
transgression,	where	no	official	rule	had	been	broken	(Steele	2008).	However,	these	emotive	
distinctions	and	the	conceptual	distinction	between	security-as-being	and	security-as-survival	
can	cause	dissonance	when	they	are	not	mutually	reassuring	such	as	breaking	the	rules	(guilt)	
to	avoid	shame	because	we	feel	morally	compelled	to	do	something;	or	not	breaking	the	rules	
to	avoid	guilt	but	as	a	result	feeling	shame	because	we	failed	to	do	anything;	or	remaining	in	
abusive	 relationships	 (fear)	 because	 anxiety	 about	 what	 we	 will	 become	 out	 of	 that	
relationship	is	too	much	to	manage.		
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Steele	 explains	 that	 the	 constructivist	 view	 that	 identities	 and	 interests	 are	 co-constituted	
means	that	it	is	unnatural	for	actors	to	identify	one	way	and	perform	in	another,	hence	shame	
occurs	 when	 actors	 feel	 anxiety	 about	 the	 ability	 of	 their	 narrative	 in	 reflecting	 their	
behaviour	 (Steele	 2008).	 Or	 put	 another	 way,	 we	 feel	 shame	 when	 there	 is	 a	 miss-match	
between	our	self-narrative,	who	we	say	we	are,	and	our	actions;	when	we	fail	to	reconcile	our	
actions	 or	 decisions	 with	 our	 biographical	 narrative	 to	 justify	 our	 behaviour.	 Steele	
demonstrates	 the	 distinction	 between	 guilt	 and	 shame	 using	 actors’	 responses	 to	
humanitarian	crisis.	In	his	analysis,	despite	‘liberal’	regimes	may	not	feel	guilty	when	they	fail	
to	act	in	a	humanitarian	crisis,	they	may	feel	shame	because	inaction	is	inconsistent	with	their	
sense	 of	 integrity	 and	 self-identity	 (Steele	 2008).	 In	 response	 to	 shame,	 actors	 can	 show	
remorse	 and	 adapt	 their	 routines	 reflexively,	 or	 engage	 in	 counterfactual	 practices	 and	
compulsively	stick	to	their	routines	in	order	to	mask	their	feeling	of	shame.	Steele	and	Mitzen	
agree	 that	 rigid	 routines	 constrain	 actors	 in	 their	 ability	 to	 ‘learn’,	 they	 prevent	 us	 from	
adapting,	 limit	 our	 subjectivity	 and	 instead	 insert	 objectivity	 (Mitzen	 2006:364,	 Steele	
2008:60).		
	
Lupovici	 takes	 the	 concept	 of	 shame	 and	 dissonance	 a	 step	 further	 by	 pointing	 out	 that	
identity	and	behavioural	changes	that	are	needed	to	address	a	particular	anxiety	may	in	fact	
add	another	dimension	of	ontological	insecurity	by	creating	“a	gap	between	the	identity	and	
the	 expected	 resulting	 practices”	 (Lupovici	 2012:817).	 This	 is	 what	 he	 calls	 ontological	
dissonance;	 in	 contrast	 to	 cognitive	 dissonance,	 which	 is	 studied	 at	 the	 individual	 level	 of	
analysis,	 Lupovici	 introduces	 the	 term	 ontological	 dissonance	 to	 represent	 a	 dissonance	
experienced	by	collective	actors.	Different	from	‘identity	conflict’,	which	means	that	there	is	a	
clash	between	the	identities	held	by	collective	actors,	and	‘identity	dissonance’,	meaning	that	
there	 is	 clash	 between	 one	 of	 the	 identities	 and	 the	 actor’s	 behaviour,	 ‘ontological	
dissonance’	 denotes	 a	 clash	 between	 the	 measures	 taken	 to	 address	 the	 threats	 to	 the	
different	 identities.	 Ontological	 dissonance	 specifically	 occurs	when	 a	 practice	 that	 aims	 to	
secure	 one	 of	 the	 identities	 that	 actors	 hold	 challenges	 another	 identity	 held	 by	 the	 same	
actor	(Lupovici	2012).	Lupovici’s	analysis	can	be	read	as	a	more	intricate	way	of	understanding	
the	 concept	 shame;	 the	 dissonance	 does	 indicate	 a	 disconnect	 between	 the	 self-identity	
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narratives	and	the	actors’	actions	and	decisions,	but	it	particularly	emphasises	the	complexity	
of	multi-layered	identity	narratives	and	points	to	a	clash	across	different	layers.	
	
However,	anxiety	does	not	necessarily	translate	into	shame,	or	it	is	not	necessarily	a	negative	
condition.	Even	though	Tillich	stresses	that	all	anxiety	boils	down	to	‘non-being’	and	relates	to	
situations	where	 our	 identity	 narratives	 or	 self-integrity	 is	 being	 challenged,	 and	 triggers	 a	
sense	 of	 meaninglessness	 (Tillich	 1962:38),	 anxiety	 is	 also	 key	 to	 a	 reflexive	 and,	 in	
Heidegger’s	 terms,	 to	an	 ‘authentic’	 life.	 	For	Heidegger,	an	authentic	 life	 is	when	the	being	
does	 not	 just	 physically	 exist	 as	 alive	 but	 is	 aware	 of	 the	 prospect	 and	 scope	 of	 its	 own	
mortality	(Heidegger	2002).	What	he	referred	as	‘Dasein’	was	this	self-aware	reflexive	‘being’,	
who	could	lead	an	authentic	life,	and	who	cannot	be	decontextualised	from	the	world	it	lives	
in	 (Heidegger	 2002).	 Heidegger’s	 Dasein	 is	 partly	 influenced	 by	 Nietzsche’s	 equivocal	 and	
highly	debated	work	on	‘will	to	power’,	which	contemplates	human	motivation	and	drive	for	
self-affirmation,	self-preservation	and	self-realisation	(Nietzsche	1968).	For	Heidegger,	and	in	
part	 for	Nietzsche	 as	well,	 our	 fear	 and	 self-awareness	 about	 the	 prospect	 of	 an	 inevitable	
death	is	what	makes	authentic	life	a	possibility.	Authentic	life	in	Heidegger’s	terms	is	possible	
for	 collectives	 as	 well,	 as	 they	 too	 recognise	 mortality,	 and	 thus,	 feel	 urgency	 for	 their	
biographical	continuity	and	mark	on	history.		
	
Steele,	who	views	daily	anxiety	positively,	underlines	that	anxiety	can	serve	as	a	reminder	of	
humanity	(Steele	2008).	Despite	actors’	temptation	towards	eliminating	anxieties	inherent	to	
daily	life,	without	them,	actors	would	lack	reflection	and	the	motivation	to	act.	A	certain	level	
of	 anxiety	 allows	 actors	 to	 live	 as	 beings	 beyond	merely	 surviving.	 However,	 anxieties	 can	
become	multi-layered,	deeply	existential	and	unmanageable.	While	‘some’	anxiety	is	good,	‘a	
lot’	 of	 anxiety	 can	 be	 incapacitating.	 As	 such,	 actors	 who	 are	 incapacitated	 by	 existential	
anxieties	 can	 turn	 to	 counterfactual	 narratives	 (i.e.	 denial)	 or	 to	 securitisation	 to	 identify	 a	
source	 for	 their	 anxieties	 (i.e.	 blame).	 Yet,	when	 faced	with	 existential	 anxieties,	 actors	 are	
usually	 tempted	 to	 find	 quick	 solutions	 to	 avoid	 distancing	 from	 the	 self-narratives	 (i.e.	
adaptation).	 Reconfiguration	of	 historical	 and	 institutionalised	 self-narratives	 is	 difficult	 and	
unattractive	for	actors,	because	distancing	from	the	self	can	risk	lacerated,	decapitated	sense	
of	being	(Steele	2008),	a	state	Laing	refers	to	as	‘disembodied	self’	or	the	‘divorced	self’	(Laing	
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1971:173-174).	Steele	warns	that	over-excavation	and	too	much	reflexivity	can	result	in	self-
negating	action	and	endanger	‘paralysis	by	analysis’	(Steele	2008:62).		
	
Steele,	 theorising	 anxiety	 at	 the	 state	 level,	 introduces	 agency	 as	 a	 condition	 for	 our	
conceptualisation	of	anxiety.	 In	his	words,	 “We	 feel	anxiety	not	about	 those	 things	 that	are	
outside	of	our	control,	but	about	those	we	perceive	to	be	in	the	realm	of	our	possible	agency”	
(Steele	 2008:61).	 Drawing	 in	 Kierkegaard,	 he	 argues	 that	 absolute	 emancipation	 can	 create	
‘dizziness’	 and	 incapacitating	 anxieties,	 and	 to	 bring	 order	 to	 our	 freedom	 and	 anchor	 our	
dizziness,	we	construct	routines.	“It	is	precisely	because	routines	reduce	our	freedom	that	we	
find	 hem	 comforting.	 They	 reduce	 the	 number	 of	 things	 about	which	we	 can	 feel	 anxious”	
(Steele	2008:61).	As	a	result,	Steele	concedes	that	the	more	power	and	capability	agents	have,	
the	higher	 levels	 of	 anxiety	 they	would	 feel	 due	 to	 their	 increased	 sense	of	 ‘responsibility’.	
The	role	agency	plays	in	different	levels	of	anxiety	actors	experience,	hence	its	links	with	the	
capacity	to	think	ahead	and	to	anticipate	future	possibilities	in	relation	to	the	chosen	action,	
did	not	escape	Giddens.	Drawing	on	Freud,	Giddens	claims	that	 the	extent	of	anxiety	 felt	 in	
any	 given	 situation	 “depends	 on	 a	 persons	 knowledge	 and	 sense	 of	 power	 vis-à-vis	 the	
external	world”	 (Giddens	 1991:43-44).	 Therefore,	 if	 the	 self	 completely	 lacked	 reflexivity	 in	
relation	to	its	environment,	or	if	it	did	not	perceive	change	to	be	within	its	capacity,	it	would	
also	lack	agency,	and	hence	would	feel	neither	shame,	nor	anxiety.	
	
Ontological	security,	though	related,	is	different	from	other	non-traditional	security	concepts	
like	societal	security.	Even	though	identity	is	integral	to	both	ontological	security	and	societal	
security,	 the	 latter	 is	 associated	with	 a	negative,	 threat-based	 and	 survivalist	 conception	of	
security.	It	refers	to	the	failure	of	dealing	with	issues	within	the	realm	of	normal	politics	and	
as	 such,	 securitisation	 of	 issues	 as	 existential	 threats	 to	 legitimise	 the	 use	 of	 emergency	
measures	 (Buzan,	 Wæver	 et	 al.	 1998).	 We	 speak	 of	 societal	 security	 when	 there	 is	 an	
articulated	 existential	 threat	 to	 a	 society’s	 identity.	 Hence,	 societal	 security	 deals	 with	
identifiable	threats	and	dangers,	and	in	that	sense	refers	to	‘fear’	rather	than	‘anxiety’.	On	the	
other	hand,	ontological	 security,	which	 is	based	on	basic	 trust	 to	deal	with	anxieties	of	 the	
real-world	 that	are	not	 identifiable,	 is	associated	with	a	positive	conception	of	 security	 that	
enables	 the	 ‘owner’	 to	 ‘to	 be’	 and	 ‘to	 go	 on’	 (Giddens	 1991).	McSweeney	 sees	 ontological	
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security	 as	 a	 “property	 of	 a	 relationship,	 a	 quality	 making	 each	 secure	 in	 the	 other”	
(McSweeney	 1999:15).	 Nonetheless,	 for	 Rumelili,	 ontological	 security	 also	 usurps	 the	 value	
distinction	between	positive	and	negative	 security;	what	makes	 the	self	 secure	 in	 the	other	
could	be	a	negative	relationship	of	enmity	and	hostility	as	well	as	a	positive	one	of	friendship	
and	 harmony	 (Rumelili	 2013).	 Hence,	 ontological	 security	 does	 not	 presuppose	 a	 threat	 to	
identity	but	is	concerned	with	its	stability.		
	
Furthermore,	 identity	 is	 treated	 as	 an	 external	 variable	 in	 societal	 security,	 and	 it	 always	
refers	 to	 the	 process	 of	 securing	 a	 collective	 identity	 (i.e.	 does	 not	 apply	 to	 individuals).	
Although,	the	CS	does	not	reify	identities	as	something	objective	and	given,	 it	assumes	their	
de	facto	stability	and	rigidness	over	the	limited	periods	relevant	to	the	analysis	of	a	particular	
securitisation	event	(Buzan	and	Wæver	1997,	Theiler	2003).	Wæver	defines	societal	security	
as	“the	ability	of	a	society	to	persist	in	its	essential	character	under	changing	conditions	and	
possible	or	actual	threats”	(Waever	1993:23).	Hence,	unlike	this	conceptualisation	of	identity	
as	 a	 pre-constituted	 and	 fixed	 ‘commodity’	 that	 is	 secured	 from	an	 ‘attack’,	 for	 ontological	
security,	the	concern	is	not	an	identifiable	threat	to	a	given	identity	but	an	enduring	quest	for	
a	stabile	narrative.		
	
Steele	succinctly	states	that	“being	a	human	being	means	knowing	both	what	one	is	doing	and	
why	one	is	doing	it”	(Steele	2005:526).	An	ontologically	secure	actor	can	produce	answers	to	
fundamental	existential	questions	and	 relay	 these	answers	 in	her	actions,	which	are	 turned	
into	 routines	 that	 reaffirm	 self-identity	 and	 reproduce	basic	 trust	 in	 the	 real	world	 and	 the	
relations	with	 others	 (Giddens	 1991).	 Giddens	 stresses	 the	 importance	 of	 various	 forms	 of	
routines	 in	 developing	 ontological	 security;	 “the	 discipline	 of	 routine	 helps	 to	 constitute	 a	
formed	framework	for	existence	by	cultivating	a	sense	of	being	and	its	separation	from	non-
being,	 which	 is	 elemental	 to	 ontological	 security”	 (Giddens	 1991:39).	 Thus,	 ontological	
security	is	essentially	concerned	with	“a	sense	of	knowing	what	to	expect”	that	is	grounded	in	
stability	providing	routines	in	the	social	world	(Browning	and	Joenniemi	2013:495).	Therefore,	
the	pursuit	of	societal	security	within	the	securitisation	framework	is	distinct	from	ontological	
security,	 inasmuch	 it	 is	 about	 defending	 collective	 identities	 against	 identified	 threats,	 a	
distinction	which	ultimately	reflects	Giddens’	differentiation	between	fear	and	anxiety.	 	
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2.4	Ontological	security:	A	fundamental	need	or	an	unattainable	quest?		
	
The	ontological	security	literature	is	ambivalent	about	whether	ontological	security	is	always	a	
never-ending	 pursuit	 of	 security	maximisation	 for	 an	 ideal	 complete	 identity-narrative	 or	 a	
fixed	state	of	being.	Neither	Laing’s	nor	Giddens’	 conceptualisation	clearly	contemplate	 this	
distinction.	Even	though	Giddens	notes	that	“self-identity	is	not	something	that	is	just	given,	
as	a	result	of	the	continuities	of	the	individual’s	action-system,	but	something	that	has	to	be	
routinely	created	and	sustained	in	the	reflexive	activities	of	the	individual”,	which	indicates	to	
a	 shifting	 spectrum	 of	 experiencing	 being;	 he	 also	 talks	 about	 ontological	 security	 as	 a	
personal	quality,	or	an	ability	 (Giddens	1991:62).	Similarly,	Ronald	D.	 Laing,	who	coined	 the	
phrase	‘ontological	security’	in	his	book	titled	‘The	Divided	Self’,	defines	it	as	“a	centrally	firm	
sense	 of	 one’s	 own	 and	 other	 people’s	 reality	 and	 identity”	 (Laing	 1990:39).	However,	 it	 is	
unclear	whether	Laing	treats	ontological	security	as	something	we	have,	a	position	we	hold,	or	
a	shifting	sense	of	being	experienced	as	a	continuous	journey	that	is	not	fully	on	the	level	of	
consciousness.	He	interchangeably	refers	to	it	as	a	‘sense	of	being’	and	as	a	‘basic	existential	
position’	 in	which	 a	 person	 ‘has	 a	 firm	 core	 of	 ontological	 security’	 (Laing	 1990:39,	 4,	 42).	
While	 modes	 of	 experiencing	 a	 coherent	 sense	 of	 being	 would	 be	 better	 understood	 as	 a	
spectrum,	 conceptualising	 ontological	 security	 as	 a	 basic	 existential	 position	 implies	 that	
ontological	security	is	a	quality	that	can	be	possessed.	In	this	fourth	section	of	the	chapter,	I	
will	contemplate	what	 it	means	to	be	ontologically	 (in)secure	for	 individuals	and	collectives,	
and	argue	that	ontological	security	 is	an	oscillating	spectrum	rather	than	a	quality	or	a	fixed	
state	of	being.	
	
According	to	Giddens,	as	well	as	others	such	as	Steele,	ontologically	secure	actors	can	adapt	
and	 change	 their	 routines	 through	 reflexive	 behaviour	 under	 ‘critical	 situations’	 that	 create	
anxieties	 and	 challenge	 self-identity	 by	 imperilling	 the	 sense	 of	 basic	 trust	 (Giddens	 1991,	
Steele	 2005:526).	 According	 to	 Giddens,	 critical	 situations	 are	 “circumstances	 of	 a	 radical	
disjuncture	 of	 an	 unpredictable	 kind	 which	 affect	 substantial	 numbers	 of	 individuals,	
situations	 that	 threaten	 or	 destroy	 the	 certitudes	 of	 institutionalised	 routines”	 (Giddens	
1984:61).	An	agent	is	ontologically	secure	when	they	choose	a	course	of	action	that	complies	
with	their	sense	of	self-identity.	 If	critical	situations,	or	 traumas	(e.g.	a	near	death	accident,	
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separation,	rejection,	structural/territorial/political	transformations)	become	very	frequent	or	
reach	a	high	 intensity,	 actors	may	 fail	 to	manage	 the	 resulting	existential	 anxieties	because	
their	 routine	 is	 incapable	 of	 accommodating	 such	 circumstances,	which	 creates	 ontological	
insecurity	(Giddens	1991,	Steele	2005).	Kinnvall	explains	a	state	of	ontological	insecurity	as	a	
disruption	where	 the	 self	 has	 lost	 its	 anchor	 to	 its	 identity	 narrative	 and,	 consequently,	 its	
ability	to	sustain	the	coherence	of	its	narrative	and	answer	questions	about	doing,	acting,	and	
being	 (Kinnvall	2004).	Mitzen	and	Zarakol	point	out	 that	unmanageable	existential	anxieties	
may	arise	from	deep	uncertainty,	a	sudden	change	in	the	identity	definitions	that	tie	the	self	
to	the	objective	world,	and/or	from	the	failure	to	be	acknowledged	and	affirmed	by	others,	
which	can	pull	the	actor	into	incapacitating	state	of	ontological	insecurity	overwhelmed	by	the	
confusion	about	which	dangers	to	confront	and	which	to	ignore	(Mitzen	2006,	Zarakol	2010).		
	
In	other	words,	existential	anxieties	appear	when	a	person’s	self-identity	is	challenged,	but	an	
individual	who	is	ontologically	secure	can	deal	with	these	anxieties	reflexively	and	can	change	
and	adapt	to	circumstances	(Giddens	1991).	Accordingly,	Rumelili	underlines	that	“in	a	state	
of	ontological	security,	the	self	experiences	a	stable,	certain,	and	consistent	social	existence,	
where	 it	 remains	 in	 control	 about	 its	 identity	 and	 capacity	 for	 action”(Rumelili	 2013:8).	 For	
Steele,	“ontological	security	comes	about	when	agents	continue	to	choose	actions	which	they	
feel	reflect	their	sense	of	 identity”	(Steele	2008:52).	As	such,	ontologically	secure	actors	can	
manage	day-to-day	anxieties,	adapt	in	the	face	of	critical	situations	and	continue	to	‘be’.	This	
analysis	seems	to	assume	that	ontological	security	 is	something	actors	can	‘have’,	or	a	fixed	
state,	like	being	‘zen’,	rather	than	a	constant	on-going	and	never-ending	quest	for	maximising	
the	feeling	of	ontological	security.		
	
However,	I	argue	that	ontological	security	is	not	a	binary	state	of	being	where	the	self	is	either	
secure	 about	 its	 identity	 or	 not.	 Ontological	 security	 is	 not	 a	 quality	 that	 ‘comes	 about’.	
Identity	 is	 never	 complete,	 there	 is	 no	 final	 destination,	 or	 an	 absolute	 state.	 Actors’	 self-
narratives	are	a	constant	work	 in	progress,	responding	to,	 interpreting	and	negotiating	their	
experiences	 in	 the	 social	 and	 material	 world.	 Their	 identities	 are	 multi-layered,	 and	 by	
extension	 so	 are	 their	 self-narratives,	 and	 again,	 by	 extension	 so	 are	 their	 anxieties.	
Considering	that	ontological	security	 is	not	external	 to	self-identity,	and	that	neither	does	 it	
	 83	
develop	 independent	 of	 self-identity,	 assuming	 it	 can	 be	 a	 fixed	 state	 of	 being	 severs	 this	
intricate	and	organic	 interdependence	and	 co-constitution.	 Security-as-being	 can	only	be	as	
complete	as	being	itself.	Thus,	I	argue	that	as	identity	is	fluid	and	ever	shifting,	actors	are	all	
ontological	 security	 seekers,	 always	 engaged	 in	 the	 pursuit	 of	 maximising	 their	 sense	 of	
ontological	security	in	search	of	a	more	stable	identity.	For	Kinnvall,	who	contends	that	social	
constructivism	 can	 only	 explain	 collective	 identity	 as	 something	more	 than	 the	 sum	 of	 the	
individuals	 involved	 precisely	 because	 it	 locates	 identity	 construction	 in	 the	 process	 of	
becoming,	rather	than	complete,	“the	fact	that	individuals	search	for	one	stable	identity	does	
not	mean,	however,	that	such	identities	exist”	(Kinnvall	2004:747).		
	
Therefore,	 the	 view	 of	 identity	 as	 constructed,	 incomplete,	 fluid	 and	multi-layered	 concept	
also	 needs	 to	 acknowledge	 that	 different	 layers	 of	 our	 identities	 can	 be	 simultaneously	
challenged.	 Hence,	 actors	 can	 experience	 different	 levels	 of	 anxiety	 directed	 at	 different	
layers	simultaneously.	Although	being	in	a	state	of	absolute	ontologically	security	is	the	ideal	
end	 point,	 in	 practice,	 actors	 travel	 on	 a	 spectrum	 of	 ontological	 security	 and	 insecurity	
moving	 along	 the	 line	 of	 unfulfilled	 ontological	 security.	 Those	 of	 us	 who	 enjoy	 a	 more	
developed	sense	of	basic	trust	in	our	relationships	with	others	and	the	social	world,	and	have	
stronger	sense	of	continuity	may	feel	closer	to	the	secure	end	of	the	spectrum,	where	we	do	
not	perceive	a	disconnect	between	our	behaviour	and	self-identity,	where	our	self-narrative	is	
not	existentially	challenged,	and	where	we	have	the	capacity	to	perform	ontological	security	
seeking	actions	that	can	effectively	address	our	anxieties.	In	other	words,	on	the	secure	end	of	
the	spectrum,	we	enjoy	a	stronger	ability	to	manage	anxieties	and	adapt	routines	when	faced	
with	critical	situations.		
	
On	the	other	hand,	those	of	us	who	are	closer	to	the	insecure	end	of	the	spectrum	may	feel	
heightened	anxieties	that	are	difficult	to	manage,	or	shame	caused	by	inconsistent	behaviour,	
or	simultaneous	challenges	at	more	than	one	identity	level.	For	example,	a	sudden	change	in	
identity	 narratives	 such	 as	 betrayal	 of	 a	 ‘friend’	 or	 rejection	 by	 the	 in-group	 may	 trigger	
incapacitating	 anxieties	 on	 one	 level	 while	 the	 actor	 may	 still	 be	 feeling	 reaffirmed	 and	
coherent	on	another	level	of	her	identity.	Thus,	I	argue	that	all	actors	seek	actions	that	try	to	
maximise	 their	 ontological	 security	 but	 their	 effectiveness	 and	 reflexiveness	depend	on	 the	
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capacity	of	the	actors,	the	multitude	and	the	level	of	anxiety	experienced	at	different	identity	
layers,	and	significance	of	those	layers	of	identity	to	the	overall	self-narrative.	If	the	search	for	
a	 complete	 identity	 does	 not	 have	 destination,	 and	 the	 desire	 to	 eliminate	 all	 anxieties	 is	
unachievable,	then	we	can	concede	that	our	desire	for	a	complete	 identity	that	experiences	
the	absolute	ontological	security	utopia	is	not	only	an	unattainable	quest,	it	is	an	undesirable	
end,	because	it	is	this	quest	that	provides	the	opportunity	for	an	authentic	life.		
	
Those	actors	that	are	closer	to	the	insecure	end	of	the	spectrum	may	have	compulsive	rather	
than	 reflexive	 and	 adaptive	 attitudes	 towards	 routines.	 They	may	 lack	 the	 capacity	 to	 deal	
with	anxiety	producing	critical	situations	or	may	seek	to	securitise	others	in	search	of	a	more	
stable	 identity	 due	 to	 their	 lack	of	 confidence	 in	 their	 biographical	 continuity.	 These	 actors	
would	find	it	particularly	hard	to	trust	the	objective	world	and	their	relationships	with	others;	
and	 their	 ontological	 security	 seeking	 practices	may	 create	 dissonance	with	 other	 layers	 of	
their	 identity.	Collectives	would	most	 likely	disintegrate	 in	a	state	of	absolute	and	complete	
ontologically	 insecurity,	 where	 they	 lack	 basic	 trust,	 continuity,	 acknowledgement	 and	
affirmation	on	every	identity	level.	As	identity	is	multi-layered,	so	are	the	experienced	feelings	
of	security	and	insecurity.	Anxieties	in	one	identity-layer	may	be	incapacitatingly	high,	but	on	
another	level,	they	can	be	just	right	for	reflexive	behaviour.	As	a	result,	actors	can	move	along	
the	 spectrum	 depending	 on	 the	 intensity	 and	 the	 number	 of	 anxieties	 that	 challenge	 their	
multi-layered	 identity	 narratives.	 For	 example,	 changing	 our	 gender	 identity	 may	 be	
reaffirming	one	 layer	 of	 our	 identity-narrative	while	 challenging	 another.	Or,	 in	 the	 case	 of	
Cyprus,	 reaching	 a	 comprehensive	 settlement	may	be	 addressing	 anxieties	 by	 affirming	 the	
European	identity	narrative	of	Turkish-Cypriots	but	at	the	same	time	challenging	their	ethnic	
identity	narratives	that	depend	on	a	historic	enmity	with	Greek-Cypriots.	Or,	the	UK	may	be	
ontologically	secure	with	regards	to	its	relationship	with	the	USA	but	not	with	the	EU.		
	
Giddens	notes	“self-identity	is	not	a	distinctive	trait,	or	even	a	collection	of	traits,	possessed	
by	 the	 individual.	 It	 is	 the	 self	as	 reflexively	understood	by	 the	person	 in	 terms	of	her	or	his	
biography.”	(Giddens	1991:53).	Therefore,	we	can	interpret	ontological	security	as	a	constant	
journey	rather	 than	an	acquired	quality	 in	 itself.	Giddens	also	explains	 that	self-identity	and	
routines	are	both	robust	and	fragile.	Self-identity	is	fragile	because	the	biography	of	the	self	is	
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only	one	‘story’	among	many	other	possible	stories	that	could	be	told	about	the	self,	and	it	is	
robust	 because	 a	 sense	 of	 self-identity	 is	 often	 securely	 held	 against	 major	 tensions	 and	
critical	 situations,	 as	 actors	 seek	 to	maintain	 their	 self-identity	 and	 resist	 change	 (Giddens	
1991).	The	same	is	valid	for	routines,	they	are	both	rigid	and	delicate,	because	even	though	
they	reproduce	trust,	 they	are	begotten	by	actors’	self-identity,	which	 is	 fluid	 (Steele	2005).	
Ontological	 security	 is	 based	 on	 the	 cumulative	 narrative	 of	 the	 self	 that	 transpires	 into	
routines.	 This	 self-biography	 is	 the	accumulation	of	experiences,	 relationships	and	 (dis)trust	
towards	some	material	and	social	world.	Every	drop	that	adds	to	this	self-narrative	affects	the	
sum	by	 reaffirming	or	challenging	 it,	 thus	 it	has	an	effect,	however	hefty	or	minute,	on	our	
sense	of	ontological	security	too.		
Since	 eliminating	 all	 anxiety	 is	 not	 possible	 or	 desirable,	 achieving	 a	 holistic	 fully	 complete	
state	 of	 ontological	 security	 too	 is	 not	 attainable	 nor	 is	 it	 desirable.	 We	 maximise	 it	 by	
planning,	routinising,	trusting,	reaffirming,	insuring	and	securitising.	It	becomes	something	we	
desire,	 but	 are	 never	 able	 to	 close	 on	 an	 end	 in	 itself	 where	 we	 are	 secure	 in	 ourselves	
completely	and	absolutely.	Pointing	 to	 Jean	Paul	Sartre’s	 “Being	and	Nothingness”,	Woolley	
argues	that	having	an	absolute	sense	of	ontological	security	would	mean	denying	our	status	as	
a	 being	 ‘for-itself’	 rather	 than	 ‘in-itself’,	 it	 is	 living	 in	 the	 past	 where	 all	 possibilities	 are	
foregone	 (Woolley	 2007:184).	 In	Derrida’s	 terms,	 state	 of	 self	 is	 always	 open,	 and	 it	 is	 this	
open-endedness	 of	 existence	 that	 allows	 us	 to	 live	 and	 experience	 being	 with	 possibilities	
(Derrida	and	Ewald	1995).	Absolute	ontological	security	would	mean	closing	the	self-narrative,	
which	 is	 effectively	 ‘non-existing’.	 Hence,	 completely	 securing	 the	 self	 in-itself	would	mean	
being	becomes	static,	and	like	‘death’,	self	becomes	that	of	the	past.	This	does	not	mean	we	
do	 not	 seek	 coherent	 consistent	 narratives	 and	 try	 to	 secure	 ourselves	 in-ourselves,	 but	
thankfully,	such	a	state	of	ontological	security	 is	unattainable.	While	Woolley	conceptualises	
ontological	security	as	a	sense	of	being	at	peace	with	the	conditions	of	ones	existence	as	one	
authentically	 experiences	 it,	 and	 terms	 it	 ‘ontological	 quietude’	 (Woolley	 2007:184),	 I	
conceptualise	 it	as	an	unfulfilled	ontological	 security	 journey	on	a	spectrum	stretching	 from	
secure	to	insecure.		
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2.5	Conclusion	
This	 chapter	 provided	 a	 literature	 review	 on	 ontological	 security,	 and	 explored	 its	 intricate	
relationship	with	identity.	Establishing	ontological	security	as	a	distinct	concept	from	security-
as-survival	 that	 can	 be	 extrapolated	 to	 states	 and	 collectives,	 the	 chapter	 adopted	 a	
conceptualisation	of	ontological	security	it	as	an	ongoing	quest	for	a	consistent	and	coherent	
biographical	 self-narrative	 rather	 than	 a	 binary	 state	 of	 being.	 Despite	 the	 inherent	
elusiveness	 of	 the	 concept,	 which	 is	 not	 overtly	 cognitive	 and	 at	 times	 beyond	 capture;	
interpreting	 Laing’s	 and	 Giddens’	 writings	 that	 beheld	 ontological	 security	 as	 a	 ‘reflexive	
project	of	 the	self’,	 I	 argue	 that	 is	best	viewed	as	a	constant	work	 in	progress	 that	 is	never	
complete,	or	 a	 journey	without	a	destination	 (Laing	1971,	Giddens	1991:5).	 In	 this	 analysis,	
absolute	ontological	security	is	neither	attainable,	nor	desirable	because	it	closes	the	door	on	
the	opportunity	for	an	authentic	life.			
In	contrast	to	the	securitisation	framework	where	security	does	not	refer	to	an	ideal	state	but	
to	a	state	where	the	self	experiences	concern	about	imminent	threat	and	danger,	in	an	ideal	
state	 of	 ontological	 security	 (towards	 the	 secure	 end	 of	 the	 spectrum),	 the	 self	 enjoys	
existential	stability,	certainty	and	continuity	and	the	actor	feels	confident	about	her	 identity	
and	 capacity	 for	 action.	 On	 the	 insecure	 end	 of	 the	 spectrum,	 the	 self	 feels	 high	 levels	 of	
existential	 anxiety	 and	 lacks	 the	 capacity	 to	 effectively	 manage	 those	 anxieties.	 While	 the	
ideal	 state	 for	 the	 securitisation	 framework	 would	 be	 a	 state	 of	 asecurity,	 where	 the	 self	
experiences	no	concerns	about	imminent	threat	or	danger,	it	is	difficult	to	talk	about	a	case	of	
ontological	 asecurity	where	 the	 self	 is	 not	 concerned	 about	pursuing	 a	 stable	 and	 constant	
identity.	 In	 such	 a	 state,	 conceptualising	 basic	 trust,	 relationships	with	 others	 and	 the	 real	
world	would	be	very	difficult,	if	not	impossible.		
This	 chapter	mainly	 aimed	 to	 add	 another	 key	 theoretical	 layer	 to	 the	 first	 chapter	 on	 the	
securitisation	 framework,	 where	 I	 argued	 for	 broadening	 it	 to	 different	 actors	 and	 beyond	
speech-acts.	Since	multi-directional	institutionalised	securitisations	can	escape	the	securitising	
actors’	 discourses	 and	 result	 in	 cognitive	 and	 behavioural	 changes,	 they	 are	 closely	
intertwined	with	ontological	security	due	to	their	innately	performative	nature.	Consequently,	
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because	 security-as-being	 is	 as	 important	 for	 actors,	 if	 not	more	 so,	 as	 physical	 security	 or	
security	as	survival,	conflation	of	the	two	in	the	literature	limited	the	way	we	understand	the	
relationship	between	security	and	identity	and	the	way	we	theorise	desecuritisation.	Thanks	
to	 this	 distinction,	 desecuritisation	 of	 identities	 in	 protracted	 conflicts	 that	 is	 integral	 to	
peacebuilding	 efforts	 can	 be	 achieved	 without	 endangering	 or	 undermining	 group	
distinctiveness,	or	replacing	one	enemy	other	with	the	next.	Therefore,	without	unpacking	the	
distinctions	 between	 ontological	 security	 and	 security-as-survival,	 and	 a	 more	 nuanced	
understanding	 of	 identity,	 we	 cannot	 fully	 grasp	 the	 prospects	 of	 desecuritisation	 for	
peacebuilding,	which	leads	us	to	the	next	chapter	that	adds	the	third	dimension	to	the	nexus,	
namely	desecuritisation	and	ontological	security.		
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Chapter	3.	Ontological	security,	(De)Securitisation	and	the	Peacebuilding	Nexus	
3.1	Introduction:	Contextualising	the	theoretical	framework	
	
Protracted	conflicts	provide	a	fertile	ground	for	institutionalised	securitisations,	spatially	and	
temporally,	to	establish	norms,	rules,	myths,	stories	and	institutions	that	categorically	define	
and	 essentialise	 who	 belongs	 and	 who	 does	 not,	 and	 securitisations	 that	 become	
institutionalised	 to	 an	 extent	 that	 they	 no	 longer	 need	 explicit	 articulations	 to	 justify	 their	
status,	pose	a	particular	challenge	for	desecuritisation	(Hansen	2012).	As	previously	discussed,	
securitisation	of	identities	in	protracted	conflict	environments	can	become	rooted	in	identity	
narratives,	where	they	become	a	perpetual	source	of	threat	engrained	in	history,	 in	 ‘chosen	
traumas’	 and	 ‘chosen	 glories’	 that	 make	 up	 that	 history	 (see	 Volkan	 1997).	 As	 such,	 the	
conflict	 itself	 can	 become	 a	 source	 for	 ontological	 security	 where	 the	 collective	 identity	 is	
consolidated	 vis-à-vis	 an	 enemy-other	 and	 the	 conflict	 producing	 routines	 reinforce	 and	
reproduce	identity	narratives	(Fierke	2007:112).		
	
As	 Rumelili	 warns,	 securitisation	 processes	 that	 reify	 identities	 and	 challenge	 their	
negotiability	and	flexibility,	leave	self	with	little	or	no	capacity	to	transform	its	relation	toward	
the	 other,	 while	 preserving	 its	 ontological	 security	 (Rumelili	 2011).	 Transforming	 those	
identity	 narratives	 out	 of	 the	 conceptual	 realm	 of	security	 can	be	 extremely	 difficult,	 and	
without	 the	 distinction	 between	 security-as-being	 and	 security-as-survival	 we	 obstruct	 the	
potential	 transformative	 effects	 of	 desecuritisation,	 running	 it	 into	 a	 vicious	 cycle.	 Not	
accounting	for	ontological	security	considerations	in	desecuritisation	strategies	can	lock	actors	
into	self-perpetuating	conflict	producing	routines.	Consequently,	sustainable	desecuritisation	
especially	 in	 protracted	 conflicts	 necessitates	 a	 two-fold	process	where	 removal	 of	 physical	
security	 issues	 is	 complemented	 with	 reconfiguration	 of	 self/other	 relations	 in	 order	 to	
alleviate	ontological	security	challenges.		
	
Despite	 the	 CS’s	 normative	 commitment,	 processes,	 conditions	 and	 consequences	 of	
desecuritisation	 have	 remained	 relatively	 under-theorised	 almost	 like	 an	 afterthought	 to	
securitisation	 (Aradau	 2004,	 Rumelili	 2011,	 Hansen	 2012).	 Ole	 Wæver	 coined	 the	 term	
desecuritisation	as	the	mirror	image	of	securitisation,	where	desecuritisation	is	conceived	as	
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the	opposite	direction	of	a	 securitisation	process	where	a	 security	 issue	 is	unmade	 (Wæver	
1995).	Once	sufficiently	subdued,	countered	or	resolved,	the	threat	hypothetically	ceases	to	
exist,	 or	 to	 be	 articulated	 in	 existential	 terms,	 returning	 to	 the	 realm	 of	 normal	 public	
discourse.	However,	when	both	the	referent	and	threats	are	ultimately	about	 identities	and	
the	threat	is	embedded	in	the	identity	narratives,	where	does	desecuritisation	leave	the	self	in	
relation	to	the	other?	How	can	the	self	move	from	a	securitised	to	a	desecuritised	relationship	
with	the	other	while	its	very	identity	depends	on	this	relationship?	What	happens	to	the	self	
once	 we	 take	 the	 threat	 out	 of	 the	 self-narrative	 that	 is	 constructed	 in	 opposition	 to	 an	
enemy?				
	
Consequently,	 we	 cannot	 study	 desecuritisation	 when	 the	 referent	 object	 is	 the	 collective	
identity	of	a	group	without	looking	at	varying	self/other	configurations	that	are	constructed	as	
a	result	of	-	and	prior	to	-	securitisation	processes.	The	main	aim	of	this	chapter	to	establish	
the	link	between	(de)securitisation,	ontological	security	and	peacebuilding	and	to	unpack	this	
nexus	 through	 a	 more	 refined	 discussion	 in	 order	 to	 help	 contextualise	 the	 theoretical	
framework	 for	 the	 case	 study	 at	 hand.	 In	 doing	 so,	 the	 chapter	 helps	 establish	 the	 full	
theoretical	 framework	 that	 is	 used	 to	 analyse	 the	 historical	 context	 of	 Cyprus	 and	 the	
empirical	data,	and	provides	the	thesis	with	the	necessary	tools	to	assess	the	role	of	Turkish	
immigrants	 in	 peacebuilding	 in	 Cyprus.	 To	 that	 end,	 I	 first	 present	 the	 different	
desecuritisation	approaches	 in	 the	 literature	and	establish	a	normative	commitment	 for	 the	
concept.	 The	 second	 section	 discusses	 the	 concept	 of	 peace-anxieties	 that	 illustrate	 the	
delicate	 relationship	 between	 (de)securitisation	 and	 ontological	 security,	 which	 can	 turn	
peace	 into	 an	 insecure	 experience.	 In	 the	 third	 section,	 I	 explore	 different	 self/other	
configurations	that	allow	us	to	imagine	the	self	outside	of	a	securitised	relationship	with	the	
other.	 Finally,	 I	 ask	 whether	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 envision	 the	 ‘self’	 without	 ‘enemies’	 and	
extrapolate	this	question	to	the	case	of	Cyprus.		
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3.2	Conceptualising	desecuritisation	
Although	 the	 theory	 of	 securitisation	 allows	 for	 the	 possibility	 of	 desecuritisation,	 its	
understanding	of	identity	as	an	‘external	factor’	(Wæver	1998:69)	significantly	constrains	that	
possibility.	Despite	the	CS’s	normative	preference	for	desecuritisation,	it	is	widely	recognised	
that	the	concept	of	desecuritisation	is	left	highly	under-theorised	and	its	application	is	at	best	
unsystematic	and	inconsistent	in	the	literature	(Hansen	2000,	Aradau	2004,	Huysmans	2006,	
Taureck	 2006,	 Coskun	 2011).	 For	 example,	 the	 rather	 obvious	 relationship	 between	
desecuritisation	 and	 reconciliation	 was	 left	 unexplored	 by	 both	 the	 Copenhagen	 and	 Paris	
Schools.	However,	 the	 recent	 literature	addressing	 this	 gap	has	been	growing	exponentially	
(Noble	2005,	Coskun	2008,	Kay	2012,	Lupovici	2012,	Mitchell	2015,	Rumelili	2015,	Çelik	2015).		
Buzan	 and	 Wæver	 define	 desecuritisation	 as	 “a	 process	 in	 which	 a	 political	 community	
downgrades	or	ceases	to	treat	something	as	an	existential	threat	to	a	valued	referent	object,	
and	 reduces	 or	 stops	 calling	 for	 exceptional	measures	 to	 deal	with	 the	 threat”	 (Buzan	 and	
Wæver	2003:489).	The	assumption	is	that	if	a	particular	phenomenon	can	be	constituted	as	a	
security	issue	through	discourse,	it	can	also	be	desecuritised	at	some	point,	where	it	re-enters	
the	 realm	 of	 normal	 politics.	 Wæver	 suggests	 that	 security	 approaches	 are	 inherently	
defensive,	hence	they	can	prove	to	be	an	ineffective	way	of	dealing	with	some	issues,	because	
they	lock	people	into	talking	in	terms	of	security	and	reiterating	the	threat	(Wæver	1995).		
Securitisation	 can	 happen	 at	multiple	 fronts,	meaning	multiple	 political,	 economic,	 societal	
issues	 can	 simultaneously	 be	 securitised	 as	 threats	 to	 a	 referent	 object’s	 survival,	 which	
cultivates	fear.	Living	in	a	constant	state	of	fear	that	has	multiple	sources	is	far	from	ideal.	In	
fact,	if	the	ideal	state	is	asecurity	as	opposed	to	(in)security,	where	there	are	no	threats	and	
no	fear,	desecuritisation	of	at	 least	some	security	 issues	back	to	the	politics	of	 ‘normality’	 is	
necessary	 to	 move	 on,	 to	 manage	 fear	 without	 creating	 a	 prevalent	 state	 of	 panic,	 or	 to	
mobilise	 resources	 for	 another	 securitisation	 process	 that	 is	 prioritised	 by	 the	 securitising	
actors.	 Desecuritisation	 does	 not	 only	 open	 up	 a	 more	 inclusive	 platform	 for	 public	
deliberation,	but	also	transforms	the	identities	and	interests	of	self	and	others	by	loosing	the	
friend-enemy	distinction.		
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The	 CS’s	 view	 of	 securitisation	 is	 negative	 in	 itself,	 as	 it	 elevates	 issues	 to	 a	 state	 of	
emergency,	 and	 consequently,	 it	 creates	 political	 deadlocks,	 inefficiency,	 secrecy	 and	 fear.	
Conversely,	desecuritisation	moves	them	back	to	the	normal	politics	of	deliberation,	which	is	
at	least	the	case	for	liberal	democracies	(Buzan,	Wæver	et	al.	1998).	Even	though	the	CS	does	
not	 rule	 out	 that	 securitisation	 can	 be	 normatively	 justified	 in	 certain	 circumstances	 and	
recognises	 that	 the	 mobilisation	 power	 and	 resources	 inherent	 to	 the	
securitisation	framework	 can	be	 used	 pragmatically	 for	 ‘good’	 ends,	 their	 reluctance	 in	
promoting	such	an	approach	is	very	explicit.	Since	securitisation	needs	desecuritisation	as	its	
constitutive	 and	 equally	 political	 mirror	 image	 to	 achieve	 analytical	 and	 political	 meaning,	
Huysmans	 maintains	 that	 the	 preference	 for	 desecuritisation	 is	 technical,	 managerial	 and	
instrumental,	rather	than	genuinely	political	or	ethical	(Hansen	2012)	(Huysmans	1998).		
	
Still,	preference	for	desecurisation	can	also	be	normative	and	ethical.	Hanrieder	and	Kreuder-
Sonnen	warn	 that	 organisations	 and	 institutions	 involved	 in	 security	 practices	 are	 prone	 to	
what	they	call	the	‘emergency	trap’,	meaning	the	effectiveness	and	mobilisation	provided	by	
securitisation	can	become	addictive	and	reoccurring	(Hanrieder	and	Kreuder-Sonnen	2014).	In	
other	words,	reducing	the	obstacles	in	dealing	with	issues	through	securitisation	increases	the	
incentives	 and	 makes	 it	 easier	 for	 institutions	 to	 reactivate	 the	 language	 of	 security.	 For	
example,	 the	 World	 Health	 Organisation	 (WHO)	 may	 have	 increased	 the	 effectiveness	 of	
dealing	 with	 the	 SARS	 crisis	 in	 2003	 through	 securitisation,	 but	 this	 led	 to	 the	
institutionalisation	of	emergency	powers	within	the	organisation,	which	made	it	easier	for	the	
WHO	 to	 securitise	 other	 outbreaks	 without	 much	 deliberation	 (Hanrieder	 and	 Kreuder-
Sonnen	2014).	Therefore,	the	legal	and	institutional	consequences	of	securitisation	can	in	fact	
be	 more	 far	 reaching	 than	 the	 pragmatic	 concerns	 about	 mobilising	 power	 and	 resources	
because	the	logic	of	emergency	is	not	only	a	transient	mode	of	political	decision	making	but	
can	transform	institutional	structures	by	providing	them	with	the	allure	and	the	precedent	of	
setting	 the	 ‘exception’.	 This	 can	 be	 particularly	 unfavourable,	 if	 not	 outright	 detrimental,	
when	it	comes	to	framing	issues	about	society	and	identity	within	a	threat-defence	sequence.	
Thus,	desecuritisation	is	not	only	an	alternative	strategy	in	cases	where	elevation	to	a	state	of	
emergency	 is	 not	 an	 effective	 way	 of	 dealing	 with	 issues,	 but	 also	 it	 becomes	 more	 of	 a	
normative	commitment	when	issues	are	particularly	about	identity	and	society.		
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If	securitisation	is	seen	as	a	top-down	political	choice,	and	we	approach	desecuritisation	as	a	
reverse	 equation	 as	 such,	 then	 this	 implies	 that	 the	 same	 components	 present	 in	 a	
securitisation	 process	 (securitising	 actor,	 audience,	 speech-act	 and	 facilitating	 conditions)	
should	be	present	 in	 desecuritisation	 as	well.	However,	Hansen	highlights	 the	performative	
nature	of	desecuritisation,	stating	that	desecuritisation	is	not	a	linguistic	or	political	two-step	
procedure	where	first	‘we’	have	to	agree	that	X	is	no	longer	threatening	and	then,	‘we’	agree	
to	 stop	 speaking	 security	 (Hansen	 2012:533).	 As	 such,	 if	 we	 adopt	 a	 broader	 approach	 to	
securitisation,	 where	 processes	 can	 move	 bottom-up	 and	 horizontal,	 where	 they	 can	 be	
accumulated	and	negotiated,	where	 they	are	both	discursive	and	performative,	where	once	
institutionalised	 they	 result	 in	 cognitive	 and	 behavioural	 change	 and	 where	 they	 can	 be	
initiated	and	reproduced	by	other	actors,	 then	we	also	need	to	broaden	our	theorisation	of	
desecuritisation	too.		
	
As	 far	 as	 the	 question	 of	 how	 to	 desecuritise	 is	 concerned,	 the	 CS	 merely	 outlines	 three	
options	that	I	label	as	pre-emptive,	retroactive	and	reversive	respectively:	1)	not	to	talk	about	
issues	in	terms	of	security	in	the	first	place;	2)	once	an	issue	has	been	securitised,	try	not	to	
generate	 security	 dilemmas	 and	 vicious	 cycles;	 and	 3)	 to	 move	 security	 issues	 back	 into	
‘normal’	 politics	 (Buzan	 and	 Wæver	 2003:253).	 Bezen	 Coşkun,	 who	 simply	 describes	
desecuritisation	 as	 the	 fading	 away	 of	 a	 particular	 issue	 from	 the	 security	 agenda	 when	
certain	 threats	 are	 no	 longer	 valid	 or	 have	 been	 replaced	 with	 more	 powerful	 threat	
perceptions,	highlights	the	difficulty	of	using	desecuritisation	as	an	explanatory	framework	as	
the	three	options	outlined	by	the	CS	are	too	imprecise	and	vague	when	it	comes	to	empirical	
application	(Coskun	2008).	The	theoretical	inferiority	attached	to	desecuritisation	is	evident	as	
while	 the	CS	delves	 into	analysing	 the	quality	of	securitising	actors	 for	different	sectors	and	
regions	in	detail,	who	can	be	a	desecuritising	actor,	how	desecuritisation	can	be	applied	and	
what	 kind	of	 qualities	 or	 facilitating	 factors	 are	 necessary	 for	 desecuritisation	 is	 left	 almost	
untouched.	
	
Since	 securitisation	 in	 the	 societal	 sector	 is	 about	 threats	 to	 identity,	 we	 can	 assume	 that	
desecuritisation	 in	 the	 societal	 sector	 requires	a	 level	of	 acceptance	 that	 two	 identities	 can	
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coexist	(Coskun	2008);	or	at	the	very	least,	recognise	each	other	as	legitimate.	In	protracted	
conflicts,	 the	 pre-emptive	 option	 (not	 to	 talk	 about	 issues	 in	 terms	 of	 security	 in	 the	 first	
place)	and	 the	 retroactive	option	 (to	avoid	 the	generation	of	 security	dilemmas	and	vicious	
cycles)	 are	 not	 conceivable	 because	 even	 if	 non-violent,	 protracted	 conflicts	 have	 deeply	
embedded	daily	narratives	and	routines	that	perpetuate	the	security-ness,	and	render	these	
two	desecuritisation	options	 implausible.	On	 the	other	hand,	 the	 reversive	option	 (to	move	
security	issues	back	into	‘normal’	politics)	assumes	that	the	same	actors	who	were	part	of	the	
securitisation	process	and	who	reproduced	their	identity	narratives	in	response	to	an	enemy	
other	 can	 initiate	desecuritisation	by	 renegotiating	emergency	measures	 and	 conveying	 the	
reinterpretation	 of	 the	 threat	 to	 the	 relevant	 audience,	 which	 seems	 particularly	 elusive	
within	 the	 broader	 understanding	 of	 securitisation.	Within	 the	 broader	 approach,	 cognitive	
and	behavioural	 change	 can	 occur	without	 emergency	measures,	 and	 emergency	measures	
are	 not	 only	 limited	 to	 security	 policies	 but	 also	 include	 social	 and	 civil	 movements	 and	
interactions.	 Consequently,	 securitisation	 does	 not	 necessarily	 escape	 ‘normal	 politics’	 but	
prevalently	redefines	certain	identities	and	groups	within	a	threat-defence	sequence	based	on	
survival,	 which	 thwarts	 compromise	 and	 reconciliation	 efforts,	 and	 hence	 makes	
desecuritisation	particularly	difficult	in	conflict	environments.		
	
On	 the	 other	 hand,	 Hansen,	 who	 underlines	 the	 tenuous	 definition	 and	 application	 of	
desecuritisation	 in	 the	 literature,	 identifies	 four	 forms	 of	 desecuritisation:	 Replacement,	
silencing,	 change	 through	 stabilisation	 and	 re-articulation	 (Hansen	 2012).	 Replacement	 and	
silencing	 seem	 like	 the	 more	 straight	 forward	 modalities,	 where	 the	 former	 conceives	
desecuritisation	 as	 the	 combination	 of	 one	 issue	 moving	 out	 of	 security	 while	 another	 is	
simultaneously	securitised,	and	the	latter	happens	when	the	issue	is	obliterated,	repressed,	or	
it	 disappears	 or	 fails	 to	 register	 in	 security	 discourse	 (Browning	 and	 Joenniemi	 2010).	
However,	once	a	 threat	 is	 explicitly	 articulated	and	 institutionalised,	 the	 likelihood	of	 these	
simply	 disappearing	 ‘on	 their	 own’	 without	 intentional	 suppression	 is	 quite	 small	 (Hansen	
2012).	 Further,	while	 change	 through	 stabilisation	 (détente)	 implies	 a	 slow	move	out	 of	 an	
explicit	security	discourse,	which	facilitates	a	less	militaristic,	less	violent	and	more	genuinely	
political	 form	of	engagement,	 rearticulation	suggests	a	more	direct,	 radical	 form	of	political	
and	 social	 engagement	 where	 a	 political	 solution	 is	 reached	 for	 the	 threats,	 dangers,	 and	
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grievances	 in	 question	 or	 where	 the	 threats	 are	 rearticulated	 out	 of	 the	 survivalistic	 logic	
based	 on	 enmity.	 Even	 though	 Hansen	 argues	 détente	 seems	 to	 have	 disappeared	 from	
political	 and	 academic	 use,	 not	 only	 as	 a	 concept,	 but	 also	 as	 a	 way	 to	 understand	
desecuritisation	since	the	end	of	the	Cold	War	(Hansen	2012),	I	maintain	that	they	are	more	
interconnected	than	Hansen’s	initial	analysis	which	fails	to	account	for	the	ontological	security	
needs	of	the	actors.		
	
In	 essence,	 stabilisation	 can	 be	 conceived	 as	 a	 facilitating	 tool	 for	 rearticulation	 since	
rearticulation	would	be	very	difficult	without	stabilisation	(i.e.	ongoing	violence).	Stabilisation	
normalises	the	existence	of	the	threat	and	accepts	the	situation,	 integrating	 it	 into	daily	 life	
and	routines	without	a	comprehensive	resolution.	Yet,	while	it	may	help	manage	anxieties,	it	
does	 not	 address	 insecurities	 in	 a	 transformative	 way.	 For	 example,	 opening	 political	
communication	channels	between	Cuba	and	the	USA,	or	Iran	and	the	USA	can	be	considered	
as	 attempts	 at	 stabilising	a	 securitised	 relationship,	which	provides	 the	opportunity	 for	 and	
facilitates	 rearticulation.	 This	 approach	 does	 bear	 similarities	 with	 Rumelili’s	 two-level	
analysis,	 as	 rearticulation	 of	 self/other	 configurations	 need	 to	 take	 ontological	 security	
dimension	into	account	to	manage	existential	anxieties.	For	instance,	it	could	be	argued	that	
Greece-Turkey	relations	first	stabilised	after	the	Imia/Kardak	incident	in	1995	where	the	two	
parties	were	engaged	 in	military	 confrontation	over	 the	 small	 island	of	 Imia/Kardak,	before	
they	 were	 successfully	 rearticulated	 post-earthquake	 incidents	 in	 1999	 (see	 Rumelili	 2005,	
Şahin	2010).	Without	rearticulation,	resecuritisation	of	a	 ‘stabilised’	 issue	would	continue	to	
loom	in	the	background	like	in	the	case	of	Turkey	and	the	Kurdish	Workers’	Party	(PKK);	where	
the	cease-fire	declared	 in	2013	temporally	stabilised	the	conflict	and	provided	the	space	for	
diplomacy	and	dialogue,	but	the	failure	 in	rearticulation	of	the	self/other	narratives	saw	the	
violence	 reignite	 in	 2015.	 According	 to	 Ayşe	 Çelik,	 the	 process	 that	 remained	 exclusively	
focused	on	the	bargaining	between	the	PKK	and	the	Turkish	state,	failed	to	include	measures	
that	promote	 reconciliation	at	 the	 societal	 level,	 and	construct	new	narratives	and	 routines	
that	could	help	maintain	the	sense	of	ontological	security	(Çelik	2015).		
	
Even	 though	 stabilisation	 of	 a	militarised	 or	 a	 confrontational	 relationship	may	 be	 the	 first	
step	 before	 rearticulation,	 this	 is	more	 of	 an	 empirical	 question.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 Cyprus,	we	
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could	 argue	 that	 normalisation	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 RoC	 and	 Turkey	 (i.e.	
implementation	of	 the	Ankara	protocol)	 can	be	 a	 form	of	 stabilisation	 strategy	 to	pave	 the	
way	 for	 rearticulation	 and	 reconfiguration	 of	 the	 friend-enemy	 relationship.	 However,	
considering	Turkish-Cypriots	securitise	Turkish	immigrants	and	Turkishness	only	on	the	social	
level,	without	 a	 securitised	 political	 relationship	with	 the	 Republic	 of	 Turkey,	 rearticulation	
and	reconfiguration	of	Turkish	immigrants	as	a	threat	to	distinct	Turkish-Cypriot	identity	does	
not	necessarily	rely	on	stabilisation.		
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3.3	The	delicate	relationship:	Can	peace	be	an	insecure	experience?	
Failing	to	account	for	ontological	security	would	obscure	the	potential	of	desecuritisation	for	
transformative	peace,	where	peace	is	not	only	agreed	on	paper	but	experienced	socially	(see	
Kay	2012).	Considering	 securitisation	 reifies	 identities	 and	 challenges	 their	negotiability	 and	
flexibility,	it	is	important	that	desecuritisation	reconfigures	self/other	relations	from	a	state	of	
insecurity	 to	one	of	asecurity	without	 inducing	unmanageable	existential	anxieties	 (Williams	
2003).	 Investigating	 the	 road	 to	 transformative	 peace,	 Sean	 Kay	 argues	 that	 while	
peacemaking	can	be	explained	by	rational	actor	models	that	focus	on	negotiating	‘objective’	
issues,	constraints	on	peacebuilding	remain	ontologically	driven,	which	explains	the	dramatic	
decrease	 in	 violence	 but	 the	 persistence	 of	 existential	 anxieties	 in	 Northern	 Ireland	 (Kay	
2012).	Comparatively,	despite	 the	 fact	 that	violence	has	been	non-existent	 (except	 sporadic	
hooliganism	and	vandalism	incidents)	since	the	opening	of	borders	in	2003,	opinion	polls	and	
referenda	 predictions	 show	 that	 insecurities	 and	 anxieties	 attached	 to	 achieving	 a	
comprehensive	settlement	in	Cyprus	are	still	very	strong.	
Rumelili	explains	ontological	security	and	 insecurity-as-survival,	or	ontological	 insecurity	and	
asecurity	 as	 survival,	 are	 not	 sustainable	 states	 of	 security	 (Rumelili	 2004).	 In	 other	words,	
actors’	 concerns	 about	 survival	 are	 likely	 to	 destabilise	 security-as-being,	 and	 insecurity-as-
being	may	 generate	 concerns	 about	 survival	 as	 actors	will	 turn	 to	 securitisation	 to	 reaffirm	
their	identity	narratives	and	find	an	identifiable	threat	to	channel	their	existential	anxieties	in	
search	for	a	more	stable	identity	(Rumelili	2011).	Within	this	framework	of	analysis,	the	ideal	
state	 and	 normative	 view	 of	 security	 is	 the	 state	 of	 ontological	 security/physical	 asecurity,	
where	 the	 self	 is	 secure	 about	 its	 biographical	 continuity	 and	 self-identity	 and	 does	 not	
experience	a	concern	about	 imminent	threat	or	danger.	 In	such	a	state,	actors	can	maintain	
the	self/other	distinctions	without	seeing	the	other	as	a	threat.	Conversely,	where	security-as-
survival	and	security-as-being	contradict	one	another,	actors	are	tempted	to	translate	anxiety,	
which	has	no	identifiable	object,	into	fear,	which	is	easier	to	pin	down.	The	powerful	drive	in	
humans	to	maintain	the	sense	of	self-identity	and	biographical	continuity	that	dispels	fear	of	
changing	too	fast	or	against	one’s	will	makes	all	actors	ontological	security	seekers	(see	Sigel	
1989).	 As	 Browning	 notes,	 “fear	 often	 operates	 as	 a	 means	 of	 escaping	 (or	 sidestepping)	
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anxiety”,	because	constituting	an	enemy	can	become	an	easy	way	of	reaffirming	a	particular	
notion	of	collective	self	(Browning	2016:167).		
	
Tajfel	explains	that	because	groups	provide	a	sense	of	belonging	and	self-esteem,	individuals	
tend	to	favour	their	own	group	(ingroup)	 in	relation	to	other	groups	(outgroups)	even	when	
the	group	formation	per	se	is	relatively	meaningless	(Tajfel	1982,	Tajfel	2010).	However,	this	
does	 not	mean	 that	 group	membership	 is	 static,	 or	 exclusive	 or	 singular;	 they	 can	 overlap,	
dissolve	or	emerge.	Our	relationship	with	the	collective	group	is	co-constructed,	meaning	the	
group	narratives	affect	our	 self-identity	and	a	 change	 in	our	 identity-narratives	 could	affect	
our	group	or	our	membership.	Actors	who	feel	existentially	uncertain	(towards	the	 insecure	
end	of	 the	 spectrum)	 seek	 to	 reaffirm	 their	 self-identity	by	drawing	 closer	 to	any	 collective	
that	is	perceived	as	being	able	to	reduce	insecurity	and	existential	anxiety	(Kinnvall	2004).	Any	
collective	 identity	 that	 can	 provide	 such	 security	 is	 a	 potential	 pole	 of	 attraction	 because	
collective	 identities	 are	 institutionalised	 and	 embedded	 in	 historical	 narratives	 that	 reach	
beyond	 their	 members	 and	 provide	 a	 sense	 of	 immortality.	 For	 example,	 nation-states	 or	
religious	 communities	 can	 offer	 both	 the	 strong	 narrative	 for	 individuals	 to	 anchor	 their	
identities	historically,	and	a	primordial	relationship	to	a	certain	territory	(Kinnvall	2004:763).		
	
Thus,	actors	inevitably	tend	to	intensify	their	connections	to	the	respective	identity	group	that	
they	perceive	can	ensure	their	safety.	 In	pursuance	of	the	preservation	and	reaffirmation	of	
the	 collective-self,	 groups	 will	 often	 advocate	 policy	 solutions	 connected	 to	 the	 values	
embodied	within	the	context	of	their	respective	identities.	As	a	result,	competing	groups	may	
increasingly	come	to	view	one	another	as	obstacles	to	a	desired	stability,	threats	to	an	object	
of	value	or	as	 impediments	 to	a	particular	 goal.	Within	 this	process,	 self	 and	other	become	
essentialised	 bodies,	 which	 reduces	 them	 to	 a	 number	 of	 subjectively	 fabricated	
characteristics	 that	 are	 perceived	 as	 natural	 and	 unified	 signifiers	 for	 groups;	 those	 on	 the	
outside	lack	the	traits	that	are	valued	by	the	self	(Kinnvall	2004).	Securitising	subjectivity	in	an	
attempt	to	re-affirm	self-identity	based	on	exclusive	collective	narratives	involves	a	process	of	
turning	the	stranger	into	an	enemy,	through	which	self	is	sacralised	by	demonising	the	other	
(Kinnvall	 2004).	 In	 other	words,	 communities	 establish	 norms,	 routines	 and	 institutions	 to	
identify	who	belongs	and	who	does	not	 in	an	attempt	to	narrate	their	 identities	and	bolster	
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their	ontological	security;	those,	who	are	on	the	insecure	end	of	the	spectrum,	are	more	likely	
to	 establish	 an	 inherently	 securitised	 relationship	 with	 the	 other	 and	 come	 to	 portray	
‘outsiders’	 as	 threats	 to	 their	 safety,	which	 increases	 the	 likelihood	of	 conflict	 and	 violence	
between	groups.		
	
‘Insecure’	 actors	 repeatedly	 attempt	 to	 create	 a	 secure	 base	 for	 their	 identity	 narratives,	
which	 prompts	 defensive	 positioning	 that	 is	 prone	 to	 securitisation	 (see	 Young	 1999).	
Routines	and	habits	that	are	integral	to	actors’	quest	for	ontological	security	can	take	a	life	of	
their	own	(Hopf	2010,	Kay	2012).	Giddens	explains	blind	commitment	to	established	routines	
as	a	sign	of	neurotic	compulsion	due	to	lack	of	basic	trust;	“It	is	a	compulsiveness	born	out	of	
unmastered	 anxiety,	 which	 lacks	 that	 specific	 hope	which	 creates	 social	 involvements	 over	
and	 above	 established	 patterns”	 (Giddens	 1991:40).	 Without	 basic	 trust,	 actors	 lack	 the	
capacity	to	act	or	think	creatively	in	relation	to	routines.	According	to	Giddens,	“trust	itself,	by	
its	very	nature,	is	in	a	certain	sense	creative,	because	it	entails	a	commitment	that	is	a	‘leap	
into	the	unknown’”	(Giddens	1991:41).	Lack	of	creative	and	reflexive	capacity,	because	of	the	
compulsive	enactment	of	 routines,	or	because	of	 lack	of	basic	 trust	 in	relation	to	social	and	
material	environment,	can	trigger	chronic	melancholic	or	schizophrenic	tendencies.	Adapting	
routines	and	behaviours	to	alleviate	anxieties	or	maintaining	the	right	amount	of	anxiety	that	
allows	for	self-reflexivity	without	translating	it	into	securitisation	can	be	particularly	hard	for	
collective	identities	due	to	their	institutionalised	and	self-perpetuating	quality.		
	
Under	‘critical	situations’	the	self	is	tempted	to	fortify	the	borders	of	its	identity,	more	often	
than	 not,	 by	 turning	 to	 exclusivist	 rhetoric	 to	 differentiate	 between	 members	 and	 non-
members.	 ‘Chosen	 traumas’,	 and	 their	 opposites,	 ‘chosen	 glories’	 that	 bolster	 collective	
harmony	and	self-esteem	provide	comforting	stories	in	times	of	intensified	existential	anxiety.	
(see	Volkan	1997)	Yet,	making	ethnic	memories,	traumas	or	narratives	an	integral	part	of	the	
collective	 self-identity	 reduces	 ontological	 security	 to	 upholding	 a	 particular	 securitised	
identity,	which	means	 closing	 the	door	on	 reflexivity	 (Browning	2016).	 Some	actors	may	be	
less	capable	than	others	to	reflexively	monitor	their	actions,	due	to	their	historical	narratives,	
failed	nation-building	(infancy),	high	levels	of	existential	anxiety,	perpetuating	conflict,	or	due	
to	their	systems	of	government,	institutional	structures	or	regimes.	In	such	situations,	actors	
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resort	 to	 xenophobic,	 fundamentalist,	 exclusive	 and	 populist	 accounts	 of	 nationalism,	
ethnicity	 and	 religion	 as	 an	 ontological	 security	 seeking	 strategy	 (Kinnvall	 2004,	 Roe	 2008,	
Browning	and	Joenniemi	2013).		
	
Although	ontological	security	 is	 inter-dependent	but	by	no	means	the	same	as	discourses	of	
securitisation,	for	the	very	reason	that	securitisation	is	an	easy	resort	to	reinforce	ontological	
security,	actors	can	find	themselves	in	conflict-producing	routines	(Mitzen	2006).	Particularly	
in	protracted	conflicts,	there	is	a	strong	tendency	to	see	the	security	needs	of	the	rival	identity	
narratives	as	zero-sum	and	to	assume	that	one’s	own	security	and	identity	can	be	protected	
or	enhanced	by	depriving	the	other	of	security	and	identity	(Kelman	1997:68).	Consequently,	
peace	processes	that	do	not	predicate	on	adaptation	of	self-narratives	and	routines	are	bound	
to	 remain	 vulnerable	 to	 resecuritisation	 or	 at	 worse,	 reignition	 of	 violence.	 Yet,	
desecuritisation	 cannot	 leave	 the	 existing	 identity	 constructions	 intact	 because	 those	
antagonistic	and	threatening	relationships	embedded	in	protracted	conflict	environments	are	
part	 of	 the	 narrative	 that	 establishes	 the	 boundaries	 of	 a	 distinct-self.	 Ontological	 security	
considerations	 are	 crucial	 for	 desecuritisation	 to	 be	 successful	 and	 sustainable	 in	
reconfiguring	the	self/other	relationships	based	on	representations	of	threat	and	enemy.	
	
Consequently,	 this	begs	the	question	of	how	the	self	can	move	from	a	securitised	to	a	non-
securitised	relation	with	the	other	while	its	very	identity	is	dependent	on	this	relationship.	In	
other	 words,	 how	 do	 we	 desecuritise	 threat	 perceptions	 embedded	 in	 identity	 narratives	
without	creating	existential	anxieties	that	challenge	self-identity	and	hence	trigger	ontological	
insecurity?	Opening	up	the	securitisation	framework	to	a	broader	range	of	actors	and	beyond	
the	speech-act,	and	understanding	 it	as	a	multi-directional	negotiated	process	could	help	us	
better	 theorise	 desecuritisation	 and	 identify	 actors	 who	 can	 initiate	 sustainable	
desecuritisation	 practices.	Without	 underestimating	 the	 importance	 of	 external	 factors	 and	
political	will	on	the	part	of	the	political	elite	for	peacemaking,	broadening	and	extending	the	
analysis	 can	 help	 us	 place	 actors	 such	 as	 civil	 society	 and	 media	 at	 the	 heart	 of	
desecuritisation	 and	 provide	 us	 with	 more	 tools	 to	 support	 the	 bottom-up	 and	 horizontal	
reconfiguration	of	narratives	in	a	creative	and	reflexive	way.	‘Peace’	cannot	merely	be	agreed	
on	by	 the	political	 elite,	 it	 also	 needs	 to	 be	believed	 in	 by	 the	 audience.	 In	 other	words,	 it	
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needs	to	entail	a	shift	in	enemy	perceptions	and	exclusive	identity	narratives,	and	reconfigure	
the	 enemy	 or	 the	 threatening	 other	 into	 a	 partner,	 a	 parent,	 a	 neighbour	 or	 a	 friend.	 To	
address	our	lack	of	understanding	and	capacity	to	deal	with	effective,	emotional,	perceptual	
and	 the	 not	 overtly	 cognitive	 experience	 of	 peacebuilding	 we	 need	 to	 acknowledge	 the	
intricate	relationship	between	desecuritisation	and	ontological	security.		
	
Protracted	 conflicts	 often	 endure	 because	 despite	 the	 discernible	 threat	 posed	 to	 physical	
security	in	terms	of	ineffective	use	of	resources,	damage	to	infrastructure,	or	loss	of	life,	they	
uphold	and	reaffirm	a	sense	of	certainty	about	both	self-identity	and	the	identity	of	the	other	
(Mitzen	2006,	Steele	2008,	Rumelili	2015).	By	contrast,	desecuritisation	produces	anxiety,	as	it	
requires	flexibility	and	openness	towards	reconceptualising	the	identities	 involved	in	conflict	
and	accepting	that	 the	world	might	not	actually	be	how	we	think	 it	 is.	Desecuritisation	as	a	
peacebuilding	strategy	needs	questions	about	who	will	we	be	if	our	enemy	was	not	an	enemy	
after	 all	 or	 if	 we	 were	 more	 similar	 to	 the	 enemy	 than	 we	 thought.	 Faced	 with	 such	 an	
anxiety-inducing	prospect	of	self-questioning,	if	not	handled	with	care,	reconciliation	may	well	
be	rejected	in	favour	of	the	security	of	what	 is	known	(Browning	2016).	Therefore,	agreeing	
on	 a	 peace	 settlement	 on	 Track	 1	 level	 requires	 a	 significant	 and	 reflexive	 adaptation	 of	
embedded	routines,	habits	and	by	extension	narratives	because	a	peace	settlement	requires	
creativity	to	break	the	‘safety’	of	the	conflict	that	is	known	and	a	‘leap	into	the	unknown’	for	
collective	 identities.	 Although	 this	 is	 exactly	why	 the	 ‘non-violent’	 descriptor	 of	 the	 Cyprus	
Problem	 is	 relevant	 (it	 provides	 room	 for	 reflexivity,	 two-level	 desecuritisation	 and	 a	more	
‘stabilised’	 environment	 for	 reconciliation),	 it	 is	 also	 why	 I	 maintain	 that	 the	 failure	 to	
reconfigure	 the	 identity	 narratives	 vis-à-vis	 Turkishness	 and	 to	 address	 Greek-Cypriots’	
existential	anxieties	triggered	by	the	prospect	of	making	peace	with	their	primordial	enemy	is	
one	of	the	main	reasons	behind	the	‘no’	vote	on	the	reunification	referenda	in	2004.	
	
Inevitably,	 the	 prospect	 of	 peace	 does/needs	 to	 challenge	 the	 fears,	 deprivations	 and	
isolations	of	groups	by	bringing	them	together,	but	that	very	possibility	can	create	a	sense	of	
anxiety	 since	 it	 requires	actors	 to	question	 their	previous	understandings	of	 the	 ‘other’	and	
open	 themselves	 up	 for	 new	 definitions	 and	 group	 relations	 (Çelik	 2015).	 Unlike	 the	 way	
material	 resources	such	as	 territory	or	governance	 is	negotiated	on	Track	1	 level,	 the	self	 is	
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a	non-negotiable	 object	 in	 peacemaking.	 Because	 the	 self	 can	 only	 be	 negotiated	 through	
reconfiguration	 of	 narratives,	 these	 anxieties	 need	 to	 be	 channelled	 constructively	 through	
carefully	crafted	peacebuilding	efforts	to	move	actors	towards	the	ontologically	secure	end	of	
the	 spectrum.	 Failing	 to	 do	 so	 would	 thwart	 peace	 efforts	 and	 possibly	 result	 in	 further	
securitisation.	 In	 other	 words,	 although	 structural	 interventions	 and	 Track	 1	 level	
peacemaking	can	achieve	security-as-survival	and	stabilisation,	they	create	what	Rumelili	calls	
‘peace-anxieties’	(See	Rumelili	2015);	they	can	also	essentialise	the	identity	narratives	of	the	
salient	parties	by	assuming	homogenised	positions	and	 inherent	 interests.	 If	not	addressed,	
peace-anxieties	can	have	a	crippling	effect	on	the	peacebuilding	efforts,	 such	as	compulsive	
attachment	 to	 routines	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 other	 or	 phobic	 behaviour	 towards	 the	
peacebuilding	efforts.		
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3.4	Is	it	possible	to	envision	the	‘self’	without	‘enemies’?	
	
Connolly	 argues	 that	 there	 is	 a	 “double	 relation	 of	 interdependence	 and	 strife	 between	
identity	and	difference”,	which	constitutes	the	‘paradox	of	difference’	and	makes	identity	an	
insecure	experience	(Connolly	1991:64).	The	paradox	of	difference,	which	means	that	identity	
is	 dependent	 on	 difference,	 epitomises	 the	 omnipresent	 potential	 that	 the	 behavioural	
relationship	between	self	and	other	can	be	constituted	on	the	representation	of	the	other	as	
threatening	 to	 self’s	 identity.	 However,	 Rumelili	 also	 emphasises	 that	 “the	 two	 levels	 of	
security	 are	 mutually	 constitutive,	 yet	 are	 partially	 independent,	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 neither	
representations	of	self	and	other	are	derivate	of	representations	of	threat	and	danger,	nor	are	
the	social	 structures	of	meaning	 that	shape	 identities	 reducible	 to	acts	of	securitisation	and	
desecuritisation”	(Rumelili	2011:16).	Hence,	although	the	potential	for	the	transformation	of	
difference	 into	 threatening	 always	 exist,	 the	 logic	 of	 identity	 allows	 for	 a	 great	 deal	 of	
variation	in	self/other	relationships.	Rumelili	distinguishes	between	threatening-others	where	
the	 relationship	 is	 characterised	 by	 conflict	 and	 othering,	 and	 different-others	 where	 the	
other	 is	 seen	 as	 non-threatening	 and	 the	 relationship	 could	 be	 characterised	 as	
guardian/children	or	leader/partner	(Rumelili	2004).		
	
Rumelili’s	 two	 layered	 approach	 identifies	 three	 constitutive	 dimensions	 along	 which	
self/other	 relationships	 vary	 to	 (not)	 produce	 relationships	 of	 othering:	 nature	 of	 the	
difference,	 social	 distance	 and	 response	 of	 the	 other	 (Rumelili	 2004,	 Rumelili	 2011).	 The	
nature	of	difference	 relates	 to	whether	 the	 identities	 in	question	are	exclusive	 identities	or	
inclusive	 identities.	Where	the	 former	 identify	 the	other	based	on	acquirable	characteristics	
such	as	democratic,	liberal	or	developed,	the	latter	base	difference	on	inherent	characteristics	
such	 as	 European	 (in	 terms	 of	 geography),	 Islamic	 or	 heterosexual.	 This	 is	 simply	 an	
experiential	distinction,	as	an	objective	marker	does	not	exist	to	help	us	categorise	identities	
as	simply	inclusive	and	exclusive.	Rumelili	explains	that	for	exclusive	identities,	the	difference	
is	permanent	and	possibilities	for	change	in	the	other	are	by	default	non-existent;	whereas	if	
the	difference	is	constructed	based	on	acquired	characteristics	the	difference	is	perceived	to	
be	temporary	and	possibilities	 for	 reconfiguring	 the	 identity	narratives	are	ample.	This	does	
not	mean	that	 the	 inclusive	 identities	are	essentially	good	and	exclusive	ones	are	bad,	both	
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identities	can	configure	self/other	relationships	that	can	be	characterised	by	threat,	fear	and	
othering	 (Rumelili	 2004,	 Rumelili	 2011).	 Rather,	 it	 gives	 us	 an	 indication	 of	 what	 types	 of	
desecuritisation	 strategies	 are	 potentially	 more	 effective	 and	 feasible	 (i.e.	 parental,	
partnership,	friendship	etc.).		
The	second	constitutive	dimension	that	Rumelili	 identifies	is	the	social	distance	between	the	
self	and	the	other.	Identities	can	be	secured	through	association	with	or	dissociation	from	the	
different	others	(Rumelili	2011).	In	terms	of	states	or	collectives,	she	differentiates	association	
from	 cooperation	 as	 it	 embodies	 a	 feeling	 of	 similarity,	 or	 co-belonging.	 In	 this	 context,	
association	means	that	the	other	is	not	a	polar	opposite,	and	the	self/other	relationship	can	
be	 configured	based	on	 guardian/children	or	 leader/partner	 axis.	On	 the	other	 hand,	while	
dissociation	makes	the	inclusive	identity	more	insecure	by	challenging	the	perceived	similarity	
and	 co-belonging,	 it	makes	 the	 exclusive	 identity	more	 secure	 as	 it	 reinforces	 the	 inherent	
differences	and	boundaries	(Rumelili	2011).		
Since	the	construction	of	identity	is	a	performative	action	that	includes	both	the	self	and	the	
other,	 the	 third	constitutive	dimension	 is	about	 the	 response	of	 the	other.	The	 response	of	
the	other	 in	terms	of	discourses	and	practices	has	reinforcing	or	destabilising	effects	on	the	
difference	attributed	to	the	other	and	on	self-identity,	which	is	conceptualised	on	a	spectrum	
running	between	recognition	and	resistance.	Whereas	recognition	reinforces	the	self-identity	
narratives,	 resistance	 makes	 it	 more	 insecure	 by	 challenging	 the	 perceived	 difference.	
Consequently,	 resistance	 tempts	 actors	 to	 reaffirm	 their	 self-identity	 by	 asserting	 the	
differences	of	the	other,	which	would	in	turn	result	in	securitisation	of	subjectivity,	where	the	
other	 is	 represented	 as	 a	 threat.	 However,	 inclusive/exclusive,	 association/dissociation,	
recognition/resistance,	 othering/not-othering	 are	 all	 a	 matter	 of	 degree	 and	 there	 can	 be	
myriad	variations	of	self/other	configurations	(Rumelili	2004,	Rumelili	2011).		
In	 the	 case	 of	 Cyprus,	 although	 the	peacebuilding	 efforts	 reduce	 the	 conflict	 to	 one	 that	 is	
based	on	ethnicity	and	see	only	two	sides	to	the	conflict,	we	need	to	challenge	the	view	that	
“ethnic	 identity	 is	 generally	 singular	and	 these	 singular	 identities	 reliably	predict	behaviour,	
attitudes	and	values”	 (Wetherell	 2009:10).	 It	 is	exactly	 this	approach	 that	boxes	 the	Cyprus	
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Problem	into	two	opposing	ethnic	poles	hyphenated	between	the	Greek-side	and	the	Turkish-
side;	 it	 disregards	 the	multiplicity	 and	 fluidity	 of	 identity	 narratives	 and	 fails	 to	 account	 for	
ontological	security.	For	example,	while	Turkish-Cypriots	and	Greek-Cypriots	are	each	other’s	
‘other’,	 they	 also	 perceive	 people	 from	 Turkey	 as	 their	 ‘other’	 as	 well.	 Historically,	 ethnic	
identity	 signifiers	 in	 Cyprus,	 which	 are	 based	 on	 inherent	 characteristics	 that	 assume	 a	
permanent	difference,	provided	a	mutually	exclusive	future	on	the	same	territory	for	Turkish-
Cypriots	 and	 Greek-Cypriots.	 Yet,	 Turkish-Cypriots’	 growing	 Cypriotism,	 and	 disassociation	
from	Turkey	and	Turkishness	challenges	these	singular	ethnic	narratives.	As	a	result,	Turkish-
Cypriots	 find	 themselves	 in	 identity	 dissonance	 and	 by	 extension	 ontological	 dissonance,	
where	affirmation	of	their	distinctiveness	from	Greek-Cypriots	clashes	with	their	affirmation	
of	distinctiveness	from	Turks.	The	response	of	the	other	(people	from	Turkey)	and	the	limited	
capacity	 for	 reflexivity	 further	 complicates	 the	 picture;	 while	 the	 other	 depicts	 Turkish-
Cypriots	 as	 Turks	 who	 happen	 to	 live	 in	 Cyprus	 and	 hence	 resists	 their	 perceived	
distinctiveness18,	 Turkish-Cypriots	 lack	 the	 ability	 to	 address	 their	 anxieties,	 due	 to	 their	
significant	 political,	 economic	 and	 financial	 dependence	 on	 Turkey.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	
disassociation	from	Turkey	(i.e.	under	the	EU	umbrella)	and	the	response	of	the	other	(Turks)	
reaffirms	 the	 perceived	 differences	 of	 Greek-Cypriots	 and	 thus,	 reinforce	 their	 self-identity	
narratives,	but	 the	peacebuilding	efforts	 challenge	both	 their	Greekness	and	Cypriotness	by	
associating	it	with	Turkish-Cypriots,	Turkish	migrants	and	by	extension	Turkishness.		
	
																																																								
18	Tuğrul	 İlter	 argues,	 Turkish-Cypriots	 “are	 surrounded	 by	 denials	 of	 their	 independent	 existence”	 (İlter	 2015).	 	 This	
denial	in	itself	has	two	roots;	one	is	the	denial	of	distinctiveness	by	the	‘other’	and	the	other	is	the	denial	of	legitimacy	
by	the	‘international’.	While	the	first	one	is	focused	on	the	response	of	the	other,	where	the	official	rhetoric	in	Turkey	
denies	a	distinct	Turkish-Cypriot	 identity	and	sees	Turkish-Cypriots	as	one	and	the	same	as	the	greater	Turkish	nation,	
the	 second	 one	 is	 focused	 on	 international	 recognition	 and	 legitimacy	 of	 Turkish-Cypriots’	 communal	 existence.	
Mainstream	media	and	politicians	in	Turkey	are,	at	best,	indifferent	to	the	distinctiveness	of	the	Turkish-Cypriot	identity	
and	 mostly	 refer	 to	 Turkish-Cypriots	 as	 ‘Cypriot	 Turks’	 (Kıbrıs	 Türkü),	 or	 as	 ‘our	 compatriots	 in	 Cyprus’,	 which	
undermines	 and	 circumstantialises	 their	 Cypriotness.	 They	 also	 refer	 to	 the	 northern	 part	 of	 Cyprus	 as	 babyland	
(yavruvatan),	 implying	a	 sense	of	ownership	over	 the	northern	part	of	Cyprus	 and	Turkish-Cypriots.	 Even	 though	 this	
rhetoric	was	 historically	 accepted	 and	 even	 celebrated	 by	many	 Turkish-Cypriots,	 a	 growing	 sense	 of	 Cypriotism	 and	
discontent	with	Turkish	immigrants	and	Turkey’s	policies	created	a	strong	displeasure	towards	this	paternal	relationship	
that	 denies	 distinctiveness	 to	 Cypriots.	 In	 reaction	 to	 the	 expressions	 such	 as	 the	 ‘Cypriot	 Turk’	 that	 underplays	
Cypriotness,	 left-wing	 journalists	 such	 as	 Sevgül	 Uludağ	 and	 Arif	 Hasan	 Tahsin,	 choose	 to	 use	 new	 terms	 to	 define	
Turkish-Cypriots	that	underplays	Turkishness.	For	instance,	Uludağ	uses	the	term	‘Kıbrıslıtürk’	instead	of	‘Kıbrıslı	Türk’,	to	
deemphasize	the	Turkish	component	of	the	identity,	and	Tahsin	uses	the	term	‘Turkish	speaking	Cypriot’	(Loizides	2015).	
(	
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Table	No	1:		Ontological	security	matrix	
	
	
Vamık	 Volkan	 problematises	 the	 peacemaking	 and	 peacebuilding	 policies	 concerning	 the	
Cyprus	 Problem	 that	 center	 around	 the	 promotion	 of	 an	 ‘illusionary’	 ‘new’	 large-group	
‘Cypriot’	identity,	arguing	that	they	undermine	the	ethnic	identities	of	being	a	Turk	or	a	Greek	
(Volkan	 2008:8).	 Volkan,	who	 argues	 that	 there	 has	 never	 been	 a	 ‘Cypriot’	 ethnicity	 or	 na-
tionality,	seems	to	fall	into	the	same	singular	ethnicity	trap.	He	rejects	the	idea	that	there	is	a	
distinct	 sense	 of	 Cypriotness	 shared	 across	 collectives	 living	 in	 Cyprus	 that	 creates	 a	 sui	
generis	 character	 independent	 from	 the	motherlands	 of	 the	 two	main	 communities.	 In	 his	
view,	 civic	 or	 cultural	 perceptions	 of	 Cypriotism	 are	 not	 only	 illusionary	 but	 they	 cannot	
coexist	 with	 ethnic	 or	 religious	 associations	 with	 the	 motherlands.	 However,	 despite	 their	
different	 religious,	 linguistic	 or	 ethnic	 ancestries,	 and	 despite	 the	 nationalist	 discourse	 that	
dominated	 the	 identity	 narratives	 historically,	 the	 sense	 of	 Cypriotness	 has	 been	 growing	
across	the	island.	Loizides	notes	that	the	identity	narratives	of	the	two	main	communities	on	
the	island	are	not	only	increasingly	detaching	themselves	from	the	motherland	narratives,	but	
the	 growing	 variations	 of	 Cypriotism	 and	 its	 political	manifestations	 are	moving	 at	 a	 faster	
pace	than	the	related	mediation	and	peacebuilding	formulas	(Loizides	2015).		
	
That	being	said,	even	though	I	disagree	with	Volkan’s	prioritisation	and	singular	view	of	ethnic	
identity	 over	 other	 identity	 layers,	 and	his	 view	of	 Cypriotism	as	 ‘illusory’,	 reading	Volkan’s	
argument	 from	 an	 ontological	 security	 perspective	 provides	 better	 ground	 for	 his	 analysis.	
Identity	narratives	 in	general	 and	collective	 identity	narratives	 in	particular,	 are	 resistant	 to	
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change.	Giddens	and	Lupovici	argue	that	actors’	attachment	to	their	identity	makes	it	difficult	
to	implement	a	reflexive	behavioural	or	an	identity	change	to	adapt	to	a	new	situation	that	is	
creating	 anxiety	 (Giddens	 1991,	 Lupovici	 2012).	 Similarly,	 humans,	 according	 to	 Volkan,	
cannot	 accept	 change	 without	mourning	 what	 is	 lost,	 which	 is	 valid	 for	 collectives	 as	 well	
(Volkan	 1997).	 Since	 desecuritisation	 does	 not	 and	 cannot	 leave	 the	 existing	 identity	
constructions	 intact,	 peacemaking	 and	 peacebuilding	 can	 in	 fact	 disturb	 existing	 and	
embedded	identity	narratives	and	create	anxieties	by	blurring	distinctiveness.		
	
Desecuritisation	processes	 that	have	been	predicated	on	 the	 transcendence	and	blurring	of	
differences	 are	 unsustainable	 because	 they	 elicit	 a	 sense	 of	 uncertainty	 regarding	 the	
biographical	 continuity	 and	distinct	 identity	 of	 the	 self	 vis-à-vis	 the	 other	 (Rumelili	 2011).	
This	 means	 that	 the	 resolution	 of	 protracted	 conflicts	 challenge	 deep-rooted	 antagonistic	
identities	 and	 unsettle	 self-identity	 narratives	 that	 are	 dependent	 on	 the	 conflict.	 As	 such,	
desecuritisation	processes	that	culminate	in	a	state	of	ontological	insecurity/physical	asecurity	
are	 easily	 reversible	 because	 existential	 anxieties	 can	 easily	 be	 politically	 mobilised	 and	
manipulated	 into	 fear	 (Rumelili	 2015).	We	 secure	 ourselves	 as	 beings	mainly	 by	 discourses	
and	practices	that	differentiate	us	from	others	because	identity	lacks	a	pre-given,	objectively	
identifiable	 essence	 (Connolly	 1991,	 Campbell	 1998).	 Thus,	 perceived	 incompatibilities	
between	 Turkish-Cypriots	 and	 the	 Turkish	 immigrants,	 between	 Greek-Cypriots	 and	 the	
Turkish	 immigrants	 or	 between	 the	 two	main	 Cypriot	 communities	 are	 not	 a	 pre-given	 but	
‘exist’	only	because	they	are	continuously	re-produced	both	bottom-up	and	horizontally.		
	
Departing	from	this	approach,	the	thesis	empirically	argues	that	a	collective	‘shared’	Cypriot	
large-group	 identity	 needs	 to	 be	 envisioned	 carefully.	 Ethnic,	 religious	 and	 linguistic	
differences	 can	 be	 re-constructed	 as	 part	 of	 a	 broader,	 more	 inclusive	 identity	 that	
encompasses	different	ways	of	being	Cypriot	without	subsuming	or	transcending	distinctions.	
In	other	words,	Cypriotism	 that	undermines	difference	and	only	underlines	 similarity	would	
produce	 existential	 anxieties	 for	 Greek-Cypriots	 and	 Turkish-Cypriots;	 it	 can	 also	 result	 in	
essentialisation	 of	 Cypriotness	 which	 in	 turn	 risk	 securitisation	 of	 migrant	 communities	 or	
other	 minorities	 in	 Cyprus.	 Therefore,	 peacebuilding	 efforts	 need	 to	 consider	 ontological	
security	 when	 crafting	 desecuritisation	 strategies	 that	 promote	 an	 overarching	 Cypriot	
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identity;	instead	of	minimising	the	distinctiveness	of	variant	identities	in	Cyprus,	they	need	to	
acknowledge	 their	 ‘shared-ness’	 under	 a	 more	 inclusive	 and	 fluid	 identity	 narrative	 and	
celebrate	their	difference	rather	than	avoiding	or	securitising	it.		
	
This	 by	 no	 means	 is	 an	 idealistic	 approach.	 There	 are	 success	 stories	 that	 show	 formerly	
antagonistic	 identities	 can	 be	 sustainably	 desecuritised	 without	 resecuritisation	 of	 another	
group	 as	 a	 replacement.	 One	 such	 example	 that	 Browning	 and	 Joenniemi	 explore	 is	 the	
construction	of	a	security	community	among	the	Nordic	states	where	similarity	is	appreciated,	
difference	is	celebrated,	and	it	is	not	translated	into	danger	(Browning	and	Joenniemi	2013).	
The	Nordic	 Security	 community	 has	 emerged	 from	 a	mutually	 reproducing	war	 community	
and	was	transformed	into	a	region	of	peace	where	the	idea	that	there	are	different	ways	of	
being	 Scandinavian	 has	 replaced	 the	 categorical	 perceptions	 of	 difference	 between	 the	
Scandinavian	nations	as	existentially	threatening	(Browning	and	Joenniemi	2013).	Could	it	be	
possible	 to	 envision	 a	 Mediterranean	 security	 community	 too,	 where	 Greek-Cypriots	 and	
Turkish-Cypriots	do	not	only	 reconfigure	 their	 relationship	 to	 fit	a	 larger	and	more	 inclusive	
Cypriot	 identity	 narrative	 without	 undermining	 their	 distinctiveness	 but	 also	 come	 to	 see	
themselves	 as	 the	 members	 of	 a	 different	 but	 unthreatening	 larger	 Mediterranean	
community	that	includes	Greece	and	Turkey	among	others?		
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3.5	Conclusion	
This	chapter	unpacked	the	concept	of	desecuritisation	to	explore	its	intricate	relationship	with	
ontological	security.	The	chapter	argued	that	even	though	there	is	an	omnipresent	potential	
of	 desecuritisation	 in	 creating	 a	 sense	 of	 ontological	 insecurity	 as	 the	 removal	 of	 threat	
perceptions	 can	 leave	 actors	 in	 a	 state	 of	 uncertainty	 and	 existential	 anxiety	 vis-à-vis	 their	
self-identities	and	relationships	with	their	significant	others,	this	does	not	have	to	be	the	case.	
Conflict	 can	become	a	source	of	ontological	 security	and	 	 “the	desire	 to	protect	a	 ‘sense	of	
self’	 can	 be	 the	 basis	 from	which	 old	 conflicts	 become	 new”	 (Kay	 2012:239).	 Yet,	 coupling	
desecuritisation	 in	 Track	 1	 level	 negotiations	 that	 challenge	 self-identity	 narratives	 with	
desecuritisation	 at	 the	 grassroots	 level	 can	 provide	 a	 way	 out	 of	 the	 vicious	 cycle	 the	
securitisation	 framework	 creates.	 Put	 differently,	 multi-directional	 institutionalised	
securitisations	 require	 multi-directional	 desecuritisation	 strategies	 that	 are	 equipped	 to	
reflect	on	ontological	concerns.	
Although	the	concept	of	ontological	security	is	intimately	tied	to	identity,	and	that	its	pursuit	
requires	differentiation	 from	an	other,	a	stable	relationship	with	the	other	can	be	based	on	
minor	distinctions	that	are	recognised	in	the	context	of	similarity,	positive	 identification	and	
friendship	or	they	may	be	major	distinctions	that	situate	self	and	other	as	polar	opposites	and	
enemies	 (Rumelili	 2004,	 Rumelili	 2013).	 As	 Kay	 stresses,	 ultimate	 attainment	 of	 peace	 in	
conflict	 environments	 requires	 fundamental	 transformation	of	 the	 self	 (Kay	2012).	 Still,	 this	
does	not	mean	 that	 I	envision	an	 idealised	 form	of	 self/other	 relationship	 that	 is	not	 latent	
with	 power;	 instead,	 the	 intricate	 link	 between	 (de)securitisation,	 ontological	 security	 and	
peacebuilding	suggests	that	non-securitised	forms	of	otherness	is	possible,	and	the	normative	
commitment	of	this	thesis	is	more	concerned	with	facilitating	transformative	peace	in	Cyprus	
than	with	the	emancipation	of	identities	from	constraints	of	power	imbued	relations.		
From	a	pragmatic	perspective,	we	may	be	interested	in	questioning	whether	the	securitisation	
of	 the	 Turkish	 immigrants	 would	 bring	 Greek-Cypriots	 and	 Turkish-Cypriots	 closer	 together	
against	 a	 common	 enemy	 and	 produce	 a	 sense	 of	 urgency	 for	 reaching	 a	 comprehensive	
settlement	on	the	island.	However,	based	on	the	analysis	in	the	first	three	chapters,	which	will	
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be	 further	 supported	 in	 the	 empirical	 chapters,	 I	 argue	 in	 favour	 of	 both	 the	 normative	
preference	for	desecuritisation,	and	for	the	desecuritisation	of	the	Turkish	immigrants	as	the	
way	 forward	 for	 transformative	 peace.	 While	 securitisation	 of	 Turkish	 immigrants	 is	 the	
reason	behind	growing	xenophobia,	racism	and	existential	anxieties	among	the	TCc	as	well	as	
the	 reason	 for	 their	 consolidated	 Cypriot	 identity,	 it	 is	 also	 creating	 ontological	 dissonance	
and	peace-anxities.	Consequently,	it	may	be	argued	that	the	peacemaking	and	peacebuilding	
efforts	for	the	reunification	of	Cyprus	are	repeatedly	failing	because	they	generate	existential	
anxieties	that	tempt	parties	 into	securitising	issues	and	differences	that	need	to	be	resolved	
for	making	a	comprehensive	settlement	possible.	
	
Challenging	 the	essentialised	ethnic	 approaches	 to	protracted	 conflicts	where	 reconciliation	
efforts	singularly	focus	on	imposing	a	sense	of	similarity	at	the	expense	of	ontological	security	
could	 be	 the	 key	 to	 fully	 understanding	 the	potential	 of	 desecuritisation	 for	 transformative	
peace.	Constructing	a	collective	non-essentialised	narrative	 for	a	 larger	Cypriot	 identity	 that	
simultaneously	 celebrates	 similarities	 as	well	 as	 the	 differences	 of	 people	who	 call	 Cyprus	
home	 can	 be	 the	 way	 forward	 for	 achieving	 certainty	 and	 stability	 of	 being,	 while	
remaining	in	a	state	of	physical	asecurity	vis-à-vis	one	another.	Within	this	context,	I	argue	
that	 in	 order	 to	 facilitate	 a	 comprehensive	 solution	 and	 achieve	 transformative	 peace	 in	
Cyprus,	we	need	desecuritisation	strategies	that	include	all	‘others’.	Peacebuilding	efforts	on	
the	 island	 should	 not	 only	 address	 reconciliation	 between	 Greek-Cypriots	 and	 Turkish-
Cypriots,	 but	 they	 should	 employ	 desecuritisation	 as	 a	 tool	 to	 reconfigure	 the	 relationship	
between	 the	 two	 main	 communities	 and	 Turkish	 immigrants	 for	 the	 very	 reason	 that	 a	
comprehensive	 solution	 will,	 by	 default,	 create	 existential	 anxieties	 for	 all	 parties	 that	
perceive	each	other	as	threatening.	
	
However,	this	thesis	does	not	go	as	far	as	to	devise	desecuritisation	strategies	for	the	case	of	
Cyprus.	More	research	and	comparative	analysis	would	be	needed	to	formulate	specific	policy	
recommendations	 in	 this	 regard.	Nonetheless,	 it	 is	 still	 necessary	 to	explore	 the	ontological	
security,	 (de)securitisation	 and	 peacebuilding	 nexus	 in	 order	 to	 answer	 the	 research	
questions,	which	can	in	turn	inform	the	desecuritisation	literature,	peace	research	and	break	
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the	dual-ethnic	approach	 to	 the	Cyprus	Problem	that	has	 locked	 the	 island	 in	 stalemate	 for	
nearly	five	decades.		
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Chapter	4.	Research	Methodology	
4.1.	Introduction	
	
The	thesis	focuses	on	a	single	case	study	to	provide	a	thorough	and	in-depth	analysis	of	the	
securitisation	of	 identities	 in	conflict	environments,	 its	 relationship	with	ontological	 security	
and	its	implications	on	peacebuilding	efforts.	Grounding	itself	on	the	empirical	data	collected	
in	 Cyprus,	 the	 research	 will	 explore	 shifting	 identity	 narratives	 and	 the	 role	 of	 ontological	
security	 in	the	peace	process	on	the	island.	 In	doing	so,	the	thesis	explores	the	prospects	of	
desecuritisation	and	its	delicate	link	with	ontological	security	as	a	facilitating	tool	for	achieving	
transformative	peace.	Based	on	the	theoretical	framework	and	considering;	a)	the	audience’s	
role	 in	 securitisation;	 b)	 that	 institutionalised	 securitisations	 can	 become	 bottom-up	 and	
horizontal	 resulting	 in	 cognitive	 and	 behavioural	 change;	 and	 c)	 the	 interdependent	
relationship	between	(de)securitisation	and	ontological	security,	the	thesis	blends	qualitative	
and	 quantitative	methods	 in	 order	 to	 seek	 answers	 to	 underlying	 theoretical	 and	 empirical	
research	questions.	 The	 thesis	 adopts	mixed-methods	 research	 that	 is	 formally	 and	broadly	
defined	as	 “the	 class	of	 research	where	 the	 researcher	mixes	or	 combines	quantitative	and	
qualitative	 research	 techniques,	 methods,	 approaches,	 concepts	 or	 language	 into	 a	 single	
study”	(Johnson	and	Onwuegbuzie	2004:17).	
	
Measuring,	 assessing	 and	 evaluating	 ontological	 security	 and	 identity,	 and	 analysing	
securitisation	within	the	broader	approach	adopted	in	this	thesis	is	complex.	Especially	when	
the	aim	is	to	inform	peace	research	and	reconciliation	efforts	in	Cyprus,	drawing	conclusions	
and	credible	argumentation	that	can	reflect	the	multi-layered	narratives,	actors	and	realities	
on	 the	 island	becomes	even	more	challenging.	To	alleviate	 these	challenges	 inherent	 to	 the	
theoretical	 framework,	 the	 thesis	 adopts	mixed-methods	 that	 provide	meticulousness	 with	
numbers	and	statistics,	as	well	as	depth	and	meaning,	to	increase	the	vigour	and	robustness	
of	 its	data	and	analysis.	Additionally,	 in	order	to	magnify	the	utility	and	effectiveness	of	this	
methodological	approach,	the	fieldwork	strategy	also	borrows	from	previous	opinion	polls	and	
surveys	and	secondary	data	 sets	 that	allows	 for	a	 temporal	 comparison.	As	 such,	 the	 thesis	
adopts	a	two	layered	approach	to	its	research	questions,	while	the	theoretical	questions	are	
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concerned	with	overarching	contributions	to	the	 literature,	they	also	underpin	the	empirical	
questions	and	relate	to	the	normative	commitments	of	the	research:		
	
Table	No	2:	Research	questions	(1)	
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4.2	A	Birdseye	look	at	research	methodology	
	
In	line	with	the	identified	research	questions,	the	fieldwork	methodology	primarily	combines	
quantitative	 surveys,	 online	 semi-structured	 questionnaires	 and	 focus	 groups,	 and	 enriches	
these	with	 secondary	datasets.	 Recognising	 the	 limitations	of	 using	 a	 single	method,	mixed	
methods	 research	 encourages	 researchers	 to	 use	 multiple	 approaches	 to	 collecting	 and	
analysing	data	within	a	single	study,	allowing	for	a	more	complete	understanding	and	analysis	
of	 the	 research	 problem	 (Tashakkori	 and	 Teddlie	 1998,	 Hanson,	 Creswell	 et	 al.	 2005).	 The	
utilisation	 of	 multiple	 research	 methods	 to	 study	 the	 same	 general	 problem	 by	 posing	
different	 specific	 empirical	 questions	 has	 pragmatic	 implications	 for	 social	 theory;	 “rather	
than	being	wedded	to	a	particular	 theoretical	 style	…	and	 its	most	compatible	method,	one	
might	 instead	 combine	 methods	 that	 would	 encourage	 or	 even	 require	 integration	 of	
different	 theoretical	 perspectives	 to	 interpret	 the	 data”	 (Hunter	 and	 Brewer	 2006:55).	
Adopting	a	mixed	methods	approach	however	comes	with	some	inherent	problems	especially	
based	on	the	debates	 ‘paradigm-method	 fit’	and	the	 ‘best	paradigm’	debates,	which	mainly	
stems	 from	the	 idea	of	 incompatibility	between	different	philosophical	world-views	and	 the	
quantitative	or	qualitative	approaches	(Reichardt	and	Rallis	1994,	Migiro	and	Magangi	2011).		
	
The	 ‘paradigm-method	 fit	 issue’	 and	 the	 ‘best	 paradigm’	 issue	 have	 inspired	 considerable	
debate	 regarding	 the	 philosophical	 basis	 of	mixed	methods	 research.	While	 the	 ‘paradigm-
method	 fit’	 debates	 are	 based	 on	 how	well	 the	 chosen	methods	 and	 value-based	 systems	
relates	 to	 the	 research	 questions	 and	 how	 well	 the	 epistemological	 and	 ontological	
foundations	of	the	research	fit	with	the	methodological	choices;	the	‘best	paradigm’	debates	
relate	 to	 the	 adoption	 of	 a	 philosophical	 paradigm	 that	 provides	 the	 best	 foundation	 for	
mixed	methods	research.	According	to	Guba	and	Lincoln,	the	paradigm	differences	between	
post-positivist	 philosophical	 assumptions	 and	 naturalistic	 assumptions	 are	 incompatible	 in	
terms	 of	 epistemology,	 ontology,	 axiology	 and	 methodology,	 which	 renders	 quantitative	
methods	unfit	for	constructivist	and	post-positivist	paradigms	(Guba	and	Lincoln	1994).	From	
this	 perspective,	 mixed	 methods	 research	 can	 be	 viewed	 as	 untenable	 because	 certain	
paradigms	and	methods	can	not	be	legitimately	fit	together	(Smith	1983,	Sale,	Lohfeld	et	al.	
2002).	 Nonetheless,	 this	 debate	 inherently	 assumes	 that	 the	 choice	 of	 research	 methods	
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represent	a	commitment	to	a	certain	kind	of	truth	and	the	concurrent	rejection	of	other	kinds	
of	 truth	 (Gorard	 2010).	 For	 Gorard,	 this	 approach	 becomes	 divisive	 and	 conservative,	
impoverishing	the	range	of	methods	deployed	to	try	and	analyse	important	social	questions.	
He	 asserts	 that	 it	 is	 impractical	 to	 sustain	 an	 argument	 that	 all	 parts	 of	 the	 chosen	
methodology	have	to	carry	epistemological	and	ontological	commitments;	as	he	argues	that	in	
real	 life,	 methodology	 and	 epistemology	 cannot	 be	 easily	 separated	 and	 the	 clear	 cut	
distinction	 between	 paradigms	 (qualitative,	 quantitative	 and	 mixed	 methods)	 is	 in	 fact	
imposed	and	illusionary	(Gorard	2010).		
	
In	 responding	 to	 these	 debates,	 Tashakkori	 and	 Teddlie	 adopt	 a	 pragmatist	 approach	 that	
provides	 the	 researcher	 with	 a	 wide	 range	 of	 methods	 and	 flexibility	 for	 the	 research	
questions	at	hand	(Tashakkori	and	Teddlie	1998,	Tashakkori	and	Teddlie	2009,	Tashakkori	and	
Teddlie	 2010).	 “Pragmatism	 views	 knowledge	 as	 being	 both	 constructed	 and	 based	 on	 the	
reality	 of	 the	 world	 one	 experiences	 and	 lives	 in.	 …	 [It]	 endorses	 pluralism	 and	 carefully	
considered	 integrative	 eclectism	 …	 [where]	 different	 even	 conflicting	 theories	 and	
perspectives	can	be	useful	…	in	solving	traditional	philosophical	dualisms	as	well	as	for	making	
methodological	 choices”	 (Tashakkori	 and	 Teddlie	 2009:74).	 Many	 scholars	 propose	
pragmatism	 as	 the	 best	 paradigm	 for	 justifying	 the	 use	 of	 mixed	 methods	 research	 and	
believe	 that	decisions	 regarding	 the	use	of	either	or	both	methods	depend	on	 the	 research	
questions	 and	 the	 “ongoing	 phase	 of	 the	 inductive-deductive	 research	 cycle”	 (Howe	 1988,	
Guba	and	Lincoln	1994,	Tashakkori	and	Teddlie	1998:87,	Biesta	and	Burbules	2003,	 Johnson	
and	Onwuegbuzie	2004,	Morgan	2007).	 In	other	words,	 the	pragmatist	 approach	prioritises	
the	research	question	over	the	theoretical	lens	or	the	underlining	methodological	paradigms.	
	
Based	on	the	above	discussion,	this	thesis	will	combine	quantitative	and	qualitative	methods	
in	 a	 complimentary	 way	 that	 allows	 for	 robust	 triangulation,	 corroboration	 and	 temporal	
comparison.	This	approach	can	yield	a	more	complete	picture	for	analysis	because	neither	one	
on	its	own	is	sufficient	to	capture	the	details	and	nuances	of	a	non-violent	protracted	conflict	
that	 is	 interlaced	with	a	 challenging	but	unique	 theoretical	 framework.	 Thus,	 statistical	 and	
narrative	 data,	 collected	 in	 parallel,	 can	 help	 better	 understand	 the	 research	 problem	
providing	strength	to	conclusions	that	can	be	generalised	and	reflective	at	the	same	time.	As	
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such,	 the	 thesis	 can	 provide	 strong	 foundations	 both	 for	 further	 research	 on	 formulating	
specific	 desecuritisation	 strategies	 and	 for	 comparative	 analysis	 for	 other	 non-violent	
protracted	conflicts.	
Even	though	empirical	application	of	securitisation	theory	often	utilises	discourse	analysis	as	a	
methodological	tool,	the	broadened	approach	to	securitisation	in	this	thesis	that	expands	the	
concept	to	include	performatives,	calls	for	a	methodological	choice	beyond	discourse	analysis.	
Rather	 than	 the	 top-down	 securitisation	 speech-acts	 of	 power	 holders	 and	 elites,	 the	
empirical	 research	questions	are	more	 interested	 in	analysing	the	cognitive	and	behavioural	
nuances	 in	 grassroot	 perceptions	 and	 securitisation	 practices	 that	 are	 bottom-up	 and	
horizontal.	 Lastly,	 there	 are	 underlying	 practical	 limitations	 for	 conducting	 an	 island-wide	
discourse	 analysis	 for	 the	 case	 of	 Cyprus,	 such	 as	 the	 language	 barrier	 (i.e.	 translation	 of	
documents	from	Greek	and	Turkish	into	English)	and	accessibility	of	data	and	documents.		
On	the	other	hand,	the	ontological	security	literature	has	remained	mostly	theoretical	and	did	
not	produce	a	concrete	framework	for	empirical	analysis;	this	 is	not	only	due	to	the	relative	
youth	of	the	literature	itself	but	also	due	to	ontological	security	often	being	an	experience	on	
the	level	of	sub-consciousness	and	due	to	issues	with	scaling	it	up	to	collectives	in	particular,	
and	 due	 to	 ambivalence	 of	 measuring	 identity	 in	 general.	 For	 example,	 the	 ontological	
security	 that	 has	 its	 roots	 in	 psychology	 comes	 from	 a	 phenomenological	 tradition19	that	
makes	 the	 distinction	 between	 experiencing	 a	 sense	 of	 being	 and	 actual	 embodied	 being	
difficult,	 if	 not	 impossible	 to	 validate	 (Woolley	 2007).	 According	 to	 Moran	 and	 Mooney,	
neither	 can	 we	 reduce	 all	 that	 exists	 to	 appearings,	 nor	 confirm	 an	 unknown	 behind	
appearances	 (Moran	and	Mooney	2002).	 Yet,	even	 if	we	cannot	 categorically	and	definitely	
distinguish	the	two,	there	are	elements	that	we	can	investigate	that	reflect	our	self-narratives	
spatially	and	temporally,	such	as	interpretation	of	history,	memory,	actions	and	routines20.	
19	Phenomenalogy	is	distinct	from	that	of	the	nature	of	being.	Phenomenology	is	primarily	concerned	with	the	study	of	
the	structures	of	 consciousness	and	 the	content/acts	of	 conscious	experiences,	and	attempts	 to	create	conditions	 for	
the	 objective	 study	 of	 topics	 usually	 regarded	 as	 subjective,	 such	 as	 such	 as	 judgements,	 perceptions	 and	 emotions	
(Szanto	and	Moran	2015).		
20	For	 example,	 we	 can	 probe	 into	 reflexivity	 in	 the	 adaptation	 of	 routines	 in	 response	 to	 anxiety	 producing	 critical	
situations,	and	assess	the	feeling	of	shame	caused	by	disconnect	between	chosen	actions	and	self-identity	narratives	by	
looking	into	discourse.	
	 116	
Philosopher	Peter	Burgess	summarises	the	ambivalence	with	regards	to	measuring	identity	as	
a	‘prisoner	of	language’,	meaning	that	“identity	needs	language	to	be	expressed,	but	even	its	
expression	 is	 by	 nature	 part	 of	 identity	 itself”	 (in	 Bruter	 and	 Lodge	 2013:34).	 Thus,	 the	
answers	of	two	people	to	a	certain	question	about	identity21	will	not,	in	principle,	be	directly	
comparable.	 Capturing	 identity	 and	 measuring	 it	 quantitatively	 at	 the	 individual	 level	 may	
appear	‘inappropriate’	to	some	scholars	(see	Duchesne	and	Frognier	1995),	but	this	leaves	a	
significant	range	of	research	questions	surrounding	identity,	and	especially	collective	identity,	
untouched	 and	 unexplored.	 Even	 though	 it	 is	 difficult	 to	 operationalise	 a	 concept	 that	 is	
widely	said	to	be	unmeasurable,	it	is	not	impossible	with	a	strategic	combination	of	different	
research	 tools	 and	 methods.	 In	 that	 sense,	 the	 research	 provides	 originality	 in	 its	
methodology.		
	
Even	 though	 many	 scholars	 may	 perceive	 quantitative	 measures	 of	 identity	 as	 an	
‘inappropriate	 approach’,	 conflict	 resolution,	 ontological	 security	 and	 desecuritisation	
literature	on	a	collective	level	for	the	case	of	Cyprus	necessitates	a	birds-eye	view	of	society	as	
well	 as	 reflective,	 in-depth	 qualitative	 analysis	 in	 order	 to	 inform	 policy-making	 and	
reconciliation	efforts.	Drawing	conclusions	for	institutionalised	securitisation	practices	and	for	
the	role	of	collective	ontological	 security	 for	 reconciliation	would	not	be	well	grounded	and	
legitimate	without	looking	at	the	perceptions,	fears,	anxieties,	tendencies	and	identifications	
of	 the	 general	 public	 in	 a	 representative	 way	 with	 quantifiable	 data.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 it	
would	not	be	as	well	grounded	and	valuable	to	draw	these	conclusions	only	with	quantitative	
research,	 without	 substantiating	 it	 with	 in-depth	 qualitative	 analysis	 that	 is	 more	 human,	
individual	and	reflective	and	that	can	capture	and	 interpret	 the	more	emotive	and	affective	
side	of	peacebuilding.		
	
Even	 though	 the	 quantitative	 measurement	 of	 identity	 is	 difficult	 because	 it	 is	 not	
spontaneously	 conceived	 in	 analytical	 terms	 but	 at	 best	 ‘expressed’;	 this	 limitation	 can	 be	
somewhat	 mitigated	 by	 approaching	 it	 both	 with	 labelled	 scale	 questions	 and	 with	 self-
placement	 questions.	 Additionally,	 Michael	 Bruter	 (2014)	 suggests	 yet	 another	 alternative	
model	 to	 quantitative	 analysis	 of	 identity	 that	 distinguishes	 between	 two	 conceptually	 and																																																									
21	For	example:	Do	you	feel	more	Cypriot	than	Turk/Greek?	or	How	Cypriot	do	you	feel	on	a	scale	from	one	to	five?	
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empirically	 distinct	 components	 of	 identity:	 civic	 and	 cultural.	 While	 the	 ‘cultural’	 pillar	 is	
related	to	a	person’s	sense	of	belonging	to	a	community,	with	which	they	believe	they	share	
certain	commonalities	such	as	culture,	values,	religion	and	ethnicity;	the	‘civic’	pillar	is	linked	
to	 a	 person’s	 identification	with	 a	 political	 system,	 referring	 to	 a	 system	 that	 defines	 their	
rights	and	duties	as	an	agent	(Bruter	and	Lodge	2013).		
	
Even	though	I	believe	this	differentiation	can	be	significant	for	some	cases,	it	is	not	analytically	
possible	 within	 the	 scope	 of	 this	 thesis	 to	 separate	 cultural	 attributes	 from	 civic	 ones.	 In	
Cyprus,	we	see	changes	in	identity	narratives	that	shift	from	religious	to	ethnic,	and	ethnic	to	
civic;	 the	 majority	 of	 Cypriots	 claim	 to	 have	 a	 distinct	 Cypriot	 identity	 that	 is	 both	
Mediterranean	 and	 rooted	 in	 the	 shared	 experiences	 of	 living	 together	 for	 centuries	 under	
different	 rulers.	 This	 sense	 of	 Cypriotness,	 which	 at	 first	 looks	 like	 a	 categorical	 shift	 in	
identification,	 cannot	 be	 simply	 attributed	 to	 ‘civic’	 as	 Turkish-Cypriots	 and	 Greek-Cypriots	
alike	 emphasise	 shared	 cultural	 distinctiveness	 while	 living	 under	 two	 separate	 political	
systems.	However,	the	quantitative	research	combines	self-placement	questions	with	labelled	
scale	 questions	 to	 get	 a	 more	 comprehensive	 picture	 for	 the	 elusive	 concept	 of	 identity.	
Adopting	this	approach,	the	quantitative	opinion	poll	includes	questions	such	as	“How	would	
you	 self-identify	 yourself?”	 which	 will	 provide	 response	 options	 such	 as	 “I	 consider	myself	
only	 a	 Greek/Turk,	 not	 at	 all	 Cypriot”,	 or	 “I	 consider	 myself	 mostly	 a	 Greek/Turk	 and	
somewhat	Cypriot”,	or	“I	consider	myself	a	Greek/Turk	and	a	Cypriot	to	the	same	degree”	and	
so	 forth.	 The	 opinion	 poll	 also	 includes	 a	 question	 relating	 to	 respondents’	 cultural-civic	
identity	such	as	“On	a	scale	of	1-5	to	what	extent	do	you	believe	in	a	distinct	shared	Cypriot	
identity	among	all	Cypriots?”	as	well	as	 triangulating	 this	with	ethnic	 identity	 signifiers	with	
questions	such	as	“To	what	extent	do	you	consider	Cyprus/Turkey/Greece	your	motherland?”	
These	 questions	 can	 then	 be	 temporally	 compared	 to	 other	 surveys	 carried	 out	 by	 other	
institutions.	
	
Methodologically,	if	we	agree	that	identity	is	utterly	individual,	mostly	sub-conscious	and	can	
only	 be	 expressed,	 then	 qualitative	 measures	 of	 identity	 suffer	 from	 similar	 limitations	 as	
quantitative	 approaches.	 Thus,	 acknowledging	 that	 identity	 cannot	 be	 measured	 in	 ideal	
terms	because	 it	 is	contextual,	 individual,	 fluid	and	expressive,	a	strategic	blend	of	the	both	
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qualitative	and	quantitative	methods	would	provide	a	strong	foundation	to	draw	conclusions	
for	 the	 purposes	 of	 this	 thesis.	 On	 these	 grounds,	 the	 empirical	 analysis	 is	 based	 on	
quantitative	surveys	with	1000	people	in	total	(500	Turkish-Cypriot	and	500	Greek-Cypriot),	3	
focus	 groups	 with	 Turkish	 immigrant	 population	 and	 101	 online	 semi-structured	
questionnaires	with	CSO	representatives	to	provide	a	grounded	and	nuanced	understanding	
of	identity	perceptions	as	well	as	perceptions	of	threat	and	anxiety	in	Cyprus.		
	
In	 addition,	 the	 island-wide	 quantitative	 surveys	 and	 semi-structured	 online	 questionnaires	
include	questions	with	 regards	 to	Cypriots’	 perceptions	of	 threat,	 anxieties	 and	 fears	 about	
settlement	 plans/options	with	 regards	 to	 the	 Cyprus	 Problem	 and	 perceptions	 towards	 the	
Turkish	immigrant	community	that	will	demonstrate	the	extent	of	the	securitisation	dynamics.	
Particularly,	the	semi-structured	online	questionnaires	with	CSO	representatives	provide	more	
in-depth	 reflection	 on	 the	 institutionalisation	 of	 securitisation	 practices	 and	 horizontal	 and	
bottom-up	movement	of	these	practices.	This	data	will	also	be	triangulated	with	focus	groups	
with	 the	 Turkish	 immigrant	 groups	 and	 enriched	 with	 media	 clippings,	 press	 releases	 and	
personal	anecdotes	mainly	from	civil	society	representatives.		
	
In	this	respect,	the	thesis	will	assume	both	a	normative	and	a	pragmatist	stance	towards	the	
Cyprus	Problem.	Normatively,	 I	argue	 that	 reconciliation	 is	more	desirable	 for	Cypriots	 than	
the	 status	 quo	 and	 the	 current	 deadlock,	 and	 that	 inclusion	 and	 deliberation	 is	 more	
conducive	 and	 facilitatory	 for	 reconciliation.	 Thus,	 desecuritisation	 and	 inclusion	 of	 the	
Turkish	 immigrants	 can	have	 transformative	effects	 for	 reconciliation.	Pragmatically,	 I	 argue	
that	 a	 bi-zonal,	 bi-communal	 federation	 as	 foreseen	 by	 the	 UN	 resolutions,	 Track	 1	 level	
negotiations	 and	 myriad	 settlement	 plans	 to	 date	 is	 more	 desirable	 than	 other	 solution	
options,	such	as	partition	or	a	unitary	state.	I,	by	no	means,	strictly	hold	that	this	is	the	ideal	
model	 for	a	 solution	 to	 the	Cyprus	Problem;	however,	 it	 is	 the	most	practical	 starting	point	
that	 has	 been	 adopted	 by	 the	 negotiation	 teams	 and	 the	 international	 community,	 and	
challenging	 this	 solution	 alternative	 is	 beyond	 the	 scope	of	 this	 thesis.	 Instead	 the	 thesis	 is	
interested	 in	 facilitating	 this	 model	 through	 informing	 peace	 research	 and	 peacebuilding	
efforts	 to	 facilitate	 reaching	 a	 comprehensive	 settlement	 and	 to	 contribute	 to	 its	
sustainability.		
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4.3	The	Chosen	methods	and	justifications		
	
The	 research	 questions	 are	 broken	 down	 into	more	 specific	 sub-questions	 and	matched	 to	
particular	 research	methods	 to	 provide	 an	 overall	 table	 that	 summarises	 the	 design	 of	 the	
thesis	in	a	snapshot.	Each	chosen	method	is	then	justified	one	by	one	by	briefly	discussing	its	
utility,	strengths	and	weaknesses.		
	
Table	No	3:	Research	questions	(2)	
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Cyprus	as	a	case	study	
Case	studies	allow	for	temporally	and	spatially	bounded	in-depth	and	 intensive	analysis	of	a	
single	 ‘unit’	or	a	 ‘	phenomenon’	 (Gerring	2004:342).	 Even	 though	 single	 case	 study	analysis	
has	 been	 subject	 to	 a	 number	 of	 criticisms	 that	 include	 issues	 concerning	 methodological	
rigour,	 researcher	 subjectivity	 and	 external	 validity,	 these	 criticisms	 are	 not	 unique	 to	 case	
studies	 per	 se	 but	more	 specific	 to	 chosen	methods	 of	 analysis22.	One	particularly	 criticism	
specific	 to	 single	 case	 studies	 is	 the	 inter-related	 issues	 of	 reliability,	 replicability	 and	
generalizability	 (Flyvbjerg	 2006).	 How	 can	 one	 case	 reliably	 offer	 anything	 beyond	 the	
particular?	Although	single	case	studies	contain	no	greater	bias	toward	verification	than	other	
methods	 of	 inquiry23	and	 although	 this	 thesis	 and	 fieldwork	 is	 potentially	 replicable,	 the	
criticism	of	generalisability	is	of	little	relevance	when	the	intention	is	particularisation,	and	the	
objective	 is	 based	 upon	 conducting	 explanatory	 research	 rather	 than	 theory-testing	 and	
theory-building.	As	such,	 this	 thesis	 is	neither	 interested	 in	 ‘proving’	or	 ‘disproving’	 theories	
and	 hypotheses	 nor	 in	making	 predictions.	 	 Single	 case	 studies	 also	 offer	 a	more	 practical	
advantage	as	they	are	economical	for	all	resources	 including	money,	human	resources,	time	
and	effort.	Cyprus	is	a	unique	case	that	can	demonstrate	the	links	between	(de)securitisation,	
ontological	security	and	peacebuilding;	it	is	a	practical	case	due	to	my	links	and	networks;	and	
it	is	a	case	that	I	am	personally	invested	and	interested	in.	
	
Ethical	concerns:	My	personal	attachment	to	and	involvement	in	various	CSOs	on	the	ground	
and	 my	 explicit	 political	 position	 vis-à-vis	 the	 Cyprus	 Problem	 could	 be	 considered	 as	
researcher	bias.	Nevertheless,	considering	subjectivity	cannot	be	eliminated	and	the	research	
has	explicit	normative	commitments,	these	concerns	can	also	be	viewed	as	strengths,	as	they	
present	effective	access	and	understanding	for	the	case	study.	The	established	rapport	with	
myriad	stakeholders	and	personal	experiences	could	strengthen	the	interpretive	aspect	of	the	
research	when	drawing	conclusions.	 	
	
																																																								
22	For	more	on	criticisms	see	Gomm,	R.,	M.	Hammersley	and	Foster,	P.	Eds.	(2000).	Case	Study	Method:	Key	Issues,	Key	
Texts;	 Flyvbjerg,	B.	 (2006).	 Five	misunderstandings	about	 case-study	 research;	Bennett,	A.	and	Elman,	C.	 (2007).	Case	
study	methods	in	the	international	relations	subfield;	Yin,	R.	K.	(2014).	Case	study	research	:	design	and	methods.		
23	On	 the	 contrary,	 according	 to	 Flyvbjerg	 “experience	 indicates	 that	 the	 case	 study	 contains	 a	 greater	 bias	 toward	
falsification	of	preconceived	notions	than	toward	verification”	(Flyvbjerg	2006:	237).	
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Analytical	 and	 methodological	 concerns:	 The	 research	 may	 not	 be	 comparable	 to	 other	
protracted	 conflict	 environments	 and	 it	 is	 difficult	 to	 draw	 generalisations	 beyond	 the	 case	
study.	However,	the	research	will	pave	the	way	for	comparative	studies,	could	be	replicated	in	
other	 conflict	 environments	 and	 enrich	 emerging	 the	 academic	 literature	 on	 the	
(de)securitisation,	reconciliation	and	ontological	security	nexus.	
	
The	focus	on	Turkish	immigrants		
Turkish	 immigrants	 are	part	 of	 the	 comprehensive	 settlement	negotiations	on	Track	1	 level	
but	 the	 existing	 research	 rarely	 goes	 beyond	 a	 debate	 about	 their	 numbers.	 As	 previously	
discussed,	the	literature	that	takes	the	debate	about	people	from	Turkey	beyond	a	discussion	
about	mere	numbers	 are	mainly	 limited	 to	 the	works24	of	Mete	Hatay,	Neophytos	 Loizides,	
Yeal	Navaro-Yashin,	Hatice	Kurtuluş	 and	 Semra	Purkis	 and	Hüseyin	Çakal.	However,	 despite	
the	 securitisation	 of	 Turkish	 immigrants	 as	 an	 existential	 threat	 and	 a	 major	 obstacle	 for	
reaching	 a	 solution	 and	 the	 lack	 of	 agreement	 about	 their	 future	 on	 the	 island	 on	 the	
negotiation	table,	the	conflict	resolution	and	peacebuilding	 literatures	have	failed	to	 include	
Turkish	 immigrants	 in	 their	 analysis,	 limiting	 the	 understanding	 of	 the	 conflict	 between	
Turkish-Cypriots	and	Greek-Cypriots.		
	
By	 expanding	 the	 focus	 to	 include	 this	 group,	 the	 thesis	 seeks	 to	 add	 value	 to	 the	 existing	
literature	 through	 arguing	 that	 Turkish	 immigrants	 occupy	 a	 fundamentally	 important,	 yet	
surprisingly	unrecognised	 role,	 in	 the	Cypriot	 identity	narratives	as	well	as	 in	 the	discourses	
and	 dynamics	 underpinning	 the	 conflict.	 Furthermore,	 the	 Turkish	 settler/immigrant	
community	 holds	 a	 different	 status	 compared	 to	 other	 migrants	 in	 Cyprus	 for	 five	 main	
reasons:	 1)	 their	 growing	 numbers	 are	 a	 big	 concern	 for	 Cypriots	 and	 this	 number	 is	 being	
negotiated	 by	 the	 parties	 at	 Track	 1	 level;	 b)	 they	 are	more	 politically	 charged	 than	 other	
migrants	due	to	their	numbers	and	ties	to	Turkey;	c)	Turkey’s	role	in	Cyprus	and	the	‘TRNCs’	
dependence	 on	 Turkey	 is	 undeniable	 as	 a	 guarantor,	 occupier,	 negotiator,	 financer	 and	 so	
forth;	 d)	 They	 are	 a	 diverse	 group	 of	 people	 that	 include	 settlers,	 economic	 migrants,	
students,	 soldiers,	 investors	 and	 so	 forth	 who	 are	 mostly	 pigeonholed	 into	 a	 lump	 sum	
number;	e)	They	have	ethnic,	linguistic	and	religious	ties	with	Turkish	Cypriots.																																																											
24	I	have	scanned	486	pieces	of	literature	including	articles,	books	and	reports	on	Cyprus	and	the	Cyprus	Problem.			
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Ethical	concerns:	Due	to	different	cultural	values	and	traditions	within	the	Turkish	immigrant	
community,	the	female	participants	were	asked	whether	they	felt	comfortable	in	participating	
in	a	mixed	group	or	whether	they	preferred	to	participate	in	an	only	female	group	during	the	
‘recruitment’	process.	However,	no	female	participant	expressed	such	a	concern	for	the	two	
focus	groups	that	took	place	in	Nicosia	and	Famagusta.	 In	fact,	female	participation	in	these	
two	 focus	 groups	was	meaningful	 both	 qualitatively	 and	 quantitatively25.	 In	 the	 third	 focus	
group	 that	 took	 place	 in	 Kyrenia,	 where	 the	migrant	 population	 is	 particularly	made	 up	 of	
unskilled	construction	workers,	all	13	participants	were	male.	The	method	of	recruitment	that	
was	used	for	all	focus	groups	was	the	snow-ball	technique	but	the	researcher’s	unfamiliarity	
with	 the	 city	 compared	 to	 the	other	 two	 cities	meant	 a	heavier	 reliance	on	 this	 technique.	
However,	all	male	participation	in	the	third	focus	group	is	also	representative	of	the	social	and	
economic	background	of	the	migrant	population	in	Kyrenia,	as	participants	in	the	capital	and	
in	Famagusta	are	more	socially	and	economically	 integrated	and	established.	As	such,	 these	
participants	were	more	likely	to	come	from	educated	backgrounds	that	inter-married	Cypriots	
or	acquired	 ‘TRNC’	citizenship.	 In	Kyrenia,	the	snow-ball	 technique	was	particularly	effective	
as	 the	 migrants	 in	 this	 city	 expressed	 disempowerment	 and	 being	 disenfranchised;	 they	
expressed	 their	 excitement	 at	 the	 opportunity	 to	 share	 their	 opinions	 and	 problems	 to	
someone	who	was	interested	outside	of	an	election	campaign.		
	
Analytical	and	methodological	concerns:	The	migrant	groups	from	Turkey	are	highly	diverse26	
and	 it	 is	 important	 not	 to	 pigeonhole	 people	 into	 identity	 categories.	 Although	 Turkishness	
may	not	be	 the	primary	 identity	 for	 some	people	 in	 this	group,	 some	categorical	analysis	 is	
necessary	to	draw	conclusions	 from	the	research.	Methodologically,	 the	research	adopted	a	
strategically	 controlled	 bias	 when	 recruiting	 to	 ensure	 that	 the	 diversity	 of	 this	 group	 is	
respected.	Age	groups,	birthplace,	 gender,	 location	and	 time	of	 stay	 in	Cyprus	were	among	
these	 considerations.	 That	 being	 said,	 the	 majority	 of	 both	 Turkish-Cypriots	 and	 Greek-
Cypriots,	except	for	some	civil	society	representatives,	tend	to	securitise	this	diverse	group	of	
immigrants	 into	 one	 all-inclusive	 and	 undifferentiated	 threat	 category	 under	 the	 title	 of	
‘people	from	Turkey’	(Turkiyeliler).																																																												
25	2	females	and	4	males	in	Nicosia;	3	female	and	5	males	in	Famagusta.	
26	Including	Kurds,	Shi’as,	Laz/Pontus,	soldier/veteran	families,	settlers,	economic	migrants.	
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Quantitative	telephone	surveys	
Quantitative	 telephone	 surveys,	 which	 were	 based	 on	 stratified	 random	 sampling	 among	
Cypriot	 citizens	 to	 provide	 data	 on	 the	 perceptions	 of	 the	 existential	 threat(s),	 anxieties,	
identities	 and	 possible	 solution	 scenarios,	 are	 chosen	 for	 their	 efficiency	 and	 cost	
effectiveness	 in	 reaching	 out	 to	 a	 large	 number	 of	 people.	 Quantitative	work	 often	 comes	
with	 budgetary	 and	 efficacy	 constrains.	 Telephone	 surveys	 are	 comparatively	 cheaper	 and	
faster	 to	 conduct	 compared	 face-to-face	 questionnaires	 and	 they	 also	 offer	 discreet	
anonymity	 for	 the	 respondent	 and	 are	 proven	 to	 provide	 more	 honest	 replies	 when	 the	
interviewer	and	interviewee	are	fundamentally	unknown	to	one	another	(Mathers,	Fox	et	al.	
1998).	Telephone	interviews	are	particularly	useful	when	the	respondents	to	be	interviewed	
are	geographically	distributed,	but	the	complexity	of	the	interview	is	limited	without	the	use	
of	 visual	 aids	 and	 prompts	 (Parfitt	 2005).	 The	 quantitative	 surveys	were	 conducted	 by	 two	
research	 companies	 in	 Cyprus;	 one	 in	 the	 RoC	 that	 conducted	 the	 survey	 in	Greek	 for	 RoC	
citizens	and	one	in	north	Cyprus	that	conducted	the	survey	in	Turkish	for	‘TRNC’	citizens.	The	
sample	was	based	on	 citizenship	and	did	not	 filter	out	 those	who	had	non-Cypriot	parents,	
who	were	dual	citizens	or	who	acquired	citizenship	due	marriage	or	length	of	stay	in	Cyprus.	
The	two	research	companies	delivered	the	data	in	SPSS	format.		
Ethical	concerns:	Due	to	the	political	content	of	the	questionnaire	questions,	the	interviewers	
were	particularly	 instructed	 to	 clearly	 state	 the	nature	and	objectives	of	 the	project	before	
starting	the	questionnaire	and	receive	respondents’	consent.		
Analytical	 and	 methodological	 concerns:	 In	 quantitative	methods,	 sampling	 and	 analytical	
concerns	are	particularly	tricky	as	the	aim	is	to	be	able	to	draw	credible,	representative	and	
legitimate	 conclusions.	 The	 research	 used	 stratified	 random	 sampling	 to	 represent	 the	
population	 in	Cyprus.	Generally,	a	sample	for	student	projects	 for	descriptive	or	exploratory	
surveys	 is	 ranged	 between	 60-120	 (Davies	 and	 Hughes	 2014);	 however,	 considering	 the	
objectives	of	the	thesis	and	its	normative	commitments,	the	legitimacy	and	the	robustness	of	
the	data	is	crucial.	Thus,	the	telephone	survey	sample,	which	was	drawn	separately	based	on	
registered	telephone	lines,	was	500	for	each	community.	Considering	the	decrease	in	the	use	
of	landline	phones	and	wide	penetration	of	mobile	phones,	telephone	survey	methodologists	
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that	mainly	rely	on	landlines	face	a	new	challenge	to	overcome	coverage	bias27	(Groves	1989).	
However,	 based	on	 the	 study	 carried	 out	 on	 coverage	 bias	 in	 European	 telephone	 surveys,	
which	 included	 both	 the	 RoC	 and	 north	 Cyprus,	 the	 concern	 about	 coverage	 bias	 is	 not	 a	
decisive	one	for	this	research	(see	Mohorko,	de	Leeuw	et	al.	2013).	
	
The	main	 analytical	 concern	with	 regards	 to	 employing	 this	methodology	 in	 the	 context	 of	
Cyprus	 is	 the	 problem	of	 different	 interviewers	 asking	 the	 same	 questions	 in	 two	 different	
languages,	which	may	create	nuances	 in	the	meaning	of	certain	words	such	as	 ‘anxiety’	and	
‘fear’.	Considering	the	difficulty	with	measuring	identity,	the	telephone	survey	questions	were	
strategic	 and	 carefully	 crafted	 in	 consultation	 with	 the	 research	 companies	 and	 thesis	
supervisors.	 Some	 of	 these	 questions	 were	 also	 adopted	 from	 previous	 opinion	 polls	 that	
tested	their	viability	and	allowed	for	a	temporal	comparison.	The	identity	questions	included	
scale	 questions	 and	 self-referential	 questions	 in	 order	 to	 avoid	 pigeonholing	 people	 into	
identity	 labels	 and	 to	 try	 to	 establish	 the	 closest	 associations.	 In	 this	 sense,	 the	 research	 is	
mainly	 interested	 in	cultural,	ethnic	and	civic	 identity	perceptions	rather	than	other	 identity	
layers	that	may	come	with	religion,	family,	gender,	age,	occupation,	sexual	orientation	and	so	
forth.		
	
Another	 analytical	 concern	 is	 asking	 interviewees	 to	 reflect	 on	 changes	 over	 time	 (i.e.	with	
regards	to	their	identity	perceptions).	This	raises	issues	of	‘recall	bias’,	meaning	that	the	past	
can	be	glorified,	damned,	downplayed,	or	 ‘not	 recalled’	 (Bruter	and	Lodge	2013).	However,	
the	key	interest	for	the	research	is	to	explore	the	shared	perceptions	of	change	and	not	the	
‘hard	reality’	of	change;	thus,	despite	being	a	concern,	recall	bias	will	not	be	decisive	for	the	
conclusions.		
	
																																																								
27	Referring	to	over-representation	of	some	groups	and	the	gap	between	the	target	population	and	the	sampling	frame.	
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Table	No	4:	QTS	
	
	
Focus	groups	
Focus	 groups	 provide	 an	 in-depth	 analysis	 about	 Turkish	 immigrants’	 perceived	 role	 in	 and	
understanding	of	the	Cyprus	Problem	and	the	peacebuilding	process,	and	insights	about	their	
experiences	of	the	securitisation	dynamics.	Focus	groups	are	a	very	efficient	way	of	garnering	
empirical	data	as	they	allow	the	researcher	to	collect	data	from	the	group	interaction	as	well	
as	 the	 responses	 of	 the	 individual	 participants.	 Compared	 to	 individual	 interviews,	 a	 free	
flowing	 discussion	with	 a	 small	 group	 of	 people	 can	 significantly	 increase	 the	 sample	 for	 a	
qualitative	 study.	 It	 is	also	worth	noting	 that	participants	 in	 focus	groups	can	build	on	each	
other’s	responses	and	insights,	which	improves	the	richness	of	discussion	and	is	more	likely	to	
be	revealing.	The	three	regional	focus	groups	that	were	conducted	as	part	of	the	fieldwork	are	
summarised	in	the	table	below:	
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Table	No	5:	FG	
Ethical	concerns:	Due	to	the	political	content	of	the	questionnaire	questions,	the	nature	and	
objectives	of	the	project	was	clearly	stated	to	the	participants	during	recruitment	and	before	
the	 focus	group	 to	ensure	 that	 the	participants	knew	the	data	would	be	used	anonymously	
and	that	they	can	withdraw	from	the	research	at	any	time.	Focus	group	conductors	remained	
outside	 of	 the	 discussion	 without	 expressing	 their	 own	 opinions	 on	 the	 subject	 matter.	
Overall,	 there	 were	 two	 experienced	 focus	 group	 conductors,	 while	 one	 facilitated	 the	
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discussion	and	I	acted	as	the	note	taker	and	observer.	The	conversation	was	free	flowing	but	
guided	with	a	list	of	open-ended	questions.	The	focus	groups	were	audio	recorded	as	people	
tend	to	feel	more	conscious	about	their	expressions	when	there	is	a	video	camera	present.		
	
Analytical	 and	 methodological	 concerns:	 Generally,	 the	 ideal	 sample	 for	 focus	 groups	 is	
approximately	4-6	but	can	move	up	to	20	depending	on	the	complexity	and	the	depth	of	the	
questions	(Davies	and	Hughes	2014).	The	focus	group	participation	was	between	6-13	people	
in	each	location.	Sample	was	based	on	noncitizen	people	of	Turkish	origin	who	are	residents	in	
north	Cyprus	and	‘TRNC’	citizens	of	Turkish	origin	who	were	born	to	non-Cypriot	parents.	The	
sample	 took	 age,	 gender	 and	 occupation	 into	 consideration	 to	 ensure	 diversity	 but	 young	
people	aged	18-30	and	people	aged	over	60	were	not	 represented.	This	was	a	 result	of	 the	
snow-balling	 technique	 in	 recruitment	 as	 well	 as	 due	 to	 transportation	 issues	 (i.e.	 young	
people	and	people	over	60	 lacked	access	 to	cars).	Considering	the	data	will	not	be	used	 for	
generalisations	but	rather	to	enrich	and	triangulate	other	fieldwork	data,	the	limitations	with	
the	representation	of	all	age	groups	is	not	a	major	concern.		
	
The	focus	group	data	is	used	reflectively	for	interpretive	analysis	to	allow	the	reader	to	get	a	
sense	of	the	nature	and	meaning	of	the	responses	offered,	as	well	as	illustratively	to	support	
arguments	rather	than	to	make	arguments.	The	aim	is	not	to	count	the	number	of	people	who	
agreed	and	quantify	it	or	to	represent	a	diverse	migrant	community	as	a	whole,	but	rather	to	
bring	 to	 surface	 the	 reflective	 thoughts	 and	 experiences	 of	 small	 but	 strategically	 selected	
sample,	and	to	shed	light	on	an	identified,	practical,	policy-related	or	conceptual	question.		
	
Semi-structured	online	surveys	
Online	 surveys	 have	 become	 really	 popular	 tools	 for	 systematic	 gathering	 of	 data	 from	 a	
target	audience	as	they	are	cheap,	efficient	and	practical.	Compared	to	email	questionnaires,	
online	survey	software	or	websites	 increase	the	efficiency	of	data	gathering	by	streamlining	
the	 responses,	 providing	 some	 control	 over	 which	 questions	 need	 to	 be	 answered	 (i.e.	
administering	skip	logic	techniques),	and	providing	the	initial	data	analysis	very	rapidly28.																																																										
28	Other	 advantages	 include:	 a)	 Allowing	 respondents	 to	 take	 their	 own	 time	 to	 complete	 the	 survey;	 b)	 Providing	
anonymity	 thus	 they	 can	 be	 better	 at	 addressing	 sensitive	 questions;	 c)	 Offering	 fairly	 quick	 response	 time	 for	
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Ethical	 concerns:	 There	 are	 a	 few	 ethical	 concerns	 about	 online	 surveys,	 such	 as	 sending	
unsolicited	emails	can	be	intrusive	or	be	considered	spamming.	Some	emails	being	rejected	as	
spam	or	falling	into	junk	folders	or	not	being	delivered	can	be	a	worry	for	the	researcher	too.	
There	are	also	the	sampling	considerations	about	online	surveys	as	they	exclude	those	who	do	
not	 have	 access	 to	 the	 Internet,	 IT	 resources	 or	 those	 who	 are	 not	 IT	 literate.	 All	 these	
concerns	about	spamming	and	sampling	do	not	apply	to	this	particular	research	project	as	the	
online	surveys	were	used	 to	 reach	out	 to	a	 specific	 target	group.	Cyprus	CSO	Directory	was	
used	to	identify	the	target	group,	who	were	emailed	directly	on	an	individual	level	with	a	link	
to	the	online	survey	to	avoid	spamming	or	intrusion.		
	
Analytical	and	methodological	concerns:	At	a	first	glance,	it	can	be	argued	online	surveys	are	
not	suitable	for	surveys	with	open-ended	questions	because	there	is	no	trained	interviewer	to	
explore	the	answers	of	the	respondents,	and	no	human	contact	or	a	chance	to	build	rapport.	
However,	 recent	 studies	 show	 that	 high	 quality	 responses	 to	 open-ended	 questions	 are	
obtainable	in	web	surveys	(Smyth,	Dillman	et	al.	2009).	Even	though	there	are	no	spur	of	the	
moment	 anecdotes	 or	 the	 instant	 opportunity	 follow	 up	 on	 an	 interesting	 topic,	 semi-
structured	online	surveys	tend	to	produce	less	non-response	questions	than	other	modes,	as	
they	have	the	ability	to	prompt	a	respondent	when	a	question	is	left	blank;	where,	in	face-to-
face	 or	 telephone	 interviews,	 interviewers	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 accept	 ‘no	 opinion’	 answers	
without	 any	 probing	 in	 order	 to	maintain	 the	 rapport	 or	 not	 to	 intimidate	 the	 respondent	
(Fricker,	Galesic	et	al.	2005).	For	semi-structured	and	open-ended	questionnaires,	including	an	
introduction	to	a	question	that	states	the	importance	of	the	question	for	the	study	can	result	
in	 higher	 quality	 and	 longer	 responses	 (Christian	 and	 Dillman	 2004,	 Smyth,	 Dillman	 et	 al.	
2009).	 There	 are	 similar	 studies	 that	 show	 that	 online	 respondents	 on	 average	 use	 more	
words	(Schaefer	and	Dillman	1998).		
	
Furthermore,	online	 surveys	 are	well	 suited	 for	CSO	 representatives	not	 least	because	 they	
have	 internet	access	and	are	computer	 literate,	but	also	because	they	are	more	 likely	 to	be	
familiar	with	the	survey	questions	and	the	topic	at	hand,	which	negates	the	need	for	guidance																																																																																																																																																																										
participants;	 e)	 Ease	 of	 dissemination;	 f)	 Ability	 to	 track	 respondents	 and	 do	 follow	 ups;	 g)	 Hassle-free	 and	 efficient	
handling	of	data	(Miller	2003).			
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and	 explanation	 during	 the	 survey.	 To	 further	 eliminate	 the	 concerns	 regarding	 the	 lack	 of	
guidance	and	human	contact,	a	pilot	study	was	conducted	with	10	 individuals	 including	PhD	
students	and	professionals	to	ensure	that	the	questions	were	clearly	phrased.	Approximately	
200	CSO’s29	were	identified	and	the	survey	link	was	sent	to	an	identified	CSO	representative30	
rather	 than	 directly	 to	 the	 organisational	 email	 address	 or	web	 forum	 to	minimise	 interns,	
assistants	 or	 people	 who	 cannot	 be	 considered	 ‘representatives’	 from	 filling	 in	 the	
questionnaire.		
Table	No	6:	CSOS	
29	Including	international	organisations,	local	authorities,	trade	unions,	chambers,	associations,	think-tanks	and	etc.	
30 	A	 CSO	 representative	 refers	 to	 a	 founding/board	 member,	 project/programme	 coordinator/manager,	 general	
secretary/chair	or	an	active	member.	
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4.4	Conclusion	
	
Today,	 social	 sciences	 in	particular	and	 research	world	 in	general	are	becoming	 increasingly	
inter-disciplinary.	 In	 fact,	 inter-disciplinary	 work	 is	 not	 only	 growing	 but	 being	 actively	
encouraged	and	promoted	 through	various	grants	and	programmes.	This	 is	not	only	a	 ‘new	
trend’	 in	academia,	but	 it	also	underlines	 the	acknowledgement	and	realisation	that	 ‘purist’	
approaches	that	treat	subjects,	methods	and	tools	mutually	exclusive	are	not	necessarily	on	
solid	ground	in	assuming	the	existence	of	inherent	incompatibility	between	different	research	
methods.	 Johnson	 and	 Onwuegbuzie,	 who	 promote	 epistemological	 and	 methodological	
pluralism,	 contend	 that	 mixed-methods	 facilitate	 communication	 and	 collaboration	 across	
approaches	and	disciplines	and	provide	superior	research	(Johnson	and	Onwuegbuzie	2004).	
	
If	we	do	not	assume	that	the	logic	of	justification	has	inherent	impositions	on	data	collection,	
then	epistemological	and	paradigmatic	ecumenicalism	becomes	more	achievable	by	allowing	
us	 to	move	past	 the	 paradigm	wars,	 and	 by	 offering	 a	 practical	 alternative	 to	 combine	 the	
strengths	 of	 both	 qualitative	 and	 quantitative	 methodologies	 (Howe	 1988,	 Bryman	 and	
Burgess	1994).	 In	other	words,	we	should	not	treat	epistemology	and	methodology	as	being	
synonymous,	 or	 assume	 that	 methodological	 choices	 dictate	 our	 epistemological	
commitments. Acknowledging	 the	weaknesses	and	 limitations	of	different	methods,	 a	good	
blend	of	quantitative	and	qualitative	analysis	and	strategic	triangulation	of	data	can	provide	
the	 thesis	 with	 a	 strong	 foundation	 to	 interpret	 and	 draw	 valuable	 conclusions	 about	
ontological	 security,	 identity	 narratives	 and	 (de)securitisation	 practices	 in	 conflict	
environments.			
	
In	 addition	 to	 the	 primary	 data	 collection	 laid	 out	 in	 this	 chapter,	 the	 thesis	 also	 utilises	
existing	 secondary	 datasets	 and	 data	 such	 as	 opinion	 polls	 carried	 out	 by	 different	
organisations,	 CSO	 reports,	 press	 releases,	 and	 the	 like	 to	 corroborate,	 triangulate	 and	
temporally	 compare	 the	 findings31.	 This	 secondary	 data	 is	 invaluable	 for	 identifying	 and	
																																																								
31	For	 example,	 Cyprus-2015-Initiative,	 funded	 by	 USAID	 and	 Interpeace	 has	 produced	 numerous	 option	 poll	 reports	
since	2008	and	Cypriot’s	Voice,	a	bicommunal	think-tank,	has	published	myriad	press	releases	about	the	concerns	and	
priorities	of	the	two	communities.	
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triangulating	 securitisation	 dynamics,	 ontological	 security	 concerns	 and	 perceptions	 about	
Turkish	immigrants.		
Considering	 protracted	 conflicts	 provide	 a	 fertile	 ground	 for	 institutionalised	 securitisations	
and	 institutionalised	 securitisations	 pose	 a	 particular	 challenge	 for	 desecuritisation,	 Cyprus	
presents	a	unique	case	study	to	explore	the	theoretical	 research	questions.	Similarly,	as	 the	
concepts	of	 identity,	threat	and	security	are	all	 intermingled	and	interlaced,	exploration	and	
enrichment	 of	 these	 concepts	 through	 empirical	 analysis	 and	 providing	 a	 more	 nuanced	
understanding	 would	 inform	 peace	 research	 and	 reconciliation	 in	 conflict	 environments.	
Understanding	multi-layered	and	complex	identity	narratives	and	perceptions	of	threat	across	
the	 island	 calls	 for	 a	 nuanced,	 empirically-rich,	 holistic	 fieldwork	 methodology.	 As	 such,	
application	of	multiple	qualitative	and	quantitative	research	methods	can	provide	the	thesis	
with	 a	 more	 wholesome	 and	 well-grounded	 data	 in	 understanding	 and	 analysing	 the	
underlying	research	questions.			
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Part	II:	The	Case	of	Cyprus:	Who	we	were?	Who	we	are?	Who	will	we	
become?	
Introduction	
Cyprus	is	the	third	largest	island	in	the	Mediterranean	Sea.	It	sits	roughly	forty	miles	south	of	
Turkey	and	 five	 hundred	 miles	southeast	 of	mainland	 Greece,	 with	 a	 population	 of	 1.1	
million.		 The	history	of	 Cyprus	has	been	 tempestuous	with	 the	 involvement	of	many	 actors	
ranging	from	different	empires	and	nations	of	the	past	to	regional	and	global	actors	of	today.	
As	George	Christou	highlights,	 the	history	of	Cyprus	“has	been	characterised	by	tension	and	
conflict	due	to	the	diametrically	opposed	 interests	of	Greece	and	the	Greek-Cypriots	on	the	
one	hand,	and	Turkey	and	the	Turkish-Cypriots	on	the	other”	(Christou	2004:29).		
The	Cyprus	Problem	operates	on	local,	regional	and	international	levels:	the	local	entails	the	
relationship	between	the	two	‘ethnically’	categorised	communities;	the	regional,	which	is	the	
product	 of	 geography,	 history,	 and	 demographics	 of	 the	 region,	 at	 its	 core,	 involves	 the	
relationship	 between	 Greece	 and	 Turkey	 or	 Greekness	 and	 Turkishness;	 and	 at	 the	
international	 level,	the	problem	has	preoccupied	the	UN	since	1964	and	involved	NATO,	the	
USA	and	increasingly	the	EU.	On	the	other	hand,	conflict	resolution	and	reconciliation	efforts	
on	 the	 island	 mainly	 operated	 on	 two	 levels,	 Track	 1	 level	 (peacemaking	 through	 peace	
negotiations	 at	 the	 level	 of	 political	 leaders)	 that	 traces	 back	 to	 1960s	 and	 Track	 2	 level	
(peacebuilding	at	 the	 level	of	 civil	 society)	 that	was	 introduced	 in	 the	1990s	 (Broome	1998,	
Loizos	2007,	Hadjipavlou	and	Kanol	2008).		
Part	II	of	the	thesis	serves	as	a	bridge	between	the	theoretical	framework	presented	in	Part	I	
and	the	empirical	analysis	in	Part	III;	it	contextualises	the	theoretical	framework	to	the	case	of	
Cyprus	before	moving	on	to	the	analysis	of	the	fieldwork	data.	Considering	that	the	debates	
about	identity	and	security	remain	intricately	interweaved	in	protracted	conflicts,	providing	a	
historical	account	for	the	case	of	Cyprus	is	not	only	an	inevitable	task	for	contextualisation	of	
the	 theoretical	 arguments	 and	 the	 empirical	 data,	 but	 also	 necessary	 to	 understand	 how	
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securitisation	of	different	others	relates	to	and	is	engrained	in	the	ontological	security	of	the	
two	main	Cypriot	communities.		
The	analysis	of	historical	 events	presented	 in	 the	next	 two	 chapters	 illustrates	 the	dynamic	
and	 kaleidoscopic	 nature	 of	 Cypriot	 identity,	 where	 identity	 narratives	 demonstrate	 a	 shift	
from	religious	to	ethnic	and	ethnic	to	civic	and	cultural.	This	shift	supports	Kinnvall’s	argument	
that	actors	who	feel	ontologically	insecure	are	tempted	to	draw	closer	to	any	collective	that	
can	 provide	 them	 safety	 to	 reduce	 their	 existential	 anxieties	 (Kinnvall	 2004).	 However,	 the	
writing	 of	 history	 is	 selective;	 as	 Benjamin	 Broome	 suggests,	 “the	 past	 has	 been	 distorted	
beyond	 recognition	 by	 the	 educational	 systems	 and	 political	 propaganda	 of	 both	 sides”	 in	
Cyprus	 (Broome	2005:83).	While	 the	historical	 accounts	about	Cyprus	 can	be	 contradictory,	
ascertaining	 individuals’	 and/or	 collectives’	 self-identity	 from	 history	 or	
remembering/interpreting	identity	narratives	retroactively	is	at	best	challenging.	However,	in	
order	to	explore	the	relationship	of	the	self	with	different	and/or	enemy	others,	and	how	this	
relationship	 impinges	 upon	 ontological	 security,	 we	 need	 a	 deeper	 understanding	 of	 the	
particular	 ‘self(s)’	 as	 well	 as	 the	 particular	 ‘other(s)’.	 To	 that	 end,	 Part	 II	 of	 this	 thesis	 will	
provide	an	extended	historical	account	 for	 the	case	of	Cyprus	and	map	 the	shifting	 identity	
narratives	on	a	timeline.	Mainly	drawing	from	old	data	sets,	literature	on	the	Cyprus	conflict,	
media	sources	and	history	books,	the	two	chapters	in	this	section	traces	Turkish-Cypriot	and	
Greek-Cypriot	identity	narratives	through	history.		
Historian	and	psychoanalyst	Peter	Loewenberg	concurs	that	when	we	examine	history	it	can	
often	be	difficult	to	figure	out	where	reality	ends	and	fantasy	begins	(Loewenberg	1995).	This	
is	certainly	the	case	in	Cyprus	as	well.	When	Greek-Cypriots	and	Turkish-Cypriots,	and	in	fact	
Greeks	and	Turks	 in	general,	 speak	or	write	about	what	has	happened	 in	Cyprus	during	 the	
last	 five	 decades,	 they	 select	 and	highlight	 two	different	 events	 as	 the	most	 traumatic	 and	
devastating	 for	 their	 communities.	 For	 example,	 while	 the	 Greek-Cypriot	 history	 textbooks	
focus	on	British	 rule	 and	 the	events	of	1974	 (Makriyianni	 and	Psaltis	 2007),	 Turkish-Cypriot	
history	 textbooks	 focus	 on	 the	 Ottoman	 period	 and	 the	 inter-communal	 strife	 before	 the	
events	of	1974	(Papadakis	2008,	Bekerman,	Kızılyürek	et	al.	2010).	Hence,	they	ignore	those	
events	 that	 do	not	 satisfy	 their	 identity	 narratives	 sustained	by	 the	 government	 (Papadakis	
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2005).	 Despite	 the	 difference	 in	 the	 way	 historical	 events	 are	 selected	 and	 presented,	 the	
policies	 and	 strategies	 used	 to	 construct	 and	 reinforce	 identity	 narratives	 are	 very	 similar;	
both	 communities	 have	 created	 symbols,	 ethnic	 maps,	 detailed	 accounts	 of	 murders	 and	
heroes,	and	a	conception	of	the	other	as	the	ultimate	enemy	whose	existence	on	the	island	
comes	at	the	expense	of	‘our’	existence.	
Cypriots’	 self-identification	varies	on	a	 scale	of	 ‘only	Cypriot’	 to	 ‘only	Turkish/Greek’,	where	
the	 majority	 position	 themselves	 somewhere	 in	 the	 middle	 (see	 Volkan	 2008,	 Ker-Lindsay	
2011).	 I	 personally	 identify	myself	 as	 a	Turkish	 speaking	Cypriot,	which	 is	 a	personal	 choice	
that	circumstantialises	my	‘Turkishness’	and	limits	it	to	my	mother	tongue	rather	than	linking	
it	 to	my	 civic,	 ethnic	 or	 national	 identity.	 I	 do	 not	 deny	 that	 I	 have	 a	 shared	 culture	 with	
people	from	Turkey;	after	all	I	love	hummus	and	goblet	drums…	However,	I	cannot	deny	the	
same	shared	culture	with	other	Mediterranean	people	either.	For	me,	just	as	an	Australian	or	
an	American	speaks	English	without	perceiving	 ‘Englishness’	as	an	 identity	signifier,	 the	 fact	
that	Turkish	happens	to	be	my	mother	tongue	does	not	necessarily	define	who	I	am.	At	least	
ideally,	 I	 wish	 it	 did	 not.	 As	 previously	 discussed	 however,	 identity	 is	 not	 solely	 a	 self-
referential	 practice,	 it	 is	 also	 about	 the	 response	 and	 acknowledgement	 of	 the	 other	 (see	
Butler	 2004,	 Rumelili	 2004,	 Wetherell	 2009)	 and	 being	 simply	 and	 only	 Cypriot	 is	 not	
‘accepted’.	 In	social	and	professional	 interactions,	as	well	as	 in	the	1960	Constitution	of	 the	
RoC,	I	am,	more	often	than	not,	required	to	specify	what	‘kind’	of	Cypriot	I	am.	Nevertheless,	
my	self-identification	is	only	one	variation	on	one	end	of	the	spectrum;	on	the	other	end	are	
those	 whose	 sense	 of	 belonging	 lies	 with	 their	 Turkishness/Greekness,	 and	 they	 define	
themselves	as	Turks/Greeks,	who	happened	to	be	born	in	Cyprus.		
While	 many	 scholars	 locate	 the	 conflict	 in	 a	 dual-ethnic	 analysis	 based	 on	 historic	 enmity	
between	 Greeks	 and	 Turks	 (i.e.	 Akcali	 2007)	 and	 others	 locate	 it	 in	 the	 1960	 constitution,	
which	 is	 viewed	 as	 inherently	 defective	 (i.e.	 Adams	 1966,	 Trimikliniotis	 and	 Bozkurt	 2010),	
some	others	 read	 it	as	a	 failure	 in	nation-building	and	national	 integration	of	 ‘Cypriots’	 (i.e.	
Nimetz	1991,	Rizvi	1993)	and	others	as	 the	product	of	manipulative	 foreign	 interests	 in	 the	
region	 (i.e.	 Mavratsas	 1999,	 O'Malley	 and	 Craig	 2001).	 Generally,	 the	 locus	 of	 the	
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responsibility	for	the	conflict	in	these	readings	are	either	situated	inside,	meaning	internally	to	
communities,	or	outside,	 linked	to	 the	selfish	 interests	and	conspiracies	of	external	powers,	
where	the	two	communities	are	to	an	extent	stripped	of	agency.	Appropriating	the	blame	to	
others	 and	 self-victimisation	 is	 especially	 prevalent	 in	 the	 national	 narratives	 of	 the	 two	
communities.	These	approaches	risk	essentialisation	and	reification	of	the	actors	involved	and	
assume	 rationality,	 autonomy	 and	 homogeneity	 of	 actors	 and	 their	 interests	 (Trimikliniotis	
and	 Bozkurt	 2012).	 It	 is	 counter-intuitive	 and	 reductionist	 to	 seek	 a	 singular	 answer	 or	
diagnosis	 to	 the	 protracted	 conflict	 in	 Cyprus.	Historic	 enmities,	 shifting	 identity	 narratives,	
physical	 and	 existential	 insecurities	 and	 anxieties,	 colonial	 legacy,	 the	 Cold	War	 dynamics,	
realpolitik	 interests,	 the	 constitutional	 impositions	 and	 defects,	 the	 role	 of	 international	
organisations	and	even	personal	egos	and	ambitions	of	certain	political	figures32	have	all	had	a	
role	to	play,	amalgamating	into	what	we	came	to	know	as	the	Cyprus	Problem.	
	
Helen	 and	 Everett	 Hughes	 argue	 “an	 ethnic	 group	 is	 not	 one	 because	 of	 the	 degree	 of	
measurable	or	observable	difference	from	other	groups;	it	is	an	ethnic	group…	because	both	
the	ins	and	the	out	feel	and	act	as	if	it	were	a	separate	group”(Hughes	and	Hughes	1952:152).	
National	 and	 ethnic	 identities,	 like	 the	other	 layers	 of	 our	 self-identity,	 are	 incomplete	 and	
permeable	 layers;	 meaning,	 they	 are	 always	 in	 the	 process	 of	 shifting	 and	 becoming.	 For	
example,	being	British,	Turkish,	Greek	or	Cypriot	is	not	about	fulfilling	a	set	criteria	essential	
for	membership,	but	it	is	rather	an	inter-subjective	process	negotiated	between	the	self,	the	
members	of	the	collective	and	the	non-members.	This	inter-subjective	process	adds	meaning	
to	 the	 membership,	 but	 it	 is	 also	 constantly	 re-negotiated	 in	 relation	 to	 our	 social	 and	
material	 environment.	 Thus,	 locking	 the	 conflict	 into	 one	 of	 ethnicity,	 does	 not	 only	
essentialise	ethnic	signifiers,	assuming	there	is	a	homogeneous	group	of	Turkish-Cypriots	that	
align	themselves	in	opposition	to	Greek-Cypriots	based	on	their	Turkish	ethnicity	and	Turkish	
interests,	 but	 it	 also	 reifies	 them	 as	 complete	 and	 unchanging.	 The	 binary	 and	 dual-ethnic	
approach	 thwarts	 peacebuilding	 efforts	 as	 it	 assumes	 that	 the	 rival	 and	 homogeneous	
positions	of	each	 ‘side’	 can	be	mediated	based	on	 ‘objective’	negotiations	and	compromise	
that	satisfies	their	‘interests’.	As	a	result,	it	disregards	the	inter-subjective	and	co-constitutive																																																									
32	For	 example	 former	 community	 leaders	 Rauf	 Raif	 Denktaş	 and	 Archbishop	 Makarios	 wielded	 greater	 power	 in	
determining	their	respective	community’s	stance	than	any	other	individual	actor.	
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nature	 of	 identities,	 and	 fails	 to	 account	 for	 ontological	 security	 and	 for	 peace-anxieties	
triggered	by	the	prospect	of	a	comprehensive	solution.		
	
That	being	said,	by	no	means	am	I	trying	to	postulate	a	singular	diagnosis	for	the	roots	of	the	
conflict	or	a	new	alternative	explanation	to	 the	whole	story;	neither	am	 I	 trying	 to	 reinvent	
the	wheel	for	peacebuilding.	Instead,	while	recognising	that	the	conditions	on	all	levels	need	
to	be	 favourable	 for	a	comprehensive	settlement,	 I	argue	that	 the	narrow	dual-ethnic	 focus	
thwarted	 the	peacebuilding	and	 reconciliation	efforts	on	 the	 island.	Thus,	 in	order	 to	break	
free	 of	 an	 essentialist	 dual-ethnic	 approach,	 I	 introduce	 ‘other-others’,	 ‘other-selves’	 and	
‘othered-selves’	 to	 the	 historical	 analysis	 of	 identity	 narratives	 and	 add	ontological	 security	
considerations	to	the	equation.	For	example,	I	explore	the	role	of	Turkish	immigrants	as	other-
others	 and	Turkishness	as	 the	othered-self	 for	 Turkish-Cypriots.	One	 significant	 and	original	
contribution	of	this	historical	and	contextual	account	is	the	adoption	of	a	broader	and	more	
nuanced	 lens	 to	 our	 understanding	 of	 identity	 narratives	 in	 Cyprus.	 As	 such,	 in	 addition	 to	
exploring	Greek-Cypriot	 and	Turkish-Cypriot	 identity	narratives,	Chapters	5	 and	6	also	 trace	
the	 perceptions	 towards	 people	 from	 Turkey	 and	 Turkishness.	 While	 the	 Greek-Cypriot	
perception	of	 Turkishness	 as	 their	 enemy	other	did	not	 shift	 but	 instead	was	 reinforced	by	
historical	events,	it	is	interesting	to	see	how	Turkish-Cypriots’	self/other	relationship	that	was	
first	based	on	similarity	and	admiration	for	Turkey	and	Turkishness	was	securitised	 into	one	
based	on	inferiority	and	disassociation.		
	
Furthermore,	tracing	how	identity	narratives	shifted	over	time	against	certain	milestones	and	
how	they	were	reconfigured	on	a	temporal	basis	will	allow	me	to	interpret	the	fieldwork	data	
and	better	assess	 the	prospect	of	desecuritising	 ‘Turkishness’,	as	a	potential	 facilitating	 tool	
for	 reconciliation.	 Yet,	 it	would	be	extremely	 challenging	 and	 counter-intuitive	 to	 study	 the	
identity	narratives	of	Cypriots’	independently	as	they	cannot	be	analysed	in	disconnect	from	
each	 other.	 Thus,	 Part	 II	 adopts	 a	 linear	 chronological	 approach	 where	 each	 chapter	 is	
organised	 around	major	milestones	 that	 have	 (re)shaped	 and	 (re)configured	 the	 two	main	
identity	 narratives	 on	 the	 island.	Unlike	 Part	 I,	where	 each	 theoretical	 chapter	 had	 its	 own	
introduction	 and	 conclusion,	 considering	 the	 chapters	 in	 Part	 II	 present	 the	 two	 parts	 of	 a	
bigger	 temporal	whole,	 I	 do	 not	 deem	 that	 necessary	 here.	 Instead,	 the	 chapters	 in	 Part	 II	
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share	 the	 same	 introduction	 and	 conclusion.	 While	 Chapter	 5	 traces	 shifting	 identity	
narratives	 and	 relevant	 historical	 events	 from	 the	 Ottoman	 to	 the	 British	 period	 and	 then	
from	 independence	 to	division,	Chapter	6	 traces	 the	 identity	narratives	 from	the	division	of	
the	 island,	 to	 the	 Europeanisation	 of	 the	 conflict	 and	 the	 reunification	 referendum	 (a.k.a.	
Annan	Plan).	Starting	from	the	Ottoman	era,	which	was	the	origin	of	Turkish	presence	on	the	
island,	 the	 two	 chapters	 bring	 the	 timeline	 up	 to	 2015,	which	 sets	 the	 scene	 for	 empirical	
analysis	of	the	fieldwork	data	in	Part	III.			 	
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Chapter	5.	Shifting	Identity	Narratives:	Pre-Division	
5.1	From	the	Ottoman	to	the	British:	Religious	vs.	Ethnic	signifiers	(1571-1960)	
	
5.1.1	Primordial	enemies	on	a	rock	
It	 is	 the	majority	 Greek-Cypriots	 who	 are	 the	 older	 established	 peoples	 on	 the	 island.	 The	
ethnological	contention	is	that	they	are	directly	descended	form	Achaean	Greeks	who	settled	
in	Cyprus	in	the	14th	Century	BC	and	again	at	the	beginning	of	the	12th	Century	BC,	following	
the	Trojan	Wars	(Lee	and	Lee	1973).	The	preservation	of	the	language,	customs	and	traditions,	
especially	 after	 the	 introduction	of	Christianity	 to	 the	 island	has	 given	 the	Greek-Cypriots	 a	
permanent	ethnical,	cultural	and	religious	 link	with	Greece.	Greek-Cypriots	take	pride	 in	the	
ancient	 and	 rich	 Greek	 language,	 and	 in	 the	 accomplishments	 of	many	Greek	 thinkers	 and	
philosophers,	 who	 are	 considered	 as	 the	 foundation	 blocks	 of	 Western	 civilisation	 and	
democracy	 (Broome	 2005).	 Compared	 to	 Turkish-Cypriots,	 whose	 presence	 on	 the	 island	
dates	 back	 to	 the	Ottoman	 rule	 that	was	 established	 in	 the	 1570s,	 the	 archaism	 of	 Greek-
Cypriots’	 identity	 narratives	 provides	 them	 with	 strong	 primordial	 ties	 to	 the	 island	 and	
simultaneously	 represents	 the	 island’s	 Hellenic	 essence	 (see	 Stamatakis	 1991).	 Due	 to	 this	
archaic	 link	 with	 the	 greater	 Hellenic	 world,	 Greek-Cypriot	 identity	 narratives	 adopt	 the	
history	of	Greece	with	all	its	glories	and	traumas,	from	the	fall	of	Constantinople	to	the	Greek	
War	 of	 Independence,	 where	 Ottomans	 and	 by	 extension	 Turks	 play	 a	 central	 role	
(Theodossopoulos	2007:2).		
	
Consequently,	national	education	in	Greece	and	in	the	GCc	symbolically	relies	upon	the	image	
of	 the	 Turk	 to	 foster	 an	 understanding	 of	 what	 it	 means	 to	 be	 a	 Greek	 (Theodossopoulos	
2007).	 In	 this	 imagination	 of	 the	 self,	 the	 undifferentiated	 Turk	 is	 the	most	 significant	 and	
salient	 other.	 For	 example,	 a	 common	 Greek/Greek-Cypriot	 saying33	that	 denotes	 growing	
anger	 and	 frustration	 in	 a	 social	 interaction	 resembles	 the	 feeling	 to	 “becoming	 a	 Turk”	 or	
“acting	 like	 a	 Turk”	 (see	 Papadakis	 2005).	 The	 official	 history	 textbooks	 can	 elucidate	 this	
reliance	upon	the	 image	of	 the	enemy	 for	 the	construction	of	 the	self;	 they	stretch	back	 to	
Mycenaeans	(1200	BC)	and	present	the	Byzantine	period	in	exclusively	positive	light	and	the																																																									
33	Έγινε	Τούρκος	("He	became	a	Turk")	denotes	extreme	anger	towards	someone	or	because	of	something;	or	Κάνει	σαν	
Τούρκος	("He	acts	like	a	Turk")	implies	somebody	is	acting	in	an	uncivilised	or	very	rude	manner.	
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Ottoman	period	in	exclusively	negative	light.	In	his	revealing	comparative	study	of	the	history	
schoolbooks,	 Yiannis	 Papadakis	 notes	 that	 adopting	 the	 dominant	 model	 of	 the	 history	 of	
Greece,	the	history	books	in	the	RoC	convey	the	message	that	“Cyprus	is	and	has	been	Greek	
and	nothing	but	Greek”	and	“Cypriot	Hellenism”	is	the	central	actor	of	history	from	beginning	
of	 time	 (Papadakis	2008:132).	As	 such,	history	 textbooks	use	 the	 term	Cypriot	 (Kyprioi)	and	
Greeks	 (Ellines)	 interchangeably,	 which	 excludes	 the	 possibility	 of	 any	 other	 legitimate	
indigenous	peoples	on	the	island.	They	also	refer	to	Turkish-Cypriots	either	as	Turks,	who	are	
depicted	as	barbaric	and	unruly,	or	as	descendants	of	Islamicised	Greeks	in	Cyprus	(Papadakis	
2008).	 Consequently,	 textbooks	 that	 argue	 even	 the	 people	 initially	 brought	 over	 from	
Anatolia	 by	 the	 Ottoman	 Empire	 in	 the	 16th	 Century	 were	 originally	 of	 Greek	 stock	 reifies	
Cypriotness	 based	 on	 ‘ethnic’	 descent	 and	 blood,	 and	 denies	 a	 distinct	 identity	 to	 Turkish-
Cypriots	and	a	legitimate	claim	to	political	equality	since	they	do	not	‘exist’	as	a	‘real’	ethnic	
group.	Drawing	from	a	study	conducted	among	Greek-Cypriot	youth	and	high	school	teachers	
that	revealed	Turkish-Cypriots	as	the	most	rejected	collective	category	above	others	such	as	
Roma	 people,	 Arabs,	 ‘foreign	 artists/dancers’	 (meaning	 sex	 workers)	 and	 Asian	 domestic	
workers,	Papadakis	confirms	that	the	representations	that	treat	the	presence	of	others	on	the	
island	as	incidental	and	parasitic	pervade	not	just	history	teaching	but	the	overall	educational	
system	in	the	GCc	(Papadakis	2008).	
	
On	the	other	hand,	 the	Turkish	presence	 in	Cyprus	dates	back	 to	 the	Ottoman	years	 (1571-
1878).	Even	though	at	one	point	during	the	Ottoman	rule	the	number	of	Turks	exceeded	that	
of	Greeks,	their	numbers	fluctuated	over	the	years	and	at	the	time	of	independence	in	1960,	
Turkish-Cypriots	made	up	approximately	18%	of	the	population	in	Cyprus	(Ker-Lindsay	2011).	
However,	 ethnicity	was	 not	 an	 identity	 signifier	 until	 the	 British	 rule.	 Before	 the	Ottomans	
obliterated	the	feudal	system	and	serfdom	in	the	1570s,	identity	was	defined	in	terms	of	class	
as	well	 as	 religion.	While	 class	 distinctions	 became	 less	 relevant	 to	 identity	 categorisations	
during	 the	 Ottoman	 rule,	 religion,	 even	 though	 it	 cannot	 automatically	 be	 equated	 with	
ethnicity,	 was	 the	 key	 categorical	 distinction	 for	 the	millet34	system	 (see	 Pollis	 1996,	 Hatay	
2007).	 The	 Ottoman	 millet	 system	 divided	 the	 population	 between	 millet-i	 hakimiye	 and																																																									
34	The	 word	 millet	 came	 to	 mean	 nation	 in	 the	 19th	 C	 but	 its	 earlier	 meaning	 referred	 to	 an	 organised	 religious	
community	whose	 leader	was	responsible	 to	 the	Ottoman	for	 the	community’s	obligations	under	 the	Empire,	 such	as	
taxation.		
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millet-i	 dhimmiye,	 meaning	 between	 the	 ruling	 Muslim	 community	 and	 the	 subject	 non-
Muslim	 communities.	 The	 religious	 communities	 mingled	 freely	 enough	 on	 friendly	 terms,	
tolerant	 of	 religious	 differences,	 and	often	 interacted	 through	 commercial	 transactions	 and	
social	 functions,	 but	 mostly	 lived	 in	 separate	 villages	 or	 town	 quarters	 and	 intermarriages	
were	very	rare	(See	Hannay	2005);	a	trend	that	did	not	change	post-1960s.		
	
While	the	Ottoman	rule	is	depicted	as	a	time	of	oppression	in	the	Greek-Cypriot	textbooks,	it	
is	glorified	as	a	time	of	freedom	and	progress	in	the	Turkish-Cypriot	textbooks	that	start	with	
the	Ottoman	conquest	of	the	island,	 linking	 it	historically,	strategically	and	geographically	to	
Anatolia	 (Papadakis	 2008).	 Adopting	 a	 similar	 thesis	 to	 the	 Turkish	 history	 books,	 Turkish-
Cypriot	textbooks	present	the	Ottomans	as	the	gracious	and	tolerant	rulers	compared	to	the	
cruel	Venetians,	and	Greek-Cypriots	as	ungrateful	mutineers.	However,	 ‘renting’	 the	 island’s	
administration	over	to	the	British	Empire	in	return	for	diplomatic	aid	against	Russia	in	187835,	
marks	a	significant	milestone	for	the	Turkish-Cypriot	identity	narratives,	as	it	can	be	perceived	
as	 their	 first	 ‘rejection’	 trauma	by	 the	 large-group.	 They	were	 handed	off	 to	 another	 ruler;	
‘traded	 in’	 and	 ‘sacrificed’	 for	 diplomatic	 aid.	 As	 it	will	 be	 discussed	 later,	 these	 feelings	 of	
rejection	and	betrayal	were	triggered	by	different	historical	events	again	and	again.		
	
Following	 the	 census	 of	 1881,	 the	 millet	 system	 was	 officially	 replaced	 with	 a	 Legislative	
Council,	 composed	 of	 twelve	 elected	 members,	 nine	 Orthodox,	 three	 Muslim,	 and	 six	
appointed	 British	 officials.	 Although,	 together	 with	 the	 Turkish-Cypriot	 members	 British	
representatives	could	prevent	Greek-Cypriot	majority	and	domination	over	decision	making,	
representative	arrangements	based	on	proportionality	 rather	 than	the	millet	system,	meant	
that	demography	now	had	more	of	a	political	significance	for	the	communities	(Nevzat	2005).	
When	the	British	rulers	started	classifying	and	institutionalising	the	local	population	based	on	
their	ethnicity	following	the	World	War	I	(WW	I)	and	Britain’s	annexation	of	Cyprus,	the	terms	
Greek-Cypriot	 and	 Turkish-Cypriot	 started	 appearing	 as	 categorical	 definitions	 for	 the	
communities	on	the	island	(Nevzat	2005,	Hatay	2007).		
																																																									
35	The	 Convention	 of	 Defensive	 Alliance,	 signed	 in	 Constantinople	 between	Great	 Britain	 and	 the	Ottoman	 Empire	 in	
1878,	was	also	a	strategic	deal	for	the	British	to	protect	their	sea	route	to	India		
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The	role	of	the	British	Empire	in	Cyprus	was	reconstructed	after	WW	I.	On	the	one	hand,	the	
disappointment	and	frustration	of	Greek-Cypriots’,	who	hoped	that	the	British	Empire	would	
help	Cyprus	join	Greece	as	it	did	with	the	Ionian	Islands,	was	growing	especially	after	Cyprus	
officially	became	Crown	Colony	(Borowiec	2000).	On	the	other	hand,	the	end	of	WW	I	played	
a	 significant	 role	 in	 reconfiguring	 Turkish-Cypriots’	 political	 association	 with	 the	 Ottoman	
Empire	and	their	growing	sense	of	solidarity	with	the	wider	Turkish	community.	While	Greek-
Cypriots	 nurtured	 their	 desire	 for	 independence	 and	 subsequently	 Enosis,	 as	 well	 as	 their	
budding	 enmity	 against	 the	 colonisers	who	were	 the	 obstacle	 in	 front	 of	 these	 aspirations,	
Turkish-Cypriots	saw	the	British	Administration36	as	their	only	source	of	security	 in	the	wake	
of	 the	 invasion	 of	 Istanbul	 and	 growing	 disturbance	 among	 Greek-Cypriots	 (St	 John-Jones	
1983,	Nevzat	 2005).	 After	 the	 Treaty	 of	 Lausanne,	which	 left	 Cyprus	 outside	 of	 the	Misak-i	
Milli	 (the	 national	 pact	 re-drawing	 modern	 Turkey’s	 borders)	 in	 1923,	 Turkish-Cypriots	
experienced	 another	 sense	 of	 abandonment,	 evident	 from	 old	 newspaper	 articles	 and	
accounts	 of	 the	 political	 elite	 of	 the	 time	 (See	 Nevzat	 2005,	 Persianis	 2013).	 Despite	 their	
great	eagerness	and	support	for	Atatürk’s	reforms,	the	narrow	nationalist	policy	of	the	Turkish	
War	of	 Independence	relinquished	claims	over	 ‘Turks’	 living	outside	the	borders	of	 the	new	
Turkey	(i.e.	Crete	and	Cyprus).	Altay	Nevzat	writes	that	“the	hostilities	between	the	empire	of	
their	 roots	and	the	empire	of	 their	 rulers”,	which	prompted	full	annexation	of	 the	 island	by	
the	latter,	left	little	leeway	for	Turkish-Cypriots	to	profess	a	dual	allegiance	(Nevzat	2005:256).	
While	 some	 re-negotiated	 their	 dual	 allegiance	 and	 started	 distinguishing	 between	
Ottomanism	 and	 Turkism,	 others	 chose	 to	 leave	 the	 identity	 dilemma	 and	 the	 island	 itself	
behind,	migrating	to	Turkey	and	to	the	UK	by	the	thousands.		
	
The	ethnically	Turkish	and	religiously	Muslim	population	of	Cyprus	declined	during	the	British	
rule	as	many	migrated	to	Turkey	or	left	the	island.	Between	1878	when	the	island	was	leased	
to	Britain	and	1923	when	Cyprus	was	added	to	the	Crown	Colony,	Turkish-Cypriot	population	
decreased	over	10%	(St	John-Jones	1983,	Nevzat	2005,	Nevzat	and	Hatay	2009).	The	changes	
in	 demographics	 also	 changed	 the	 representation	 in	 Legislative	 Councils,	 where	 the	 town	
mayors	became,	almost	exclusively,	Greek-Cypriot	(St	John-Jones	1983,	Heper	and	Criss	2009).																																																									
36	Cyprus	was	under	British	protectorate	between	1878-1914,	under	British	military	occupation	until	1925	and	part	of	
Crown	Colony	in	after	1925.	Turkish	government	formally	recognised	Britain's	sovereignty	over	Cyprus	with	the	Treaty	of	
Lausanne	in	1923.	
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This	created	what	Rebecca	Bryant	calls	a	“a	situation	of	structural	inequality”,	which	marked	
the	minority	complex	of	Turkish-Cypriots;	as	their	number	decreased,	so	did	their	voice	and	
legitimacy	on	the	island	(Bryant	2006:48).	
	
While	the	Greek-Cypriot	national	 identity	corresponds	with	the	Greek	War	of	 Independence	
(1821-1832),	 the	 Turkish-Cypriot	 national	 identity	 coincides	 with	 the	 establishment	 of	 the	
Republic	of	Turkey	in	1923	(Samani	1999).	The	War	of	Independence	and	Atatürk’s	revolution	
compelled	the	TCc	to	reassess	their	political	outlook;	as	the	religious	and	Ottoman	elements	
receded,	 the	 Turkish	 component	 and	 the	 key	 themes	 of	 the	 revolution,	modernisation	 and	
Turkism,	 became	 evident	 (St	 John-Jones	 1983).	 For	 example,	 Kıbrıs	 (Cyprus)	 newspaper	
started	distinguishing	between	‘religious’	and	‘national’	identity,	promoting	the	need	to	teach	
the	 Turkish-Cypriot	 youth	 both	 their	 ‘religious’	 and	 	 ‘national’	 heritage	 (Nevzat	 2005:151).	
Further	 politicisation	 of	 national	 and	 ethnic	 identities	 over	 religious	 ones	 on	 the	 island	
polarised	 the	 communities	 into	 separate	 ethnic	 groups	 and	 undermined	 the	 potential	 of	
constructing	 a	 shared	 collective	 identity;	 instead,	 the	 two	main	 communities	 of	 the	 island	
were	 politicised	 and	 socialised	 in	 a	 mutually	 exclusive	 way	 towards	 unification	 with	 their	
‘motherlands’	(See	Nevzat	2005:157).		
	
While	the	GCc	was	introduced	to	the	concept	of	‘modernisation’	and	‘nationhood’	in	late	19th	
Century,	 for	 Turkish-Cypriots	 it	was	 Kemalism.	 Consequently,	 the	 TCc	 distanced	 themselves	
from	their	religious	and	Ottoman	identity,	turning	their	past	into	an	unwanted	inferior	‘other’.	
As	Bryant	explains,	while	the	Greek	orthodox	majority	claimed	not	only	to	possess	European	
ancestry	 but	 that	 they	 were	 real	 ancestors	 of	 Europe,	 the	 Muslim	 minority	 desired	 to	
disconnect	 themselves	 from	 the	 ‘backwardness’	 of	 their	 past,	 and	were	eager	 to	 adopt	 the	
concepts	 of	 ‘modernisation’	 and	 ‘Europeanisation’	 underpinned	 first	 by	 the	 Young	 Turks	
movement	and	then	more	unequivocally	by	Atatürk’s	reforms	(see	Bryant	2004,	Bryant	2006).	
They	saw	their	new	politicisation	as	a	project	of	national	modernisation	that	explicitly	aimed	
at	bridging	the	East	and	the	West	(Kızılyürek	and	Gautier-Kızılyürek	2004,	Aktar,	Kızılyürek	et	
al.	2010).		
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The	 discourses	 of	 national	 and	 ethnic	 identity	 appropriated	 from	 the	 motherlands	 were	
translated	into	nationalist	education	to	civilise	and	modernise	the	citizen.	In	the	Greek-Cypriot	
case,	 these	 narratives	 were	 reproduced	 against	 their	 historical	 nemesis	 at	 the	 gates	
(Ottomans/Turks),	 and	 in	 the	 Turkish-Cypriot	 case,	 a	 backward	 other	within	 the	 communal	
self,	 that	was	 inferior	 and	 needed	 fixing	 (Bryant	 2006).	 Their	 desire	 to	 be	more	 European,	
more	 civilised	 and	 more	 modern	 was	 reflected	 in	 a	 sense	 of	 a	 weakness	 that	 had	 to	 be	
corrected,	 leading	 to	 a	 greater	 acceptance	 of	 colonial	mandates	 (see	 Bryant	 2006).	Zarakol	
explores	international	stigmatisation	and	sense	of	inferiority	in	the	Ottoman	Empire	especially	
after	 WW	 I,	 which	 created	 a	 prevalent	 sense	 of	 ‘discreditablity’	 as	 Eastern,	 backward,	
uncivilised	 and	 oriental	 (Zarakol	 2011).	 She	 explains	 that	 stigmatised	 collectives	 are	 almost	
always	 self-conscious	about	 falling	 short	of	what	 they	 consider	 the	normative	 standard	and	
calculating	 about	 the	 impressions	 they	 are	 making,	 which	 manifests	 itself	 in	 an	 officially	
sanctioned	but	stifling	self-narrative	that	motivates	actors’	every	interaction.	
	
Zarakol’s	 analysis	 of	 stigmatised	 collectives,	 who	 are	 obsessed	 with	 international	 stature,	
recognition	and	acceptance	rings	true	with	the	TCc	as	well.	This	obsession	with	recognition	is	
illustrated	 in	 the	 later	 sections	 after	 the	 division	 of	 the	 island,	 but	 at	 this	 juncture	 of	 the	
historical	timeline,	it	can	be	seen	as	one	of	the	reasons	why	Turkish-Cypriots	had	been	more	
loyal	to	their	colonisers.	The	colonisers	were	not	only	the	source	of	security	against	the	Greek-
Cypriot	majority	that	nurtured	unification	with	Greece	but	also	the	source	of	‘modernity’	and	
‘Western	civilisation’,	the	end	goal	they	(Turkish-Cypriots	as	well	as	the	Kemalists)	aspired	to	
achieve.		
	
Highlighting	 the	 concepts	 of	 imposition	 versus	 acceptance	 and	 adoption	 in	 post-colonial	
literature,	Bryant	and	Navaro-Yashin	elucidate	how	the	ambivalent	feelings	toward	the	British	
rulers	gradually	became	more	positive	especially	during	and	after	Atatürk’s	revolution	(Bryant	
2006,	 Navaro-Yashin	 2006).	 The	 clear	 sense	 of	 backwardness,	 structural	 inequality,	 and	
perceived	inferiority	created	a	prevalent	demand	for	 ‘development’,	which	meant	moderate	
feelings	 towards	 the	 colonisers	 and	 eagerness	 in	 adoption	 and	 appropriation	 of	 Kemalist	
Westernisation	 reforms.	 In	 line	with	 Zarakol’s	 analysis	 of	 internalised	 stigmatisation,	 in	 her	
book	 titled	 “Imagining	 the	Modern”,	 Rebecca	 Bryant	 explores	 this	 feeling	 of	 inferiority	 and	
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weakness	 as	 not	 a	 mere	 interpretation	 of	 a	 minority	 having	 a	 distinct	 disadvantage	 with	
regard	to	the	majority,	or	being	oppressed	by	them	but	rather	as	a	weakness	of	the	‘self’,	a	
weakness	internal	to	their	society	in	comparison	to	Greek-Cypriots	who	were	more	‘modern’	
and	‘successful’	(Bryant	2004).	Their	‘threatening	other’	was	the	Ottoman	backwardness	that	
was	 ‘bağnaz’	 (meaning	bigoted	and	 sectarian),	which	was	a	 threat	 to	 ‘medeniyet’	 (meaning	
being	civilised	and	developed),	a	concept	that	got	closely	associated	with	secularism.		
Turkish-Cypriots,	who	 readily	 and	 immediately	 adopted	 the	 Kemalist	 reforms,	 ‘modernised’	
and	 ‘secularised’	 themselves	and	orientalised	 their	past.	Hence,	while	 civilisation	 for	Greek-
Cypriots	was	a	desire	to	return	to	their	heroic	and	celebrated	past,	which	was	something	to	be	
revived	 and	 protected;	 for	 Turkish-Cypriots,	 it	 was	 a	 goal	 to	 be	 achieved,	 something	 that	
needed	to	be	acquired	based	on	their	self-critique.	Thus,	Ataturk’s	reforms	and	modernisation	
mission	was	 not	 perceived	 as	 an	 imposition	 of	Western	 values	 but	 rather	 a	 prescription,	 a	
remedy	for	their	diagnosed	weakness.	
5.1.2	National	and	ethnic	polarisation	
The	feelings	of	ethnic	and	national	identification	grew	stronger	in	the	early	1900s,	which	was	
facilitated	and	spread	through	the	rise	of	media	and	the	spread	of	education.	To	emphasise	
their	 independence	 to	 one	 another	 and	 to	 demonstrate	 their	 allegiance	 to	 the	 mainland,	
Turkish-Cypriots	 had	 been	 eager	 to	 display	 the	 flag	 of	 their	 ‘motherland’	 at	 any	 kind	 of	
function,	 institution	and	even	 in	 their	homes.	Yet,	 although	 inter-marriages	were	extremely	
rare	and	co-existence	did	not	necessarily	mean	a	rosy	picture	of	friendship	or	a	relationship	of	
close	 compatriots,	 Cypriots	 engaged	 in	 business	 ventures	 and	 participated	 in	 each	 others’	
celebrations	 especially	 in	 the	 capital	 and	 in	 mixed-villages	 until	 their	 political	 goals	 and	
desired	future	grew	mutually	exclusive	(Kızılyürek	1993,	Kızılyürek	2002).	
In	Nathalie	Tocci’s	analysis,	 “The	Greek-Cypriot	struggle	 for	self-determination	 triggered	 the	
violation	 of	 Turkish-Cypriot	 rights	 and	 ignited	 reactive	 ethno-nationalisms,	 as	 did	 the	
Georgian,	 Turkish,	 Israeli,	 Serbian	 nation-state	 building	 projects	 vis-a-vis	 the	 Abkhaz	 and	
Ossetians,	 the	 Kurds,	 the	 Palestinians	 and	 the	 Montenegrins	 respectively”	 (Tocci	 2007:2).	
Tocci	 notes	 that	 in	 all	 of	 these	 five	 cases,	 the	 real	 and/or	 perceived	 violation	 of	 individual	
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and/or	collective	rights	has	fuelled	and/or	justified	ethno-nationalism	and	exclusivist	identity-
politics,	 which	 led	 to	 mutually	 exclusive	 goals	 and	 desires.	 The	 Turkish-Cypriot	 ethnic	 and	
national	identity	grew	stronger	in	response	to	their	own	‘weak	modernisation’	and	in	reaction	
to	 the	growing	calls	 for	Enosis	especially	after	many	of	 the	Aegean	and	 Ionian	 islands	were	
unified	with	Greece	 following	 the	collapse	of	 the	Ottoman	Empire.	Cyprus	began	 to	appear	
first	on	the	maps	of	Greece	and	then	of	Turkey.	The	island	was	nicknamed	as	Megalonisos	(Big	
Island)	 by	 Greek	 nationalism	 and	 Yavruvatan	 (Babyland)	 by	 Turkish	 nationalism	 (Kızılyürek	
1993,	 Aktar,	 Kızılyürek	 et	 al.	 2010).	 While	 Greek-Cypriot	 educators	 and	 history	 teaching	
emphasised	a	primordial	ancestral	bond	with	the	Hellenic	World	and	Cyprus’	Greek	heritage,	
Turkish-Cypriots	cultivated	narratives	focused	on	an	organic	geographical	bond	and	proximity,	
asserting	 that	 Cyprus	 was	 part	 of	 Anatolia	 broken	 from	 the	 ‘mother’	 after	 the	 Ice	 Ages	
(Kızılyürek	1993,	Kızılyürek	2002).		
	
As	a	defensive	minority,	Turkish-Cypriots	 fostered	a	counter-nationalism	focused	on	survival	
and	on	 fears	of	being	assimilated	by	 the	majority	GCc,	whose	sense	of	ethnic	 identity	were	
cultivated	almost	a	century	earlier	(Aktar,	Kızılyürek	et	al.	2010).	In	response	to	Enosis,	Taksim	
(partition	 and	 then	 unification	 with	 Turkey)	 became	 the	 Turkish-Cypriots’	 core	 political	
propaganda	and	end	goal	(Kızılyürek	2002).	According	to	Kızılyürek,	this	nationalistic	approach	
created	a	political	myopathy	of	 the	Cypriot	elite,	which	ultimately	undermined	and	 ignored	
the	 shared	 local	 commonalities,	 and	 the	 ethnic	 antagonism	 diminished	 the	 significance	 of	
Cyprus	 for	 the	 collective	 identities	 to	 an	 ‘irrelevant	 geography’	 who	 were	 waiting	 to	 be	
‘rescued’	by	Greece	or	Turkey	(Kızılyürek	1993).		
	
In	 the	 years	 that	 followed	 the	 British	 rule,	 Greek-Cypriot	 demands	 for	Enosis	 developed	
rapidly.	 The	 economic	 depression	 of	 the	 time	 provided	 fertile	 ground	 leading	 to	 several	
uprisings	and	demonstrations,	the	most	significant	of	all	was	the	destruction	of	Government	
House	in	the	capital	during	the	riots	of	1931	led	by	the	Greek-Cypriot	National	Radical	Union.	
The	period	between	1931	and	1940	proved	to	be	a	very	difficult	one	for	the	Cypriots.	With	the	
aim	of	imposing	‘calmness’	and	to	prevent	local	public	interest	in	politics,	the	Governor	at	the	
time,	Sir	Richmond	Palmer,	took	a	series	of	suppressive	measures	which	included	limitations	
on	 teaching	 of	 Greek	 and	 Turkish	 history	 and	 on	 the	 administration	 and	 functioning	 of	
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schools,	and	prohibition	of	trade	unions,	associations	and	political	parties	as	well	as	national	
symbols;	the	Legislative	Councils	were	suspended,	public	meetings	were	prohibited,	the	press	
was	silenced	and	no	municipal	elections	took	place	until	1943	(Oberling	1982,	Hill	2010).	The	
uprising	and	the	suppressive	new	regime	deeply	disconcerted	the	Turkish-Cypriots;	they	were	
agitated	 by	 the	 ‘seriousness’	 of	 the	 threat	 of	 Enosis	 and	 felt	 punished	 for	what	 the	Greek-
Cypriots	did	despite	their	loyalty	to	the	British	rule	(Dodd	2010).	
	
The	suppressive	measures	were	not	lifted	until	World	War	II	(WW	II),	during	which	more	than	
thirty	thousand	Cypriots	joined	the	British	armed	forces.	The	period	after	1931	left	little	room	
for	nationalist	expressions	especially	for	Turkish-Cypriots,	who	were	relatively	 less	mobilised	
and	less	politicised	compared	to	Greek-Cypriots,	partly	because	of	their	perceived	‘inferiority’	
and	adoration	for	‘modernity’	and	the	British	rule,	partly	because	of	Turkey’s	disinterest	and	
also	 partly	 because	 they	 lacked	 an	 organised	 institution	 that	 provided	 both	 religious	 and	
ideological	 leadership	 like	 the	 Orthodox	 Church.	 Although	WW	 II	 distracted	 the	 nationalist	
mobilisation	 for	 a	 limited	 period	 of	 time,	 the	 de-colonisation	movement	 and	 their	military	
support	during	WW	II	reinforced	Greek-Cypriot	hopes	for	Enosis	(Loizides	2007).		
	
During	 this	 time,	 both	 Turkish-Cypriots	 and	 the	 British	 colonialists	 realised	 the	 need	 for	
Turkey’s	 support	 and	 involvement	 to	 act	 as	 a	 safeguard	 against	 Enosis	 and	 to	maintain	 the	
status	quo,	who	thus	far	remained	mostly	disinterested	in	the	case	(Dodd	2010).	In	1950,	the	
Turkish	foreign	minister	Ali	Köprülü	said	“For	Turkey,	there	does	not	exist	any	Cyprus	 issue”	
(quoted	in	Collective	2009:208).	Although	disheartened	with	rejection	once	again,	the	Turkish-
Cypriot	 press,	 initiated	 an	 organised	 attempt	 to	 develop	 a	 link	 with	 Turkish	 intellectuals,	
politicians	 and	 journalists,	 which	 proved	 effective	 in	 shifting	 the	 public	 opinion	 in	 Turkey	
(Nevzat	 2005,	Aktar,	 Kızılyürek	 et	 al.	 2010).	 Initially,	 Ankara	 approached	Cyprus	 affairs	with	
great	 caution,	 focusing	 on	 maintaining	 good	 relations	 with	 Greece	 and	 the	 UK.	 Yet,	 even	
though	 Turkey	 did	 not	 promote	 the	 spread	 and	 growth	 of	 nationalism	 and	 Kemalist	 ideas	
among	Turkish-Cypriots,	and	wished	to	maintain	the	status	quo,	it	did	inadvertently	help	the	
Turkish-Cypriot	 nationalists	 through	 indirect	 actions	 such	 as	 providing	 schoolteachers,	 and	
making	it	easy	for	Turkish-Cypriot	students	to	enter	Turkish	universities	(Nevzat	2005).	
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Consequently,	fearing	both	rising	communism	among	Greek-Cypriots	and	amplified	calls	and	
proposals	submitted	to	the	Government	for	Enosis,	Turkish-Cypriots	became	more	politicised	
and	 more	 mobilised	 by	 the	 end	 of	 1940s.	 They	 complained	 that	 the	 Greek-Cypriots	 were	
changing	 Turkish	 street	 names	 into	 Greek,	 flying	 Greek	 flags	 everywhere	 and	 disregarding	
Turkish-Cypriots	 in	 the	municipal	 councils	 (Markides	 2001,	 Loizides	 2007).	 Turkish-Cypriots’	
insistence	on	having	separate	municipal	councils,	and	eventual	establishment	of	separate	de	
facto	municipalities	 in	1958	was	seen	as	presaging	partition	by	both	Greek-Cypriots	and	the	
Government	in	Cyprus.	By	the	end	of	1940s,	Turkish-Cypriots	started	to	see	the	response	they	
were	 looking	 for	 from	 Turkey;	 Ankara	 was	making	 clear	 that	 there	 could	 be	 no	 change	 of	
regime	 in	Cyprus	 that	was	not	 favourable	 to	Turkey.	The	development	of	public	pressure	 in	
both	Greece	and	Turkey	toward	Enosis	and	Taksim	respectively	saw	the	deterioration	of	the	
relations	between	two	countries	(Dodd	2010).		
It	is	important	to	note	that	other	international	interests	and	strategies	were	at	stake	as	well.	
Good	relations	and	a	strong	alliance	among	Greece,	Turkey	and	Great	Britain	through	NATO	
was	very	 important	 for	 the	Middle	East,	 the	Suez	Canal	and	the	West,	especially	during	 the	
paranoid	atmosphere	of	 the	Cold	War	era.	While	Enosis	would	clearly	upset	Turkey,	 the	UK	
and	the	USA	feared	the	self-determination	option	due	to	Greek-Cypriots’	Orthodox	heritage	
and	closeness	to	the	Soviet	Union	(see	O'Malley	and	Craig	2001).	Britain	had	no	intention	of	
leaving	the	island	or	considering	Enosis.	However,	the	claim	for	Enosis	only	became	stronger,	
making	 the	 nationalist	 polarisation,	 antagonism	 and	 mutually	 exclusive	 political	 end	 goals	
more	profound	and	mainstream.	Soon	after,	two	guerrilla	organisations	were	created,	which	
resulted	in	the	escalation	and	militarisation	of	the	conflict.	
5.1.3	Thorny	road	to	fettered	independence		
In	 early	 1955,	 a	 Cypriot	 born	 Greek	 colonel	 called	 Georgios	 Grivas,	 established	 EOKA	 (the	
Nationalist	 Organisation	 of	 Cypriot	 Fighters),	 started	 the	 violent	 acts	 of	 insurgency	 in	 April	
1955.	EOKA	attacks37	significantly	inflamed	public	opinion	in	Turkey	and	further	polarised	both	
the	Turkish-Cypriots	and	 left-leaning	Greek-Cypriots,	who	preferred	a	political	 rather	 than	a	
military	route	to	Enosis	 (Markides	2001,	Makriyianni	and	Psaltis	2007).	 In	response,	Turkish-
37	EOKA	insurgents	attacked	both	the	British	and	Turkish-Cypriots,	as	they	were	both	seen	as	obstacles	for	Enosis.	
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Cypriots	 quickly	 founded	 TMT	 (Turkish	 Resistance	Organisation)	 in	 1958	 to	 fight	 for	 Taksim	
and	to	‘strengthen	Cyprus	Turks’	links	with	Turkey38	(Kızılyürek	2002).		
	
The	British	Government	 openly	 accepting	 that	 the	Cyprus	 Problem	was	not	 something	 that	
could	 be	 resolved	 without	 the	 involvement	 of	 Greece	 and	 Turkey,	 called	 for	 the	 Tripartite	
Conference	 on	 the	 Eastern	Mediterranean	 in	 1955	 that	 did	 not	 involve	 the	 participation	 of	
neither	 Turkish-Cypriots	 nor	 Greek-Cypriots	 (HM-Stationery-Office	 1955).	 Even	 though	 the	
parties	 did	 not	 reach	 an	 agreement,	 The	 Conference	 solidified	 the	 position	 of	 the	
‘motherlands’	 in	 the	 destiny	 of	 Cyprus,	 and	 most	 importantly	 heralded	 The	 Treaty	 of	
Guarantee	that	was	signed	in	1960	(Michael	2011).	Following	The	Conference,	several	British	
proposals	on	 self-government,	 such	as	 the	Radcliff	proposals	and	 the	MacMillan	Plan,	were	
refused	by	Greek-Cypriots	and	Greece,	as	they	did	not	overtly	lead	to	self-determination.	Self-
determination	that	was	already	a	popular	concept	was	not	considered	until	the	UN	debate	on	
Cyprus	 in	 1957,	 that	 discussed	 independence	 as	 a	 solution	 but	 highlighted	 that	 self-
determination	could	not	be	used	to	justify	joining	another	state	(UNGA	1957,	UNGA	1958).		
	
While	the	international	community	was	discussing	the	future	of	Cyprus	and	Cypriots	 in	their	
absence,	 violent	 ethnic	 clashes	 continued.	 In	 the	 years	 from	1955	 to	 1959,	 the	 long-lasting	
polarisation	 between	 the	 British	 and	 the	 Greek-Cypriots	 reached	 its	 peak	 and	 were	
transformed	 into	 an	 armed	 confrontation.	 EOKA	was	 fighting	 on	 three	 fronts,	 against	 TMT,	
against	moderate	Greek-Cypriots	(including	the	communist	party	AKEL)	and	against	the	British	
rulers.	Meanwhile,	the	TMT	was	increasingly	becoming	a	threat	and	as	vicious	as	EOKA	in	its	
treatment	 of	 ‘traitors’	 and	 leftists	 (Oberling	 1982).	 Even	 though	 TMT	 was	 not	 as	 well	
organised	 or	 as	 militarily	 powerful	 as	 EOKA,	 when	 it	 took	 violent	 action	 it	 was	 difficult	 to	
contain.	Some	civilians	from	both	communities	were	forced	to	abandon	certain	areas	because	
of	fierce	armed	conflict	and	intimidation.	During	this	period,	Turkish-Cypriot	leader	Rauf	Raif	
Denktaş	 and	 Federation	 of	 Turkish-Cypriot	 Associations	 (FTCA)	 pushed	 for	 cultural	
Turkification	to	prioritise	and	politicise	ethnicity	(Kızılyürek	2006).	The	‘Citizen	Speak	Turkish’	
campaign	 even	 imposed	 fines	 on	 those	 Turkish-Cypriots	 who	 spoke	 Greek	 or	 used	 Greek																																																									
38	See	TMT	mission	statement	in	Turkish-Cypriot	history	textbooks:		
http://talimterbiye.mebnet.net/Kitaplar/2008-2009/Tarih8/Kıbrıs%20Türk%20Tarihi-8a.pdf	
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words.	For	TMT,	FTCA	and	many	others	fighting	for	partition,	they	were	not	Turkish-Cypriots	
but	Cypriot	Turks	(Kıbrıs	Türkü),	or	the	Turks	of	Cyprus.	
Increased	violence	led	to	the	London-Zurich	Conference	between	the	UK,	Greece	and	Turkey	
(UNGA	1958).	Abandoning	Enosis	and	Taksim,	the	three	parties	at	the	conference	reached	an	
agreement	on	an	independence	formula	as	well	as	the	basic	articles	of	a	constitution	for	the	
new	Cypriot	state.	Even	though	Greek-Cypriots	and	Turkish-Cypriots	did	not	participate	in	the	
formulation	 of	 the	 new	 constitution,	 they	 were	 asked	 to	 give	 their	 assent	 (Oberling	 1982,	
Stefanidis	1999).	The	London-Zurich	Conference	that	did	not	foresee	a	geographic	separation	
and	 was	 based	 on	 political	 equality,	 produced	 a	 series	 of	 agreements	 that	 described	 the	
solution	 as	 a	 ‘functional	 federal	 state’	 (Dodd	 2010:38),	 and	 came	 with	 three	 important	
treaties:	 First,	 The	 Treaty	 of	 Guarantee,	 designating	 Turkey,	 Greece	 and	 the	 UK	 as	 the	
guarantor	powers,	who	were	tasked	with	jointly	or	separately	maintaining	the	state	of	affairs	
in	 the	 newly	 found	 Republic	 of	 Cyprus	 and	 gave	 recognition	 to	 the	 basic	 and	 immutable	
articles	in	the	Constitution;	second,	The	Treaty	of	Establishment,	which	included	the	right	of	
the	UK	to	keep	sovereign	military	bases	on	the	island;	and	third,	The	Treaty	of	Alliance,	signed	
by	Greece,	Turkey	and	Cyprus,	stating	that	the	they	will	co-operate	in	their	common	defence.	
In	the	end,	despite	all	 the	political	campaigns,	the	mutually	exclusive	aspirations	of	Cypriots	
proved	 impossible	 to	 realise.	 Instead,	 on	 16th	August	 1960	 Cypriots	 found	 themselves	 in	 a	
political	partnership	under	the	Republic	of	Cyprus	with	the	pressure	of	Western	alliance	at	the	
height	of	the	Cold	War.	Cyprus	was	transferred	from	one	ruler	to	another,	ruled	by	different	
empires	throughout	its	history	without	ever	becoming	a	‘sovereign’	state.	Cypriots	too	did	not	
aspire	 for	 sovereignty;	 instead	 they	 nurtured	 their	 aspirations	 to	 belong	 to	 what	 they	
perceived	as	their	‘larger-group’	that	was	the	bigger	and	better	respective	motherlands	with	a	
heroic	 past	 and	 an	 ‘imagined’	 bond.	 Thus,	 the	 newly	 created	 Republic	 of	 Cyprus	 did	 not	
generate	 ownership	 among	 Cypriots	 but	 it	 was	 perceived	 as	 a	 ‘stepping	 stone’	 to	 join	 the	
‘imagined	community’	that	was	across	the	sea	(See	Anderson	1991).		
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5.2	The	Ephemeral	Republic:	The	quick	journey	from	independence	to	division	
5.2.1	Early	days	of	the	new	Republic:	1960-1963	
Many	political	analysts	and	scholars	refer	to	the	period	of	independence	that	came	in	1960,	as	
‘fettered	independence’	due	to	the	treaties	that	gave	a	disproportionate	influence	of	foreign	
powers	 (i.e.	United	Kingdom,	Greece	and	Turkey)	over	 the	 fate	of	 the	 island	 (Theophanous	
2000,	Kızılyürek	2002,	Constantinou	2007,	Dodd	2010).	Becoming	somewhat	of	an	exceptional	
case	in	the	post-colonial	 literature39,	the	RoC	was	‘internationalised	by	the	backdoor’.	James	
Crawford	 explains	 this	 ‘internationalisation’	 as	 the	 front	 door	 portraying	 a	 sovereign	 state	
with	 international	 recognition,	while	 the	 foreign	powers	enjoyed	constitutional	privileges	at	
the	 backdoor	 (Crawford	 2006).	 The	 attempt	 by	 Turkey,	 Greece	 and	 the	 UK	 to	 create	 a	
common	state	in	the	absence	of	Cypriots	with	limited	sovereignty,	which	Constantinou	aptly	
calls	 a	 ‘realpolitik	 compromise’	 for	 a	 ‘reluctant	 republic’,	 was	 doomed	 to	 fail	 from	 the	
beginning	 as	 it lacked	 unity	 of	 purpose	 (Constantinou	 2010:17).	 The	 RoC	 became	 an	
‘unwanted	child’,	the	symbol	of	the	‘unfulfilled	struggle’	for	Cypriots	who	aspired	to	live	with	
their	 respective	motherlands	 rather	 than	with	each	other.	As	Michalis	Michael	puts	 it,	 “The	
fact	 that	Cyprus’s	 independence	was	externally	manufactured,	with	 little	or	no	 input	by	 the	
Cypriots	 themselves,	 imposed	by	 the	colonial	power	with	 the	consent	of	 their	neighbouring	
motherlands,	only	added	 to	 the	mythology	of	betrayal	 and	conspiracy”	 (Michael	2011:214).	
The	 next	 50	 years	 witnessed	 a	 long	 and	 frustrating	 process	 of	 inter-communal	 talks	 and	
several	UN	settlement	plans,	turning	the	island	into	a	 ‘graveyard	of	diplomats’	(İnanç	2010).	
As	 a	 result,	 the	 communities,	 who	were	 psychologically	 divided	 under	 the	 new	 federation,	
would	soon	become	physically	and	demographically	divided.		
While	 it	 can	be	argued	 that	 the	new	constitution	 that	was	premised	upon	political	 equality	
could	be	considered	a	victory	for	Turkish-Cypriots,	Greek-Cypriots	regarded	it	as	an	imposition	
(Clerides	 1989).	 The	 new	 Republic	 lacked	 support	 and	 constituency,	 as	 Enosis	 and	 Taksim	
remained	 the	 political	 desire	 and	 the	 ‘national	 cause’	 for	 both	Greek-Cypriots	 and	 Turkish-
39	For	a	post-colonialist	analysis	of	Cyprus	see	Bryant	R.	(2006).	On	the	condition	of	postcoloniality	in	Cyprus.	
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Cypriots.	For	 the	community	 leaders	Denktaş40	and	Makarios41,	 there	was	no	Cypriot	nation	
but	rather	a	hollow	state	as	the	nation	was	seen	as	a	natural	phenomenon,	an	expression	of	
ethnicity	made	up	of	people	with	 the	 same	descent	 (Denktaş	2000:402).	Glafcos	Clerides42,	
who	said	that	the	Cyprus	flag	was	the	best	in	the	world	“…because	no	one	would	die	for	it”,	
clearly	illustrated	this	lack	of	commitment	(quoted	in	Stearns	1992:172).	
The	 1960	 Constitution	 provided	 for	 a	 presidential	 system,	 where	 the	 GCc	 elected	 the	
President,	and	 the	TCc	elected	 the	Vice-President	with	veto	powers	on	decisions	 relating	 to	
foreign	 affairs,	 defence	 and	 security.	 The	 Council	 of	 Ministers	 and	 the	 House	 of	
Representatives	were	elected	by	separate	communal	electoral	rolls.	Legislation	was	by	simple	
majority,	but	laws	and	decisions	on	elections,	finance	and	municipalities	had	to	be	approved	
by	 each	 community.	 Separate	 communal	 Chambers	 were	 established	 for	 educational,	
religious	and	cultural	matters.	The	articles	of	the	Constitution	could	only	be	amended	with	a	
double	majority	 (two	 thirds)	of	 the	 representatives	of	each	 community	 (Constitution	1960).	
Overall,	 the	 1960s	 Constitution	 was	 neither	 as	 unitary	 as	 the	 Greek-Cypriots	 would	 have	
wanted	nor	did	it	provide	for	geographical	separation,	as	the	Turkish-Cypriots	had	preferred.	
Instead	of	 inaugurating	 the	grounds	 to	 consolidate	 cooperation	and	 trust	building,	 it	 rather	
created	 rival	 institutions	 and	 chambers,	 and	 ethnically	 hyphenated	 local	 authorities,	 sport	
clubs	and	schools.	Greek-Cypriots	considered	the	power	sharing	arrangement	that	was	based	
on	 70:30	 ratio	 for	 civil	 service	 posts	 and	 60:40	 ratio	 for	 military	 posts	 as	 unfair	 since	 the	
Turkish-Cypriots	constituted	only	18.5%	of	the	population	(See	Treaty	of	Alliance).	For	them,	
the	Constitution	established	a	political	 and	 social	 division,	whereby	 the	 communal	minority	
rights	 of	 the	 Turkish-Cypriots,	who	were	 perceived	 to	 be	 inferior	 in	 culture,	 education	 and	
intelligence,	 were	 raised	 to	 a	 disproportionately	 exalted	 status	 (Polyviou	 1980,	 Faustmann	
and	Peristianis	2006).		
40	Rauf	Raif	Denktaş	(27	January	1924	–	13	January	2012)	was	a	Turkish-Cypriot	politician,	barrister	and	jurist	elected	in	
1973	as	the	Vice-President	of	the	Republic	of	Cyprus.	He	later	became	recognised	by	Turkey	as	the	founding	President	of	
the	“Turkish	Republic	of	Northern	Cyprus”	(TRNC),	holding	that	position	until	2005.		
41	Makarios	III	(August	13,	1913	–	August	3,	1977)	was	the	archbishop	of	the	Greek	Orthodox	Church	of	Cyprus	(1950–
1977),	and	the	first	President	of	the	Republic	of	Cyprus	(1960–1974	and	1974–1977).		
42	Clerides	was	the	Greek-Cypriot	interlocutor	in	the	peace	negotiations	and	the	president	of	the	Republic	of	Cyprus	from	
1993	to	2003.		
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Communal	 chambers,	 municipalities,	 separate	 majority	 voting,	 educational	 funds,	 taxation,	
establishing	the	military	(the	National	Guard)	all	were	among	the	most	problematic	issues	that	
created	deadlock	in	the	new	government.	Both	communities	continued	to	foster	their	ethnic	
nationalism.	Paramilitary	groups	EOKA	and	TMT	did	not	abandon	their	end	goals	nor	did	they	
abandon	 their	 activities.	 Kızılyürek	 writes	 that	 exploiting	 the	 mistakes	 or	 hitches	 in	 the	
implementation	 of	 the	 new	 Constitution	 to	 use	 it	 to	 achieve	 Taksim	 continued	 to	 be	 the	
underlying	 policy	 of	 the	 Turkish-Cypriot	 elite	 (Kızılyürek	 2006).	 Even	 though	 there	 were	
intellectuals,	 journalists	 and	 left-wing	 activists	 who	 wished	 to	 see	 the	 new	 establishment	
succeed,	 both	 paramilitary	 organisations	 had	 zero	 tolerance	 to	 opposition,	 especially	 if	 the	
opposition	 promoted	 another	 identity	 narrative	 than	 one	 that	 was	 based	 on	 ethnicity.	
Numerous	 organised	 political	movements	 took	 place	 especially	 between	 1960	 and	 1963	 to	
suppress	 the	 opposition.	 The	 early	 years	 of	 the	 Republic	 was	 tainted	 by	 tug	 of	 war	 both	
between	the	two	main	communities	and	between	those	who	maintained	their	commitment	
to	Enosis/Taksim	and	those	who	wanted	the	new	Republic	to	work.		
5.2.2	The	break-up	and	the	enclaves:	1963-1964	
In	 1963,	 President	Makarios	 proposed	13	 amendments	 to	 the	Constitution,	which	 removed	
the	 safeguards	 for	 Turkish-Cypriots	 and	 reduced	 their	 status	 to	 a	 political	 minority.	 The	
proposal	included	the	abolishment	of	the	right	of	veto	of	the	President	and	the	Vice-President	
and	the	provisions	 to	 replace	double	majority	voting	with	simple	majority	voting	 for	certain	
issues	such	as	the	decisions	of	the	Public	Service	Commission.	It	is	worthy	to	note	two	other	
dynamics	here;	the	first	pertaining	to	Greek-Cypriot	and	USSR	relations,	and	the	second	to	the	
coup	 in	 Turkey.	 President	Makarios	 developed	 close	 relationships	with	 the	 USSR	 especially	
between	1961	and	1963,	reinforcing	the	high	tide	of	USSR	influence	 in	the	Middle	East.	The	
arms	 trade	 agreement	 with	 USSR,	 which	 was	 perceived	 as	 an	 attempt	 to	 set	 up	 an	 “East	
Mediterranean	Cuba”	in	Cyprus	triggered	fears	among	‘the	West’	(Goktepe	2013).	Meanwhile,	
27th	May	1960	saw	the	first	coup	d’état	in	Turkey,	which	ended	with	the	execution	of	Prime	
Minister	Adnan	Menderes,	among	other	political	leaders.		
Soon	 after	 Makarios’	 proposal,	 Turkish-Cypriots	 had	 taken	 to	 the	 streets	 of	 the	 capital	 in	
protest.	The	inter-communal	conflict	that	started	in	Nicosia	quickly	spread	to	the	rest	of	the	
	 153	
island.	 Harassment	 of	 Turkish-Cypriots	 by	 the	 Greek-Cypriot	 police	 and	 sporadic	 ethnic	
violence	 begun	 as	 a	 tactic	 to	 get	 Turkish-Cypriots	 to	 accept	 the	 proposal	 (Collective	 2009,	
Kızılyürek	 2015).	 Turkish-Cypriots	 left	 the	 government	 in	 protest	 and	 as	 the	 situation	
deteriorated,	 those	 in	 scattered	 villages	 and	 towns	where	Greek-Cypriots	were	 in	majority,	
started	moving	into	enclaves	to	defend	them	selves	better.	By	1965,	60%	of	them	were	living	
in	enclaves	confined	to	the	3%	of	the	 island	with	 limited	access	to	food	and	basic	amenities	
(UNSC	1964,	Stephen	2001).	Although	the	Constitutional	amendments	presented	a	‘fortunate’	
pretext	for	the	Turkish-Cypriot	nationalists	to	‘prove’	that	the	Republic	was	unworkable,	the	
decision	 to	 withdraw	 from	 the	 government	 did	 not	 help	 their	 cause	 for	 Taksim.	 Instead,	
Turkish	Cypriots’	physical	insecurity	and	suffering	in	the	enclaves	from	1963	until	1974	was	a	
collective	trauma	shared	and	passed	down	to	younger	generations	(Navaro-Yashin	2012).		
	
According	 to	Volkan,	 the	 idea	of	motherhood	 and	 fatherhood,	 that	 brings	 the	 fundamental	
concepts	of	caring,	protecting	and	guiding,	is	contained	in	the	idea	of	a	‘nation’,	which	relates	
to	 security	 and	 governance	 of	 the	 self	 (Volkan	 1980).	 This	 analysis	 of	 the	 emotional	
relationship	 actors	 have	 with	 their	 imagined	 nations,	 which	 is	 heightened	 in	 conflict	
environments	 offers	 a	 complementary	 psycho-political	 level	 of	 analysis	 to	 the	 ontological	
security	 literature.	 Volkan’s	 study	 of	 conflicts	 reveal	 that	 boundaries,	 walls,	 enclaves	 and	
cages	 take	 on	 a	 powerful	meaning	 as	 actors	 derive	 their	 sense	 of	 self	 and	 self-worth	 from	
identification	 with	 a	 nation	 and	 the	 continuity	 of	 the	 self	 become	 dependent	 on	 this	
identification.	 For	 him,	 actors’	 self-esteem	 rise	 and	 fall	with	 the	 fate	 of	 their	 nation	 that	 is	
closely	 tied	with	 ‘geographic	actuality’.	 Those	who	cannot	give	geographic	actuality	 to	 their	
definition	of	a	nation	live	in	a	constant	condition	of	injured	self-regard	and	inner	rage	(Volkan	
1980).	As	such,	the	new	Republic	did	not	only	fail	to	satisfy	the	geographical	actuality	of	the	
mainstream	 national	 identity	 narratives	 of	 the	 two	 communities,	 it	 also	 promoted	 a	
geographical	actuality	that	challenged	the	mainstream	identity	narratives.	
	
Yet,	 the	 Turkish-Cypriots’	 confinement	 to	 the	 enclaves	 brought	 about	 a	 certain	 political	
homogeneity	 and	 united	 them	as	 an	 isolated	minority.	 This	 political	 homogeneity	 solidified	
the	call	for	partition	and	the	position	of	the	political	elite,	especially	that	of	Denktaş	and	later	
that	of	UBP	(National	Unity	Party	lead	by	Dr.	Eroğlu),	reinforcing	the	belief	that	Greek-Cypriots	
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and	Turkish-Cypriots	could	not	live	together	since	the	former	will	always	try	to	dominate	the	
latter.	 Thus,	 the	 alternative	 voices	 to	 the	 mainstream	 nationalistic	 narrative	 were	 quickly	
marginalised	 and	 silenced.	 This	 created	 a	 largely	 unchallenged	 self-narrative	 for	 Turkish-
Cypriots	as	a	small	but	brave	group,	severed	from	the	motherland.	Their	narratives	adopted	
Greek-Cypriots,	who	were	depicted	as	the	extension	of	the	Greeks,	as	the	natural	enemy	of	
the	Turks.	As	such,	they	internalised	their	suffering	and	violence	as	righteous	resistance.	
Kızılyürek	writes	about	the	tragic	example	of	the	fate	of	two	lawyers	Ayhan	Hikmet	and	Ahmet	
Gürkan.	 With	 the	 establishment	 of	 the	 RoC,	 Hikmet	 and	 Gürkan	 launched	 the	 weekly	
Cumhuriyet	(Republic)	newspaper,	which	was	explicitly	in	favour	of	the	new	Republic	and	was	
promoting	peace	and	coexistence	as	well	 as	 criticising	 the	nationalistic	movements	and	 the	
elites’	propaganda	(Kızılyürek	2015).	Cumhuriyet	Newspaper	was	one	of	the	earliest	sources,	
if	 not	 the	 first,	 that	 promoted	 a	 collective	 Cypriot	 identity	 detached	 from	 ethnicity	 and	
opposed	 Enosis/Taksim.	 The	 newspaper	 had	 close	 ties	 with	 the	 Greek-Cypriot	 communist	
party	AKEL	and	worked	under	 the	common	motto	“Cyprus	 for	Cypriots”	and	“Constitutional	
Patriotism”.	 In	 his	 newspaper	 article	 series	 titled	 “Journalists	 of	 the	 Republic”,	 Niyazi	
Kizılyürek	 notes	 that	 Cumhuriyet	 was	 also	 supported	 by	 the	 Turkish	 Embassy,	 and	 both	
Hikmet	 and	Gürkan	were	 previously	 assaulted	 and	 threatened	 by	 the	 TMT,	which	 declared	
that	 the	 assaults	 were	 necessary	 punishment	 not	 because	 they	 were	 in	 opposition	 of	 the	
establishment	 [referring	 to	 the	 mainstream	 Turkish-Cypriot	 elite],	 but	 because	 they	 were	
undermining	 the	 national	 unity	 of	 the	 community	 (Kızılyürek	 2015,	 Kızılyürek	 2015).	 At	 the	
time,	Greek-Cypriots	and	Turkish-Cypriots	were	bombing	their	own	heritage	cites	and	places	
of	 significance	and	were	blaming	each	other	 for	 the	 incidents	 to	 instil	 tension	and	provoke	
violence	 (Zaman	2010,	Kızılyürek	2015).	 Cumhuriyet	Newspaper	 allegedly	uncovered	one	of	
these	 incidents,	namely	the	bombing	of	the	Bayraktar	Mosque	 in	196243.	Soon	after	Hikmet	
and	Gürkan	wrote	about	TMT	attacks	on	the	mosque,	the	two	men	were	assassinated	by	none	
other	than	TMT	members	(See	Uludağ	2004,	Navaro-Yashin	2012).		
43	It	should	be	noted	that	the	perpetrator(s)	are	unknown	to	date	and	there	are	also	accounts	that	claim	The	Minister	of	
Interior,	Polycarpos	Georgadjis	had	ordered	 the	attack,	 though	 these	accounts	are	 limited	 to	 the	Denktaş	himself	and	
the	Nacak	(hatchet)	newspaper	printed	by	Danktaş	and	the	community	leader	Dr.	Fazil	Küçük.		
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In	his	book	titled	‘Killing	in	the	Name	of	Identity’,	Volkan,	whose	family	had	lived	in	enclaves	in	
the	 1960s,	 explores	 the	 subsequent	 collective	 trauma	 through	 its	 symbols	 and	 collective	
mourning	processes	(Volkan	2006).	He	studies	collective	traumas,	especially	those	that	come	
at	the	end	of	perceived	enemies,	using	Erikson’s	concept	of	‘blow	to	the	basic	tissues	of	social	
life’	 (Erikson	1976)	and	Parkes	and	Williams’	concept	of	 ‘biosocial	 regeneration’	 (Parkes	and	
Williams	 1975).	 Parkes	 and	 Williams’	 research	 in	 Aberfan	 and	 Merthyr	 Vale	 following	 the	
disaster44,	 reveals	 that	 survivors	 did	 not	 only	 want	 to	 repair	 the	 damage	 but	 also	 bring	
something	positive	out	of	 the	 tragedy,	which	was	demonstrated	by	 the	 significant	boom	 in	
birth	rates	in	the	aftermath	of	the	disaster	as	if	to	replace	the	children	who	had	been	lost.	This	
reaction	 to	 the	 disaster	 was	 not	 confined	 to	 bereft	 parents	 but	 to	 the	 entire	 community.	
According	to	Volkan’s	interpretation,	if	the	tissue	of	a	community	is	not	completely	torn	part,	
meaning,	if	the	bonds	(both	emotional	and	material	such	as	photographs	and	mementos)	that	
link	 people	 together	 do	 not	 disappear,	 psychological	 transition	 from	 the	 trauma	 shows	
elements	 of	 biosocial	 regeneration	 (Volkan	 2006).	 Drawing	 links	 between	 other	 collective	
traumas	 such	 as	 Hiroshima,	 Chernobyl	 and	 the	 conflict	 in	 Georgia,	 Volkan	 studies	 Turkish-
Cypriots’	 experiences	 in	 the	 enclaves.	He	 argues	 Turkish-Cypriots’	 collective	 trauma	did	not	
tear	their	basic	tissues	of	social	life,	partly	because	of	their	ties	with	the	motherland	and	hope	
that	 they	 will	 be	 saved,	 and	 partly	 because	 their	 links	 with	 their	 material	 and	 emotional	
symbols	of	 their	 identity	 though	 severed	and	damaged,	was	not	 totally	 destroyed45	(Volkan	
2006).	Volkan	observed	that	instead	of	bearing	more	children,	Turkish-Cypriots	in	the	enclaves	
raised	hundreds	of	parakeets46	in	cages,	representing	their	own	imprisonment	and	self-image.	
As	such,	he	argues	that	prevalent	breeding	of	caged	parakeets	in	the	“subhuman	conditions”	
of	the	enclaves	was	a	way	to	control	Turkish-Cypriots	shared	anxiety;	as	long	as	the	birds	were	
kept	alive	so	was	their	hope	for	salvation	(Volkan	2006:113).	
The	 clashes	 of	 1963,	 what	 is	 known	 as	 the	 Turkish-Cypriots’	 bloody	 Christmas,	 heralded	 a	
more	organised	attack	on	Turkish-Cypriots,	which	was	laid	out	in	what	is	known	as	the	Akritas	
44	The	Aberfan	 disaster	was	 a	 catastrophic	 collapse	 of	 a	colliery	spoil	 tip	in	 the	Welsh	village	 of	Aberfan,	 near	Merthyr	
Tydfil,	on	21	October	1966,	killing	116	children	and	28	adults.		
45	Mainly	because	enclaves	were	partly	self-imposed	and	houses	and	possessions	were	still,	for	the	most	part,	intact.	
46	Parakeets	are	not	native	to	Cyprus.	
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Plan.	The	objective	of	 the	Akritas	Plan,	 later	conferred	by	Glafkos	Clerides47	in	his	memoirs,	
was	to	convince	 international	opinion	that	the	settlement	was	unjust	and	that	the	Treaty	of	
Guarantee	 was	 an	 intrusion	 and	 should	 be	 annulled,	 and	 to	 amend	 the	 constitution	 and	
subjugate	Turkish-Cypriots	before	outside	help	could	arrive	(Clerides	1989,	Hoffmeister	2006,	
Bryant	 and	 Papadakis	 2012,	 Isachenko	 2012).	 Even	 though	 the	 existence	 of	 the	 plan	 is	 not	
disputed,	its	significance	and	meaning	is.	According	to	Kızılyürek,	Drousiotis	and	Hatzivassiliou,	
it	was	a	‘stupid’,	wishful	and	impractical	plan	that	got	more	attention	than	it	deserved	due	to	
propaganda	 (See	 personal	 interviews	 with	 Drousiotis	 and	 Kızılyürek	 by	 Uludağ	 2004,	
Hatzivassiliou	2006).	However,	the	main	significance	of	the	Akritas	Plan	was	the	instillation	of	
panic,	 paranoia	 and	 fear	 among	 Turkish-Cypriots.	 Based	 on	 her	 interviews	with	 those	who	
remember	the	events	of	the	1960s,	 investigative	peace	journalist	Sevgül	Uludağ	asserts	that	
rumours	spread	like	Chinese	whispers	and	people	started	waiting	for	the	‘genocide’	to	happen	
because	 there	was	 a	 ‘plan’	 to	 ‘end’	 them	 all,	 endorsed	 by	 President	Makarios	 and	 lead	 by	
Minister	of	Interior,	Yiorkadjis	(see	Uludağ	2004).	
For	the	Turkish-Cypriot	elite	and	leaders,	geographic	separation	was	unattainable	without	the	
outright	 support	 of	 Turkey	 and	 the	 Turkish	military,	 and	 such	 a	 level	 of	 support	 would	 be	
possible	 only	 in	 the	 most	 dire	 circumstances.	 Despite	 President	 Makarios’	 and	 Turkish	
President	 İnönü’s	 urge	 to	 return,	 Turkish-Cypriot	 deputies	 and	 most	 of	 the	 civil	 servants	
refused	 to	 take	 up	 their	 positions	 in	 government	 citing	 that	 they	 feared	 for	 their	 lives	
(Demirer	1993,	Dodd	2010).	The	range	and	bitterness	of	the	fighting	that	broke	out	inflamed	
Turkish	public	opinion	that	triggered	threatening	jet	flights	for	deterrence	(Hannay	2005).	The	
intervention	 of	 British	 troops	 led	 to	 the	 establishment	 of	 a	 cease-fire	 line	 and	 the	 first	 UN	
force	(UNFCYP),	was	deployed	in	early	1964.		
5.2.3	The	clashes	and	the	world	outside:	1964-1974		
The	UNSC	Resolution	186	that	deployed	the	small	UN	force	in	1964	is	still	very	relevant	today	
and	established	the	legal	framework	for	the	Cyprus	Problem;	it	references	the	government	of	
Cyprus	and	internationally	recognises	the	existence	of	the	administration	despite	the	absence	
47	Glafcos	 Ioannou	 Clerides	(24	 April	 1919	 –	 15	 November	 2013)	 was	 a	Greek-Cypriot	politician	 who	 served	 as	 the	
fourth	President	of	Cyprus	from	1993	to	2003.	
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of	 the	Turkish-Cypriots,	and	hence	recognises	Greek-Cypriots	as	having	the	effective	control	
over	 the	 functions	and	 institutions	of	 the	Republic	 (UNSC	1964).	Ultimately,	Resolution	186	
still	 persists	 today,	 laying	 the	 foundations	 of	 Turkish-Cypriots	 unrecognised	 status.	 Turkish-
Cypriots	resented	this	resolution	arguing	that	there	can	be	no	government	of	Cyprus	without	
their	 representation	 (Ker-Lindsay	 2011),	 which	 can	 be	 perceived	 as	 yet	 another	 rejection	
adding	to	their	self-victimisation.		
	
The	plans	and	reports	that	followed	the	cease-fire,	such	as	that	of	the	UN	Mediator,	Dr	Galo	
Plaza	 either	 claimed	or	 subtly	 implied	 that	 the	 rights	 TCc	 obtained	 from	 the	 London-Zurich	
Agreements	were	“greatly	superior	to	those	which	can	realistically	be	contemplated	for	in	the	
future”	 and	 those	 Turkish-Cypriots	 who	 did	 not	 like	 the	 wishes	 of	 the	 majority	 of	 the	
population	could	be	assisted	to	resettle	in	Turkey	(Plaza	1965:Para.	161).	It	is	not	hard	to	see	
the	 position	 of	Greek-Cypriots	 (as	well	 as	 the	 negotiators’	 of	 the	 time)	 and	 their	 perceived	
injustice	pertaining	to	power	sharing	and	political	equality	with	the	18%	of	the	population	that	
was	part-enemy.	Neither	 is	 it	 hard	 to	understand	 the	 fears	of	 domination,	 assimilation	 and	
physical	 security	 of	 the	 Turkish-Cypriots	 who	 had	 always	 been	 poorer,	 less	 mobilised	 and	
smaller	in	numbers,	with	an	inherent	inferiority	complex	(see	Fisher	2001).	That	being	said,	it	
is	still	hard	to	justify	the	international	actors’	insistence	on	political	equality	over	a	protected	
minority	 status	without	 a	 comprehensive	 consideration	of	 the	global	Cold	War	dynamics	of	
the	time.	The	insistence	on	a	federal	solution	between	the	two	communities	within	the	Cold	
War	context	that	made	‘sense’	for	the	actors	such	as	the	UK,	US	and	Turkey	has	transformed	
into	an	unchallengeable	given,	especially	for	Turkish-Cypriots.	For	them,	insistence	on	political	
equality	became	more	than	an	acquired	right;	it	became	part	of	their	identity	narratives	and	
the	foundation	of	their	‘existential	resistance’.		
	
All	 settlement	 alternatives	 since	 1974	 have	 unchallengeably	 relied	 on	 the	 reunification	 of	
Cyprus	 based	 on	 a	 bicommunal,	 bizonal	 federation	 based	 on	 political	 equality,	 single	
sovereignty	 and	 single	 citizenship	 (See	 UNSC	 2008).	While	 this	 unchallengeable	 settlement	
framework	 challenges	 Greek-Cypriots’	 narratives	 that	 depict	 Cyprus	 as	 Greek	 and	 Turks	 as	
their	 eternal	 enemy,	 any	 deviation	 from	 bicommunality	 and	 bizonality	 challenges	 Turkish-
Cypriots’	ontological	security	by	rendering	their	‘existential	resistance’	and	‘heroic	struggle’	as	
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a	community	a	moot	point.	Mere	suggestion	that	there	may	be	a	different	alternative	that	can	
be	 put	 on	 the	 negotiation	 table	 is	 enough	 to	 make	 Turkish-Cypriots	 feel	 defensive	 and	
anxious.	A	recent	example	is	the	debate	initiated	by	the	former	presidential	candidate	of	2015	
elections	Dr	Kudret	Özersay.	Özersay	made	public	announcements	to	‘warn’	the	TCc	and	call	
for	‘caution’	following	the	UN	Special	Advisor	Espen	Barth	Eide’s	statement	on	27th	July	2015	
that	the	EU	advisers	would	provide	support	to	“…make	the	settlement	fully	compatible	with	
the	EU	principles	and	acquis”	(TRNC	2015).	Özersay’s	admonition	that	was	widely	published	in	
mainstream	 newspapers	 and	 social	media	warns	 the	 TCc	 that	 the	word	 ‘acquis’	 had	 never	
been	included	in	joint	declarations	and	statements	pertaining	to	the	peace	negotiations,	and	
that	 compliance	with	 the	 ‘acquis’	may	 imply	a	deviation	 from	bizonality	and	bicommunality	
(Özersay	2015)	.		
	
However,	bizonality	 and	bicommunality	was	not	 the	alternative	 considered	 in	 the	1960s.	 In	
1964,	the	US	started	showing	more	interest	in	Cyprus	to	avoid	an	open	conflict	between	two	
NATO	allies,	Greece	and	Turkey	(Hannay	2005).	Turkey	and	Greece	under	the	auspices	of	the	
Washington	tried	to	broker	a	solution	based	on	the	Acheson	Plan,	named	after	Dean	Acheson,	
American	Secretary	of	State	at	the	time.	Turkey	was	open	to	Enosis	in	exchange	for	a	Turkish	
military	base	 in	north	Cyprus,	but	 the	parties	 could	not	agree	on	 the	 size	and	 terms	of	 the	
base48	(Dodd	2010,	Ker-Lindsay	2011).	Even	though	the	negotiations	quickly	broke	down	when	
violence	between	Greek-Cypriots	and	Turkish-Cypriots	was	exacerbated,	this	was	yet	another	
disappointment	 for	 Turkish-Cypriots	 despite	 their	 devotion	 to	 the	 motherland.	 Turkey’s	
disinterest	 in	Cyprus	and	Turkish-Cypriots	 that	can	be	traced	back	to	 the	start	of	 the	British	
rule	 in	 late	1800s,	their	 lack	of	commitment	to	Taksim	and	their	willingness	to	negotiate	for	
Enosis	in	exchange	for	a	military	base	made	Turkish-Cypriots	feel	dispensable	and	rejected	by	
the	large-group	yet	again.	However,	in	the	years	to	come,	the	Turkish-Cypriot	pressure	led	by	
Denktaş	succeeded	in	cultivating	Turkey’s	interest	on	the	island.			
	
Even	though	Turkey’s	intervention	was	rebuffed	at	the	last	minute	in	1964	and	again	in	1965	
and	 1967	 by	 Washington	 and	 London	 (Hitchens	 1997,	 O'Malley	 and	 Craig	 2001),	 these	
developments	both	encouraged	(because	Turkey	was	now	showing	interest)	and	disappointed																																																									
48	Turkey	insisted	on	sovereign	bases,	and	Makarios	proposed	lease	agreements.	
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(because	 Turkey	 was	 showing	 hesitation)	 Turkish-Cypriots.	 In	 the	 face	 of	 the	 inter-ethnic	
clashes	 and	 Turkish	military	 threats,	 President	Makarios,	without	 abandoning	 his	 desire	 for	
Enosis49,	adopted	a	more	reconciliatory	stance	towards	negotiations.	His	new	policy	to	seek	a	
‘feasible’	 solution	 prompted	 strong	 criticism	 from	 Greece,	 and	 created	 a	 stark	 division	
between	 those	Greek-Cypriots	who	wanted	Enosis	 ‘now’	and	 those	who	were	moving	away	
from	the	idea	(Clerides	1989,	Hitchens	1997,	Ker-Lindsay	2011).		
	
In	June	1967,	under	pressure	from	the	‘mainland’	that	was	now	ruled	by	the	junta,	the	Greek-
Cypriot	House	of	Representatives	unanimously	voted	for	immediate	Enosis	(Stavrinides	1976).	
Subsequently,	 things	 turned	 darker	 for	 Turkish-Cypriots;	 people	 went	 missing,	 buses	 and	
vehicles	were	stopped	for	random	‘checks’,	and	people	were	strip	searched	in	the	streets	by	
the	Greek-Cypriot	police.	However,	 they	did	not	only	 suffer	at	 the	hands	of	Greek-Cypriots,	
their	 own	 leadership	 exerted	 pressure	 on	 those	 who	 did	 not	 move	 into	 the	 enclaves	 and	
threatened	 those	 who	 entered	 Greek-Cypriot	 controlled	 areas	 without	 a	 special	 permit.	
Turkish-Cypriots	who	 visited	Greek-Cypriot	 courts,	 hospitals	 and	 other	 state	 institutions,	 or	
entered	 the	 Greek-Cypriot	 controlled	 areas	 for	 business,	 leisure	 or	 for	 friendly	 association	
with	Greek-Cypriots	were	met	with	severe	punishment	and	fines	(Uludağ	2005).		
	
November	 1967	 witnessed	 one	 of	 the	 bloodiest	 clashes	 between	 the	 two	 communities.	
Violence	 broke	 out	 between	 Turkish-Cypriots	 villagers	 in	 Kofinou/Geçitkale	 and	 Ayios	
Theodoros/Boğaziçi	and	Greek-Cypriot	forces	led	by	colonel	Grivas	(Dodd	2010).	TMT	fighters	
under	the	command	of	a	Turkish	military	officer	were	blocking	the	Nicosia-Limassol	road	and	
not	letting	anyone	pass	without	a	UN	escort.	Grivas	and	his	troops	attacked	and	burned	down	
both	villages	(Uludağ	2005).	The	incident	that	brought	Greece	and	Turkey	to	the	brink	of	war,	
reshuffled	 the	 international	 dynamics.	 In	 response,	 the	 Turkish	 Government	 ordered	
preparations	for	military	intervention	in	Cyprus	and	presented	a	list	of	demands	to	the	Greek	
Junta,	that	included	the	immediate	recall	of	colonel	Grivas,	the	withdrawal	of	excess	troops	in	
accordance	with	the	1960	Accords,	compensation	for	the	Turkish-Cypriot	victims,	relaxation	of	
restrictions	 on	 Turkish-Cypriots	 living	 in	 the	 enclaves	 and	 guarantees	 against	 any	 further	
assaults	on	the	Turkish-Cypriots	(UNSG	1967).	Although	the	Turkish-Cypriots	were	somewhat																																																									
49	Nevertheless,	some	Hellenists	considered	him	a	traitor	for	abandoning	the	fight	for	enosis	(see	Dodd	2010).		
	 160	
resentful	 that	 Turkey	 had	 not	 achieved	more	 for	 their	 position	 and	 the	 deal	was	merely	 a	
reversion	to	the	situation	in	1963	in	the	enclaves,	they	had	been	nonetheless	encouraged	by	
Turkish	determination	to	intervene	militarily	(Dodd	2010).		
	
This	event	is	significant	for	reproducing	self-victimhood	and	the	aggressiveness	of	the	other	in	
the	 Turkish-Cypriot	 historical	 narratives.	 The	 events	 in	 these	 villages	 are	 integral	 to	 the	
‘chosen	traumas’	and	as	such,	they	are	remembered	and	retold	as	a	pretext	for	the	Turkish-
Cypriots’	 need	 for	 Turkey’s	 military	 presence	 on	 the	 island	 and	 their	 objection	 to	 the	
withdrawal	 of	 Turkish	 troops	 in	 a	 post-settlement	 scenario50.	 The	 current	 Turkish-Cypriot	
history	 textbooks	 that	 interchangeably	 refer	 to	 Turkish-Cypriots	 as	 island-Turks	 or	 Cyprus	
Turks	or	simply	Turks,	link	these	events	to	the	Akritas	Plan,	representing	them	as	the	symbol	
of	Greek/Greek-Cypriot	desire	for	ethnic	cleansing.	The	unilateral	establishment	of	the	‘TRNC’	
in	 November	 1983,	 on	 the	 6th	 anniversary	 of	 the	 events	 further	memorialises	 this	 chosen	
trauma.		
	
When	the	door	of	the	enclaves	opened	in	the	summer	of	1968	following	the	event,	Turkish-
Cypriots	faced	a	shocking	reality,	similar	to	the	one	when	the	check-points	were	opened	after	
four	decades	of	 separation	 in	April	2003.	Even	 though	 the	 life	 in	 the	enclaves	was	not	easy	
and	access	to	basic	needs	were	limited,	Hatay	and	Bryant	note	that	a	feeling	of	together-ness	
was	bolstered:	“Not	only	were	they	“all	together,”	but	social	and	economic	differences	were	
flattened,	 as	 everyone	 was	 subject	 to	 the	 rulings	 of	 the	 administration	 and	 the	 needs	 of	
community	defence”	(Hatay	and	Bryant	2008:439).	The	life	in	the	enclaves	destroyed	many	of	
the	traditional	hierarchies	between	the	young	and	the	old	as	well,	where	boys	as	young	as	12	
would	take	up	guard	duty	in	the	evening	and	girls	would	stitch	uniforms.	Faced	with	a	threat	
to	their	existence	as	a	collective,	their	together-ness	took	an	organic	form	and	their	lives	were	
given	a	purpose	and	a	common	goal	(Hatay	and	Bryant	2008).	They	founded	their	first	theatre,	
first	 radio	 station	and	pop	groups	 in	 the	enclaves	 (Volkan	1980,	Hatay	and	Bryant	2008).	 In	
line	with	Freud’s	argument	that	groups	are	found	on	the	basis	of	common	need	(Freud	2001),	
																																																								
50	The	 Cyprus-2015-Initiativeopinion	 poll	 shows	 that	 79%	 of	 Turkish-Cypriots	 express	 support	 for	 the	 continuation	 of	
Turkey’s	guarantorship	and	33%	think	both	Turkish	and	Greek	troops	should	remain	on	the	island	permanently	in	a	post	
settlement	scenario	(Cyprus-2015-Initiative	2009).		
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Turkish-Cypriots	found	themselves	as	a	community	in	the	enclaves	on	the	basis	of	their	need	
for	defence	and	survival.		
	
Volkan	describes	Turkish-Cypriots’	reaction	to	the	opening	of	the	barriers	as	their	“first	taste	
of	freedom”	that	“paradoxically	evoked	symptoms	like	those	of	depression”,	reflected	in	the	
increased	 use	 of	 antidepressant	 drugs	 and	minor	 tranquilisers	 (Volkan	 1980:102).	 Although	
their	 confinement	 came	 with	 extreme	 hardship,	 it	 had	 provided	 them	 with	 security	 and	
comfort	by	distancing	them	from	the	dangers	of	the	‘outside’.	During	his	visit	in	1968,	Volkan	
notes,	 “This	 world	 was	 now	 gone,	 and	 its	 inhabitants	 were	 faced	 with	 the	 humiliating	
recognition	that	a	prosperous	Greek	life-style	surrounded	them	on	every	hand”	as	the	Greek-
Cypriot	economy	had	flourished	significantly	(Volkan	1980:103).	In	Volkan’s	analysis,	Turkish-
Cypriots’	 aggression	evoked	by	 the	 shocking	 reality	of	 the	outside	 following	 their	 ‘freedom’	
“was	 turned	 inward	 and	 directed	 against	 the	 self,	 and	 self-esteem	 was	 reduced”	 (Volkan	
1980:103).	Now	exposed	to	the	outside	reality,	 they	tried	to	relieve	their	damaged	sense	of	
self-worth	 and	 self-esteem	by	 continuing	 to	 deny	Greek-Cypriots	 entry	 to	 the	 enclaves	 and	
hence	trying	to	maintain	a	level	of	control	over	their	lives	and	destiny	(Volkan	1980,	Hatay	and	
Bryant	2008).	
	
In	 the	midst	of	 the	negotiations	between	Clerides	and	Denktaş	 that	started	 in	1968,	Grivas,	
who	 had	 become	 the	 symbol	 of	 militant	 Enosis,	 had	 returned	 to	 Cyprus	 in	 1971	 (Michael	
2011).	Opposed	to	the	inter-communal	negotiations	and	Makarios’s	‘feasible’	solution	policy,	
Grivas	 established	EOKA-B,	 a	new,	more	militant	 and	 fanatic	 version	of	 EOKA.	Breaking	 the	
atmosphere	of	 relative	calmness,	EOKA-B	 targeted	Greek-Cypriots	who	were	supporting	 the	
negotiations	 as	 much	 as	 Turkish-Cypriots	 (Fouskas	 2001).	 The	 re-instigation	 of	 violence	
directly	 impacted	 the	 negotiations.	 In	 1973,	 with	 Bülent	 Ecevit	 as	 the	 new	 prime	minister,	
Turkey	 backtracked	 from	 the	 concessions	 asserting	 a	 federal	 solution	 rather	 than	 a	 unitary	
bicommunal	 state	 to	 the	 Cyprus	 Problem,	 which	 drew	 the	 negotiations	 to	 a	 deadlock	
(Necatigil	1993).		
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5.2.4	The	division	and	amnesia:	1974	
In	July	1974,	the	coup	directed	by	the	Greek	 junta	ousted	President	Makarios,	declaring	the	
notoriously	anti-Turkish	Nikos	Sampson	as	the	President,	which	set	the	‘favourable’	conditions	
for	Turkey’s	military	intervention.	Turkish-Cypriots	fearing	massacre	believed	that	the	Akritas	
Plan,	or	a	version	of	it,	was	now	put	into	play	(Volkan	1980).	Citing	its	right	to	intervene	under	
the	 Treaty	 of	 Guarantee51,	 Turkey	 intervened	 on	 20th	 July	 1974.	 Having	 gained	 control	 of	
nearly	 36%	 of	 Cyprus,	 Ecevit	 declared	 that	 the	 “foundations	 have	 been	 laid	 for	 the	 new	
federal	 state	 of	 Cyprus”	 (quoted	 in	 Michael	 2011:36).	 By	 August	 1974,	 a	 UN-brokered	
ceasefire	extended	the	original	‘Green	Line’	in	the	capital	of	Nicosia	across	the	entire	length	of	
the	island,	where	it	remains	to	this	day.	The	Turkish	military	intervention	is	still	celebrated	as	
the	‘happy	peace	operation’	by	Turkish-Cypriots	today,	although	with	increasing	cynicism.	
	
It	is	all	together	another	question	beyond	the	scope	of	this	chapter	why	Britain	and	the	USA	
watched	Brigadier	Dimitrios	 Ioanides,	 leader	of	Greek	 junta,	 stage	a	 coup	 in	Cyprus	despite	
the	warnings	and	CIA	intelligence	as	early	as	1973,	and	despite	the	fact	that	Ioanides	had	told	
the	 CIA	 officers	 in	Athens	 in	 June	 1974	 that	 he	was	 to	 overthrow	Makarios	 (Fouskas	 2001,	
O'Malley	and	Craig	2001,	Dodd	2010,	Michael	2011).	 It	 is	 important	to	note	once	again	that	
the	 Cyprus	 Problem	 cannot	 be	 reduced	 purely	 to	 ethnic	 hatred	 between	 the	 two	 main	
communities	 of	 the	 island.	 For	 many	 accounts	 such	 as	 Michalis	 Stavrou	 Michael’s	 book	
‘Resolving	the	Cyprus	Conflict:	Negotiating	History’	and	Brendan	O'Malley	and	Ian	Craig’s	book	
‘The	 Cyprus	 Conspiracy:	 America,	 Espionage	 and	 the	 Turkish	 Invasion’,	 the	 events	 of	 1974	
were	all	part	of	the	Cold	War	strategy	with	“the	hand	of	the	CIA”	at	“every	important	turn”,	
when	“unevenly	matched	and	differently	motivated	forces	came	together	to	divide	the	island”	
(O'Malley	and	Craig	2001:vii).		
	
During	 the	 inter-communal	 clashes	 and	 as	 a	 result	 of	 Turkey’s	 intervention,	 thousands	 of	
Greek-Cypriots	 and	 Turkish-Cypriots,	 including	 my	 grandfather,	 were	 taken	 as	 prisoners	 of	
war,	many	of	whom	went	 ‘missing’	and	hundreds	of	 thousands	became	 internally	displaced	
(Gürel,	 Hatay	 et	 al.	 2012).	 If	 Turkish-Cypriots’	 collective	 trauma	 was	 their	 years	 in	 the																																																									
51	The	1960	Treaty	of	Guarantee	states	that	each	guarantor	power,	after	consultation,	reserves	the	right	to	take	action	
with	the	sole	aim	of	re-establishing	the	state	of	affairs	(Treat	of	Guarantee	1960:No.5475).		
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enclaves,	Greek-Cypriots’	was	the	Turkish	 intervention	that	physically	divided	the	island	into	
two.	 In	 1974,	 Greek-Cypriots	 suffered	 most	 in	 terms	 of	 casualties	 as	 well	 as	 missing	 and	
displaced	peoples.	Around	one-third	of	the	Greek-Cypriot	population	(160,000)	was	displaced	
to	the	southern	part	of	the	island,	while	45,000	Turkish-Cypriots	were	displaced	to	the	north	
(Fisher	2001,	Papadakis	2008).	Without	underestimating	the	psychological,	social	and	material	
costs	of	dislocation	for	both	communities,	it	is	important	to	note	that	while	Turkish-Cypriots’	
displacement	 was	 perceived	 as	 necessary	 cost	 for	 their	 salvation,	 Greek-Cypriots’	
displacement	was	caused	at	the	hands	of	their	primordial	enemy52.		
	
In	Volkan’s	diagnosis,	1974	served	a	therapeutic	function	for	Turkish-Cypriots,	repairing	their	
‘narcissistic	hurts’,	where	 sharing	aggressive	 feelings	 toward	a	 common	enemy	with	Turkey	
reinforced	their	self	worth	providing	a	liberating,	cleansing	sensation	for	a	minority	suffering	
self-victimisation	 and	 low	esteem	 (Volkan	1980).	While	 the	 events	 represented	 a	 victorious	
time	for	Turkish-Cypriots,	as	their	large-group	finally	came	to	save	them	from	oppression;	it	is	
mourned	by	Greek-Cypriots	as	the	darkest	days	in	their	modern	history	where	they	have	lost	
lives,	property,	 land	and	 felt	betrayed	by	 the	motherland	and	 the	 international	 community.	
The	events	of	1974	also	generated	a	historical	amnesia	among	the	Greek-Cypriots,	creating	a	
prevalent	 narrative	 that	 the	 communities	 lived	 peacefully	 before	 the	 junta	 and	 the	 Turkish	
invasion53,	 and	 if	 it	 were	 not	 for	 EOKA-B,	 the	 junta	 and	 the	 invasion,	 Turkish-Cypriots	 and	
Greek-Cypriots	would	have	lived	happily	ever	after.		
	
Drawing	 from	 Stanley	 Cohen,	 Rebecca	 Bryant	 argues	 that	 there	 are	 two	 different	 forms	 of	
‘denial’	 and	 two	 different	 forms	 of	 ‘silence’	 in	 Cyprus	 (Bryant	 2010).	 Greek-Cypriots	
remembrance	of	the	period	before	1974	as	blissful	coexistence	resembles	Cohen’s	‘denial	of	
injury’	(Cohen	2013).	According	to	Cohen,	this	silence	about	the	sufferings	of	Turkish-Cypriots,	
or	 denial	 of	 injury	 where	 the	 offender	 insists	 that	 the	 actions	 did	 not	 cause	 any	 harm	 or	
damage,	can	emerge	even	as	the	events	are	unfolding,	where	the	majority	community	or	the	
community	 in	power	may	not	see	the	violence	or	suffering	 inflicted	or	 recognise	 the	 lasting																																																									
52	For	a	more	detailed	account	on	perceptions	regarding	the	refugee	and	IDP	status	of	the	two	main	communities	see	
Zetter,	R.	(2007).	More	Labels,	Fewer	Refugees:	Remaking	the	refugee	label	in	an	era	of	globalization.		
53	Greek-Cypriots	use	the	term	‘occupation’	or	‘invasion’	for	the	events	of	1974,	while	the	Turkish-Cypriots	use	the	term	
‘happy	peace	operation’.	I	opt	for	the	more	neutral	term	‘intervention’	or	‘the	events	of	1974’.		
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trauma.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 Turkish	 Cypriots’	 denial	 resembles	 Cohen’s	 ‘denial	 of	 the	
victim’,	 where	 trapped	 in	 self-victimisation,	 the	 ‘victim’	 justifies	 causing	 displacement	 and	
destruction	 on	 those	 that	 are	 perceived	 to	 be	 responsible	 based	 on	 a	 ‘they	 deserved	 it’	
psyche.	In	other	words,	while	the	Greek-Cypriot	amnesia	silences	the	traumas	and	sufferings	
of	 the	 period	 before	 1974,	 the	 Turkish-Cypriot	 denial	 justifies	 all	wrongdoing,	 traumas	 and	
sufferings	of	1974.	As	such,	while	the	amnesia	prevents	Greek-Cypriots	from	coming	to	terms	
with	the	past,	the	denial	prevents	Turkish-Cypriots	from	engaging	with	any	moral	accounting.	
Bryant	also	talks	about	a	‘loud	silence’	since	the	opening	of	the	check-points	in	2003,	where	
increased	 interactions	 and	 friendships	 exacerbated	 the	 silence	 and	 denial	 rather	 than	
breaking	the	invisible	border	to	the	past	and	coming	to	terms	with	each	others’	sufferings	and	
truths	(Bryant	2010).	The	scholars	note	that	in	the	name	of	preserving	newfound	friendships,	
Cypriots	avoid	talking	about	the	past	and	their	views	on	the	Cyprus	Problem.	
	
Papadakis	 confirms	 that	 the	 historical	 amnesia	 of	 the	 Greek-Cypriots	 that	 romanticises	 the	
past	as	 times	of	coexistence	provides	 the	pretext	 for	 the	possibility	of	 reunification	without	
which,	 the	 myth	 of	 return	 to	 the	 lost	 lands	 cannot	 be	 sustained	 (Papadakis	 2008).	 For	
example,	 the	primary	 school	 textbooks	describe	 the	period	of	 1960-1974	as	 follows:	 “From	
1960	when	the	Republic	was	created	to	1974	Cyprus	enjoyed	unprecedented	development	in	
all	sectors.	The	population	had	full	employment	and	its	 life	constantly	 improved”	(quoted	in	
Papadakis	 2008:10).	 Similarly,	 Philippou	 and	 Varnava	 point	 out	 that	 the	 formal	 curricula	
construes	 the	 Cyprus	 Problem	 as	 an	 international	 violation	 of	 statehood	 by	 a	 foreign	 state	
that	 dates	 back	merely	 to	 1974	 (Philippou	 and	 Varnava	 2009).	 They	 also	 highlight	 that	 the	
terms	 Greek	 and	 Cypriot	 are	 used	 interchangeably,	 which	 suggests	 Cypriots	 are	 Greek	 and	
non-Greeks	are	not	Cypriot	(Philippou	and	Varnava	2009).	
	
Drawing	on	his	fieldwork	among	Greek-Cypriot	school	children,	anthropologist	Sypros	Syprou	
explores	the	role	of	‘the	Turk’	as	the	primary	other	in	children’s	identity	construction,	where	
the	 enemy	 helps	 “concretise	 the	 sense	 of	 self”	 (Spyrou	 2007:258).	 Syprou’s	 work	
demonstrates	 that	 Greek-Cypriot	 children	 cannot	 deal	 with	 the	 unusual	 message	 of	 ‘the	
Turkish-Cypriot’,	who	are	Turks	therefore	different	from	the	self	but	are	also	Cypriots,	which	
makes	 imagining	 the	 self	 confusing.	 He	 explains	 that	 the	 problem	 of	 conflation	 Greek	 and	
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Cypriot	identity,	where	the	local	more	particular	history	of	the	latter	dissolves	into	the	larger	
history	 of	 the	 Greek	 nation,	 results	 in	 the	 exclusion	 of	 Turkish-Cypriot	 claims	 to	 Cypriot	
identity	 (Spyrou	 2001:174-175).	 As	 such,	 peacemaking	 and	 peacebuilding	 that	 have	 been	
ultimately	based	bicommunality,	requires	Greek-Cypriots	to	accept	Turkish-Cypriots,	who	are	
part-enemy	 and	 part-self,	 as	 legitimate	 political	 equals	 on	 the	 island.	 This	 challenges	 the	
ontological	security	of	Greek-Cypriots,	by	adding	Turkishness	into	the	definition	of	Cypriotness	
and	challenging	the	their	historical	and	identity	narratives.	
	
Examining	the	nationalist	historiographical	and	pedagogical	Turkish-Cypriot	narratives,	Doğuş	
Derya	argues	that	Turkish-Cypriots	are	presented	as	the	historical	objects	of	Turkish	national	
pedagogy	 (Derya	2010).	According	to	Derya,	 the	creation	of	 the	 ‘evil	other’	serves	as	a	dual	
amplifier	 by	 disregarding	 the	 cultural	 differences	 between	 Turkish-Cypriots	 and	 Anatolian	
Turks	and	by	situating	the	problem	between	Turks	and	Greeks	(Derya	2010).	 In	this	process,	
Greek-Cypriots	become	one	and	 the	 same	with	 the	 larger	Greek	nation,	who	 tried	 to	break	
the	Ottoman	Empire	apart,	and	Turkish-Cypriots	become	the	descendants	of	Anatolian	Turks,	
highlighting	 sameness	and	discounting	distinctiveness.	This	historical	narrative	 subsequently	
serves	as	the	axis	of	reference	for	all	historical	events.	For	example,	 just	 like	Greek-Cypriots	
interpret	the	events	of	1974	with	the	same	lens	as	the	annexation	of	Constantinople	by	the	
expansionist	and	barbaric	Turks,	Turkish-Cypriots	interpret	the	struggle	for	Enosis	as	a	struggle	
for	the	re-establishment	of	the	Byzantine	Empire.		
	
The	official	historical	narratives	 silence	 the	pain	of	 the	other,	 in	effect	 reducing	 the	historic	
existence	and	the	legitimacy	of	the	‘other’	on	the	island.	This	is	apparent	from	the	reactions	to	
a	 speech	made	 by	Doğuş	Derya	 in	 parliament	 on	 15	December	 2014,	who	 is	 a	Member	 of	
Parliament	 for	 the	 Republican	 Turkish	 Party	 (CTP54).	 In	 her	 speech,	 Derya	 emphasised	 that	
Turkish-Cypriots	were	 not	 the	 only	 ones	 losing	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 Cyprus	 Problem,	 and	 that	
there	 was	 a	 need	 to	 acknowledge	 the	 traumas	 and	 sufferings	 of	 others.	 Pointing	 to	 the	
sufferings	of	Greek-Cypriots,	Armenians	and	Maronites,	Derya	said	that	contrary	to	Orthodox																																																									
54	Republican	Turkish	Party	is	a	left-wing,	pro-peace,	social	democratic	political	party	in	north	Cyprus,	founded	in	1970.	
The	party	was	led	by	Mehmet	Ali	Talat	from	1996	until	his	election	as	president	in	2005.	
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doctrine,	the	Church	had	allowed	abortions	for	rape	victims	in	1974	(See	Hadjipavlou	2010).	
This	speech	made	the	headlines	the	next	day,	both	in	Cyprus	and	in	Turkey	(Yeniduzen	2014).	
The	majority	of	commentary	on	online	platforms,	social	media	and	in	the	mainstream	media	
denied	Derya’s	claims	and	condemned	her	for	being	‘ignorant’	and	a	‘traitor’.		
	
Peacemaking	 and	 peacebuilding	 efforts	 reduce	 reconciliation	 to	 ‘bicommunalism’	 and	 take	
this	inescapable	hyphenation	for	granted.	This	excludes	the	nuances	and	dynamism	of	identity	
and	 disregards	 its	 multiplicity.	 Consequently,	 bicommunalism	 assumes	 two	 inherent	 and	
homogeneous	 positions	 to	 the	 conflict,	 that	 of	 Greek-Cypriots	 and	 Turkish-Cypriots.	Within	
the	context	of	the	Cyprus	Problem,	Cypriots	cannot	simply	be	Cypriot	because	their	political	
legitimacy	 is	 built	 upon	 their	 perceived	 ethnic	 ties.	 In	 other	words,	 Turkish-Cypriots	 cannot	
claim	 Cypriotness	 as	 political	 equals	 without	 their	 Turkishness,	 and	 taking	 Greekness	 away	
from	Cypriotness	allows	 the	enemy	 to	 seep	 into	 the	 self	 for	Greek-Cypriots.	Turkish-Cypriot	
trauma	 is	 tied	 in	 with	 Greek-Cypriots’	 Greekness	 (i.e.	 Enosis	 and	 Greek	 junta);	 and	 their	
damaged	self-esteem	and	internalised	stigma	is	underpinned	by	their	11	years	of	confinement	
in	the	enclaves	and	their	minority	status.	On	the	other	hand,	Turkish-Cypriots’	Turkishness	is	
tied	to	the	eternal	barbaric	enemy	narratives	of	Greeks	and	Greek-Cypriots,	and	to	the	Greek-
Cypriots’	 trauma	of	1974.	Both	Cypriot	communities	 find	 their	political	 legitimacy	as	well	as	
their	 enemy	 in	 their	 ethnic	 ties	with	 the	motherland.	 Thus,	 reconciliation	between	Turkish-
Cypriots	and	Greek-Cypriots	could	never	explore	its	true	potential	without	desecuritising	the	
‘national	centres’	and	ethnic	roots.		
	
The	 sense	of	betrayal	 by	 the	motherland	and	 the	events	of	 1974	had	a	profound	effect	on	
Greek-Cypriots’	identity	narratives.	Michalis	Michael	explains	1974	as	“…the	apex	of	national	
treachery	for	Greek	determinism,	which	reverberates	through	Greek	Cypriot	political	culture	
and	 haunts	 their	 decision-making	 throughout	 the	 peace	 process”	 (Michael	 2011:33).	 The	
social	consequence	of	1974	on	the	Greek-Cypriot	psyche	was	the	ideological	reconfiguration	
of	 Cypriot	 consciousness,	 which	 facilitated	 the	 growth	 of	 Cypriotism	 as	 a	 sociopolitical	
movement	at	 the	expense	of	Greek	ethno-nationalism	(Michael	2011).	Papadakis	also	notes	
that	 the	historical	amnesia	 triggered	a	 shift	 in	 the	ascriptions	of	 the	 two	communities	 from	
Greeks	 to	Greek-Cypriots	 and	 Turks	 to	 Turkish-Cypriots	 to	 distinguish	 Turkish-Cypriots	 from	
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both	Turkish	settlers/immigrants,	and	Turks	in	general,	who	were	the	aggressors	responsible	
for	 the	 trauma	of	1974.	Similarly,	Stamatakis	and	Mavratsas	characterise	 the	second	half	of	
the	1970s	as	golden	age	of	Cypriotism,	where	a	Cypriot	political	identity	and	a	sense	of	loyalty	
to	the	RoC	was	systematically	cultivated	for	the	first	time	(Stamatakis	1991,	Mavratsas	1997).	
As	 the	 desires	 for	 Enosis	 were	 abandoned	 and	 the	 seeds	 of	 Cypriotism	 were	 sowed,	 the	
Cyprus	 flags	started	waving	together	with	the	Greek	 flags	at	public	 institutions	and	national	
holidays	 (Papadakis	 1998).	 Greek-Cypriots’	 renewed	 attitudes	 towards	 rapprochement	 was	
reflected	 in	 the	 post-1974	 doctrine	 of	 epanaprosegisi,	 meaning	 “coming	 together	 again”,	
which	further	reinforced	the	historical	amnesia	(Papadakis	1998:152).		
	
This	was	an	 important	 juncture	 for	Greek-Cypriot	 identity	narratives,	which	 in	 tandem	with	
the	peacemaking	and	peacebuilding	efforts	created	ontological	dissonance.	On	the	one	hand,	
abandoning	Enosis	and	embracing	independence	could	only	be	justified	based	on	coexistence	
with	 the	 Turkish-Cypriots	 that	 necessitated	 a	 common	 Cypriot	 dimension.	 On	 this	 account,	
historical	amnesia	helps	to	shift	the	blame	for	the	sufferings	of	1974	outside	of	the	GCc	and	to	
maintain	 the	 enemy’s	 image	 as	 aggressive,	 barbaric	 and	 expansionist.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	
religious	 and	 cultural	 heritage	 that	 is	 integral	 to	Greek-Cypriots’	 self-identity	 narratives	 still	
required	an	emphasis	on	Greekness	and	Hellenism.	In	effect,	while	the	division	challenges	the	
integrity	 of	 the	 geographical	 actuality	 Greek-Cypriot	 self-narratives	 are	 based	 on	 (whole	 of	
Cyprus),	 promoting	 rapprochement	 allows	 the	 enemy	 (Turkishness	 of	 Turkish-Cypriots)	 into	
their	self-narratives.	To	date,	this	dilemma	creates	ontological	dissonance	for	Greek-Cypriots,	
where	 addressing	 their	 anxieties	 attached	 to	 division	 simultaneously	 exacerbates	 their	
anxieties	attached	to	a	prospective	solution.		
	
The	 events	 of	 1974	 that	 demarcated	 the	 communities	 in	 Cyprus	 both	 socially	 and	
demographically	 had	 a	 significant	 impact	 on	 the	 subsequent	 peace	 negotiations.	
Bicommunality	under	a	unitary	state	that	was	the	basis	of	negotiations	up	until	1974	came	to	
include	 bizonality	 as	 a	 fundamental	 principle	 post-division.	 Today,	 the	 principles	 of	
bicommunality	and	bizonality	have	become	the	unchallengeable	foundations	of	any	potential	
comprehensive	settlement	to	the	Cyprus	Problem.		 	
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Chapter	6.	Shifting	Identity	Narratives:	Ethnic	to	civic	signifiers	post-division	
6.1	Never-ending	Inter-communal	Negotiations	and	the	Road	to	Europeanisation	(1974-
1990)	
	
6.1.1	Recognition	vs.	unrecognition	
The	 ethnic	 and	 geographical	 division	 that	 came	 in	 1974	 severed	 nearly	 all	 contact	 and	
communication	between	the	two	communities	until	the	opening	of	the	check-points	in	2003.	
Broome	notes	 that	 lack	 of	 contact	 that	 eliminated	 the	opportunity	 to	 establish	 any	 kind	of	
social,	 political	 or	 business	 interactions	 created	 a	 wide	 crevasse	 between	 the	 two	
communities	that	solidified	unfavourable	images	of	the	other	(Broome	2005).	Unable	to	travel	
to	the	other	half	of	their	island,	especially	the	new	generation	of	Greek-Cypriots	and	Turkish-
Cypriots,	who	lacked	direct	experience	with	the	other	community,	relied	on	myths,	rumours	
and	 propaganda,	 which	 fuelled	 misunderstandings,	 misconceptions,	 and	 mistrust.	 As	 the	
division	became	protracted,	the	difference	between	history	and	myth,	reality	and	propaganda	
and	what	is	possible	and	what	is	fantasy	became	fuzzy.		
	
In	 the	 post-1974	 period,	 Greek-Cypriots	 focused	 on	 reconstructing	 and	 reconfiguring	 their	
Cypriotism	under	the	RoC	while	mourning	for	the	other	half	of	their	island.	Across	the	divide,	
Turkish-Cypriots,	 now	having	 territorial	 control	 over	 approximately	 36%	of	 the	 island	 and	 a	
strong	Turkish	military	presence	had	a	new	sense	of	[physical]	security	and	confidence.	With	
the	 establishment	 of	 the	 Turkish	 Federated	 State	 of	 Cyprus	 in	 1975,	 they	 now	 considered	
themselves	 on	 an	 ‘equal	 footing’	with	 the	RoC,	which	 they	perceived	 as	 the	 ‘Greek-Cypriot	
state’	 (Volkan	 1980,	 Dodd	 2010).	 This	 self-confidence	 did	 not	 last	 for	 long	 however.	 The	
international	community,	particularly	the	UN,	was	condemning	Turkish	military	action,	which	
created	thousands	of	internally	displaced	people	(IDPs)	and	violated	the	Treaty	of	Guarantee.	
Even	 though	 the	 ultimate	 goal	 of	 the	 Turkish-Cypriot	 political	 elite	 was	 to	 solidify	 their	
administration	 and	 gain	 recognition	 as	 an	 autonomous	 political	 unit	 in	 the	 post-1974	 era,	
failing	 to	 do	 so	 turned	 the	 ‘pseudo’	 administration	 into	 an	 invisible	 enclave55.	 As	 the	 years	
																																																								
55	During	the	mass	demonstration	in	2003,	one	among	many	of	the	striking	posters	read,	“We	don’t	want	to	live	in	an	
open	air	prison”	(Açık	hava	hapishanesinde	yaşamak	istemiyoruz).	Another	read	“I	lost	a	parent	[to	war]	but	I	still	want	
peace”(Ben	bir	şehit	çocuğuyum	ve	barış	istiyorum)	(Bayrak	2003,	Christou	2003).		
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passed,	Turkish-Cypriots	 came	 to	mock	 their	unrecognised	 state	as	 the	 ‘banana	 republic’	or	
likened	it	to	children	‘playing	house’	(see	Ergü	2005,	Turan	2014).		
	
A	new	round	of	negotiations,	known	as	the	Vienna	talks,	started	in	April	1975	under	the	UN	
auspices.	Greek-Cypriots	argued	for	a	strong	federal	state,	while	Turkish-Cypriots	argued	for	a	
weak	 one,	 closer	 to	 a	 confederation.	 Very	 little	 was	 achieved	 in	 Vienna,	 apart	 from	 an	
agreement	on	population	exchange	for	the	people	left	on	the	‘wrong’	side	of	the	Green	Line	
(Hannay	2005).	Failed	Vienna	talks	that	collapsed	in	1979	were	marked	by	what	is	known	as	
the	 historic	 High	 Level	 Agreements,	 where	 Makarios	 and	 Denktaş	 agreed	 upon	 a	 set	 of	
guidelines	that	established	the	parameters	of	a	future	settlement;	although	both	sides	agreed	
on	 a	 bicommunal	 ‘federal’	 solution,	 what	 each	 side	 understood	 from	 the	 concept	 of	
‘federalism’	was	very	different	 (Hannay	2005).	Turkish-Cypriots,	due	to	their	underlying	fear	
of	 political	 domination	 and	 being	 reduced	 to	 a	 political	 minority,	 insisted	 that	 federalism	
should	also	include	bizonality	and	autonomy,	which	suggested	partition	to	Greek-Cypriots	and	
was	not	acceptable;	 they	wanted	a	 strong	 federation	 focused	on	 functionality.	 There	was	a	
stark	discrepancy	between	what	was	feasible	at	the	negotiation	table	and	what	was	desirable	
by	the	two	communities.	These	positions	have	not	changed	much	over	the	decades,	and	the	
discrepancy	between	what	is	negotiated	and	what	is	desired	still	continues	to	date.		
	
Even	though	there	was	no	agreement	on	the	meaning	and	the	content	of	a	federal	solution,	
considering	the	heavy	economic	embargoes	and	 lack	of	 international	recognition	of	Turkish-
Cypriots,	 time	 was	 clearly	 on	 the	 side	 of	 Greek-Cypriots.	 This	 became	 the	 basis	 of	 ‘long	
struggle’	for	Makarios,	who	was	replaced	by	Kyprianou	after	his	death	in	1977	(Varnava	2013).	
The	 bargaining	 chip	 of	 recognition	 vs.	 unrecognition	 was	 put	 into	 ‘good’	 use	 with	 the	
internationalisation	 campaign	 of	 the	 Cyprus	 Problem	 to	 strengthen	 the	 international	
pressures	and	the	embargoes	on	the	Turkish	Federated	State	of	Cyprus,	which	in	turn	had	an	
adverse	 effect	 on	 the	 inter-communal	 relationships.	 Greek-Cypriots	 promoted	 their	 case	 at	
myriad	international	platforms	and	events,	such	as	the	non-aligned	conferences	in	1976	and	
in	1979	and	followed	a	successful	campaign	with	the	Universal	Postal	Union	to	invalidate	the	
Turkish-Cypriot	postal	stamps	(see	District	General	1976:26,	para.85,	General	1979:63,	para.	
197,	Kyle	1997).	United	Nations	General	Assembly	Resolution	34/30	of	1979	also	confirms	the	
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success	 of	 this	 campaign	 and	 notes	 one	 of	 the	 earliest	 concerns	 pertaining	 to	 the	 Turkish	
settlers/migrants	that	‘deplores’	“all	unilateral	actions	that	change	the	demographic	structure	
of	Cyprus”	(UNGA	1979).	These	developments	had	a	crippling	effect	on	the	Turkish-Cypriots’	
economic	 and	 social	 life.	 Consequently,	 they	 were	 excluded	 from	 all	 sporting	 events	 and	
international	organisations,	their	tourism	industry	suffocated,	and	they	did	not	receive	much	
international	financial	aid	that	was	being	offered	to	the	RoC	(Kyle	1997).	
	
UN	resolutions	and	internationalisation	campaigns	were	creating	resentment	among	Turkish-
Cypriots.	When	another	attempt	by	the	UN	Secretary-General’s	Special	Representative	Hugo	
Gobbi	 to	 find	 a	 settlement	 through	 inter-communal	 talks	 failed	 (1980-1983),	 the	 Turkish	
Republic	of	Northern	Cyprus	(TRNC),	which	remains	the	unrecognised	administration	in	north	
Cyprus,	was	declared	by	a	unanimous	vote	in	the	Turkish-Cypriot	parliament	on	15	November	
1983	 (Dodd	 2010).	 Three	 days	 later,	 the	 UN	 Security	 Council	 Resolution	 541	 deplored	 the	
declaration	as	invalid	and	called	for	its	withdrawal56	(UNSC	1983).		
	
Peace	negotiations	continued	between	different	Greek-Cypriot	presidents,	and	Denktaş,	who	
kept	getting	re-elected	in	landslide	victories.	Despite	the	positive	atmosphere	surrounding	the	
negotiations	due	to	the	improved	Turkish-Greek	relations	following	their	respective	juntas57,	
numerous	draft	agreements	proposed	by	the	UN	were	rejected	by	the	community	leaders.	For	
Greek-Cypriots	 the	 lack	 of	 mention	 of	 ‘settlers’	 and	 Turkish	 troops	 in	 the	 drafts	 was	
intolerable,	and	for	Turkish-Cypriots,	the	reference	to	‘substantial’	numbers	of	Greek-Cypriot	
IDPs	allowed	to	return	and	the	provisions	to	remove	Turkey’s	unilateral	guarantee	was	utmost	
worrying	(Kyle	1997).		
	
6.1.2	Securitisation	of	Turkish	immigrants	
Towards	 the	 end	 of	 1980s	 and	 early	 1990s,	 the	 issues	 pertaining	 to	 demography	 and	 the	
Turkish	settlers/immigrants	were	being	debated	with	more	emphasis	among	Greek-Cypriots,																																																									
56	Denktaş,	the	president	of	the	new	Republic,	in	his	response	to	the	UN	Security	Council	said,	‘It	was	decided	that	my	people,	
because	they	are	 fighting	 for	 their	 liberty,	and	do	not	accept	colonisation	by	 the	Greek	Cypriots,	 should	be	 isolated	 in	 this	
world	like	lepers…	Now	on	their	behalf	you	are	asking	them	[the	Greek	Cypriots]	to	squeeze	us	out	economically.	We	have	
lived	on	bread,	on	onions,	on	beans	for	twenty	years.	We	shall	continue	to	do	so,	if	necessary,	but	we	shall	not	accept	those	
who	occupy	by	force	the	seat	of	Government	as	the	Government	of	Cyprus’	(quoted	in	Moran	1997:241).		
57	Greek	military	coup	1967-1974,	Turkish	military	coup	1980-1983.		
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the	 Turkish-Cypriot	 left	 and	 international	 circles	 such	 as	 the	 Council	 of	 Europe	 (CoE),	 who	
asked	the	Committee	on	Migration,	Refugees	and	Demography	to	prepare	a	report	on	Cyprus	
(see	Cuco	1992).	 The	 report	highlighted	 the	 inexplicable	population	growth	 in	north	Cyprus	
and	 inaccuracy	 of	 the	 data	 provided	 by	 the	 Turkish-Cypriot	 authorities.	 The	 issue	 was	
becoming	increasingly	securitised	as	an	obstacle	to	a	comprehensive	settlement	on	the	island	
across	different	circles.	Later	 in	2003,	another	CoE	report	stated:	“The	settlers	come	mainly	
from	the	region	of	Anatolia,	one	of	the	least	developed	regions	of	Turkey.	Their	customs	and	
traditions	 differ	 significantly	 from	 those	 present	 in	 Cyprus.	 These	 differences	 are	 the	main	
cause	of	 the	 tensions	 and	dissatisfaction	of	 the	 indigenous	Turkish-Cypriot	population,	who	
tend	to	view	the	settlers	as	a	foreign	element.	…	The	Assembly	is	convinced	that	the	presence	
of	 the	settlers	constitutes	a	process	of	hidden	colonisation	and	an	additional	and	 important	
obstacle	to	a	peaceful	negotiated	solution	of	the	Cyprus	Problem”	(Laakso	2003:139).		
	
Hatay	confirms	that	the	Turkishness	that	came	with	a	Sunni	Muslim	identity	was	not	familiar	
to	 Turkish-Cypriots;	 and	 as	 the	 feeling	 of	 injustice	 about	 Greek-Cypriot	 land	 and	 property	
given	out	to	new	comers	spread,	so	did	the	orientalisation	of	the	Turkish	 immigrants	(Hatay	
2008).	The	growing	number	of	Turkish	 immigrants	 in	north	Cyprus	 in	conjunction	with	mass	
Turkish-Cypriot	 emigration,	 especially	 to	 the	 UK,	 conditioned	 the	 emergence	 of	 discontent	
that	 contested	 the	 Turkishness	 of	 Turkish-Cypriots,	 bringing	 forth	 anxieties	 related	 to	 their	
biographical	 continuity	 as	 a	 distinct	 identity.	 Volkan	 explains	 that	 historical	 developments	
after	 the	 summer	 of	 1974	 continued	 to	 traumatise	 Turkish-Cypriots	 in	 a	 slow	 and	 often	
unrecognised	fashion	(Volkan	2008).	Although,	they	changed	the	names	of	villages58	in	north	
Cyprus	 to	 Turkify	 their	 geographic	 actuality	 in	 line	 with	 their	 national	 identity	 narratives,	
Turkish-Cypriots	 failed	 to	 provide	 a	 geographical	 actuality	 for	 their	 national	 identity	
narratives.	 Their	 Turkishness	 and	 perceived	 primordial	 bonds	 with	 Turkey	 was	 no	 longer	
providing	 them	with	 the	 concepts	 of	 caring,	 protection,	 safety	 that	 came	with	 the	 idea	 of	
motherhood/fatherhood,	neither	did	 it	 grant	 them	the	nation	and	 large-group	 identity	 they	
were	 looking	 for	 (See	Volkan	1980).	The	new	realities	 that	kept	 them	unrecognised	 in	 their	
new	 invisible	 enclave,	 and	 the	 injustices	 pertaining	 to	 the	 distribution	 of	 Greek-Cypriot	
‘ganimets’	 (spoils)	 left	 in	 the	 north	 disturbed	 the	 tight	 community	 feeling	 created	 by	 the																																																									
58	See	Giray,	H.	(1922).	KKTC	Coğrafi	İsimler	Kataloğu,	Cilt	3.	Nicosia,	KKTC	İskân	Bakanlığı.	
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enclave	mentality	 of	 1960s.	 Feelings	 of	 injustice,	 rejection,	 and	 isolation	 undermined	 their	
initial	‘we-ness’	and	Turkishness	as	well	as	the	nationalistic	projects	of	the	right-wing	political	
elite.	This	prompted	Turkish-Cypriots	to	seek	an	alternative	collective	identity	that	came	with	
a	 geographical	 actuality	 (i.e.	 the	 EU	 and	 their	 Cypriotness).	 Following	 the	 “exaggerated	
nationalistic	feelings	and	excitement	over	“being	free”	during	the	years	following	1974,	large-
group	identity	splits	began	to	appear	clearly”	among	the	TCc	(Volkan	2008:8).	Turkish-Cypriots	
that	 reproduced	 their	 Turkishness	 among	 the	 Greek-Cypriot	 majority	 started	 realising	 and	
reproducing	their	distinctiveness	from	Turkish	mainlanders.		
	
Although	the	 identity	narratives	first	grew	in	opposition	to	each	other	based	on	motherland	
nationalism,	by	the	end	of	the	1980s,	primordial	attachment	to	Turkey	and	Turkishness	began	
to	lose	its	homogeneous	allure.	As	Niyazi	Kızılyürek	and	Sylvaine	Gautier-Kızılyürek	assert,	we	
can	observe	a	gradual	process	of	differentiation	and	divergence	 in	 the	post-1974	era	where	
Turkish-Cypriots	were	in	search	of	their	own	connection	to	Cypriotism	(Kızılyürek	and	Gautier-
Kızılyürek	2004).	Artists,	 intellectuals,	and	the	left	 in	general,	began	to	challenge	the	Turkish	
nationalist	 discourse	 and	 Turkey	 as	 the	 motherland,	 the	 saviour	 and	 the	 liberator	 (Ramm	
2006).	Especially	with	 the	Europeanisation	of	 the	conflict	 in	 late	1990s	and	early	2000s,	 the	
colonial	heritage	became	a	shared	collective	experience	 that	helped	shape	Turkish-Cypriots’	
Cypriotness	 as	 a	 distinct	 narrative	 from	 the	 motherland.	 In	 other	 words,	 Turkish-Cypriots’	
colonial	past	distinguished	them	from	their	stigmatised	Turkishness;	being	an	ex-colony,	part	
of	 the	 Commonwealth	 and	 their	 intermingling	with	 the	Greek-Cypriots	 provided	 them	with	
the	 desired	 attributes	 in	 relation	 to	 being	more	Western	 and	more	 European	 compared	 to	
people	 from	 Turkey.	 This	 is	 demonstrated	 in	 the	 ‘othering’	 of	 Turkish	 immigrants	 in	 north	
Cyprus	 today,	 who	 are	 generally	 perceived	 as	 backward,	 oriental	 and	 religious,	 and	 not	 as	
secular	 and	 modernised	 as	 Turkish-Cypriots	 (see	 Kurtulus	 and	 Purkis	 2012).	 The	 growing	
support	for	the	left-wing	political	parties,	the	EU	project	and	civil	initiatives	such	as	the	‘This	
Country	 is	 Ours	 Platform’	 (Bu	 Memleket	 Bizim	 Platformu)	 polarised	 Turkish-Cypriots,	 who	
demanded	recognition	of	their	distinct	identity,	and	Turkish	immigrants,	who	sought	a	better	
life	 in	 Cyprus;	 it	 also	 strengthened	 their	 desires	 to	 find	 a	 comprehensive	 solution.	 The	
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increasingly	 authoritarian	 and	 decreasingly	 secular	 direction	 of	 the	 Turkish	 government	
especially	since	201159	further	exacerbated	this	polarisation.		
	
The	tendency	to	securitise	people	from	Turkey	as	a	threat	is	not	limited	to	the	Turkish-Cypriot	
left-wing.	 In	 addition	 to	Mete	Hatay’s	work	on	 the	prevalent	 orientalisation	of	 Turkishness,	
research	 shows	 that	 Greek-Cypriots	 too	 differentiate	 between	 Turkish-Cypriots	 and	 people	
from	 Turkey.	 They	 are	 more	 willing	 to	 cohabit	 with	 Turkish-Cypriots	 than	 with	 Turkish	
settlers/immigrants,	have	more	negative	attitudes	toward	them,	perceive	more	social-identity	
differences	 between	 themselves	 and	 people	 from	 Turkey,	 and	 perceive	more	 victimisation	
from	 the	 them	 than	 from	Turkish-Cypriots	 (Danielidou	 and	Horvath	2006).	 The	quantitative	
telephone	 surveys	 also	 shows	 that	Greek-Cypriots,	 68%	of	whom	 think	people	 from	Turkey	
are	a	big	obstacle	 to	 reaching	a	comprehensive	settlement	 in	Cyprus,	differentiate	between	
Turkish-Cypriots	and	Turks:	While	62%	of	Greek-Cypriots	express	anxiety	about	living	next	to	a	
Turk,	only	37%	express	anxiety	about	living	next	to	a	Turkish-Cypriot	(QTS:	2014).		
	
6.1.3	Speckled	feelings	of	Cypriotism	and	ontological	dissonance	
Cypriotism,	or	what	Doob	 calls	 ‘Cypriot	patriotism’,	 grew	despite	 the	 separation,	 resting	on	
both	 communities’	 innate	 need	 to	 differentiate	 themselves	 as	 Cypriots	 (Doob	 1986).	 For	
Greek-Cypriots,	 their	 sense	 of	 Cypriotism	 was	 fueled	 by	 their	 sense	 of	 betrayal	 by	 the	
motherland	due	to	the	military	junta	that	led	to	the	Turkish	invasion	and	later	on	due	to	their	
remarkable	economic	growth	that	set	them	way	ahead	of	Greece.	However,	this	new	Cypriot	
patriotism	did	not	necessarily	include	Turkish-Cypriots.	Caesar	Mavratsas	notes	that	following	
the	democratisation	of	Greece	and	the	declaration	of	the	‘TRNC’,	Cypriotism	was	configured	
as	 Greek-Cypriot	 nationalism	 that	 distinguished	 from	mainland	 Greeks	 but	 maintained	 the	
Hellenic	 roots	 in	 Cypriotism	 (Mavratsas	 1999).	 Thus,	 it	 reproduced	 Greek	 identity	 in	 the	
context	of	an	independent	polity,	without	severing	the	organic	ties	to	the	Hellenic	culture	and	
the	 Greek	 state.	 According	 to	 Mavratsas,	 in	 the	 now	 dominant	 Greek-Cypriot	 nationalist	
discourse,	 Cyprus,	 even	 if	 independent,	 is	 essentially	 perceived	 as	 a	 Greek-Cypriot	 entity	
(Mavratsas	1999).																																																									
59	Justice	and	Development	Party	(AKP)	first	came	to	power	with	a	majority	in	the	2002	elections,	the	party	increased	its	
representation	in	the	parliament	in	subsequent	elections	in	2007,	2011	and	2015	from	34.3%	to	46.6%,	49.8%	and	49.5%	
respectively.		
	 174	
On	 the	other	hand,	Cypriotism	 for	 Turkish-Cypriots	was	 fueled	by	 the	orientalisation	of	 the	
Turkish	 immigrants	 as	 backward,	 religious	 and	 inferior	 and	 by	 their	 failed	 nation-building	
process,	 and	 later,	 it	 was	 further	 reinforced	 by	 the	 Europeanisation	 of	 the	 conflict.	 For	
Turkish-Cypriots	 across	 the	 political	 spectrum,	 who	 are	 mostly	 secular	 and	 agnostic,	 being	
European	and	Western	is	idealised.	Yavruvatan	(Babyland)	/	Anavatan	(Motherland)	rhetoric,	
that	provided	confidence	by	reminding	Turkish-Cypriots	that	they	were	part	of	a	large-group,	
became	increasingly	controversial	and	provocative	for	the	those	who	highlight	their	loyalty	to	
Cyprus	and	reject	the	nickname	and	the	parental	relationship	 it	 implies.	Even	the	right-wing	
Turkish-Cypriots,	 who	 emphasise	 their	 loyalty	 to	 Turkey	 and	 to	 Kemalist	 ideals,	 and	 see	
themselves	 as	 the	natural	 extension	of	 the	 Turkish	nation,	 tend	 to	distinguish	between	 the	
more	‘European’	Turks	from	Western	Turkey	(i.e.	Istanbul	and	Izmir)	and	‘oriental’	Turks	from	
Eastern	Turkey	(see	Hatay	2008).		
	
Even	 though	 those	 who	 challenge	 the	 babyland/motherland	 rhetoric	 are	 often	 labeled	 as	
Greek-lovers,	 traitors	 or	 as	 being	 ungrateful	 and	 misinformed	 by	 people	 from	 Turkey	 and	
right-wing	Turkish-Cypriots,	 the	growing	disassociation	 from	Turkishness	can	be	observed	 in	
the	 strained	 communication	between	 the	Turkish	president	Recep	Tayyip	 Erdoğan	and	pro-
solution	Turkish-Cypriot	president	Mustafa	Akıncı	following	his	election	in	April	2015.	Akıncı,	
calling	 for	 the	 abandonment	 of	 the	 ‘yavruvatan’	 rhetoric	 to	 escape	 from	 mother-baby	
relationship,	 stated	 that	Turkish-Cypriot’s	wanted	a	 relationship	of	brotherhood	 rather	 than	
motherhood	and	that	the	‘baby	has	to	grow	sometime’,	which	angered	both	Erdoğan	and	the	
right-wing	 Turkish-Cypriot	 political	 leaders	 such	 as	 Serdar	 Denktaş	 (Bilge	 2015,	 Bilge	 2015).	
While	 Serdar	 Denktaş	 reiterated	 the	motherland	 rhetoric	 saying	 Turkey	 will	 always	 be	 the	
Turkish-Cypriots’	mother,	numerous	politicians	and	news	platforms	 in	Turkey	called	Turkish-
Cypriots	‘ungrateful’	and	‘spoiled’.	In	response,	an	angry	Erdoğan,	emphasising	that	there	are	
Turkish	martyrs	on	the	babyland	soil,	scorned	Akıncı,	telling	him	to	‘watch	his	words’	and	to	
‘think	before	he	opens	his	mouth’	and	realise	why	Turkey	has	ownership	over	the	babyland	
(BBC	2015,	Bilge	2015).	
	
There	 is	a	widespread	belief	 that	Turkish-Cypriots	are	outnumbered	 in	 the	north	 (see	Hatay	
2005,	 Hatay	 2007,	 Loizides	 2011,	 Kurtulus	 and	 Purkis	 2012).	 The	 discourse	 about	 the	
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‘numbers’	 of	 Turkish	 immigrants	 re-ignites	 the	 Turkish-Cypriots	 fears	 about	 being	 a	
disempowered	minority.	In	addition	to	a	Greek-Cypriot	majority	that	have	been	presented	as	
their	historical	enemy	other,	Turkey	and	Turkish	immigrants	are	now	increasingly	perceived	as	
a	 growing	 threat	 to	 Turkish-Cypriot	 identity	 as	 well.	 The	 quantitative	 survey	 clearly	
demonstrates	 this	 existential	 anxiety	 about	 the	 biographical	 continuity	 of	 Turkish-Cypriots:	
55%	of	Turkish-Cypriots	fear	that	they	are	becoming	‘extinct’	due	to	the	growing	numbers	of	
the	people	from	Turkey	in	north	Cyprus.		
	
This	 identity	dilemma	triggered	by	the	securitisation	of	Turkish	immigrants	and	by	extension	
Turkishness,	 is	 a	 source	 of	 ontological	 dissonance	 both	 for	 Turkish-Cypriots	 and	 Greek-
Cypriots.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 underplaying	 their	 Turkishness	 and	 emphasising	 their	 more	
‘modern’	and	more	‘European’	Cypriot	identity	challenges	the	legitimacy	of	Turkish-Cypriots’	
claims	for	political	equality	under	a	comprehensive	settlement,	and	disassociating	themselves	
from	Turkey	and	by	extension	Turkish	military,	 challenges	 their	physical	 security	among	 the	
more	 prosperous	 Greek-Cypriot	 majority.	 Conversely,	 highlighting	 their	 Turkishness	 would	
contradict	 their	 Europeanness	 and	 desires	 for	 EU-membership,	 as	 it	 is	 this	 part	 of	 their	
identity	 that	 is	 securitised	 as	 non-European	 and	 as	 oriental.	 Moreover,	 as	 Turkey	 moves	
further	away	from	the	EU,	those	who	emphasise	their	Turkishness	along	with	or	above	their	
Cypriotness	are	finding	it	increasingly	harder	to	reconcile	the	European,	Kemalist	and	secular	
elements	in	their	identity	narratives	with	their	Turkishness.		
	
Similarly,	 for	Greek-Cypriots,	Turkish-Cypriots	are	a	 contradiction	 in	 terms	because	 they	are	
half-self	and	half-enemy;	their	Turkishness	makes	them	the	primordial	enemy	of	the	Greeks,	
and	 their	 Cypriotness	makes	 them	part-self	 (see	 Spyrou	 2001).	 Thus,	 as	 peace	 negotiations	
essentially	rely	on	the	reunification	of	Cyprus	based	on	a	bicommunal,	bizonal	federation	with	
political	 equality,	 single	 sovereignty	 and	 a	 single	 citizenship60,	 they	 automatically	 challenge	
the	self-narratives	and	consequently	the	ontological	security	of	Greek-Cypriots.	As	such,	while	
accepting	a	comprehensive	solution	means	accepting	that	Cypriotness	is	not	inherently	tied	to	
Greekness	 but	 can	 also	 include	 Turkishness,	 not	 supporting	 a	 comprehensive	 solution																																																									
60	See	“Statement	by	the	President	of	the	Security	Council.”	(2008).	United	Nations	Security	Council.	Doc.	
S/PRST/2008/9.		
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challenges	Greek-Cypriots’	historical	amnesia	and	requires	them	to	accept	the	division	of	the	
island	as	permanent.		
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6.2.	Europeanisation	of	the	Conflict	and	Growing	Cypriotism	(1990	–	2004)	
6.2.1	The	road	to	EU	membership	(1990-1999)	
	
The	events	of	1974	dramatically	changed	the	nature	of	the	Cyprus	Problem;	physical	partition	
and	 demographic	 separation	 of	 the	 communities	 created	 additional	 psychological,	 social,	
political	and	 international	 layers	and	facilitated	the	domination	of	the	nationalist	narratives.	
Despite	the	growing	opposition	in	the	TCc,	Denktaş	and	the	nationalist	ruling	elite	remained	in	
power	 and	 no	 major	 progress	 was	 made.	 However,	 the	 cards	 were	 reshuffled	 once	 again	
when	the	RoC	applied	for	EU	(European	Community	at	the	time)	membership	on	behalf	of	the	
whole	island	in	1990.	Constrained	by	the	physical	divide	until	the	opening	of	the	check-points	
in	2003,	inter-communal	interaction	was	mainly	limited	to	UN-mediated	talks	that	became	the	
common	denominator	of	all	future	negotiations	in	the	post-1974	era.	With	the	application	of	
the	 RoC,	 the	 EU	 and	 Europeanisation	was	 now	 added	 both	 as	 an	 actor	 and	 a	 layer	 to	 the	
‘realities’	of	the	Cyprus	Problem	(see	Anastasiou	2008,	Ulusoy	2012).	
	
The	EU	application	was	not	welcomed	as	good	news	in	the	TCc.	Turkish-Cypriot	objections	on	
the	grounds	 that	 the	Greek-Cypriot	 government	was	not	 representing	 the	whole	of	Cyprus,	
and	 that	 the	Article	 1	of	 the	1960	Treaty	of	Guarantee	did	not	 allow	RoC	 to	participate,	 in	
whole	or	 in	part,	 in	any	political	or	economic	union	with	any	state	whatsoever,	 fell	on	deaf	
ears	 in	the	international	community	(Michael	2011).	This	was	an	unwelcomed	development,	
not	 the	 least	 because	 it	 could	 force	 Turkey	 to	 accept	 more	 concessions	 pertaining	 to	 the	
Cyprus	 Problem	 to	 make	 its	 own	 way	 into	 the	 EU61,	 but	 it	 also	 reinforced	 the	 feelings	 of	
rejection	 and	 dismay	 among	 Turkish-Cypriots.	 They	 were	 not	 against	 EU	 membership,	 but	
they	 remained	 invisible	 as	 their	 ‘enemy	 other’	 represented	 them	 and	 as	 the	 ‘motherland’	
pursued	EU	accession.	
	
The	new	UN	Secretary	General	 Boutros	Boutros	Ghali,	 adopting	 a	more	 vigorous	 approach,	
reignited	the	efforts	to	bring	the	two	communities	together	with	what	became	known	as	‘The	
Set	of	Ideas’	(UNSC	1992).	Despite	both	Vassiliou	and	Denktaş	agreed	with	the	majority	of	the	
Ghali	 proposals	 at	 the	 new	 phase	 of	 inter-communal	 talks	 that	 started	 in	 1992,	 it	 was	 not																																																									
61	EC	Summit	in	Dublin	in	June	1990	linked	Turkey’s	accession	to	the	Cyprus	Problem	(Christou	2004).		.	
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surprising	 when	 the	 issue	 of	 rotating	 presidency,	 territory,	 property,	 return	 of	 IDPs	 and	
repatriation	of	Turkish	 immigrants	gridlocked	 the	negotiations.	Even	 though	Ghali’s	was	yet	
another	failed	attempt	to	find	a	solution	to	the	protracted	problem,	 it	 laid	the	ground	work	
for	 the	principles	of	bizonality	and	single	sovereignty,	which	was	added	 to	 the	 foundational	
parameters	of	all	future	negotiations	along	with	bicommunality	and	federation.	For	the	Greek	
Cypriot	 right-wing,	Vassiliou	who	had	agreed	 to	bizonality	 “had	 committed	 the	 cardinal	 sin.	
…compromising	 the	most	 sacred	 of	 values,	 namely,	 the	 nation	 and	 Hellenism”	 (Anastasiou	
2008:100).	 While	 the	 bizonality	 element	 challenged	 Greek-Cypriot	 identity	 narratives	 that	
relied	on	‘holistic’	sovereignty	and	integrity	of	the	island	as	a	whole	and	further	undermined	
the	 possibility	 of	 a	 unitary	 state,	 it	 reinforced	 Turkish-Cypriot	 identity	 narratives	 by	
emphasising	their	distinctness	and	legitimacy	as	equal	political	partners	rather	than	a	cultural	
and/or	religious	minority	that	need	to	be	accommodated.		
	
Europeanisation	of	the	problem	was	thought	to	act	as	a	catalyst	to	finding	a	comprehensive	
settlement	 on	 the	 island	 (see	 Christou	 2004).	 However,	 when	 the	 EU	 suggested	 that	 a	
settlement	was	 not	 an	 essential	 condition	 for	 the	 admission	 of	 Cyprus,	 the	 EU	 became	 an	
alternative	platform	to	seek	a	more	favourable	settlement	for	Greek-Cypriots	(Christou	2004).	
The	Greek-Cypriot	case	pertaining	to	the	‘three	freedoms’	(freedom	of	movement,	settlement	
and	property)	that	would	have	to	be	curtailed	with	bizonality	and	limitations	on	the	return	of	
IDPs	would	be	strengthened	by	EU	membership.	Hence,	the	unconditionality	of	EU	accession	
was	affecting	Greek-Cypriot	attitudes	toward	the	peace	process	(Hannay	2004,	Ulusoy	2012).	
Even	though	unconditional	acceptance	of	the	RoC	as	a	member	state	did	not	act	as	a	catalyst	
and	 Cyprus	 acceded	 as	 a	 divided	 country,	 the	 Europeanisation	 of	 the	 conflict	 did	 act	 as	 a	
catalyst	in	the	redefinition	of	identity	narratives	especially	in	the	TCc.		
	
Looking	at	the	EU’s	role	 in	conflict	resolution	and	capacity	 in	promoting	peace,	Tocci	argues	
from	a	social	constructivist	point	of	view	that	 through	participation	 in	common	 institutional	
structures,	 actors	 can	 reconfigure	 their	 identities,	 and	 hence	 their	 perceived	 interests	 and	
collective	 goals,	 either	 top	 down	 through	 change	 agents62	or	 bottom-up	with	 civil	 society’s	
support	(Tocci	2007).	Considering	the	absence	of	bilateral	relations	between	Brussels	and	the																																																									
62	Such	as	the	European	framework	persuading	domestic	elites	or	through	institutional	interaction.	
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Turkish-Cypriots,	and	the	dominance	of	the	nationalist	ruling	elite	led	by	Denktaş	until	2005,	
Europeanisation	of	the	Cyprus	Problem	triggered	a	bottom-up	change	in	the	TCc,	where	civil	
society	 and	 the	 left-wing	 elite	 re-assessed	 their	 interests,	 adopted	 new	 European	 norms,	
reproduced	 their	 Cypriotism	 and	 reconfigured	 their	 stance	 towards	 a	 solution	 (see	 Kyris	
2013).	 Their	new	 interests,	 goals	and	norms	 that	became	more	European	 required	 them	 to	
become	more	Cypriot	and	less	Turkish,	which	also	reinforced	the	bottom-up	securitisation	of	
Turkish	immigrants	as	an	obstacle	to	their	desired	future.		
	
Europeanisation	 of	 the	 conflict	 became	 more	 visible	 as	 it	 seeped	 into	 different	 European	
institutions.	 For	example,	 in	addition	 to	numerous	property	 cases	at	 the	European	Court	of	
Human	 Rights	 (ECHR)	with	 regards	 to	 use	 and	 sale	 of	 formerly	 Greek-Cypriot	 properties	 in	
north	Cyprus,	the	cases	at	the	European	Court	of	Justice	(ECJ),	simultaneously	undermined	the	
nationalist	narrative	by	highlighting	the	pariah	status	of	the	administration	in	the	north	and	by	
fuelling	 feelings	 of	 rejection	 in	 the	 TCc.	 The	 cases	 were	 brought	 against	 Turkey	 (not	 the	
‘TRNC’),	 and	 north	 Cyprus	 was	 now	 defined	 as	 the	 ‘subordinate	 administration	 of	 Turkey’	
(ECHR	1995).	In	1994,	the	ECJ	decision	that	required	Turkish-Cypriot	exports	to	EU	states	to	be	
certified	 by	 the	 Greek-Cypriot	 authorities	 was	 a	 major	 blow	 to	 both	 the	 Turkish-Cypriot	
economy	 and	 psychology	 (Börzel	 2003,	 Tocci	 2007).	 It	 did	 not	 only	 significantly	 reduce	
lucrative	citrus	and	potato	exports	to	the	EU,	but	also	demonstrated	a	lack	of	understanding	
of	‘realities’	on	the	EU’s	part.	The	ECJ,	stating	that	the	Turkish-Cypriot	exporters	could	apply	
to	 the	 RoC	 for	 the	 necessary	 certification	 did	 not	 consider	 that,	 among	 other	 difficulties,	
crossing	 across	 the	 Green	 Line	 to	 acquire	 such	 certification	 was	 not	 possible	 at	 the	 time	
(Ulusoy	2012).	The	economy	became	even	more	dependent	on	Turkey	and	Turkish-Cypriots	
more	dependent	on	Turkish	aid.		
	
Although	 Turkey	was	 suffering	 from	 shaky	 coalitions	 and	 domestic	 instability	 in	 the	 1990s,	
according	 to	 Dodd,	 halving	 the	 financial	 aid	 to	 ‘TRNC’	 in	 1995	 was	 aimed	 at	 making	 the	
Turkish-Cypriot	 ruling	 elite	 and	 particularly	 Denktaş	 more	 willing	 to	 agree	 to	 a	 settlement	
(Dodd	2010).	For	the	ruling	elite,	the	Turkish-Cypriot	cause	was	going	to	be	sacrificed	for	the	
RoC’s	path	to	EU	membership	and	Turkey’s	path	to	customs	union.	After	all,	Kemalism,	built	
on	the	idea	of	modernity,	believed	that	Turkey	was	essentially	European	and	that	the	Cyprus	
	 180	
Problem	 was	 causing	 an	 inconvenience	 towards	 that	 goal.	 By	 March	 1995,	 as	 Turkey’s	
customs	union	agreement	was	approved	and	 the	RoC	started	the	accession	 talks	 (EC	1995),	
Denktaş,	although	noting	gradual	decline,	won	his	presidential	seat	for	the	fifth	time	with	63%	
of	 the	 vote	 (TAK	 2015).	 Turkish-Cypriot	 opposition	 grew	 with	 their	 crippling	 economy	 and	
corruption,	 high	 dependency	 on	 Turkey,	 and	 the	 perception	 that	 Denktaş	 in	 particular	 and	
right-wing	 nationalists	 in	 general	 were	 propped	 up	 by	 Turkish	 immigrants	 and	 the	 Turkish	
military.	 The	 prevalent	 perception	 that	 the	 right-wing	 political	 leaders	 were	 kept	 in	 power	
with	the	support	from	Turkish	immigrants	was	disproved	by	Mete	Hatay.	Hatay,	who	studied	
voting	patterns	of	Turkish	immigrants,	concluded	that	they	tend	to	vote	in	line	with	the	rest	of	
the	electorate	(Hatay	2005).	In	line	with	Hatay’s	analysis,	Loizides	emphases	that	the	Turkish	
settler/immigrant	population	in	Cyprus,	unlike	many	other	settlers	in	contested	lands,	are	not	
mobilised	and	politicised	[by	their	motherland],	despite	perceived	discrimination	and	fear	of	
relocation	following	a	negotiated	peace	agreement	because	they	meet	the	profile	of	migrant	
populations,	 who	 are	 concerned	 with	 daily	 survival	 issues	 rather	 than	 territorial	 and	
ideological	politics	(Loizides	2015).	
	
It	was	in	late	1990s	that	the	bi-communal	workshops	and	meetings	were	being	used	as	a	tool	
to	challenge	the	perception	of	‘us’	vs	‘them’	and	the	idea	of	‘win-lose’	(Broome	1998,	Broome	
2005).	 I	 participated	 in	 my	 first	 bi-communal	 workshop	 in	 1996	 in	 the	 mixed	 village	 of	
Pyla/Pergamos 63 ,	 where	 I	 met	 Greek-Cypriots	 for	 the	 first	 time.	 The	 enthusiasm	 and	
excitement	of	participating	in	these	workshops	were	both	curbed	and	heightened	by	the	fact	
that	 they	 were	 not	 approved	 by	 the	 political	 elite.	 For	 the	 right-wing	 nationalists	 led	 by	
Denktaş	 and	 Eroğlu,	 the	 organisers	were	 traitors,	 and	 they	were	 using	 ‘kids’	 to	 serve	 their	
ambitions.	 At	 times,	 civil	 police	 watched	 our	 workshops	 from	 afar,	 or	 took	 our	 names.	 At	
other	 times,	 they	were	 cancelled	 all	 together	 at	 the	 last	minute	 or	we	were	 stopped	 from	
going.	 These	brief	 encounters	were	our	only	opportunity	 to	engage	with	 the	 ‘enemy	other’	
and	challenge	the	official	historical	narratives	taught	to	us	in	schools.	
																																																								
63	Pyla	was	the	only	mixed	village	that	provided	a	‘buffer’	for	bicommunal	interaction.	Only	the	residents	of	the	village	
could	travel	across	the	island	but	non-resident	Turkish-Cypriots	and	Greek-Cypriots	could	come	together	at	the	village	
that	 provided	 a	 space	 of	 exceptionality	 within	 the	 political,	 territorial	 and	 social	 division	 upheld	 by	 a	 cease-fire	 and	
doctrine	of	necessity.	
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The	year	1996	was	marked	with	great	hostility.	Greece	and	Turkey	were	fighting	over	a	small	
rocky	 island	 in	 the	 Aegean	 called	 Kardak/Imia	 (Clogg	 2013).	 Tensions	 that	 spilled	 over	 to	
Cyprus	 peaked	 when	 a	 group	 of	 bikers	 tried	 to	 cross	 the	 Green	 Line	 as	 part	 of	 a	 protest	
against	 the	Turkish	 invasion.	One	biker	who	made	 it	 across	 the	barbed	wire	was	beaten	 to	
death	 by	 a	 Turkish-Cypriot	 mob	 and	 another	 was	 shot	 and	 killed	 by	 Turkish	 forces	 as	 he	
climbed	 a	 flagpole	 to	 take	 down	 the	 Turkish	 flag	 (Anastasiou	 2014).	 A	 few	 weeks	 later	 a	
Turkish	soldier	was	killed	and	another	seriously	injured	by	Greek-Cypriot	civilians	(CNN	1996).	
In	 this	 hostile	 atmosphere,	which	was	 further	 exacerbated	by	 the	 S-300	missile	 crisis64,	 the	
nationalist	discourse	across	the	 island	was	finding	ground	again.	The	UN	tried	once	more	to	
bring	the	two	sides	together	in	1997	in	Glion	but	the	negotiations	did	not	yield	any	results	or	
agreements	(see	Tocci	2003,	Christou	2004).			
	
In	1999,	the	UN	called	for	proximity	talks	once	again,	this	time	with	no	preconditions	and	all	
issues	on	the	table.	Denktaş	refused	to	participate	unless	there	was	political	equality	from	the	
start,	which	for	him	meant	recognition	(Dodd	2010).	Although	Denktaş	had	the	support	of	the	
Turkish	 public	 and	military,	 his	 unyielding	 position	 and	 stubbornness	 was	 not	 liked	 by	 the	
Turkish	government65	(Anastasiou	2009).	Following	the	disastrous	earthquake	on	its	western	
coast	that	killed	over	15,000	people,	the	Turkish	economy	was	in	a	dire	condition	and	needed	
financial	aid	from	the	USA,	and	global	financial	institutions.	For	that,	and	to	be	on	good	terms	
with	the	EU,	Turkey	needed	Denktaş	to	play	ball.		
	
Moreover,	 Turkey	 was	 now	 on	 very	 good	 terms	 with	 Greece.	 Greek-Turkish	 relations	 that	
revolved	 around	 a	 constant	 tug	 of	 war,	 frequent	 military	 confrontation	 and	 nationalistic	
narratives	based	on	enmity	were	revolutionised	following	the	earthquake	that	hit	Northwest	
Turkey	 and	 a	 month	 later	 Athens	 in	 1999.	 The	 confrontational	 relationship	 of	 enmity	 was	
quickly	reconfigured	with	the	 images	of	Greek	and	Turkish	rescuers	digging	out	women	and	
children	 from	 the	 debris	 (see	 Rumelili	 2005,	 Şahin	 2010).	 Greece’s	 immediate	 and	 sincere	
humanitarian	response	desecuritised	the	image	of	the	historical	enemy,	transforming	it	into	a																																																									
64	In	 early	 1997	 RoC	 ordered	 S-300	 ground-to-air	missiles	 from	 Russia	 as	 part	 of	 its	military	 build-up,	 which	 created	
tensions	with	Turkey.	This	triggered	provocative	Greek	and	Turkish	military	exercises	over	and	around	the	island.			
65	For	example,	Denktaş	always	kicked	up	a	fuss	about	being	called/invited	as	the	Turkish-Cypriot	leader	rather	than	the	
Turkish-Cypriot	 president.	 Neither	 did	 he	 like	 the	word	 ‘community’,	 preferring	 stronger	 terminology	 to	 refer	 to	 the	
Turkish-Cypriots.		
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good	neighbour	offering	a	helping	hand.	The	new	relationship	was	likened	to	that	of	a	sibling,	
where	no	matter	how	much	you	fight,	you	still	love	and	help	each	other	(Kinzer	1999,	Özsüer	
2012).	Correspondingly,	Turkish	rescuers	were	among	the	first	 foreign	teams	to	arrive	when	
the	 earthquake	 shifted	 further	 west	 to	 Athens	 a	 month	 later	 (Smith	 1999,	 Şahin	 2010).	
Desecuritisation	 of	 Greek-Turkish	 relations	 was	 reflected	 in	 the	 mainstream	 media,	 where	
joint	 films,	 adverts	 and	 productions	 with	 Greek	 and	 Turkish	 protagonists	 became	
commonplace66.	 Theodossopoulos	 explains	 “in	 local	 conversations	 during	 the	 period	 that	
followed	the	earthquakes,	the	Turks	were	discovered	as	fellow	humans,	who	shared	the	same	
concern	for	peace	and	comparable	aspirations…”	(Theodossopoulos	2007:10).	Unfortunately,	
however,	this	sudden	desecuritisation	did	not	reverberate	in	Cyprus.	
	
6.2.2	Peacebuilding	and	ontological	anxieties		
When	 Denktaş	 was	 eventually	 convinced	 to	 participate	 in	 the	 proximity	 talks	 with	 much	
pressure	 from	 Turkey,	 the	 European	 Council	 formally	 accepted	 Turkey	 as	 a	 candidate	 for	
membership	at	the	Helsinki	Summit	in	1999	(Christou	2010).	This	meant	that	Turkey	could	no	
longer	 claim	 that	 the	RoC’s	 application	was	 not	 admissible	 on	 legal	 grounds.	 As	 such,	 a	 EU	
candidate’s	relationship	with	 individual	member	states	or	other	candidates	may	significantly	
influence	a	country’s	EU	accession	prospects	and	timeline	(Archick	2014).	Yet	again,	it	was	not	
only	the	EU	that	considered	Turkish-Cypriots	not	anything	more	than	an	inconvenience	for	the	
accession	of	 the	RoC	by	not	making	a	 settlement	a	condition;	now	Turkey	 reiterated	 that	 it	
would	prioritise	 its	 EU	ambitions	over	Turkish-Cypriots	 and	 showed	 that	 it	was	prepared	 to	
make	future	concessions	on	the	road	to	EU	membership.		
	
The	 proximity	 talks	 that	 saw	 the	 seeds	 of	 what	 is	 known	 as	 the	 Annan	 Plan	 lasted	 until	
Denktaş	 withdrew	 from	 the	 process	 at	 the	 end	 of	 2000.	 Denktaş,	 who	 won	 yet	 another	
presidential	election	earlier	in	the	same	year,	was	insisting	on	the	‘acknowledgement’	of	the	
‘TRNC’	if	not	recognition	(see	Lacher	and	Kaymak	2005).	The	insistence	on	‘acknowledgement																																																									
66	Politiki	Kouzina	(A	touch	of	Spice),	a	story	about	a	Greek	boy	living	in	Turkey	during	the	period	of	political	turmoil,	who	
is	 interested	 in	becoming	a	cook	released	 in	2003	(see	http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0378897/?ref_=fn_al_tt_2).	Eti,	a	
big	 international	 snack	 and	 biscuit	 producer	 in	 Turkey	 created	 an	 advert	 that	 featured	 friendly	 Greek	 and	 Turkish	
soldiers	 guarding	 at	 the	 border	 in	 2006	 (see	 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U-ppLLhDIxo).	 Bulutlari	 Beklerken	
(Waiting	 for	 the	 Clouds),	 a	 Turkish	 production	 based	 on	 a	 novel	 by	Georgios	 Andreadis	that	 focuses	 on	 Greek	 and	
Turkish	ethnic	identity	in	the	1970s	was	released	in	2003	(see	http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0418309/?ref_=fn_al_tt_1)	
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even	for	a	day’	before	a	settlement	looks	like	childish	stubbornness	at	a	first	glance,	but	can	
be	 better	 understood	 from	 an	 ontological	 security	 perspective.	 For	 the	 right-wing	 Turkish-
Cypriots	 and	 the	 ruling	 elite,	 if	 the	 federation	 were	 to	 be	 established	 without	 the	
acknowledgement	of	their	administration,	their	historic	struggle	would	count	for	nothing	and	
their	fight	for	the	Turkish-Cypriot	‘cause’	would	become	a	moot	point.	A	settlement	that	did	
not	 acknowledge	 their	 heroic	 resistance	 and	 suffering	 would	 challenge	 their	 identity	
narratives	 and	 sense	 of	 community	 built	 over	 the	 decades,	 turning	 their	 resistance	 and	
suffering	into	a	failed	self-inflicted	rebellion.	Thus,	recognition	of	the	‘TRNC’	was	as	much	to	
do	 with	 the	 pride	 and	 power	 of	 the	 political	 elite	 as	 it	 was	 about	 recognising	 collective	
struggles	and	 suffering.	Consequently,	 agreeing	 to	a	 settlement	 that	added	 the	TCc	back	 to	
the	1960	Constitution	without	acknowledging	 the	 ‘TRNC’	was	as	a	big	 source	of	ontological	
insecurity	for	the	ruling	elite	and	for	Turkish-Cypriots	of	right-wing	persuasion.		
	
Unsurprisingly,	 insistence	 on	 acknowledgement	 was	 unacceptable	 for	 Greek-Cypriots.	 The	
declaration	of	 the	 ‘TRNC’	was	a	source	of	ontological	anxiety	 for	Greek-Cypriots;	 it	not	only	
challenged	the	perception	that	Cyprus	was	Hellenic,	but	also	the	temporary-ness	of	partition,	
which	in	turn	undermined	their	hopes	for	return	to	their	land	and	properties	left	in	the	north.	
Greek-Cypriots	managed	 these	 anxieties	 by	 denying,	 isolating,	 distancing	 and	 disassociating	
themselves	 from	 the	 ‘TRNC’.	 Acknowledging	 or	 recognising	 it	 even	 for	 a	 day	would	 trigger	
incapacitating	existential	anxieties	for	Greek-Cypriots	and	would	legitimise	the	events	of	1974,	
and	by	extension	the	expansionist	and	unlawful	actions	of	the	enemy.	The	issue	of	recognition	
is	such	a	sensitive	sore	wound	for	Greek-Cypriots	that	many	view	the	crossing	of	the	check-
points	and	showing	identification	documents	to	Turkish-Cypriot	authorities	as	‘recognition	by	
implementation’,	 which	 is	 an	 act	 that	 effectively	 legitimises	 the	 Turkish	 invasion.	 Syprou	
confirms	that	these	rationales	that	oversimplify	the	 international	principles	concerning	state	
and	 government	 recognition	 and	 impose	holistic	 and	negative	understandings	of	 the	other,	
demonise	 and	 undermine	 peacebuilding	 and	 reconciliation	 initiatives	 (Spyrou	 2001:177).	
However,	instead	of	only	engaging	with	the	audience	that	is	pro-peace	and	‘Cypriot	enough’,	
and	 creating	 gatekeepers,	 peacebuilding	 efforts	 need	 to	 engage	 with	 and	 learn	 from	 the	
ontological	 security	 literature	 in	order	 to	carefully	cater	 for	and	accommodate	 the	different	
security	needs	of	the	salient	parties	that	cannot	be	objectively	negotiated	on	the	table.	
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Many	 scholars,	 such	 as	 Kızılyürek,	 Volkan	 and	 Tocci,	 agree	 that	 Turkish-Cypriot	 identity	
narratives	 were	 developed	 and	 nurtured	 in	 opposition	 to	 the	 Greek-Cypriot	 identity	
narratives,	 thus	 buttressing	 that	 opposition	 and	 enmity	 simultaneously	 reinforces	 the	
perception	of	the	self.	Similarly,	considering	that	the	Greek-Cypriot	identity	narratives	depict	
Turkey	and	Turkishness	as	 their	historical	enemy	and	the	Ottomans	as	 the	oppressor	of	 the	
Hellenic	nation,	conflict	producing	events	and	clashes	reinforce	these	narratives,	reproducing	
the	 identity	of	 the	self.	Therefore,	 the	perception	of	security	produced	by	the	separation	of	
Greek-Cypriots	and	Turkish-Cypriots	(distancing	from	the	enemy),	henceforth	the	perception	
of	security	created	by	the	protracted	conflict,	becomes	a	source	of	ontological	security.		
	
MacGinty,	Muldoon,	and	Ferguson	emphasise	that	“there	is	often	a	dissonance	between	the	
peace	 agreed	 at	 the	 elite	 level	 and	 the	 interpretation	 and	 experience	 of	 that	 peace	 at	 the	
group	 and	 individual	 level”	 (MacGinty,	Muldoon	et	 al.	 2006	).	 In	 parallel,	 LeBaron,	 Broome,	
Hadjipavlou,	 Anastasiou	 and	 Kanol	 contend	 that	 conflicts	 are	 not	 just	 about	 territory,	
boundary,	 and	 sovereignty	 issues	 but	 they	 are	 also	 about	acknowledgment,	 representation,	
and	legitimisation	of	different	identities,	as	well	as	ways	of	living,	being,	and	making	meaning	
(LeBaron	2003,	Broome,	Hadjipavlou	et	al.	2012).	The	importance	of	a	political	agreement	(i.e.	
peacemaking)	for	peacebuilding	cannot	be	overstated;	however,	what	happens	‘the	day	after’	
(Kyriacou,	Oğuz	et	al.	2009)	an	agreement	is	equally	important.	The	reason	for	thinking	about	
‘the	day	after’	is	to	stress	the	need	to	provide	a	feeling	of	security	that	the	traumas	of	the	past	
will	 not	 reoccur	 and	 to	 facilitate	 the	 reconfiguration	 of	 identity	 narratives	 where	 historic	
enemy	others	are	removed	without	existentially	destabilising	the	self.	This	points	to	a	gaping	
hole	 in	the	mainstream	peacebuilding	approach,	as	 ignoring	ontological	(in)security	 limits	 its	
capacity	to	deal	with	the	affective,	emotional,	and	perceptual	realm	of	peacebuilding.	
	
Whether	or	not	a	political	agreement	will	produce	an	environment	of	 insecurity	and	fear	by	
asking	 people	 to	 live	 with	 those	 they	 believed	 were	 their	 existential	 enemies	 depends	 on	
whether	 reconciliation	 at	 the	 grassroots	 level	 has	 managed	 to	 desecuritise	 the	 self/other	
relationships	 by	 reconfiguring	 identity	 narratives.	 The	 prospect	 of	 peace	 ideally	 needs	 to	
challenge	the	fears,	deprivations	and	isolations	of	groups	by	bringing	them	together;	but	the	
very	process	of	peacebuilding	and	 the	possibility	of	a	 settlement	 creates	a	 sense	of	anxiety	
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because	 it	 entails	 reconfiguration	 of	 group	 relations,	 and	 requires	 actors	 to	 question	 and	
redefine	 their	 understanding	 of	 the	 other	 (Rumelili	 2010,	 Zarakol	 2010).	 Hence,	 the	 peace-
anxieties	arising	 from	the	prospect	of	 finding	a	solution	need	 to	be	addressed	carefully	and	
constructively.	This	cannot	be	simply	done	by	bringing	together	Turkish-Cypriots	and	Greek-
Cypriots,	who	are	open	to	engage	in	a	dialogue	together,	but	needs	to	include	other	others,	
other-selves	and	othered-selves	too67.		
	
Failing	 to	 consider	ontological	 security	and	nuances	of	 identity	as	an	 important	 layer	 in	 the	
conflict,	peacebuilding	efforts	in	Cyprus	could	not	break	free	of	the	dual	ethnic	approach	and	
overcome	 the	 psychological	 obstacles	 to	 a	 negotiated	 settlement.	 As	 such,	 it	 excluded	 the	
Turkish	 immigrants	 and	 condoned	 their	 securitisation	 by	 both	 Greek-Cypriots	 and	 Turkish-
Cypriots.	Thus,	over	the	years,	confrontational	phases	prompted	two	opposing	waves;	while	
one	 was	 usually	 a	 positive	 attempt	 to	 diffuse	 (or	 desecuritise)	 the	 confrontation	 through	
peacemaking/peacebuilding	 initiatives,	 the	other	was	solidification	of	entrenched	nationalist	
positions	and	mutually	exclusive	identity	narratives.	
	
Michalis	Michael	points	out	that	confrontational	phases	in	the	history	of	the	Cyprus	Problem	
were	often	followed	by	a	more	cooperative	mood	demonstrated	in	 ‘new’	 initiatives	 injected	
into	 the	 inter-communal	 talks	 creating	 a	 somewhat	 renewed	 impetus	 (Michael	 2011).	 For	
example,	 the	 unilateral	 declaration	 of	 the	 ‘TRNC’	 in	 1983	 was	 followed	 by	 the	 High	 Level	
Meetings	 in	 1985;	 the	 1987-1988	 Aegean	 crisis68	was	 followed	 by	 the	 Cuellar	 and	 Boutros-
Ghali	 initiatives	 (Set	of	 Ideas)	 in	 the	early	1990s;	UK	Foreign	Secretary	Malcolm	Rifkind’s	10	
point	plan	(see	SCFA	2005)	and	negotiations	at	Glion	came	after	the	Kardak/Imia	crisis	and	the	
border	clashes	in	1996	and	the	S-300	missile	crisis	of	1997;	and	lastly,	 increased	resentment	
and	nationalist	propaganda	in	the	north	and	Turkey	triggered	by	the	unconditional	agreement	
to	go	ahead	with	the	accession	negotiations	with	the	RoC	and	not	include	Turkey	in	the	next	
enlargement	(EU	Agenda	2000)	was	matched	by	the	Annan	initiative	in	the	2000s.																																																										
67	Other	 others	 refer	 to	 Turkish	 immigrants	 and	 people	 from	 Turkey,	 other-selves	 refer	 to	 those	who	 are	 labeled	 as	
spoilers	 or	 dissidents	 of	 peace	 because	 they	 do	 not	 fit	 the	 peacebuilding	 framework,	 and	 othered-selves	 refer	 to	
Turkishness	in	Turkish-Cypriot	identity	narratives.	
68	The	Aegean	dispute	refers	 to	various	 interrelated	controversial	 issues	between	Greece	and	Turkey	over	 sovereignty	
and	related	rights	in	the	Aegean	Sea	such	as	airspace,	territorial	waters	and	exclusive	economic	zones.	The	conflict	was	
particularly	hostile	in	1987-1988	and	in	1996	and	led	to	military	build	up	and	brought	the	two	sides	to	the	brink	of	war.	
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Even	 though	 Michael	 considers	 this	 pattern	 a	 ‘paradox’	 (Michael	 2011:206),	 it	 is	 no	
coincidence.	 Securitisation	 and	 ontological	 security	 literatures	 can	 offer	 an	 alternative	
explanation	 for	 this	 pattern	 and	 consequently	 for	 the	 failed	 peacemaking	 attempts.	 Each	
confrontational	 event	 that	 triggered	 feelings	 of	 physical	 insecurity	 was	 matched	 with	 a	
political	desecuritisation	attempt	on	Track	1	level	to	re-incite	hope/vision	for	a	solution.	When	
faced	with	a	heightened	sense	of	 fear,	 the	two	main	communities	on	the	 island	resorted	to	
securitisation.	 By	 adding	 the	 fear	 caused	 by	 each	 new	 confrontation	 to	 their	 identity	
narratives,	 Turkish-Cypriots	 and	 Greek-Cypriots	 remembered	 and	 reinterpreted	 their	 past	
traumas,	and	reinforced	their	entrenched	positions	vis-à-vis	the	enemy	other.	To	counter	this	
securitisation	 dynamic,	 the	 international	 community	 pushed	 for	 peacemaking	 efforts	 as	 a	
desecuritisation	strategy.	However,	these	attempts	were	not	sufficiently	supported	at	a	social	
level	 to	 address	 feelings	 of	 ontological	 insecurity.	 Thus,	 while	 the	 political	 leaders	 were	
brought	 together	 under	 the	 auspices	 of	 international	 actors,	 and	 as	 such	 the	 confrontation	
was	 diffused,	 communities	 and	 collective	 identity	 narratives	 on	 the	 societal	 level	 remained	
largely	 securitised	 based	 on	 discourses	 of	 enmity.	 As	 a	 result,	 the	 Cyprus	 peace	 process	
became	over-dependent	on	official	Track	1	diplomacy,	which	often	disregards,	dismisses	and	
silences	anxieties	and	ontological	security	needs	at	the	societal	level.		
	
Michael’s	 conclusion	 that	 both	 communities	 had	 become	 supporters	 of	 the	 status	 quo	
because	even	though	the	status	quo	was	not	ideal,	it	was	preferable	to	the	uncertainties	of	a	
new	 settlement	 that	 did	 not	 match	 the	 communities’	 respective	 expectations	 can	 be	
unpacked	with	the	ontological	security	literature.	In	addition	to	his	analysis	that	the	“fear	of	
worst-case	 scenarios	 paralysed	 the	 will	 and	 the	 capacity	 to	 pursue	 a	 riskier	 but	 ultimately	
more	 promising	 course”	 (Michael	 2011:205),	 a	 prospective	 solution,	 no	 matter	 how	 ‘well’	
matched	 to	 expectations,	 requires	 reconfiguration	 of	 historic	 identity	 narratives	 by	 default.	
Even	a	‘perfect’	solution	plan	would	trigger	feelings	of	insecurity	and	existential	anxiety	as	it	
challenges	 the	 image	of	 the	enemy	and	disrupts	 the	daily	 routines	of	 the	actors	 involved	 in	
conflict.	Identity	narratives	in	Cyprus	have	created	an	image	for	the	self	that	depended	on	the	
image	of	the	enemy;	where	all	 internal	was	good	and	just,	and	all	external	was	bad	and	evil	
(Papadakis	2008,	Volkan	2008).	External	did	not	only	 include	the	other	community,	but	also	
the	 motherlands,	 the	 colonial	 powers	 and	 other	 actors.	 Hence,	 saying	 ‘yes’	 to	 a	
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comprehensive	 settlement,	 however	 perfect,	 means	 saying	 ‘yes’	 to	 confronting	 engrained	
societal	 fears	and	anxieties,	and	saying	 ‘yes’	 to	 living	side	by	side	with	the	 ‘enemy	other’.	 It	
effectively	requires	Cypriots	to	accept	the	other	as	a	legitimate	partner,	and	as	a	group	that	is	
part-self,	who	also	has	rights	and	has	also	suffered.	As	peacebuilding	and	reconciliation	efforts	
challenge	the	image	of	the	enemy,	they	also	challenge	our	self-identity	narratives.		
	
Even	though	literature	on	the	Cyprus	Problem	rarely	engages	with	ontological	security,	many	
scholars	 problematise	 the	 disconnect	 between	 peacemaking	 efforts	 and	 identity	 narratives	
reproduced	 through	 education	 and	 official	 histories.	 Philippou	 and	 Varnava	 argue	 that	 the	
official	 historical	 sources	 in	 the	 RoC	 portray	 Turkish-Cypriots	 as	 a	 cultural	 and	 religious	
minority,	which	delegitimises	 their	political	 rights	based	on	numerical	grounds	and	weakens	
the	sense	of	political	justice	that	various	solution	plans	require	(Philippou	and	Varnava	2009).	
Greek-Cypriot	 history	 textbooks	 represent	 Cyprus	 as	 homogeneously	 Greek-speaking	 and	
Christian	 Orthodox	 in	 European	 maps	 and	 base	 the	 concept	 of	 Europe	 on	 ethno-cultural	
content	that	is	inherently	Greek:	“the	European	civilisation	is	the	continuance	of	the	ancient	
Greek	and	Roman	civilisation.	An	important	element	of	the	European	cultural	heritage	is	also	
the	 teachings	 of	 Christianity”	 (quoted	 in	 Philippou	 and	 Varnava	 2009:201).	 Furthermore,	
official	sources	and	history	textbooks	that	reduce	the	Cyprus	Problem	to	the	Turkish	invasion,	
essentially	point	to	a	simple	solution:	The	need	for	Turkey	to	follow	UN	resolutions,	which	will	
allow	for	‘re-acquisition’	of	what	was	lost,	restoration	of	Greek-Cypriots’	human	rights	and	a	
return	to	the	1960	Constitution	(Christou	2006	).		
	
Unsurprisingly,	 a	 similar	 reductionist	 portrayal	 can	 be	 found	 in	 the	 Turkish-Cypriot	 history	
textbooks	that	reduce	the	problem	to	uncompromising	and	greedy	Greek-Cypriots	who	refuse	
to	 accept	 Turkish-Cypriots	 as	 equals	 and	 did/will	 attempt	 to	 rid	 the	 island	 of	 Turks	 and	
Turkish-Cypriots	 at	 every	 opportunity.	 The	 difference	 in	 this	 portrayal	 is	 the	 perception	 of	
1974	as	the	 ‘solution’	to	the	problem	rather	than	the	root	of	the	problem.	The	solution	can	
only	 be	 truly	 celebrated	 if	 Greek-Cypriots	 stop	 lobbying	 the	 international	 community	 to	
isolate	 and	 deny	 recognition	 to	 the	 Turkish-Cypriot	 administration.	 As	 such,	 according	 to	
mainstream	nationalists,	 the	division	of	 the	 island	was	 the	 final	goal,	 and	hence	 the	Cyprus	
Problem	was	already	‘solved’	(Kızılyürek	2012).	
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This	 reductionist	 portrayal	 and	 lack	 of	 vision	 towards	 a	 solution	 in	 official	 histories	 and	
textbooks	is	in	stark	contrast	with	the	official	political	rhetoric	of	all	governments	of	the	RoC	
and	the	Turkish-Cypriot	administration	that	engaged	in	peace	negotiations	since	1977.	While	
the	 community	 leaders	 continued	 to	 pursue	 a	 settlement	 based	 on	 a	 bicommunal,	 bizonal	
federation	of	varying	forms	at	different	historical	periods,	the	mainstream	ethnic	and	national	
identity	narratives	reproduced	the	friend-enemy	distinction,	reinforcing	the	other’s	identity	as	
aggressive	and	illegitimate.	As	a	result,	the	solution	pursued	at	the	political	 level	contradicts	
the	ideal	solution	presented	in	official	historical	sources	and	falls	short	of	constructing	a	vision	
of	what	the	future	will	look	like	in	a	reunified	Cyprus	(Irwin	2005,	Christou	2006	).		
	
Nonetheless,	 it	should	be	noted	that	there	was	a	significant	but	failed	bicommunal	effort	to	
revise	 the	 history	 textbooks	 across	 the	 island	 in	 2004.	 The	 new	 narrative	 based	 on	 peace	
education,	 civic	 identity	 and	 principles	 of	multiculturalism	 even	 criticised	 the	 older	 one	 for	
depicting	Cyprus	as	a	Turkish/Greek	homeland,	opting	for	more	inclusive	terms	like	‘Cypriots’	
and	 ‘people	 of	 Cyprus’	 to	 embrace	 both	 Greek-Cypriot	 and	 Turkish-Cypriots	 (MEKB	 2005,	
Papadakis	2008,	Tamcelik	2009).	Even	though	the	textbooks	were	revised	in	the	TCc,	the	old	
books	were	re-introduced	merely	after	five	years	in	2009.	The	revision	was	never	completed	
in	the	GCc	due	to	strong	opposition	and	outcry	that	it	would	undermine	collective	self-identity	
and	justify	the	actions	of	the	enemy	(Bekerman,	Kızılyürek	et	al.	2010).	On	the	issue	of	revised	
textbooks,	 Hadjikonstantas,	 a	Greek-Cypriot	 philologist	 observed	 that,	 “national	 heritage	 of	
three	 thousand	years	 is	questioned	by	pseudo-arguments	 for	 intercultural	and	multicultural	
ideology”	(quoted	in	Makriyianni	and	Psaltis	2007:59).		
	
Once	again,	failing	to	consider	ontological	security	concerns,	the	initiative	underestimated	the	
existential	anxieties	a	new	historical	account	would	create,	especially	 for	Greek-Cypriots.	As	
such,	re-narrating	historical	events	and	‘realities’	that	are	central	to	the	Greek-Cypriot	identity	
narratives	 based	 on	 multiculturalism	 would	 challenge	 their	 disassociation	 with	 Turkey	 and	
Turkishness,	and	destabilise	the	 image	of	the	primordial	enemy	that	 is	blamed	for	all	wrong	
doing	and	misfortunes.	Hence,	it	would	also	destabilise	the	identity	of	the	self.	However,	since	
Cypriotness	 comes	 with	 a	 European	 identity	 for	 Turkish-Cypriots,	 meaning	 they	 need	 their	
Cypriotness	in	order	to	be	European,	it	could	be	argued	that	the	initial	success	of	the	initiative	
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was,	 at	 least	 partly,	 due	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 ontological	 anxieties	 were	 more	 manageable	 for	
Turkish-Cypriots	 as	 the	 new	 historical	 narrative	 reinforced	 their	 ‘Europeanness’.	 In	 other	
words,	 the	 revised	 textbooks	 had	 the	 potential	 to	 provide	 a	 future-oriented	 narrative	 for	
Turkish-Cypriots	 that	 underplays	 their	 stigmatised	 and	 oriental	 past.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 they	
would	challenge	Greek-Cypriots’	deeply	historicised	narrative	that	provides	them	links	with	an	
ancient	and	great	civilisation	that	contributed	to	the	very	foundations	of	the	Western	world,	
and	instead	emphasise	their	links	with	the	oriental,	non-European	other.	
	
Both	 peacemaking	 and	 peacebuilding	 initiatives	 treated	 the	 Cyprus	 Problem	 as	 an	 ethnic	
conflict	and	sought	its	resolution	on	this	basis.	Although,	the	guarantor	powers	were	kept	in	
the	 loop	 on	 the	 Track	 1	 level,	 other	 levels	 of	 diplomacy	 and	 reconciliation,	 especially	
grassroots	 level,	 almost	 always	 had	 a	 dual-ethnic	 approach,	 excluding	 other	 identities	 and	
communities69.	 The	 issue	 of	 Turkish	 immigrants	 in	 the	 Cyprus	 Problem	 is	 especially	 hefty	
because	 it	 adds	highly	 emotive	 issues	 to	 an	 already	 tense	 situation,	 including	human	 rights	
violations,	 IDPs’	 resentments	 about	 property	 losses,	 anger	 and	humiliation	 over	 military	
losses,	 fears	 of	 electoral	 manipulation,	 and	 anxieties	 about	 cultural	 and	demographic	
distinctiveness	 due	 to	 the	 perceived	 ‘Turkification’	 of	 north	 Cyprus.	 It	 goes	 beyond	 a	 banal	
racism	 and	 xenophobia	 towards	 foreigners	 as	 it	 is	 tied	 into	 collective	 traumas,	 identity	
narratives,	 and	 desired	 and	 idealised	 futures.	 Christiensen	 contends	 that	 “the	pejorative	
discourse	 about	 Turkish	 settlers	 cannot	 be	 dismissed	 as	 a	 case	 of	 historic	 hatreds	 or	cross-
ethnic	animosities,	for	slurs	against	Turkish	immigrants	are	echoed	on	both	sides	of	the	island.	
That	is,	Greek	Cypriots	talk	about	the	settlers	in	ways	nearly	identical	to	how	Turkish	Cypriots	
talk	about	Turkish	settlers”	(Christiansen	2005:55).		
It	 is	 not	 new	 to	 say	 that	 reconciliation	 at	 the	 grassroots	 level	 facilitates	 Track	 1	 diplomacy	
neither	 theoretically	 nor	 empirically	 for	 the	 case	 of	 Cyprus	 (see	 Diamond	 and	 McDonald	
1996).	What	is	new	however,	is	that	on	a	theoretical	 level,	peace	research	has	a	lot	to	learn	
from	ontological	security	and	desecuritisation	literatures;	and	on	an	empirical	level,	breaking	
free	of	the	dual-ethnic	approach	to	the	Cyprus	Problem	with	a	more	nuanced	understanding																																																									
69	Even	 though	 Turkish	 immigrants	 are	 not	 the	 only	 other	 identity	 group	 in	 Cyprus	 that	 needs	 to	 be	 included	 in	 the	
process,	 the	 focus	 on	 their	 involvement	 stems	 from	 the	 underlying	 argument	 that	 this	 group	 is	 securitised	 by	 both	
Greek-Cypriots	and	Turkish-Cypriots,	as	well	as	the	fact	that	Turkishness	 is	an	integral	part	of	Turkish-Cypriots	 identity	
narratives.	
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of	 identity	 and	 expanding	 the	 efforts	 to	 desecuritise	 Turkishness	 and	 Turkish	 immigrants	
would	facilitate	a	comprehensive	settlement	and	support	the	implementation	of	a	negotiated	
solution	 by	 providing	 the	 tools	 to	 address	 peace-anxieties.	 As	 such,	 their	 involvement	 in	
reconciliation	 is	necessary	 to	 reconfigure	 the	 threat	perceptions	 that	 create	peace-anxieties	
pertaining	to	a	potential	comprehensive	settlement.	
	
6.2.3	More	Europeanisation	and	more	reconfiguration	(1999-2003)	
Going	back	to	the	historical	timeline,	despite	the	green	light	at	Helsinki	in	1999,	exclusion	of	
Turkey	 from	 the	 2000	 enlargement	 strategy	 was	 not	 welcomed	 news.	 It	 encouraged	 an	
attempt	 by	 Ankara	 to	 bring	 Turkey	 and	 the	 ‘TRNC’	 closer	 together,	 something	 the	 Turkish-
Cypriot	 ruling	 elite	 supported	 to	 counteract	 the	 Europeanisation	 of	 the	 conflict	 and	 the	
mobilisation	of	Turkish-Cypriots	against	the	status	quo.	However,	Turkey’s	economic	troubles	
that	 led	to	a	banking	crisis	 in	2001	saw	ten	banks	collapse	 in	Turkey	and	 in	the	 ‘TRNC’	(BBC	
2001).	 Imposition	 of	 drastic	 economic	 reforms	 reinforced	 the	 conviction	 for	 the	 need	 for	 a	
solution	 instead.	 Demonstrations	 that	 bore	 the	 signs	 and	 slogans	 saying	 “This	 Country	 is	
Ours”,	meaning	that	the	north	did	not	belong	to	Turkey,	were	starting	to	grow,	each	bigger	
than	the	previous	one	(Bu	Memleket	Bizim	2000,	Durduran	2000).		
	
Turkish-Cypriots	 were	 increasingly	 losing	 faith	 in	 Denktaş	 and	 Eroğlu	 and	 simultaneously	
detaching	 themselves	 from	Turkey	and	 their	Turkish	 identity.	Demonstrations	 in	 the	 face	of	
harsh	economic	reforms	and	the	banking	crisis	were	showing	growing	support	for	the	Turkish-
Cypriot	 left-wing,	 who	 rejected	 motherland	 nationalism,	 adopted	 mottos	 such	 as	 ‘Cyprus	
belongs	 to	 Cypriots’	 or	 ‘Cyprus	 for	 Cypriots’,	 and	 promoted	 Cypriotism	 that	 was	 anchored	
upon	 peace	 and	 reunification.	 As	 Kızılyürek	 contends,	 the	 left-wing	 emerged	 and	 gained	
support	 as	 an	 identity	 movement	 against	 Turkish	 nationalism,	 and	 Turkey’s	 intervening,	
clientelist	patronage	system	(Kızılyürek	2012).	As	a	result,	the	struggle	for	democracy	as	well	
as	 for	Turkish-Cypriot	 identity	was	 inseparable	 from	the	struggle	 for	peace.	Everything	 from	
lack	of	water	and	electricity,	to	corruption	and	bad	education	was	tied	to	the	Cyprus	Problem.		
	
As	previously	discussed,	Turkish-Cypriots	low	self-esteem	and	minority	complex	shows	itself	in	
their	narrative	about	always	needing	a	guardian	or	a	 saviour.	However,	by	 the	early	2000s,	
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Turkey	 was	 not	 the	 saviour	 anymore;	 this	 role	 was	 now	 projected	 on	 to	 the	 EU.	 The	
perception	 that	Turkish-Cypriots	needed	saving	did	not	change,	but	who	they	wanted	to	be	
saved	by	was	no	longer	tied	to	their	ethnic	identity.	The	subsequent	societal	outcome	of	this	
was	 the	 growing	 securitisation	 and	 xenophobia	 towards	 Turkish	 immigrants	 who	 were	
scapegoated	as	agents	of	Turkey	and	as	the	obstacle	for	a	better	future.		
	
The	 EU	 accession	 was	 initially	 viewed	 as	 a	 threat	 by	 many	 Turkish-Cypriots	 due	 to	 the	
domination	of	 public	 opinion	by	 the	 nationalist	 elites,	who	 supported	 EU	membership	 only	
after	 a	 settlement	 or	 after	 Turkey’s	 accession	 (Tocci	 2003).	 As	 the	 right-wing	 political	 elite	
started	to	lose	its	grip	on	power,	this	view	started	to	transform.	In	the	context	of	international	
isolation,	the	EU	project	was	more	than	just	economic	prosperity;	it	also	meant	‘acceptance’.	
It	 offered	 a	 new	 relationship,	 very	 different	 in	 style	 compared	 to	 the	 Turkish-Cypriot	
experience	of	dependent,	parental	 relationship	 they	had	with	 the	 ‘motherland’	 that	 treated	
them	like	a	frail	 incompetent	child70.	EU	membership	meant	recognition	of	Turkish-Cypriots’	
distinct	 identity	 by	 the	 international	 community;	 it	 meant	 that	 Turkish-Cypriots	 could	
participate	 in	global	politics,	 in	global	sporting	events,	 they	could	have	a	postcode	and	they	
could	trade	with	the	world.	
	
By	 2002,	 EU	 accession	 was	 no	 longer	 perceived	 as	 a	 threat,	 but	 rather	 as	 the	 necessary	
condition	 for	 the	 TCc’s	 survival.	 Europeanisation	 of	 the	 conflict	 also	 meant	 collective	
socialisation	 for	 Turkish-Cypriots.	 Their	 re-evaluation	 of	 EU	membership	 happened	 hand	 in	
hand	 with	 their	 re-evaluation	 of	 self-identity,	 which	 was	 facilitated	 by	 their	 widespread	
discontent	with	 the	 status	quo,	 by	 the	effective	mobilisation	of	 the	 civil	 society	 and	by	 the	
banking	crisis	that	demonstrated	their	fragility.	However,	Denktaş,	still	president	at	the	time,	
was	not	convinced	of	the	appeal	of	membership	and	considered	EU	money	a	bribe	for	osmosis	
to	 trick	 Turkish-Cypriots	 to	 relinquish	 their	 ‘sovereignty’	 (Tocci	 2007:44).	 As	 civil	 society	
matured,	Turkish-Cypriots	started	perceiving	their	administration,	which	used	to	be	a	source	
of	pride	(symbol	of	their	heroic	resistance,	when	with	the	support	of	their	large-group,	they,																																																									
70	In	2011,	Erdoğan	was	angry	with	 the	demonstrators	who	used	 signs	and	 slogans	 saying	 “Turkey,	 get	 lost”	 (Türkiye,	
defol),	 “Ankara,	 move	 your	 hands	 off	 our	 throat/collar”	 (Ankara,	 elini	 yakamızdan	 çek).	 Erdoğan	 called	 Cypriots	
“Besleme”,	 meaning	 an	 orphan	 handmaiden,	 a	 serving	 child,	 which	 triggered	much	 anger	 and	 resentment	 (EurActiv	
2011).		
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though	 a	 minority,	 gained	 victory),	 as	 a	 delusion;	 instead	 of	 being	 dominated	 by	 Greek-
Cypriots	they	were	being	controlled	by	Ankara	(see	Christou	2004,	Tocci	2007).		
	
The	 inter-communal	 talks	 resumed	 in	 January	2002	and	by	 June	 the	Annan	Plan	was	 taking	
shape	(Dodd	2010).	The	negotiations	gained	further	speed	as	the	pressure	on	Denktaş	and	the	
political	elite	grew,	now	not	only	exerted	from	the	domestic	front,	but	following	the	election	
of	the	AKP	led	by	Erdoğan,	more	overtly	from	Turkey	as	well.	That	being	said,	Turkish	political	
and	public	opinion	had	been	very	ambivalent	on	the	Cyprus	issue	especially	since	1990s.	Even	
though	 the	 secularist	 Kemalist	 front	 inherently	 supports	 Europe,	 coming	 from	 a	 Turkish	
nationalist	background	as	they	see	themselves	as	the	founders	and	protectors	of	Turkey,	just	
like	 the	 armed	 forces,	 they	 feel	 a	 national	 pride	 and	 responsibility	 for	 the	 Turkish-Cypriot	
‘cause’.	Many	interactions	are	limited	to	the	fact	that	the	blood	of	brave	Turkish	soldiers	had	
been	 spilled	 to	 ‘save’	 Turkish-Cypriots,	 and	 despite	 this	 Turkish-Cypriots	 are	 not	 grateful	
enough	towards	Turkey.	This	perceived	debt	bondage	was	recognised	in	the	focus	groups	and	
the	 civil	 society	 surveys,	 where	 one	 participant	 highlighted	 that	 “They	 call	 us	 garasakal	
[blackbeard]	to	insult	us	but	we	insult	them	by	saying	‘we	saved	you’,	‘if	we	didn’t	save	you,	
you	wouldn’t	be	here’.	We	constantly	rub	their	nose	in	it.	The	discrimination	we	face	is	also	
defensive.	…	The	migrants	who	came	here	couldn’t	go	to	Germany,	in	Germany	they	needed	
to	 integrate	 and	 adapt.	 But	 those	 who	 came	 here,	 came	 thinking	 they	 were	 ‘bosses’	 [of	
Turkish-Cypriots]…	they	came	as	saviours,	with	a	sense	of	entitlement”	(FG2-N:2015)71.		
With	very	little	time	to	spare	before	the	EU	decision	on	accession	negotiations	that	was	to	be	
taken	in	Copenhagen	in	December	2002,	the	UN	Secretary-General	Kofi	Annan	presented	his	
draft	 plan	 for	 Cyprus	 (Hoffmeister	 2006).	 In	 a	 nutshell,	 the	 Annan	 Plan	 was	 based	 on	 a	
presidential	 (a	 presidential	 council	 rather	 than	 a	 single	 person)	 federal	 system	 that	 was	
drastically	 different	 from	 the	 1960	Constitution.	 The	 communal	 veto	 powers	were	 radically	
reduced	 (a	 concern	 for	 Turkish-Cypriots),	 Guarantees	 were	 retained	 (a	 concern	 for	 Greek-																																																								
71	Responding	to	a	comment	about,	“young	Cypriots	discriminate	because	they	don’t	know	their	history	and	that	Turkey	had	
saved	them;	if	they	were	taught	the	history,	they	wouldn’t	discriminate…”,	Hasan	offers	a	self-reflective	analysis:	“We	need	
to	 discuss	 why	 their	 [Turkish-Cypriots’]	 perception	 has	 changed,	 why	 they	 feel	 reactionary	 towards	 us	 and	 why	 this	
[discriminatory]	environment	had	emerged.	…	The	door	[the	border]	is	open	to	Turkey,	there	is	no	control.	Both	good	people	
and	bad	people	come	 freely.	Rather	 than	 just	 simply	complaining	 that	 they	don’t	 like	us,	we	need	 to	question	why.	…	We	
didn’t	come	to	integrate,	we	came	to	change	the	society,	because	we	saw	it	as	‘ours’	(Hasan,	which	is	not	his	real	name,	was	
a	 focus	group	participant,	who	works	as	a	 journalist	at	a	big	newspaper.	The	quote	 is	author’s	own	translation	of	 the	
focus	group	transcripts	from	Turkish	to	English	(FG2-N:2015)).		
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Cypriots),	federal	institutions	possessed	a	wide	range	of	powers	such	as	foreign	affairs,	central	
bank,	natural	resources	and	communications	(not	as	loose	as	Turkish-Cypriots	wanted),	and	it	
included	 fairly	 detailed	 residence,	 reinstitution	 and	 property	 arrangements	 (restrictions	 on	
return72	of	 IDPs	 to	 the	 northern	 constituent	 state	was	 another	Greek-Cypriot	 concern).	 The	
plan	also	allowed	for	approximately	50,000	Turkish	migrants	to	remain,	which	was	‘too	much’	
for	Greek	Cypriots	(Christou	2004).	The	aim	was	to	get	both	communities	to	agree	on	the	plan	
before	 Copenhagen	 and	 finalise	 the	 remaining	 provisions	 and	 annexes	 before	 putting	 it	 to	
referenda	at	the	end	of	March	2003.			
	
However,	the	Copenhagen	deadline	was	missed	as	Denktaş	refused	to	sign	the	plan.	The	next	
important	deadline	was	now	the	Treaty	of	Accession	to	be	signed	in	April	2003.	In	response	to	
various	suggestions	and	feedback,	the	plan	was	revised	again	as	‘Annan	III’	in	February	2003.	
There	was	 less	 than	 a	month	 left	 to	 negotiate.	 Turkish-Cypriots	were	 afraid	 that	 under	 the	
Plan	 the	 more	 prosperous	 and	 numerous	 Greek-Cypriots	 would	 overpower	 them,	 and	 any	
restrictions	 imposed	on	 the	Greek-Cypriots	would	have	 to	be	 a	 temporary	derogation	 from	
the	 EU	 acquis.	 However,	 even	 those	 Turkish-Cypriots	 who	 would	 be	 displaced	 from	 their	
former	Greek-Cypriot	homes,	including	my	parents,	supported	the	Plan.	They	saw	it	as	a	moral	
responsibility	 to	 sacrifice	 earthly	 possessions	 for	 a	 better	 future.	 The	 alternative	 being	 the	
continuation	of	their	invisible	enclave,	or	what	they	called	at	the	demonstrations	their	‘open	
air	prison’,	was	not	considered	a	viable	option	(Bayrak	2003).	Even	the	Morphou/Güzelyurt,	a	
city	that	would	be	given	to	the	Greek-Cypriot	constituent	state	according	to	the	Annan	Plan,	
which	 would	 create	 thousands	 of	 IDPs,	 voted	 64.21%	 in	 favour	 of	 the	 plan 73 ,	 clearly	
demonstrating	 that	 their	 concerns	 over	 biographical	 continuity,	 distinct	 identity	 as	 Cypriots	
and	their	future	were	prioritised	over	immediate	financial	losses,	their	‘home’	or	their	ties	to	
their	 land.	 Reconfiguration	 of	 Turkish-Cypriots’	 loyalties	 and	 identity	 narratives	 towards	
Cypriotness	 and	 Europe,	 and	 away	 from	 Turkishness	 and	 Anatolia,	 helped	 alleviate	 peace-
anxieties	pertaining	to	the	Annan	Plan.	 It	also	provided	a	vision	for	the	future	that	trumped	
other	fears.	Bryant	notes,	“Beginning	with	the	2002	announcement,	Turkish	Cypriots	began	a	
long,	hard	struggle	to	change	their	government,	to	gain	the	support	of	Turkey	and	to	educate																																																									
72	After	15	years	the	Greek	Cypriots	could	constitute	only	21%	of	the	northern	constituent	state’s	population.	
73	http://www.cypriot.org.uk/Documents/Haber1/23-Nisan.htm	
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the	electorate.	…But	even	in	those	districts	where	thousands	of	Turkish	Cypriots	would	have	
been	relocated,	the	plan	was	approved	with	a	resounding	majority,	for	it	would	have	meant	a	
new	state	of	certainty	about	the	future”	(Bryant	2004:2).	
	
Large	mass	demonstrations	led	by	the	Turkish-Cypriot	Chamber	of	Commerce	that	mobilised	
approximately	90	 civil	 society	organisations,	political	parties,	 civil	 servants	and	 the	business	
sector	 based	 on	 a	 document	 called	 the	 ‘Common	Vision74	[of	 Turkish	 Cypriots]’	were	 being	
held	on	a	monthly	basis	and	were	bringing	70-80,000	people	 from	all	 kinds	of	backgrounds	
and	 political	 views	 into	 the	 streets	 (Christou	 2003,	 Tocci	 2003).	 Considering	 the	 small	
population	of	north	Cyprus75,	this	was	a	very	significant	number.	The	movement	became	the	
symbol	of	the	Turkish-Cypriot	reunification	movement	and	focused	on	Turkish-Cypriots’	will	to	
decide	upon	their	own	destiny	(Durduran	2000,	Kıbrıs	2002).	In	December	2002	and	January	
2003,	 unprecedented	 numbers	 of	 Turkish-Cypriot	 poured	 into	 the	 streets	 and	 city	 squares	
waving	EU	flags,	slogans,	and	olive	branches	to	call	for	reunification,	EU	membership	and	the	
resignation	of	Denktaş.	Demonstrators	that	included	a	section	of	Turkish	immigrants	as	well,	
cried	“We	are	ready	for	the	EU	and	solution”	and	“Yes	be	Annem76”	(Tocci	2007).		
	
Figure	No	1:	Turkish-Cypriot	demonstrations	(1)	
*14	January	2003	Demonstrations.	
	
																																																								
74	The	Common	Vision	document	declared	that	Turkish-Cypriots	commitment	to	‘freedom’	[from	Turkey],	EU	
membership	and	reunification.	
75	According	to	the	2011	census,	the	de	facto	population	in	the	northern	part	of	Cyprus	was	294,906.	
76	“Yes	be	Annem”	meaning,	Yes	mummy,	played	on	words	Annem	and	Annan.	
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However,	the	civil	society	movement	and	the	enthusiasm	for	reunification	was	not	matched	in	
the	GCc,	who	 thought	 they	would	be	 in	a	more	advantageous	position	 to	negotiate	a	more	
beneficial	 settlement	 after	 EU	 accession	 (Lacher	 and	 Kaymak	 2005).	 Many	 perceived	 it	 as	
being	 unfairly	 favourable	 for	 Turkish-Cypriots	 and	 believed	 that	 the	 Turkish	 Cypriot	
Constituent	 State	 would	 try	 to	 expand	 its	 functions	 and	 make	 every	 effort	 to	 become	
autonomous	(see	Bryant	2004,	Broome	2005).	They	also	greatly	feared	the	continuation	of	the	
Treaty	of	Guarantee,	fearing	Turkish	military	intervention.		
The	Church	was	particularly	 opposed	 to	 the	Plan.	 In	 fact,	 the	Bishop	of	 Kyrenia	 announced	
that	those	who	vote	yes	to	the	Plan	will	not	be	able	to	go	to	paradise	(Anastasiou	2008).	As	
Bryant	notes,	“The	plan	was	presented	to	them	in	bits	of	propaganda	and	in	the	diatribes	of	
the	 church,	 many	 of	 whose	 leaders	 condemned	 the	 plan	 as	 'satanic'	 and	 threatened	 their	
flocks	 with	 damnation	 if	 they	 voted	 in	 favour”	 (Bryant	 2004:2).	 This	 was	 part	 of	 a	 larger	
campaign	to	securitise	 the	Annan	Plan	as	an	existential	 threat	 to	the	Hellenic	character	and	
existence	 of	 Greek-Cypriots.	 It	 owed	 its	 effectiveness	 to	 the	 trust	 the	 GCc	 have	 in	 the	
Church77.	The	strong	opposition	to	the	Annan	Plan	was	reflected	in	the	presidential	elections	
of	February	2003.	The	hard-liner	candidate	Tassos	Papadopoulos	was	elected	president	with	
51.1%	of	the	vote	over	Clerides,	who	was	perceived	to	be	too	moderate.	What	was	painfully	
surprising	 however,	 in	 particular	 for	 the	 Turkish-Cypriot	 left-wing,	 was	 AKEL’s	 (communist	
party)	support	for	Papadopoulos	(Pericleous	2009).		
6.2.4	The	opening	of	the	Green	Line	and	the	Annan	Plan	(2003-2004)	
On	 16	 April	 2003,	 together	 with	 nine	 other	 candidate	 countries,	 the	 RoC	 signed	 the	 EU	
accession	 treaty	 without	 a	 comprehensive	 settlement.	 Nevertheless,	 the	 road	 to	 finding	 a	
settlement	was	still	not	final;	hence	the	negotiations	continued.	All	candidates	would	formally	
join	 the	 EU	 on	 1st	May	 2004.	 However,	 5	 days	 later	 on	 21st	 April,	 something	 breath-taking	
happened.	 A	 surprise	 move	 was	 made	 to	 relax	 the	 restrictions	 on	 movements	 across	 the	
Green	 Line.	 The	 Turkish-Cypriot	 authorities	 announced	 that	 they	 would	 allow	 freedom	 of	
movement	across	the	Green	Line	for	the	first	time	since	1974	(BBC	2003).	In	a	very	short	time,	
77	According	to	opinion	polls,	over	45%	of	the	public	trust	the	church	(Cyprus-2015-Initiative	2009)	,	and	compared	to	the	46%	
EU	average,	over	81%	Greek-Cypriots	believe	that	religion	has	a	very	significant	role	in	society	(Eurobarometer	2006).		
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almost	 over	 night,	 the	 check-points	 on	 the	 Green	 Line	 that	 divided	 the	 communities	 for	
almost	30	 years	were	opened.	 There	was	much	excitement,	optimism	and	media	 coverage,	
both	 locally	 and	 internationally.	 The	 opening	 of	 the	 checkpoints	 were	 treated	 as	 the	 first	
tangible	step	towards	reunification	(See	Loizos	2007).	
This	was	a	big	milestone	both	politically	and	psychologically.	Cypriots	were	going	to	meet	the	
‘other’	 that	 they	 had	 spent	 three	 decades	 vilifying	 through	 the	 media,	 history	 textbooks,	
national	 holidays	 and	 memorials.	 Although	 decades	 long	 separation	 made	 it	 easy	 for	 the	
mainstream	 nationalist	 discourse	 to	 vilify	 the	 ‘other’,	 it	 also	 concealed	 a	 curiosity	 for	 the	
‘other	side’;	 the	unknown	dark	side	 that	could	not	be	visited.	The	 ‘dark’	 took	a	more	 literal	
meaning	for	Turkish-Cypriots,	as	we	watched	the	twinkling	colourful	 lights	in	the	south	from	
our	 windows	 and	 balconies	 when	 the	 northern	 part	 suffered	 from	 regular	 electricity	
blackouts.	The	curiosity	for	the	‘other	side’	demonstrated	its	intensity	when	the	borders	were	
opened	for	the	first	time	in	April	2003	and	thousands	of	people	queued	at	the	check-points	to	
visit	the	estranged	half	of	their	island,	some	sleeping	in	their	cars	from	the	night	before.	Many	
wanted	to	visit	their	old	houses,	or	their	grandparents’	villages	or	orchards.		
This	 surprising	 move	 stirred,	 shifted,	 challenged	 and	 strengthened	 identity	 narratives	
simultaneously;	 north	 was	 more	 ‘normal’	 and	 less	 Islamic	 than	 the	 Greek-Cypriots	 had	
imagined,	and	 the	 south	was	more	developed,	more	European	and	more	Western	 than	 the	
Turkish-Cypriot	 expected.	 Turkish-Cypriots	 were	 impressed	 by	 the	 relatively	 high	 level	 of	
development	 by	 comparison,	 and	 to	 Greek-Cypriots’	 surprise,	 despite	 obviously	 being	 less	
prosperous,	 the	 northern	 part	 was	 not	 poverty	 stricken	 and	 disease	 ridden,	 with	 Turkish	
soldiers	 guarding	 every	 corner	 as	 their	 propaganda	 often	 implied.	 Hatay	 notes	 that	 the	
opening	 of	 the	 check-points	 “provided	 new	 access	 to	 the	 island’s	 south	 and	 gave	 Turkish-
Cypriots	a	new	vision	of	the	 island’s	 ‘essential’	 ‘European’	character”	(Hatay	2008:158).	This	
‘European’	 character	 of	Greek-Cypriots	was	 visible	by	 the	 cars	 they	drove,	 the	 clothes	 they	
wore	and	the	type	of	vacations	they	took.	It	was	visible	especially	to	the	younger	generation,	
who	 travelled	more.	 They	 did	 not	 even	 have	 Starbucks,	McDonalds	 and	 Debenhams;	 all	 of	
which	were,	at	least	for	them,	symbols	of	modernity	and	the	‘Western’	world.	Crossing	back	
to	 their	 isolated	 ‘dark’	 side,	 Turkish-Cypriots	 blamed	 Turkey	 and	 Turkish	 immigrants	 for	
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turning	the	north	into	‘the	East’,	 into	what	they	perceived	as	part	of	Anatolia.	Hatay	further	
argues	that	“this	visceral,	visual	difference	became	one	of	the	primary	motivations	for	 large	
segments	of	the	population	in	the	north	to	support	a	UN	reunification	plan	that	would	have	…	
made	 north	 Cyprus,	 also,	 a	 part	 of	 Europe”	 (Hatay	 2008:158).	 Yet,	 despite	 the	 stark	 and	
obvious	 differences,	 the	 ‘other	 side’	 was	 familiar,	 or	 may	 be	 familial	 in	 an	 organic	 way;	 it	
tasted	and	sounded	similar78.		
	
To	 the	 disenchantment	 of	 the	 nationalists,	 the	 opening	 of	 the	 check-points	 did	 not	 create	
havoc.	 Lack	 of	 violence	 or	 hooliganistic	 incidents	 also	 showed	 that	 the	 two	 communities	
would	not	 simply	 tear	each	other	apart	 like	 the	mainstream	political	 elite	 claimed	and	 that	
may	be,	peaceful	 co-existence	and	a	common	 future	on	 the	 same	 island	was	possible.	That	
spring,	my	 father	waited	with	excitement	on	 the	balcony	 for	 ‘our’	Greek-Cypriots	 to	 arrive.	
The	majority	of	our	neighbourhood	was	Greek-Cypriot	property,	my	parents	had	moved	into	
the	 2	 rooms	 in	 the	 basement	 as	 students	 in	 1983	 as	 a	 newly	 engaged	 couple	 and	 slowly	
extended	 and	 built	 upon	 the	 house	 over	 the	 years.	 As	 other	 neighbours	 had	 ‘their’	 Greek-
Cypriots	come	and	go,	the	anticipation	grew.	People	exchanged	old	photos	and	memorabilia.	
A	 neighbour	 on	 the	 street	 kept	 the	 wedding	 gown	 and	 wedding	 photos	 of	 the	 former	
inhabitants	 and	 finally	 had	 the	 chance	 to	 give	 it	 back.	 The	 stories	 from	our	 neighbourhood	
was,	luckily,	pretty	rosy.	Our	own	first	encounter	a	couple	of	weeks	after	the	opening	of	the	
check-points	 was	 very	 timid,	 and	 the	 second	 one	 very	 emotional.	 The	 second	 time	 the	
extended	Greek-Cypriot	family,	who	were	the	original	owners	of	our	house,	came	all	together	
to	visit.	Two	brothers	and	their	wives	and	children.	The	two	brothers	were	very	young	when	
they	had	to	run	away,	about	10-12	years	old.	The	younger	one	mentioned	that	he	had	buried	
his	 ‘valuables’	 in	the	garden	before	they	 left.	My	dad	having	planted	trees	and	plants	 in	the	
garden	over	 the	years	 said	he	never	 found	anything.	We	went	downstairs	 together,	and	he	
pointed	to	a	spot	to	the	right	of	the	olive	tree	that	had	been	there	for	years,	so	close	to	the	
trunk	of	 the	tree	that	my	dad	never	dug	there.	 It	 took	two	digs	with	a	small	 shovel	and	we	
found	the	little	clay	pot	filled	with	the	valuables	of	a	10	year	old	boy	when	he	had	to	abandon	
his	house	and	run	away	in	fear.	The	pot	contained	a	rusty	cross,	a	couple	of	little	toy	cars	and	
some	 dusty	 torn	 bundle	 of	 paper	 that	 was	 probably	 money.	 It	 was	 very	 emotional	 for																																																									
78	Despite	the	language	differences,	mannerisms,	sounds,	folk	music	and	slang	is	very	similar	across	the	Green	Line.		
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everyone	involved.	Funnily,	a	day	later	the	neighbourhood	was	taken	by	the	rumour	that	my	
family	 was	 ‘sitting’	 on	 Greek-Cypriot	 ‘gold’	 that	 we	 never	 found	 and	 now	 the	 owners	 had	
come	to	take	it	back.		
	
The	opening	of	the	check-points	further	intensified	the	Turkish-Cypriot	opposition	movement	
directed	at	Denktaş	as	the	symbol	of	status	quo	and	division.	The	identity	narratives	became	
more	Cypriot-centric	as	the	left-wing	and	pro-peace	rhetoric	gained	support	(see	Panayiotou	
2012).	Accordingly,	Huseyin	Çakal’s	study	reports	contact	with	Greek-Cypriots	cause	Turkish-
Cypriots	to	experience	more	anger	when	thinking	about	the	current	conditions,	which	in	turn	
increases	their	willingness	to	engage	in	radical	collective	action	for	change	(Cakal	2013).	The	
Cypriotist	narratives	rather	than	expressing	feelings	of	gratefulness	to	Turkey	and	the	Turkish	
military	 as	 the	 ‘saviour’,	 perceived	 Turkey	 as	 the	 puppet	master,	 an	 unwanted	 hegemonic	
power	 that	 claimed	 entitlement	 over	 their	 future	 and	 political	 will.	 Those	 Turkish-Cypriots	
who	prioritise	 their	Cypriotness	are	also	 those	who	do	not	 feel	as	 ‘saved’	and	who	 feel	 the	
squeeze	 of	 the	 invisible	 enclave	 more,	 because	 they	 envy	 and	 long	 for	 (or	 may	 be	 see	
themselves	 as	 more	 deserving)	 what	 Greek-Cypriots	 have	 enjoyed	 over	 the	 decades;	 the	
colourful,	modern	 and	 European	world	 Greek-Cypriots	 were	 a	 part	 of	 while	 they,	 watched	
from	 afar,	 even	 though	 they	 too	 were	 ‘Cypriots’.	 This	 shift	 fuelled	 the	 polarisation,	
differentiation	 and	 disassociation	 between	 Turkish-Cypriots	 and	 Turkish	 immigrants,	 where	
the	former	claimed	to	be	less	nationalist,	less	religious	and	more	European:	
	“…	I	consider	myself	different	than	people	from	Turkey.	Especially	in	terms	of	
culture	 of	 society;	 respect	 for	 human	 rights	 and	 freedoms	 are	 much	 less	 in	
Turkey.	 Turks’	 tolerance	 of	 violence	 and	 despotism	 is	 much	 higher	 than	 the	
Turkish	Cypriots	and	Greek	Cypriots.	 ...	 the	only	aspect	 I	 feel	different	 than	a	
Greek	Cypriot	 is	 related	 to	 the	way	 religion	 is	organised	and	practised	 in	 the	
Greek	Cypriot	community,	which	does	not	really	happen	in	the	Turkish	Cypriot	
community.	 ...	 For	 the	 Turkish	 government	 up	 until	 the	 2003	 we	 were	 not	
Turkish	enough,	and	currently	we	are	not	Muslim	enough.	…	And	thus,	for	me	
Turkey	poses	a	threat	to	my	existence	as	a	human	being	 in	Cyprus	and	in	the	
world.”	(Anonymous,	Association	for	Sustainable	Development,	(CSOS:2014))		
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In	 response	 to	 the	 Turkish-Cypriot	 move	 of	 opening	 the	 check-points,	 the	 Greek-Cypriots	
announced	a	series	of	measures	to	give	Turkish-Cypriots	the	opportunity	to	enjoy	the	rights	
and	 benefits	 that	 the	 RoC	 extends	 to	 its	 citizens	 such	 as	medical	 care,	 education	 and	 RoC	
passports.	 The	 latter	was	particularly	 important	 since	 the	RoC	was	virtually	an	EU	member.	
With	the	freedom	of	movement	across	the	island,	more	and	more	Turkish-Cypriots	acquired	
RoC	passports,	which	did	not	only	make	 their	Cypriot	 identity	available	 to	 them	once	again	
but	 also	 became	 a	 symbol	 of	 their	 European	 identity.	 Turkish-Cypriots,	 who	 were	 neither	
Turkish	nor	Muslim	enough,	could	never	be	Cypriot	enough	under	their	unrecognised	pseudo	
state;	 at	 least	 now,	 they	 had	 a	 recognised	 Cypriot	 passport	 that	 also	 confirmed	 their	
Europeanness.	The	more	‘European’	they	became,	the	more	they	set	themselves	apart	from	
the	Turkish	 immigrants,	who	could	not	cross	the	check-points	or	acquire	the	RoC	passports,	
and	hence	were	not	deemed	‘fit’	to	be	European.	This	encouraged	not	only	manual	workers	
and	 artisans	 to	 work	 across	 the	 divide,	 but	 also	 families	 started	 sending	 their	 children	 to	
private	schools	in	the	RoC.	The	Turkish-Cypriot	ruling	elite	described	this	as	a	‘charm	package’,	
aimed	at	promoting	‘osmosis’	(Kıbrıs	2006,	Christophorou,	Sahin	et	al.	2010).	They	were	not	
happy	 with	 the	 developments;	 they	 tried	 to	 discourage	 Turkish-Cypriots	 from	 shopping,	
visiting	and	travelling	from	across	the	divide	through	intimidation	at	the	check-points,	naming	
and	shaming,	confiscation	of	their	shopping	items	and	the	like.	The	ruling	elite	also	(verbally)	
banned	 Turkish-Cypriots	 from	 getting	 the	 passports	 but	 then	 it	 was	 leaked	 that	 they	
themselves	had	already	acquired	theirs	(Turan	2004,	Milliyet	2011).	
	
The	 Turkish-Cypriot	 parliamentary	 elections	 in	 December	 2003	 were	 like	 a	 rehearsal	
referendum	 for	 the	Annan	Plan.	The	campaigns	 concentrated	on	acceptance	or	 rejection	of	
the	Plan,	and	on	the	issue	of	 international	recognition	before	an	agreement.	The	opposition	
parties	 claimed	 that	 the	 government	was	 rigging	 the	 elections	 by	 granting	 citizenship,	 and	
hence	 voting	 rights,	 to	 Turkish	 immigrants	 (Hope	 2003).	 This	 was	 of	 course	 based	 on	 the	
assumption	that	the	Turkish	immigrants	lacked	the	‘Common	[EU]	Vision’.	Even	though	there	
was	an	increase	in	the	number	of	citizenships	that	were	granted	prior	to	the	elections	(Dodd	
2010),	this	was	mainly	because	many	Turkish	immigrants	who	had	lived	in	the	north	for	a	long	
time	 wanted	 to	 jump	 on	 the	 EU	 bandwagon	 and	 pursue	 their	 citizenship	 applications	 to	
secure	their	place	in	Cyprus	in	case	of	a	settlement.	This	development	did	not,	in	fact,	help	the	
	 200	
government.	The	president	of	the	TRNC	Migrants’	Association,	Nuri	Çevikel,	openly	supported	
CTP	in	the	elections	and	the	Annan	Plan	(Kıbrıs	2003,	Radikal	2003).	In	the	end,	CTP	increased	
its	votes	 from	13.35%	 in	1998	 to	35.17%	 in	2003,	and	Mehmet	Ali	Talat,	 the	 leader	of	CTP,	
became	the	first	ever	left-wing	Prime	Minister	of	the	TCc.	
	
The	 negotiations	 continued	 until	March	 2004.	 Even	 though	 the	 leaders	 (Papadopoulos	 and	
Denktaş)	 at	 the	 negotiation	 table	 did	 not	 support	 the	 Plan,	 they	 agreed	 to	 continue	 the	
negotiations,	as	they	could	not	afford	to	be	regarded	as	not	wanting	a	solution	or	to	be	the	
side	 that	 left	 the	 table.	 It	was	 agreed	 that	 if	 the	 two	 sides	 had	 not	 reached	 an	 agreement	
before	 the	 referendum,	 then	 the	 Secretary-General	 would	 fill	 in	 all	 the	 ‘blanks’	 (Asmussen	
2004).	As	expected,	all	 the	 issues	were	not	 resolved	when	the	time	ran	out,	and	the	Annan	
Plan	IV	was	revised	for	the	fifth	time	by	the	Secretary-General	to	accommodate	the	concerns	
of	both	sides.	By	the	end	of	March	2004	less	than	a	month	before	the	referenda,	Annan	V79,	
with	all	its	annexes	and	legal	documents	that	amounted	to	thousands	of	pages,	was	finalised.	
	
The	 Greek-Cypriot	 negotiation	 team	 objected	 inter	 alia	 to	 derogations	 on	 the	 rights	 to	
property	 and	 residence,	 to	 the	 Treaty	 of	 Guarantee,	 representation	 in	 the	 Senate	 on	 a	
communal	(ethnic)	basis,	voting	by	Turkish	immigrants	(with	citizenship)	in	the	referenda,	the	
numbers	of	Turkish	immigrants	that	could	remain80,	and	the	lack	of	hierarchy	between	federal	
and	 constituent	 states.	 The	 Greek-Cypriots	 also	 wanted	 the	 Greek	 and	 Turkish	 military	
contingents	 out	 by	 1	 June	 2015,	 or	 earlier	 if	 Turkey	 joined	 the	 EU	 (see	 Palley	 2005,	
Hoffmeister	 2006).	 Even	 though	 the	 Turkish-Cypriots	were	worried	 about	 the	 property	 and	
residence	restrictions	that	were	eased	in	Annan	V,	which	had	to	be	temporary	(limited	to	19	
years),	 and	 about	 the	 reduction	of	 their	 territory	 to	 from	37%	 to	 29%,	which	would	 create	
considerable	 number	 of	 IDPs,	 the	 call	 for	 reunification,	 ending	 of	 isolations	 and	 EU	
membership	 was	 so	 strong,	 all	 these	 concerns	 were	 drowned	 (see	 Asmussen	 2004,	
Hoffmeister	2006).		
	
																																																								
79	http://www.hri.org/docs/annan/	
80	48,000	in	Annan	Plan	V	
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In	 the	north,	 President	Denktaş	 and	 the	 right-wing	UBP,	 led	by	Eroğlu,	 openly	opposed	 the	
Plan;	 the	 CTP,	 led	 by	 Talat	 and	 other	 left-wing	 parties	 supported	 it,	 while	 the	 Democratic	
Party,	led	by	Serdar	Denktaş	(son	of	Rauf	Raif	Denktaş)	was	divided	on	the	issue.	In	the	south,	
apart	from	DISY,	led	by	Nicos	Anastasiades,	no	party	supported	the	Plan,	not	even	AKEL	or	the	
Greens.	President	Papadopoulos	made	an	emotional	televised	appeal	against	the	Plan,	where	
he	called	on	the	people	not	to	support	it.	At	the	TV	interview,	Papadopoulos	said	in	tears,	“I	
call	on	you	to	reject	the	Annan	plan.	 I	call	on	you	to	say	a	resounding	‘no’	on	24	April.	 I	call	
upon	 you	 to	 defend	 your	 dignity,	 your	 history	 and	what	 is	 right.	 I	 urge	 you	 to	 defend	 the	
Republic	 of	 Cyprus,	 saying	 no	 to	 its	 abolition”	 (Kadritzke	 2004).	 Calling	 upon	 ‘Greek-
Cypriotism’	 and	Greek-Cypriots’	 attachment	 to	 the	RoC	 that	 they	 recreated	 from	 its	 ‘ashes’	
after	1974,	Papadopoulos	said,	“I	was	given	an	internationally	recognised	state.	I	am	not	going	
to	give	back	‘a	community’	without	a	say	internationally	and	in	search	of	a	guardian”	(quoted	
in	 Loizides	 2015:85).	 Further,	 he	 argued	 that	 the	 plan’s	 provision	 to	 disband	 the	 National	
Guard	 would	 create	 conditions	 of	 insecurity	 for	 Greek-Cypriots,	 which	 bitterly	 reminded	
people	 of	 mainland	 Greece’s	 inability	 to	 protect	 Greek-Cypriots	 militarily	 in	 1974.	
Papadopoulos’	 speech	was	very	 instrumental	 in	 translating	 feelings	of	ontological	 insecurity	
into	securitisation,	where	peace-anxieties	were	directed	to	an	identifiable	threat;	the	Turkish	
military	and	immigrants	that	were	going	to	be	part	of	their	new	reality	if	they	sad	‘yes’.	This	
emotional	appeal	and	AKEL’s	change	of	heart	undeniably	affected	Greek-Cypriot	voters;	even	
AKEL,	 allegedly	 the	 most	 understanding	 of	 the	 Turkish-Cypriots,	 who	 to-date	 supported	
unification,	was	 strongly	 against	 the	Plan.	On	24th	April	 200481,	 65%	of	 the	Turkish-Cypriots	
approved	the	Plan,	whilst	76%	of	the	Greek-Cypriots	rejected	it	(BBC	2004).		
	
Cypriot	 Academy,	 a	 civil	 society	 group	 that	 promotes	 Cypriotism,	with	 the	 implication	 that	
Turkish-Cypriots	are	those	Greeks/Greek-Cypriots	who	converted	to	Islam	during	the	Ottoman	
rule,	 wrote	 “…the	majority	 of	 Cypriots	 rejected	 the	 Annan	 Plan	 not	 because	 they	 reject	 a	
solution	to	their	island’s	division.	Far	from	it.	They	rejected	the	plan	because	they	reject	the	
legitimisation	of	 aggressive	acts.	 They	 rejected	 the	plan	because	 they	 reject	 losing	 rights	 to	
property	 and	 free	 settlement	 in	 their	 own	 homeland.	 They	 rejected	 the	 Plan	 because	 they	
reject	apartheid,	just	as	apartheid	was	rejected	in	South	Africa”	(Academy	2002).		Despite	the																																																									
81	The	turn-out	for	the	referendum	was	88%	among	Greek-Cypriots	and	87%	among	Turkish-Cypriots.	
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peace-anxieties,	 the	 Plan	 reinforced	 Turkish-Cypriots	 distinct	 identity	 as	 Europeans	 and	 as	
Cypriots;	 but	 for	 Greek-Cypriots,	 the	 Plan	was	 a	 screaming	 source	 of	 ontological	 insecurity	
that	challenged	their	self-identity,	‘legitimised’	the	acts	of	their	enemy,	and	undermined	their	
heroic	historical	struggle	and	suffering.	
	
With	the	rejection	of	the	Annan	Plan	in	the	simultaneous	referenda,	Cyprus	officially	became	
an	EU	member	 state	 as	 a	 country	divided	by	 cease-fire	on	1st	May	2004.	 The	 ‘anomaly’	 of	
Cyprus	 was	 accommodated	 with	 the	 addition	 of	 Protocol	 10	 to	 the	 Accession	 Treaty	 that	
states	 the	 acquis	 communautaire	will	 be	 suspended	 in	 “areas	 of	 the	 Republic	 of	 Cyprus	 in	
which	 the	 Government	 of	 the	 Republic	 of	 Cyprus	 does	 not	 exercise	 effective	 control”82.	 In	
parallel	 with	 Constantinou’s	 argument	 that	 the	 Cyprus	 case	 presents	 multiple	 states	 of	
exception,	the	anomaly	of	 its	accession	was	yet	another	 ‘state	of	exception’:	“...not	much	 is	
normal	with	 the	 state	of	Cyprus.	 The	RoC	was	 intended	 to	 function	as	 a	 state	of	 exception	
from	 its	very	 inception;	an	exception	 to	 the	principle	of	 self-determination,	an	exception	 to	
the	withdrawal	of	colonial	armies,	an	exception	to	independence	from	the	‘motherlands’	and	
an	exception	to	the	unfettered	exercise	of	sovereignty”	(Constantinou	2008:145).	Anastasiou	
discusses	 how	 the	 EU	 accession	was	 yet	 another	 exception	 that	 galvanised	 Cyprus’	 ‘special	
status’	that	is	effectively	not	that	special:	“...	the	first	EU	member	country	that	was	ethnically	
divided;	 that	was	 represented	at	EU	 level	exclusively	by	members	of	one	of	 the	 rival	ethnic	
communities;	that	was	partially	occupied	by	the	military	forces	of	an	EU	candidate	state;	that	
had	the	institutional	means	to	apply	the	acquis	communautaire	in	one	part	of	its	territory	but	
not	in	another;	that	had	a	cease-fire	line	and	a	buffer-zone	manned	by	UN	peacekeepers;	and	
that	had	one	portion	of	its	citizens	deprived	of	the	right	to	their	property	and	residence	and	
another	portion	of	 its	 citizens	deprived	of	 the	 right	of	access	 to	and	participation	 in	 the	EU	
economy	and	EU	political	 institutions.	Moreover,	Cyprus	was	the	only	EU	member	where	its	
major	ethnic	communities	 recognise	 the	EU	 law	while	simultaneously	 rejecting	each	other’s	
																																																								
82	It	 is	 important	 to	note	 that	 the	wording	 in	 the	Protocol	10,	allaying	 the	purely	 legalistic	approaches	 to	 the	conflict,	
adopted	a	more	political	approach,	where	it	avoided	referring	to	the	north	as	the	‘occupied	areas’,	and	hence	softening	
the	EU’s	position	on	the	presence	of	Turkish	military	on	the	island.	This	indicated	that	Turkey	and	Turkish-Cypriots	were	
no	longer	viewed	as	the	secessionist	and	obstructionist	side,	but	rather	the	side	that	proactively	supported	reunification.	
See	European	Union	Treaty	of	Accession	-	Protocol	no	10:	On	Cyprus.	12003T/PRO/10,	Official	Journal	of	the	European	
Union	23	September	2003.	L	236,	Volume	46.		
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law;	where	its	major	ethnic	communities	accept	the	legitimacy	of	the	EU	while	rejecting	each	
other’s	legitimacy	within	their	own	shared	island”	(Anastasiou	2009:131).	
	
After	the	referenda,	the	EU	Commissioner	for	Enlargement	Günther	Verheugen	said,	‘I	feel	
cheated	by	the	Greek	Cypriot	Government’	(Spiteri	2004).	So	did	Turkish-Cypriots,	especially	
by	 AKEL.	 As	 the	 disappointment	 and	 rejection	 sank	 in,	 so	 did	 the	 feelings	 of	 resentment.	
Turkish-Cypriots	took	the	‘no’	vote	very	personally,	saying	‘They	don’t	want	us,	they	still	see	
themselves	as	real	Cypriots	and	us	as	the	minority’	(See	Volkan	2008,	Beyatli,	Papadopoulou	
et	 al.	 2011).	 Turkish-Cypriots’	 feelings	 of	 rejection	 and	 their	 self-image	 as	 an	 inferior	
‘expendable’	 ‘minority’	 has	 a	 long	 history:	 They	 were	 rented	 to	 the	 British	 Empire	 by	 the	
Ottomans	 in	 1878;	 left	 out	 of	 Misak-ı	 Milli83	by	 Atatürk	 in	 1920;	 pushed	 into	 a	 ‘federal’	
solution	with	the	Greek-Cypriots	despite	their	desires	for	Taksim	in	1960;	excluded	from	the	
negotiations	 between	Greece-Turkey	 that	were	 based	 on	 Enosis	with	 concessions	 between	
1963-1967;	 UNSC	 Resolution	 186	 recognised	 the	 legitimacy	 of	 the	 RoC	 without	 their	
representation;	 they	 remained	 unrecognised	 by	 the	 international	 community;	 and	 the	 EU	
accepted	the	RoC’s	membership	without	their	representation.	This	time,	they	were	rejected	
by	 the	Greek-Cypriots.	The	 irony	of	 them	being	 the	ones	 left	out	of	 the	EU	despite	 the	 fact	
that	they	accepted	the	Plan	was	very	traumatic	(see	Varnava	and	Faustmann	2009).		
	
Michael	 notes,	 “protracted	 negotiations,	 gridlocked	 in	 perpetual	 impasse,	 collapsing	 under	
their	own	weight,	had	accumulated	a	reservoir	of	expectations,	disillusionment,	and	despair”	
(Michael	2011:108).	Over	 the	years,	decades	 long	disappointments	and	 rejection	exhausted	
the	 public	 faith	 in	 a	 prospective	 settlement	 and	 translated	 into	 peace	 fatigue.	 It	 is	 not	
uncommon	for	communities	to	develop	‘peace-fatigue’	in	normalised	protracted	conflicts,	or	
as	Constantinou	and	Adamides	call	 it,	 in	‘comfortable	conflicts’	(Adamides	and	Constantinou	
2011).	What	 I	 refer	 to	with	 ‘peace-fatigue’	 is	a	shift	 in	 focus	to	more	mundane	and	 internal	
problems	as	people	and	civil	 society	start	 feeling	disillusioned	and	disempowered	without	a	
tangible	 achievement	 at	 Track	 1	 level	 peacemaking	 efforts.	 This	 was	 a	 prevalent	 case																																																									
83	Misak-ı	 Millî	(meaning	 National	 Pact,	 or	National	 Oath)	 is	 the	 set	 of	 six	 important	 decisions	 prepared	 by	 Mustafa	
Kemal	Atatürk,	 accepted	by	 the	 last	 term	of	 the	Ottoman	Parliament,	 that	was	used	as	 the	basis	 for	 the	new	Turkish	
Republic's	claims	in	the	Treaty	of	Lausanne	and	the	borders	of	modern	Turkey.		
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especially	among	the	TCc	following	the	referanda,	as	they	felt	that	even	though	they	had	done	
everything	within	their	power	to	change	the	status	quo,	a	comprehensive	settlement	was	not	
reached.		
	
Peace	fatigue,	that	 is	 latent	with	despair	and	frustration,	can	also	be	observed	by	looking	at	
the	gap	between	‘desire’	for	a	solution	and	‘expecting’	a	solution.	For	example,	opinion	polls	
show	 that	 the	 general	 population	 continued	 to	 desire	 a	 solution	 in	 principle	 but	 lost	 hope	
about	 the	 negotiations’	 potential	 for	 reaching	 a	 positive	 outcome	 (Lordos,	 Kaymak	 et	 al.	
2008).	 Similarly,	 according	 to	a	 survey	conducted	 in	2009,	while	69%	of	Greek-Cypriots	and	
42%	of	Turkish-Cypriots	stated	that	they	desire	a	solution,	61%	and	58%	respectively	said	they	
did	not	expect	 the	peace	process	 to	succeed	 (Cyprus-2015-Initiative	2011).	Considering	 that	
65%	of	Turkish-Cypriots	had	voted	‘yes’	 in	the	referendum,	not	only	were	their	expectations	
curbed	but	their	frustrations	suppressed	their	desires	too.	As	the	negotiations	failed	to	bring	
any	change	to	the	status	quo	people	began	to	disengage	from	the	political	process.			 	
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6.3	After	the	Referendum:	Peace	fatigue	and	identity	limbo	(2004-2015)		
	
The	Annan	Plan	referenda	were	the	closest	Cypriots	ever	got	to	reunification	since	the	break	
up	of	the	RoC	in	1963.	Despite	the	negative	outcome	of	the	referenda,	Europeanisation	of	the	
conflict	and	the	‘yes’	campaigns	for	the	Annan	Plan	provided	an	unprecedented	platform	for	
collaboration,	 bolstering	 a	 collective	 Cypriot	 identity	 and	 nurturing	 Cypriotism	 across	 the	
island.	 As	 civic	 participation	 and	 activism	 increased,	 Turkish-Cypriot	 civil	 society	 matured;	
partnerships	 across	 the	 divide	 and	 more	 institutionalised	 CSOs	 meant	 more	 bicommunal	
projects,	more	peacebuilding	initiatives,	politicisation	of	more	young	people,	and	demand	for	
more	transparency	and	accountability	especially	pertaining	to	the	peacemaking	processes.	As	
a	 result,	 mainstream	 Turkish-Cypriot	 political	 elite	 and	 right-wing	 parties	 lost	 their	
comfortable	 positions.	 As	 the	 joint	 ventures,	 projects	 and	 networks	 started	 to	 grow,	 and	
professional	and	casual	interactions	across	the	Green	Line	became	part	of	daily	life,	the	vision	
and	the	future	these	elites	promised	no	longer	matched	the	new	vision	of	Turkish-Cypriot	civil	
society.		
	
Recognising	that	something	had	to	be	done	to	improve	the	status	of	the	Turkish-Cypriots	and	
‘reward’	 their	 political	 will	 and	 support	 for	 reunification,	 the	 European	 Commission	 (EC)	
announced	 a	 €259	million	 aid	 package	 for	 the	 TCc	 in	 July	 200484.	 The	 optimism	 and	 hopes	
were	still	alive;	there	was	now	more	room,	more	leverage	and	more	carrots	and	sticks	to	end	
the	 isolations	 of	 the	 north	 and	 push	 for	 a	 comprehensive	 settlement	 within	 the	 EU	
framework.	The	EU	sidestepped	the	RoC’s	demand	to	administer	the	aid	package	by	placing	its	
administration	under	the	directorate	that	dealt	with	countries	negotiating	accession.	This	was	
the	EU’s	subtle	‘punishment’	to	the	RoC	for	their	disappointment	over	the	referenda	results.	
In	addition	to	infrastructural	work	and	support	for	small	businesses,	the	aid	package	provided	
the	boost	civil	society	needed	to	maintain	the	momentum.		
	
On	 the	 other	 hand,	 Greek-Cypriot	 civil	 society	 movement	 in	 the	 post-referendum	 era	
continued	 to	 lack	 impetus	 and	 remained	 limited	 to	 the	 work	 of	 a	 few	 marginalised																																																									
84	See	the	EU	regional	policy	for	the	aid	programme	for	the	Turkish	Cypriot	community:		
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/policy/themes/turkish-cypriot-community/	
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organisations.	Charalambous	and	Ioannou	note	that	even	though	the	bicommunal	 initiatives	
at	the	societal	level	experienced	a	boost	due	to	the	increased	amount	of	aid	during	the	early	
2000s,	this	pro-rapprochement	rhetoric	did	not	really	resonate	with	the	political	elite,	and	it	
failed	to	challenge	the	exclusivist	and	nationalist	rhetoric	that	reproduced	the	division	based	
on	ethnicity	 (Charalambous	and	 Ioannou	2015).	Mainstream	discourse	 continued	 to	 rely	on	
self-victimisation,	national	pride,	Turkish	aggressiveness	and	greed	as	the	main	causes	of	the	
Cyprus	Problem.	In	Charalambous	and	Ioannou’s	analysis,	pro-solution	civil-society	initiatives	
remained	either	marginal	with	little	impact	on	the	political	process,	or	attached	themselves	to	
parties	and	politicians,	turning	themselves	into	pressure	groups,	with	limited	appeal.	
	
More	 mobilised	 and	 focused	 civil	 society	 movement	 in	 the	 north	 succeeded	 in	 toppling	
Denktaş’	deep-rooted	position	as	the	‘Turkish	Cypriot	community	leader’.	In	2005,	CTP	leader	
Mehmet	 Ali	 Talat	 won	 the	 presidential	 elections,	 obtaining	 55.6%	 of	 the	 vote	 (Kızılyürek	
2012).	After	having	been	 successful	 in	 every	presidential	 election	 since	1975,	 the	 victory	of	
another	candidate	against	Denktaş,	especially	from	the	left,	was	a	truly	historic	event.	In	July	
2006,	Talat	and	Papadapoulos	started	the	negotiations	again	but	very	 little	was	achieved.	 In	
the	mean	time,	many	deals	and	agreements	such	as	the	‘direct	trade’	deal	were	promised	and	
discussed	 to	 ease	 the	 isolation	 of	 Turkish-Cypriots,	 which	 outraged	 the	 Greek-Cypriot	
government,	as	de-linking	the	embargoes	from	political	recognition,	what	became	known	as	
‘Taiwanisation’,	was	not	acceptable.	These	peripheral	deals	and	negotiations	apart	 from	the	
aid	packages	and	the	Green	Line	regulation85	did	not	materialise.	On	the	contrary,	they	added	
to	 the	 disappointment	 and	 peace	 fatigue	 of	 Turkish-Cypriots	 (See	 Anastasiou	 2009).	 For	
example,	Turkish-Cypriot	attempts	to	secure	representation	in	EU	institutions	was	a	political	
failure.	In	2009,	Talat	demanded	from	the	President	of	the	European	Parliament	that	two	of	
the	 six	 Cypriot	 MEP	 seats	 should	 be	 left	 vacant	 for	 allocation	 to	 Turkish-Cypriots	 until	 a	
solution	was	 reached.	 However,	 the	 Greek-Cypriot	 officials	 rejected	 the	 request	 and	 all	 six																																																									
85	Green	Line	Regulation,	adopted	in	2004,	sets	out	the	terms	under	which	persons	and	goods	can	cross	the	dividing	line.	
The	original	regulation	can	be	found	at:	
http://ec.europa.eu/cyprus/documents/turkish_community/greenline.pdf	
In	2015,	 trade	across	 the	Green	Line	reached	around	€3.5m	compared	to	€3.4m	the	previous	year.	Despite	 this	slight	
increase,	 trade	 remains	at	 a	 low	 level	due	 to	 the	 scope	of	 the	 regulation,	 inconsistencies	 in	 its	 application	and	other	
psychological	and	practical	barriers	that	thwart	business	deals	across	the	divide.	See	European	Commissions’	Green	Line	
report	at:	
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/activity/tcc/eleventh_report_on_the_implementation_of_council_regulati
on_ec_8662004_en.pdf		
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seats	were	 filled	by	Greek	Cypriot	candidates	 (Kaymak	2012).	As	Anastasiou	confirms,	 these	
outcomes	elated	Turkish	and	Turkish-Cypriot	nationalists	who	had	been	 trying	 to	 revive	 the	
secessionist	agenda,	while	it	alienated	the	pro-peace	forces	(Anastasiou	2009).		
	
Optimism	was	once	again	restored	when	Demetris	Christofias,	leader	of	AKEL	was	elected	as	
the	new	president	of	the	RoC	 in	2008.	Considering	the	close	ties	between	the	two	 left-wing	
parties	 and	 their	 explicit	 Cypriotist	 stance,	 this	 presented	 a	 new	 window	 of	 opportunity.	
Turkish-Cypriots,	 who	 blamed	 Papadopoulos	 for	 the	 failure	 of	 the	 referendum,	 saw	 the	
Christofias	and	Talat	duo	as	a	match	made	in	heaven;	not	only	did	the	two	leaders	came	from	
two	left-wing	parties	with	similar	ideologies	and	socialist	pasts,	they	were	both	explicitly	pro-
unification	 and	 pro-federalism.	 I	 remember	 celebrating	 the	 election	 results	with	my	Greek-
Cypriot	friends;	now	we	no	longer	had	hard-liner	nationalists	like	Papadopoulos	and	Denktaş	
leading	 the	 peace	 process,	we	 had	 a	 toast	 for	 the	 comprehensive	 settlement	 that	was	 just	
around	the	corner.		
	
Although	the	signs	were	good	and	both	leaders	declared	they	wanted	an	early	solution,	they	
could	not	agree	on	a	starting	point	for	the	negotiations.	While	Talat	wanted	to	renegotiate	the	
Annan	Plan,	Greek-Cypriots	including	AKEL	had	already	rejected	it	and	wanted	to	start	fresh.	
Two	 particular	 characteristics	 that	 distinguished	 this	 new	 round	 of	 negotiations	 were	
‘indigenisation’	 of	 the	 Cyprus	 Problem	 and	 merging	 of	 ‘core’	 and	 ‘soft’	 issues.	 Firstly,	 as	
Michalis	 Michael	 notes,	 a	 new	 terminology	 crept	 into	 the	 peacemaking	 and	 peacebuilding	
mind-set	under	 the	 rubric	of	 ‘Cypriot-led,	Cypriot-owned’	 (Michael	2011:196).	 The	 so-called	
indigenisation,	 that	 quickly	 became	 the	 guiding	 principle	 of	 the	 negotiations,	 rested	on	 the	
notion	that	Cypriots	had	to	take	full	ownership	and	responsibility	of	the	process,	and	that	the	
UN	and	the	EU	would	only	play	a	facilitating	role	rather	than	arbitrating.	This	indigenisation	of	
the	 process	 supported	 the	 left-wings’,	 and	 particularly	 Christofias	 and	 Talat’s	 ideological	
adherence	 to	 Cypriotism	 that	 advocated	 ‘Cyprus	 for	 Cypriots’.	 Although	 this	 notion	 was	
intended	 for	 empowerment	 and	 ownership,	 and	 to	 move	 away	 from	 the	 feeling	 that	
settlement	plans	have	historically	been	‘imposed’	on	Cyprus,	it	added	to	the	securitisation	of	
Turkish	 immigrants	 and	 Turkishness,	 because	 it	 established	 those	who	 identified	 as	 Cypriot	
first	and	 foremost	as	 the	gatekeepers	of	 the	peace	process,	and	everyone	else	as	outsiders	
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(Akçalı	 2014).	 In	 addition	 to	 Turkish	 immigrants	 being	 securitised	 as	 other-others	 by	 both	
communities,	 those	Cypriots,	who	 identified	closer	with	 the	national	centres	and	did	not	 fit	
the	peacemaking	framework,	became	other-selves,.	
	
Secondly,	to	move	the	negotiations	forward	from	the	now	‘null	and	void’	Annan	Plan,	the	two	
sides	adopted	an	approach	that	 treated	 ‘core	 issues’	 (i.e.	governance,	 territory,	guarantees)	
and	 ‘soft	 issues’	 (i.e.	 confidence	 building,	 cultural	 heritage	 sites,	 missing	 peoples)	 as	 co-
dependent.	Several	technical	committees	(i.e.	gender)	were	established	to	address	day-to-day	
issues.	Recognising	that	the	mediators	underestimated	the	opposition	and	overestimated	the	
malleability	of	public	opinion,	the	new	round	of	negotiations	with	their	Cypriot-led	approach	
aimed	 to	 promote	 inclusivity	 and	 build	 constituency	 for	 the	 peace	 process	 (Kaymak	 2012).	
Numerous	 confidence	 building	 measures	 (CBMs)	 were	 discussed	 but	 only	 a	 few	 were	
implemented,	 such	 as	 opening	more	 check-points	 to	 ease	 the	movement	 across	 the	Green	
Line.	To	a	large	extent,	CBMs	remained	limited	to	symbolic	gestures	and	many	were	shelved	
despite	the	opinion	polls	consistently	showing	overall	support	for	them	(Lordos,	Kaymak	et	al.	
2008,	Kaymak	2012).		
	
Resumption	of	fully-fledged	negotiations	in	2008	did	not	bring	about	a	significant	qualitative	
change	 to	 the	 peace	 process.	 Track	 1	 level	 peacemaking	 and	 the	 civil	 society	 initiatives	
remained	 disconnected,	 the	 leaders	 and	 technical	 committees	 continued	 to	 withhold	
information	(i.e.	on	convergence)	and	there	were	no	integrated	input	or	public	participation	
mechanism.	As	a	result,	not	only	the	bicommunal	 initiatives	 lacked	 legitimacy,	but	they	also	
lost	 potency	 as	 they	 remained	 limited	 in	 their	 outreach.	 The	 same	 group	of	 peace	 activists	
that	 became	 known	 as	 ‘the	 usual	 suspects’	 or	 the	 ‘converted’	 continued	 to	 work	 for	
reunification	with	little	success	and	little	support.	As	Erol	Kaymak	suggests,	even	the	technical	
committees	 that	 were	 supposed	 to	 bridge	 Track	 1	 with	 civil	 society	 were	 subordinated	 to	
political	authority	and	confidentiality,	which	means	that	the	technical	committee	work	failed	
to	trickle	down	into	public	discourse	and	achieved	very	little	synergy	in	cross-fertilising	ideas	
with	CSOs	(Kaymak	2012).	There	was	practically	no	tangible	constructive	progress	on	the	‘soft’	
issues,	let	alone	any	convergence	on	the	‘core’	issues	except	Talat’s	agreement	to	add	‘single	
citizenship	 and	 sovereignty’	 to	 established	 parameters	 based	 on	 ‘bizonal,	 bicommunal	
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federation	with	political	equality’.	This	was	an	important	compromise	for	the	Turkish-Cypriot	
side,	 but	 it	 was	 not	 enough	 to	 rejuvenate	 the	 negotiations.	 According	 to	 Kaymak,	 the	
negotiations	 between	 Talat	 and	 Christofias,	 “if	 anything,	 has	 led	 to	 more	 alienation	 than	
ownership”	(Kaymak	2012:107).	
	
While	 the	 Turkish-Cypriot	 left	 experienced	 unprecedented	 success	 for	 their	 identity	
movement	 that	challenged	Turkish	nationalism	and	 its	policy	of	 ‘Turkification’,	 this	was	also	
partly	 the	 reason	 behind	 the	 peace	 fatigue;	 when	 the	 ‘Common	 Vision’	 based	 on	 EU	
membership	and	reunification	no	longer	seemed	achievable	even	after	the	mainstream	power	
holders	were	somewhat	replaced,	the	left-wing	parties	and	initiatives	could	neither	maintain	
the	civil	society	momentum	nor	their	own	unity	as	an	identity	movement.	Without	this	vision	
and	hope,	 the	Turkish-Cypriot	 left-wing	 in	general	 and	CTP	 in	particular	 could	not	 vindicate	
their	 openings	 and	 compromises	 toward	 the	Greek-Cypriots	 and	 on	 the	 negotiations	 table.	
Consequently,	 what	 Kızılyürek	 calls	 ‘postnational	 patriotism’	 started	 losing	 its	 allure	 and	
appeal	 (Kızılyürek	 2012).	 Being	 denied	 Cypriotness	 and	 Europeanness,	 the	 Turkish-Cypriots	
continued	 to	 long	 for	 a	 stronger	 large-group	 identity	 that	 provided	 them	with	 security-as-
being	where	they	could	safeguard	their	distinct	identity,	and	security-as-survival,	where	they	
could	protect	themselves	as	a	minority.		
	
As	the	negotiations	proceeded,	the	optimistic	environment	quickly	dissipated	and	the	Cyprus	
Problem	continued	 to	 fester	 in	 a	 limbo.	 Frustrations	over	 the	Annan	Plan,	AKEL’s	 rejection,	
and	Christofias	 and	Talat’s	 failure	 to	 yield	 anything	 tangible	 in	 the	negotiations,	 turned	 the	
‘spring’	of	Turkish-Cypriot	civil	society	into	a	‘fall’,	and	saw	the	return	of	the	right-wing	UBP	to	
the	government	as	the	majority	party	of	the	coalition	following	the	general	elections	in	2009,	
and	 the	 election	 of	 the	 UBP	 leader	 Derviş	 Eroğlu	 as	 the	 president	 in	 2010.	 This	 showed	
Turkish-Cypriots’	 loss	of	faith	 in	the	peace	process	and	a	federal	united	Cyprus	(See	Kaymak	
2012).		
	
When	 the	RoC	started	 the	search	 for	oil	and	gas	within	 the	 islands	Economic	Zone	 in	2011,	
Turkey	protested	that	the	Turkish-Cypriots	had	an	equal	right	to	these	possible	resources,	and	
tried	to	stop	search	vessels	in	the	Mediterranean.	Turkey	also	refused	to	open	its	ports	to	the	
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Greek-Cypriot	 vessels	 claiming	 that	 it	 did	 not	 wish	 to	 ‘recognise’ 86 	the	 RoC	 prior	 to	 a	
settlement	 deal.	 Consequently,	 the	 EU	 halted	 Turkey’s	 accession	 negotiations.	 The	 tension	
thwarted	the	peace	process	and	churned	the	exclusive	and	nationalist	narratives	once	again.	
For	 Greek-Cypriots,	 Turkey	 was	 trying	 to	 intimidate	 them	 again,	 showing	 muscle	 and	
interfering	 in	 their	business,	and	Turkish-Cypriots	wanted	 to	keep	 their	half	of	 the	 island	 to	
themselves	 while	 at	 the	 same	 time	 trying	 to	 be	 equal	 partners	 in	 the	 RoC.	 For	 Turkish-
Cypriots,	Greek-Cypriots	were	demonstrating	how	they	did	not	want	to	share	Cyprus	and	its	
resources,	 and	 how	 they	 did	 not	 see	 Turkish-Cypriots	 as	 legitimate	 partners.	 As	 such,	 the	
positive	and	vibrant	environment	could	not	be	maintained	post-referenda.		
	
As	the	peace	fatigue	set	 in,	continuation	of	the	embargoes	and	the	tension	over	oil	and	gas	
excursions	 fuelled	 Turkish-Cypriot	 perceived	 injustices.	 Their	 lives	 under	 isolation	 on	 the	
fringes	of	the	EU	did	not	see	them	any	worse	off	than	before;	in	fact,	life	was	relatively	better	
due	 to	 the	 EC’s	 harmonisation	 programmes	 and	 aid.	 However,	 every	 frustration	 was	
exacerbated	with	 ‘but	we	said	yes’	 rhetoric,	every	bump	and	compromise	pertaining	 to	 the	
peace	process	was	 ‘undeserving’	because	 ‘we	said	yes’.	The	65%	that	 said	 ‘yes’	were	 losing	
face	to	the	35%	that	said	‘no’;	they	had	said	‘yes’	to	the	‘enemy’,	and	still	got	nothing;	they	
went	against	the	mainstream	narrative	and	denounced	their	Turkishness,	and	still	got	nothing;	
they	were	willing	to	give	up	land	and	territory	that	was	won	with	blood,	and	still	got	nothing.	
No	voters	had	won,	not	only	in	the	southern	part	of	the	island,	but	also	in	the	north.			
	
Although	 civil	 society	 mobilisation	 lost	 momentum	 and	 potency,	 it	 was	 temporarily	
rejuvenated	 to	 an	 extent	 in	 2011	 following	 the	 discontent	 with	 regards	 to	 Turkey’s	
interference	in	domestic	politics	and	imposed	economic	reforms.	Inspired	by	the	uprisings	in	
the	 Arab	 world	 and	 the	 Occupy	 Movement,	 what	 started	 as	 a	 protest	 against	 Ankara’s	
austerity	 measures	 to	 curtail	 public	 expenditure	 quickly	 descended	 into	 a	 resistance	
movement	 against	 Turkey’s	 patronage	 and	 was	 also	 reflected	 in	 the	 Occupy	 Buffer	 Zone	
movement	of	Greek-Cypriot	and	Turkish-Cypriot	peace	activists87.	Anti-Turkey	demonstrations																																																									
86	Although	there	is	no	Republic	of	Cyprus	Embassy	in	Ankara	and	Turkey	refers	to	the	Republic	of	Cyprus	government	as	
‘The	Greek	Cypriot	Administration	of	South	Cyprus’,	it	is	possible	to	travel	to	Turkey	with	a	Republic	of	Cyprus	passport,	
and	Greek	Cypriot	sporting	teams	and	organisations	have	been	represented	 in	events	 in	Turkey	under	the	Republic	of	
Cyprus	flag.		
87	See	http://www.occupybufferzone.info/	
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organised	by	the	“This	Country	is	Ours	Platform”	mobilised	over	25,000	people	in	the	capital	
and	 called	 for	 Turkey	 to	 ‘f-off’	 from	 Cyprus	 and	 for	 Ankara	 to	 take	 her	 ‘hands	 off	 Turkish-
Cypriots’	(Zaman	2011).	Such	strongly	worded	banners	used	at	the	demonstrations	organised	
around	the	time	of	Recep	Tayyip	Erdoğan’s	visit	to	the	‘TRNC’	 in	February	2011	generated	a	
lot	 of	 reaction	 in	 Turkey	 and	 prompted	 Erdoğan	 to	 express	 his	 anger	 by	 likening	 Turkish-
Cypriots	 to	 ungrateful	 orphan	 housemaidens/servants	 that	 feed	 on	 Turkey	 (Bilge	 2011,	
EurActiv	2011).	Erdoğan	lambasted	Turkish-Cypriots	saying	they	were	“fed	and	maintained	by	
Turkey,”	 had	 “no	 right	 to	 hold	 such	 protests,”	 and	 that	 Turkey	 had	 “martyrs,	 heroes	 and	
strategic	 interests”	 in	 Cyprus	 (Bahçeli	 2011).	 Demonstrations	 continued	 nonetheless,	 and	
Erdoğan’s	 unfortunate	 expression	 further	 fuelled	 anti-Turkey	 and	 anti-Turkish	 immigrant	
sentiments	in	northern	Cyprus.		
Figure	No	2:	Turkish-Cypriot	demonstrations	(2)	
*Left:	February	2011,	Demonstrations	in	Nicosia,	north	Cyprus.	The	blue	banner	uses	a	Cypriot	curse	word	that
translates	as	“Holy	shit”	or	“we	are	screwed”.	The	banner	reads:	“Were	we	saved?	…Holy,	shit!”.	The	red	caption	
published	by	several	online	newspaper	 in	Turkey	reads	“Ingrate	Cypriots”,	which	depicts	 the	demonstrators	as	
ungrateful	for	the	‘generosity	of	the	motherland’	(En	Son	Haber2011).		
*Right:	March,	2011,	Demonstrations	in	Nicosia,	north	Cyprus.	The	banners	from	left	to	right	read:	“Solution	and
peace	right	now”,	 	 “No	to	extinction”,	“No	more	ruled	by	order”,	“AKP	take	your	hands	off	our	 throat/collar”,	
“AKP,	Take	your	hands	off”,	“No	to	extinction”,	and	“Not	a	hostage	of	Turkey,	not	a	patching/patch-up	to	Greek-
Cypriots”	(Zaman	2011).			
	 212	
	
Figure	No	3:	Turkish-Cypriot	demonstrations	(3)	
	
	
*Left:	March	2011,	picture	 taken	at	 the	demonstrations	 in	Nicosia,	 and	published	 in	 the	 thesis	 fieldwork	blog	
funded	by	Fulbright	Commission88		
*Right:	 July	 2012,	 Cyprus	 Turkish	 Teachers’	 Union	 (KTÖS)	 and	 Cyprus	 Turkish	 Secondary	 Education	 Teachers’	
Union	(KTOEÖS)	at	the	ceremony	organised	for	the	RoC’s	EU	presidency	(Gündem	Kıbrıs	2012).		
	
The	Europeanisation	of	the	conflict	has	significantly	shifted	and	reconfigured	Turkish-Cypriot	
identity	narratives	along	the	 lines	of	Cypriotism.	This	 reconfiguration	was	 further	 intensified	
when	the	AKP	government,	who	were	supportive	of	the	Annan	Plan,	slowly	turned	away	from	
the	 EU.	 As	 the	 democratic	moderate	 Islamic	 image	 of	 the	AKP	 government	 started	 to	 fade	
away,	 and	 as	 the	 Sunni	 identity	 was	 increasingly	 highlighted	 as	 integral	 to	 Turkishness,	 it	
became	 even	 harder	 for	 Turkish-Cypriots	 to	 reconcile	 the	 two	 parts	 of	 their	 identity	
narratives.	Similar	to	Spyrou’s	analysis	of	Turkish-Cypriots	being	a	contradiction	 in	terms	for	
Greek-Cypriots	 (Spyrou	2001),	pro-solution	Turkish-Cypriots	became	half-enemy,	half-self	 to	
themselves	 too.	 Especially	 following	 the	 Istanbul	 Gezi	 demonstrations	 in	 2012,	 Erdoğan’s	
Islamic	 agenda	 was	 no	 longer	 implicit.	 The	 no-solution	 scenario	 was	 becoming	 scarier	 for	
Turkish-Cypriots	due	to	their	dependence	on	Turkey.	Bottom-up	and	horizontal	securitisation	
of	Turkish	immigrants	and	Turkishness	by	the	Turkish-Cypriot	civil	society	and	general	public	
increased	as	democracy	in	and	the	European	ambitions	of	Turkey	became	more	questionable.		
	
Similarly,	 the	economy	 in	the	RoC	started	deteriorating.	The	economic	crisis	and	the	painful	
bail-out	plan	of	2012-2013,	the	catastrophic	explosion	of	2011	in	the	village	of	Mari	that	cost																																																									
88	http://followwoody.blogspot.co.uk/	
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the	lives	of	13	people	and	blew	away	most	of	the	RoC’s	largest	power	station	combined	with	
the	 stalemate	on	 the	Cyprus	Problem	weakened	AKEL	and	Christofias’	position	as	well	 (See	
Charalambous	 and	 Ioannou	2015).	 Economic	 crisis	 triggered	 two	opposing	narratives	 in	 the	
GCc.	 While	 one	 focused	 on	 the	 economic	 benefits	 of	 a	 prospective	 solution	 hence	
emphasising	 the	need	and	 the	 sense	of	urgency	 for	a	 comprehensive	 settlement,	 the	other	
was	based	more	on	national	pride,	that	linked	the	trauma	and	the	‘destruction’	of	the	bailout	
to	the	events	of	1974,	arguing	that	if	Greek-Cypriots	succeeded	in	rising	from	their	ashes	after	
the	Turkish	invasion,	they	could	surely	survive	the	TROIKA’s	austerity	measures	and	the	crisis	
(See	Triga	and	Papa	2015).	On	balance,	however,	the	economic	crisis	was	not	directly	linked	to	
the	Cyprus	Problem	in	the	public	discourse.	As	Adamides	argues	and	as	can	be	observed	three	
years	after	the	bailout	plan,	the	overall	narrative	and	the	political	discourse	about	the	conflict	
remained	mostly	unchanged	 in	 the	GCc	and	 the	economic	 concerns	were	 simply	prioritised	
over	the	concerns	about	the	Cyprus	Problem	(Adamides	2014).	In	other	words,	the	economic	
crisis	was	merely	‘disruption’	where	the	attention	was	temporarily	focused	elsewhere.	
At	the	end	of	2011,	no	negotiation	dossier	was	formally	or	provisionally	declared	closed	and	
as	the	RoC	assumed	the	EU	presidency	in	June	2012,	the	negotiations	were	once	again	stalled.	
In	 2013,	 Nicos	 Anastasiades,	 the	 leader	 of	 DISY,	 a	 centre-right	 party	 that	 consistently	
supported	reunification	and	the	only	party	that	favoured	the	Annan	Plan,	was	elected	as	the	
new	 President.	 The	 peace	 talks	 were	 reinitiated	 briefly	 in	 early	 2014	 but	 were	 once	more	
postponed	to	an	indefinite	time	in	the	future	when	the	president	of	the	RoC	withdrew	from	
the	 negotiations	 due	 to	 the	 violation	 of	 Cyprus’	 exclusive	 economic	 zone	 by	 the	 Turkish	
seismic	vessel,	Barbarous	(Anastasiou	2015).	The	negotiations	resumed	after	the	independent	
left-wing	presidential	candidate	Mustafa	Akıncı	assumed	office	in	north	Cyprus	in	April	2015.	
Known	 for	 his	 pro-solution	 and	 Turkey	 defying	 stance,	 many	 accounts	 consider	 the	
Anastasiades	 and	 Akıncı	 duo	 creates	 a	 very	 favourable	 environment	 and	 that	 the	 stars	 are	
perfectly	aligned	this	time,	bringing	the	island	closer	than	ever	to	reaching	a	comprehensive	
settlement.	 Despite	 the	 negotiations	 continuing	 in	 a	 relatively	 constructive	 and	 positive	
environment	and	the	two	leaders	declaring	2016	will	be	the	year	of	‘peace’	for	Cypriots,	it	is	
hard	to	say	if	Cyprus	is	any	closer	to	reaching	a	comprehensive	settlement.			
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Conclusion	
	
Providing	a	historical	and	contextual	analysis	for	the	case	study	was	an	inevitable	task	for	this	
thesis.	However,	 instead	of	presenting	a	 factual	historical	 timeline	of	 the	key	events	 for	 the	
case	 of	 Cyprus,	 Chapters	 5	 and	 6	 linked	 this	 timeline	 from	16th	 Century	 to	 2015	 to	 shifting	
identity	 narratives	 on	 the	 island,	 and	 tried	 to	 unpack	 the	 relationship	 between	 these	
narratives,	ontological	 security	of	Cypriots	and	 the	peace	process.	Thus	Part	 II	of	 this	 thesis	
was	written	in	a	way	to	bridge	Part	 I	that	focuses	on	the	theoretical	framework	with	Part	 III	
that	provides	an	empirical	analysis	based	on	the	 fieldwork	data.	 Just	as	 the	two	chapters	 in	
this	part	shared	a	single	introduction,	I	will	conclude	this	lengthy	historical	and	contextual	part	
of	the	thesis	with	a	single	conclusion	as	well.		
	
Chapter	5,	 starting	with	 the	Ottoman	period	and	 stretching	back	 to	 the	16th	Century	 traces	
how	 identity	 narratives	 that	 were	 based	 on	 religion	 (Muslim	 and	 non-Muslim)	 during	 the	
Ottoman	 era	 became	 politicised	 and	 nationalised	 along	 ethnic	 lines	 especially	 during	 the	
British	 rule.	 The	 first	 section	 of	 the	 chapter	 focuses	 on	 key	 events	 that	 were	 influential	 in	
configuring	the	identity	narratives	of	the	two	main	communities	in	the	mirror	image	of	their	
respective	motherlands,	 Turkey	 and	Greece.	 As	 the	 two	main	 communities’	 desires	 for	 the	
future	became	increasingly	mutually	exclusive,	the	second	half	of	the	20th	Century	was	tainted	
with	 inter-communal	 violence.	 Subsequently,	 the	 second	 section	 of	 Chapter	 5	 takes	 the	
timeline	 from	 the	 establishment	 of	 the	 RoC	 in	 1960	 to	 the	 division	 of	 the	 island	 in	 1974,	
looking	at	how	 these	mutually	 exclusive	desires	 and	 identity	narratives	 along	with	 the	Cold	
War	dynamics	gradually	gave	birth	to	what	we	came	to	know	as	the	Cyprus	Problem.		
	
Especially	since	the	establishment	of	the	RoC,	one	can	only	be	a	Greek-Cypriot	or	a	Turkish-
Cypriot	 in	 Cyprus.	 The	 late	 TCc	 leader	 Rauf	Denktaş’	 unfortunate	 and	 unpopular	 statement	
that	 there	 are	 no	 Cypriots	 on	 the	 island,	 and	 that	 the	 only	 true	 Cypriots	 are	 the	 island’s	
donkeys	living	in	Karpasia	is	in	fact	a	legal	reality89	(İnanç	2010).	As	such,	the	1960	constitution																																																									
89	The	 former	 leader	 of	 the	 Turkish-Cypriot	 community	 and	 the	 late	 President	 of	 the	 ‘TRNC’	 Denktaş:	 “I	 am	 Child	 of	
Anatolia.	Everything	on	me	is	Turkish.	My	roots	are	in	Central	Asia.	I	am	Turkish	in	my	language,	culture	and	history.	My	
country	is	my	motherland.	Cyprus	culture,	Turkish-Cypriots,	Greek	Cypriots,	a	common	state,	all	these	are	nonsense.	The	
Greek	Cypriots	 are	Byzantium,	 they	are	Greeks,	we	are	Turks.	 They	have	 their	Greece	and	we	have	our	 Turkey.	Why	
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reified	 and	 essentialised	 identity	 narratives	 on	 the	 island,	 conflating	 religious	 identity	 with	
ethnic	 identity	 based	 on	 primordial	 blood	 relations.	 Social	 and	 political	 life	 was	 then	
predicated	 on	 this	 distinction,	 where	 media	 outlets,	 schools,	 sports	 clubs	 and	 civil	 service	
positions	were	all	founded	upon	this	hyphenation.	However,	at	least	until	1974,	the	two	main	
communities’	 bonds	 with	 their	 respective	 motherlands,	 and	 their	 Turkishness/Greekness,	
although	 legally	 imposed	 for	 some,	 shows	 itself	 as	 the	 dominant	 primary	 identity	 narrative	
that	legitimised	their	political	claims	and	their	exclusive	desires	for	the	future.		
The	 ephemerality	 of	 the	 RoC	 that	 had	 three	 disjointed	 caretakers	 (guarantors)	 can	 be	
unpacked	with	Gidden’s	concept	of	basic	trust.	Developing	a	sense	of	‘basic	trust’	at	 infancy	
resembles	 the	 inception	 of	 collective	 identities	 through	 actions	 such	 as	 nation-building	
practices	or	establishing	entities	that	(try	to)	embody	collective	identities	such	as	states.	The	
infant,	who	is	on	the	brink	of	unimaginable	anxiety	is	called	into	existence	by	the	environment	
provided	by	the	caretaker	and	develops	a	sense	of	self	in	response	to	the	social	and	material	
context	 it	 experiences	 (Giddens	 1991).	 For	 collective	 identities	 this	 environment	 represents	
the	social	and	material	relations	with	its	neighbours	and	other	collectives	in	the	regional	and	
international	 arena.	 The	 inherent	 distrust	 towards	 the	 caretakers	 and	 their	 intensions	 (i.e.	
Greece,	 Turkey	 and	 the	 UK),	 as	 well	 as	 the	 instability	 of	 the	 domestic	 social	 and	 material	
environment	coupled	with	the	instability	of	the	regional	and	international	environment	due	to	
the	 Cold	 War	 dynamics,	 hampered	 ‘basic	 trust’	 of	 the	 ‘infant’	 that	 was	 being	 called	 into	
existence.	This	analysis	can	help	explain,	at	least	partly,	why	the	RoC	as	the	infant	could	not	
develop	a	coherent	sense	of	self	that	could	comfortably	accommodate	both	Turkish-Cypriots	
and	Greek-Cypriots.		
The	key	turning	points	for	identity	reconfiguration	in	this	period	until	the	division	of	the	island	
can	be	summarised	with	the	respective	traumas	of	the	two	communities.	For	Turkish-Cypriots,	
their	collective	trauma	was	underpinned	by	a	feeling	of	consistent	rejection	and	dispensability	
from	their	large-group	and	was	galvanised	with	their	eleven	long	years	living	in	the	enclaves.	
should	we	 live	 under	 the	 same	 state?	We	once	declared	 Taksim	or	 death.	Now	 that	we	 are	 so	 close	 to	 Taksim,	why	
should	we	choose	death?	Some	people	talk	about	the	so-called	Turkish-Cypriots	or	Greek-Cypriots.	There	are	no	Turkish-
Cypriots,	no	Greek-Cypriots	and	no	Cypriots.	Do	not	dare	to	ask	us,	if	we	are	Cypriots!	We	would	take	this	as	an	insult.	
Why?	Because	in	Cyprus	the	only	thing	that	is	Cypriot	is	the	donkey”	(İnanç	2010).		
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For	Greek-Cypriots,	their	collective	trauma	was	buttressed	by	a	feeling	of	betrayal	from	their	
large-group	and	enflamed	with	 the	Turkish	 invasion	and	division	of	 the	 island.	This	point	 in	
time	is	where	the	analysis	in	Chapter	6	starts.	
	
Since	 the	 division	 of	 the	 island,	 the	 break	 away	 northern	 part	 of	 the	 island	 has	 been	
administered	by	 the	 ‘TRNC’,	which	 is	not	 internationally	 recognised	by	any	state	other	 than	
Turkey.	The	RoC,	which	 is	 internationally	recognised	as	having	the	sole	sovereignty	over	the	
island,	continues	to	function	with	the	doctrine	of	necessity	in	the	absence	of	Turkish-Cypriots,	
but	 effectively	 only	 represents	 the	 southern	part	 of	 the	 island.	 The	 analysis	 in	 Chapter	 6	 is	
located	 in	 this	 legal	 and	 political	 anomaly.	 The	 first	 section	 explores	 the	 post-division	 era	
leading	up	 to	 the	 civil	 society	mobilisation	and	Europeanisation	of	 the	 conflict	 in	 the	1990s	
while	 the	 second	 section	 explores	 the	 period	 leading	 up	 to	 the	 Annan	 Plan	 referendum.	
Subsequently,	 the	 last	 section	 of	 the	 chapter	 moves	 the	 discussion	 forward	 to	 post-
referendum	period	that	 is	marked	with	a	prevalent	sense	of	 ‘peace	fatigue’	and	 intensifying	
identity	 limbo.	 The	 chapter	 illustrates	 how	 the	 peace	 process	 and	 securitisation	 dynamics	
create	other-others	(Turkish	immigrants),	other-selves	(those	who	do	not	fit	the	peacebuilding	
framework	such	as	the	nationalists	or	‘no’	voters)	and	othered-selves	(Turkishness	in	Turkish-
Cypriot	 identity	narratives),	and	how	the	narrow	dual-ethnic	approach	of	 the	peace	process	
fuels	ontological	dissonance	and	thwarts	the	reconciliation	efforts.	
	
The	gradual	but	 significant	 shift	 from	dominant	 irredentist	motherland	nationalism	 towards	
Cypriotism	of	the	Greek-Cypriot	identity	narratives	which	also	reconfigured	their	approach	to	
the	 conflict	 is	 rooted	 in	 the	 events	 of	 1974,	 and	 remained	 mostly	 resistant	 to	 change	
thereafter.	 For	 Turkish-Cypriots,	 this	 shift	 is	 inherently	 linked	 with	 Europeanisation	 of	 the	
conflict	 and	 the	 failure	 of	 the	 ‘TRNC’	 to	 provide	 a	 geographical	 actuality	 for	 their	 identity	
narratives.	 The	 lack	 of	 a	 geographical	 actuality	 still	 creates	 existential	 anxieties	 for	 Turkish-
Cypriots,	 who	 are	 neither	 Turkish	 nor	 Muslim	 enough	 to	 be/feel	 part	 of	 Turkey,	 and	 not	
Cypriot	and	European	enough	to	be	part	of	the	RoC	and	the	EU.		
	
Although	Chapter	 6	 traces	 this	 emerging	Cypriotism,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 highlight	 its	 intrinsic	
nuances.	Two	major	Cypriotist	narratives	are	exclusivist	in	their	own	way.	One	comes	from	a	
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smaller,	more	marginalised	group	on	the	left,	who	emphasises	a	distinct	Cypriot	identity	that	
encompasses	 both	 Turkish-Cypriots	 and	 Greek-Cypriots,	 but	 also	 searches	 for	 a	 ‘pure’	 and	
‘native’	Cypriotness	that	particularly	excludes	Turkish	 immigrants	among	others	that	are	not	
deemed	 ‘Cypriot’	 enough.	 The	 other	 that	 resonates	 with	 the	 majority	 of	 Cypriots,	
amalgamates	 the	 ethnic	 ties	 with	 territorial	 loyalties	 and	 distinguishes	 Cypriotness	 from	
motherland	 nationalism	 while	 simultaneously	 homogenising	 ‘interests’	 into	 two	 opposing	
camps;	Turkish-Cypriot	and	Greek-Cypriot.		
The	 discussion	 and	 key	 events	 in	 Chapter	 6	 clearly	 demonstrate	 that	 Cypriot	 identity	
narratives	are	both	contingent	and	contextual.	 Loizides,	underlines	 that	 the	“case	of	Cyprus	
supports	 scholarly	 perspectives	 that	 see	 identities	 as	 constructed	 and	 reconstructed	 as	
political	 factors	 and	 opportunities	 change”,	 and	 points	 to	 the	 exclusivist	 nature	 of	 the	
mainstream	Cypriotist	identity	narratives	(Loizides	2007:185).	He	suggests	that	reassertion	of	
attachment	to	the	ethnic	community	in	the	form	of	Greek-Cypriotism	or	Turkish-Cypriotism	is	
more	than	simply	a	middle	ground	between	‘motherland	nationalism’	and	‘civic	Cypriotism’.	
In	 other	 words,	 ethnic	 Cypriotism	 appropriates	 national	 symbols	 and	 rhetoric	 from	 the	
motherlands	but	prioritises	the	aspirations	of	the	respective	ethnic	communities	on	the	island	
over	the	interest	of	the	‘national	centres’	or	Cyprus	as	a	whole.	“Thus,	Greek-Cypriotism	and	
Turkish-Cypriotism	 take	 ascendancy	 in	 two	 respective	 frequently	 oppositional	 camps”	
(Loizides	2007:173).	Loizides	illustrates	this	exclusivist	Cypriotism	using	the	public	response	to	
Papodopoulos’s	emotional	speech	against	the	Annan	Plan	in	April	2004	that	shows	a	turning	
point	in	Greek-Cypriot	self-perception:	“…while	all	other	‘glorious	moments’	in	Greek	Cypriot	
history	were	 celebrated	with	Greek	 flags,	 at	 the	 end	 of	 Papadopoulos’s	 speech,	 individuals	
spontaneously	rushed	to	the	presidential	palace	waving	Cypriot	flags,	appropriating	those	as	a	
symbol	of	Greek-Cypriot	identity…”	(Loizides	2007:185).	
To	visualise	fluid	and	shifting	identity	narratives	of	the	two	main	communities	on	the	island,	
we	 can	 chart	 them	 on	 a	 spectrum.	 On	 the	 right	 end	 of	 the	 spectrum	 are	 those	 Greek-
Cypriots/Turkish-Cypriots	 who	 see	 themselves	 as	 Greeks/Turks	 first	 and	 foremost,	 placing	
little,	 if	 any,	 emphasis	 on	 their	 Cypriot	 identity.	 They	 see	 themselves	 as	 Greeks/Turks	who	
happen	to	be	in	Cyprus,	just	as	like	Greeks/Turks	who	happen	to	live	in	Crete/Salonika.	On	the	
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left	 end	 of	 the	 spectrum	 are	 those	 who	 prefer	 to	 stress	 their	 Cypriotness	 and	 they	 see	
themselves	as	culturally	and	historically	tied	to	the	island	of	Cyprus	above	all	else.	For	them,	
Greece/Turkey	 is	 a	distant	 and	 foreign	 land.	However,	 increasingly	 since	 the	division	of	 the	
island	most	Greek-Cypriots/Turkish-Cypriots	fall	between	the	two	polar	ends.	They	recognise	
that	 they	 have	 a	 Greek/Turkish	 ancestry	 and	 feel	 a	 bond,	 however	 strong	 or	 weak,	 with	
Greece/Turkey,	but	they	also	see	themselves	as	clearly	distinct	from	Greece/Turkey.	They	find	
pride	 in	 their	 Cypriotness	 and	 distinct	 Cypriot	 dialect,	 and	 feel	 a	 strong	 allegiance	 to	 their	
island	 (Ker-Lindsay	 2011).	 Those	 in	 the	 middle	 of	 the	 spectrum	 and	 toward	 the	 left	 end,	
despite	their	different	 ideal	solution	scenarios,	are	also	those	who	are	most	engaged	by	the	
peace	process	on	the	island.		
The	review	of	historical	timeline	leaves	us	with	the	conclusion	that	since	the	break	up	the	RoC	
in	 1963,	 negotiations	 followed	 a	 repetitive	 cyclical	 pattern	 where	 disagreements	 on	 the	
substantial	issues	(governance,	sovereignty,	property,	citizenship	etc.)	saw	both	sides	retreat	
to	their	entrenched	positions.	Effectively,	there	is	a	mismatch	between	what	is	negotiated	and	
‘feasible’	at	Track	1	level,	and	what	the	two	main	communities	desire.	A	loose	federation	as	
Turkish-Cypriots	desire	creates	ontological	insecurity	for	Greek	Cypriots	as	it	challenges	their	
self-identity	 that	 rests	 on	 the	 whole	 of	 Cyprus,	 its	 unity	 as	 one	 singular	 homeland	 with	 a	
Hellenic	 heritage;	 the	 sovereignty	 disagreements	 (Turkish-Cypriots	 prefer	 sovereignty	 to	
emanate	from	constituent	states	rather	than	the	federal	state)	challenge	the	legitimacy	of	the	
RoC	and	the	narrative	that	is	based	on	righteous	legitimate	Cypriots	victimised	by	their	eternal	
enemy	Turkey,	who	 forcefully	 took	away	half	of	 their	 land.	 Similarly,	 a	 strong	 federation	as	
Greek-Cypriots	 desire	 creates	 ontological	 insecurity	 for	 Turkish-Cypriots	 due	 to	 their	
engrained	 fears	 about	 being/becoming	 a	 minority;	 while	 demands	 for	 singular	 central	
sovereignty,	undermines	their	heroic	struggle	based	on	their	self-perception	as	a	community	
who	was	refused	political	equality,	pushed	out	by	the	majority	but	bravely	resisted,	achieving	
‘self-determination’	in	the	end,	proving	that	Cyprus	is	not	Hellenic.		
Securitisation	of	Turkish	immigrants	and	Turkishness	turns	this	insecurity	into	dissonance	both	
for	 Turkish-Cypriots	 and	 Greek-Cypriots.	 Turkish-Cypriots	 need	 their	 Turkishness	 to	 have	 a	
legitimate	claim	within	the	peacebuilding	framework	and	to	maintain	the	narrative	that	they	
219	
need	 the	 Turkish	 military	 for	 their	 security-as-survival	 among	 the	 majority	 GCc.	 Yet,	 their	
Turkishness	is	also	part	of	the	obstacle	to	their	desired	future	and	associates	them	with	their	
securitised	and	orientalised	other-other	that	contradicts	their	secularism	and	Europeanness.			
As	 such,	 it	 comes	 as	 no	 surprise	 that	 national,	 ethnic	 and	 cultural/civic	 identity	 is	 a	
controversial	subject	for	Cypriots.	 In	fact,	 I	personally	find	myself	ambivalent	about	my	own	
self-identification.	 For	 example,	 when	 filling	 online	 administrative	 forms,	 the	 drop-down	
nationality	 menus	 provide	 two	 options:	 ‘Cypriot	 (non-EU)’	 and	 ‘Cypriot	 (EU)’.	 These	 two	
options	pragmatically	try	to	make	a	legal	distinction	between	those	Cypriots	who	hold	a	RoC	
passport	and	those	who	only	hold	a	‘TRNC’	passport	without	making	a	reference	to	ethnicity.	
However,	 they	 also	 allude	 to	 an	 internalised	 and	 stigmatised	 narrative.	 Due	 to	 recognition	
issues,	 the	 forms	 avoid	 referring	 to	 the	 ‘non-European’	 side	 as	 the	 ‘TRNC’;	 instead,	 the	
differentiation	between	Cypriots	is	made	based	on	‘Europeanness’.	As	previously	discussed,	in	
parallel	 with	 Zarakol’s	 approach	 to	 ‘stigma’,	 the	 choice	 between	 ‘Cypriot	 (non-EU)’	 and	
‘Cypriot	 (EU)’	 becomes	 a	 choice	 between	belonging	 to	 the	more	 civilised,	Westernised	 and	
modernised	box	that	refers	to	the	GCc	and	one	that	is	non-European,	backward	and	oriental	
that	refers	to	the	TCc.	As	such,	Europeanness	and	Westernisation	attributed	to	those	Turkish-
Cypriots	who	hold	the	RoC	passport	distances	them	from	the	internalised	stigma	pertaining	to	
Turkishness,	but	those	who	do	not	hold	the	RoC	passport	for	whatever	reason	(be	it	political	
or	due	to	their	or	their	parents	birth	place)	become	non-European	or	less	European.		
What	is	more,	the	ambivalence	ceases	to	be	an	administrative	tick-box	and	becomes	part	of	
the	daily	routine	every	time	I	go	back	to	Cyprus.	For	example,	when	I	cross	the	check-points	to	
travel	 to	 the	 ‘other’	 side,	 I	 need	 to	 queue	 at	 the	Greek-Cypriot	 customs	 booth	 assigned	 to	
Turkish-Cypriots	 despite	 the	 fact	 that	 I	 have	 an	RoC	passport;	while	 someone	with	 a	Greek	
sounding	 name	 with	 the	 same	 passport	 can	 walk	 through	 without	 queuing;	 my	 name	
designates	 me	 as	 a	 Turkish-Cypriot	 even	 though	 I	 carry	 the	 same	 piece	 of	 identification	
document	 produced	 by	 the	 same	 institution.	When	 I	 first	moved	 back	 to	 Cyprus	 in	 2006,	 I	
used	to	challenge	the	border	guards	and	customs	officers	because	I	considered	queuing	at	the	
booth	assigned	to	Turkish-Cypriots	an	arbitrary	meaningless	act	and	an	 imposition	upon	my	
self-identity.	However,	and	may	be	unfortunately,	crossing	 the	check-points	on	a	daily	basis	
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became	part	of	my	 routine,	 and	arbitrary	 impositions	and	daily	 frustrations	 stemming	 from	
the	Cyprus	Problem	became	part	of	that	routine.	Ironically,	working	for	peacebuilding	projects	
meant	 that	my	daily	 routine	was	 integrated	 into	 the	 conflict	 and	 visa-versa;	making	 it	 all	 a	
normalised	part	of	‘reality’.	I	stopped	challenging	the	border	guards	and	the	customs	officers;	
I	stopped	questioning	the	connotations	of	me,	with	a	non-Greek	sounding	name	queuing	to	
cross	to	the	RoC,	while	my	friend	Katerina,	holding	the	same	passport,	just	walking	through.			
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Part	III	Empirical	Analysis	of	Identity	Narratives:	Is	Peace	an	insecure	
experience?			
 
Chapter	 7.	 Securitisation	 Dynamics	 and	 Identity	 narratives	 in	 the	 Turkish-
Cypriot	Community	
7.1	Introduction		
“Yurdunu	sevmeliymiş	insan		
öyle	diyor	hep	babam		
benim	yurdum	ikiye	bölünmüş	ortasından		
hangi	yarısını	sevmeli	insan”	(Yasin	1979)	
“People	must	love	their	homeland	
so	my	father	always	says	
my	homeland	has	been	divided	into	two	
which	half	must	people	love?90”	
	
It	 is	 easy	 to	 want	 peace	 but	 not	 always	 easy	 to	 imagine	 it.	 Imagining	 peace	 in	 protracted	
conflicts	 means	 re-imagining	 the	 ‘self’	 and	 the	 ‘other’	 in	 an	 uncertain	 future.	 Peace	 is	
conditional,	depending	on	the	fears	and	anxieties	of	the	island’s	two	main	communities,	and	
these	fears	and	anxieties	are	by	no	means	static	and	homogeneous.	Even	though	Cyprus’	two	
main	communities	can	 freely	 travel	across	 the	check-points	and	have	 increased	 interactions	
since	2003,	recent	generations	of	children		still	grow	up	learning	about	their	existential	enemy	
that	 lives	 next	 door,	 across	 the	 Green	 Line.	 They	 created	 an	 image	 for	 themselves	 that	
depended	on	the	image	of	the	enemy;	where	all	internal	was	good	and	just,	and	all	external	
was	 bad	 and	 evil.	 Peacebuilding	 and	 reconciliation	 efforts	 challenge	 this	 image,	 and	 hence	
challenge	the	reification	of	self-identities,	as	 just	and	moral.	However,	perceptions	of	threat	
and	security	 in	Cyprus	extend	beyond	the	primary	self/other	(Turkish-Cypriot/Greek-Cypriot)	
relationships	 that	 the	peacebuilding	efforts	 focus	on,	and	 include	other-others,	other-selves	
and	othered-selves	
	
The	 belief	 that	 Turkey	 is	 encouraging	 immigration	 to	 change	 the	 island’s	 demographic	
balance,	 and	 to	 distort	 the	 democratic	 will	 of	 the	 ‘indigenous’,	 ‘real’	 Turkish-Cypriots	 is	
prevalent	among	both	the	Turkish-Cypriots	and	Greek-Cypriots	(see	Hatay	2005).	The	‘Turkish	
settlers	issue’,	that	is	technically	and	legally	different	than	an	‘immigrant’	or	a	‘refugee’	issue,																																																									
90	My	own	translation	
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is	 indistinguishable	 in	 the	 narratives	 and	 consciousness	 of	 Turkish-Cypriots	 and	 Greek-
Cypriots.	 The	perception	of	 threat	 this	 group	poses	 is	widespread	 irrespective	of	 their	 legal	
status.	 Even	 though	 on	 a	 theoretical	 level,	 individuals	 may	 recognise	 these	 distinctions,	 in	
daily	routines	and	interactions,	these	become	negligible.	As	such,	Cypriots	generally	refer	to	
this	 group	 with	 the	 essentialised	 all-inclusive	 categorical	 term	 ‘Türkiyeliler’	 in	 Turkish,	
meaning	people	from	Turkey	and	‘έποικοι’	in	Greek,	meaning	settlers.	This	essentialised	group	
includes	everyone	from	Turkey;	irrespective	of	whether	they	are	Kurds	or	Shi’is,	came	to	the	
island	in	1974	or	yesterday,	students,	businesspeople	or	military	personnel,	or	whether	they	
are	working	with	or	without	work	permits.		
Hatay	 argues	 that	 the	 debates	 and	 gross	 exaggerations	 about	 the	 number	 of	 Turkish	
immigrants	 are	 one	 of	 the	 main	 reasons	 behind	 the	 Greek-Cypriots’	 ‘no’	 vote	 in	 the	
referendum	(Hatay	2005).	For	instance,	the	myths	about	the	number	of	Turkish	immigrants	in	
northern	Cyprus	range	from	150,000	to	700,000	depending	on	the	accounts	(see	Hatay	2007,	
Faiz	2008,	Kurtulus	and	Purkis	2012,	Soyalan	2013).	The	uncertainty	about	their	numbers	only	
enhances	suspicion	and	anxiety	about	the	issue,	and	feeds	into	the	conspiracy	(or	not)	about	
Turkey’s	 demographic	 engineering	 plans.	 Even	 though	 the	 official	 census	 and	 demographic	
studies	carried	out	by	Peace	Research	Institute	Oslo	(PRIO)	suggest	the	numbers	are	heavily	
exaggerated,	 the	 statistics	 are	 irrelevant	 to	 the	 perceived	 threats	 and	 feelings	 of	 fear	 and	
anxiety	(Rosello	2001:18).	An	interview	quote	from	Mahmut	Anayasa,	the	author	of	the	book	
‘İsyanım	İşgale’	(My	Rebellion	is	Against	the	Occupation)	can	illustrate	this	further:		
“We	are	being	suffocated	in	the	lands	where	we	were	born.	I	believe	that	there	
are	at	least	700,000	people	in	this	country.	Why	should	I	pay	attention	to	the	
delirious	statements	of	the	State	Planning	Organisation91?	Whether	it	is	de	jure	
or	de	facto	does	not	concern	me.	What	concerns	me	is	the	street.	Because	the	
street	does	not	lie.	…	Am	I	in	the	minority?	Yes!”92	(Soyalan	2013).	
91	State	Planning	Organisation	is	the	‘TRNC’	department	that	carries	out	censuses	among	other	things.		
92	“Doğduğumuz,	büyüdüğümüz	topraklarda	boğuluyoruz.	İnanırım	ki	bu	ülkede	en	az	700	bin	insan	var.	Devlet	planlama	
örgütünün	 abuk	 sabuk	 açıklamalarına	 ne	 bakarım	 ben.	 Efendim	 ‘de	 jureymiş’,	 ‘de	 factoymuş’	 beni	 ilgilendirmez,	 beni	
sokak	ilgilendirir.	Niçin?	Çünkü	sokak	yalan	söylemez.	Ben	gittiğim	ortamlara,	gittiğim	yerlere	bakarım.	Azınlıkta	mıyım?	
Evet!”		
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The	 importance	 of	 demography	 impacts	 upon	 Turkish-Cypriots’	 consciousness	 and	 incites	
fears	 about	 their	 existence	 and	 anxieties	 about	 their	 biographical	 continuity,	 which	 are	
intensified	by	the	increasingly	authoritarian	and	Islamicised	direction	of	Turkey.	Even	though	
their	 securitisation	 by	 the	 GCc	 is	 unsurprising	 considering	 the	 island’s	 history	 and	 that	 of	
Greece-Turkey,	where	similar	enemy-other	constructions	exist,	it	is	particularly	interesting	to	
explore	 the	 securitisation	 of	 this	 group	 by	 Turkish-Cypriots	 despite	 their	 shared	 ethnicity,	
language	and	religion.	Securitisation	that	shows	itself	in	xenophobia,	discrimination	and	social	
polarisation	 also	 impacts	 upon	 the	 Turkish	 immigrants’	 ability	 to	 integrate,	 to	 claim	 basic	
rights,	and	their	sense	of	certainty	about	the	future.	
Drawing	on	the	fieldwork	data	carried	out	in	2014-2015	and	enriching	it	with	secondary	data	
sets	 stretching	 back	 to	 2008,	 this	 chapter	 unpacks	 the	 securitisation	 dynamics	 between	
Turkish-Cypriots	 and	 Turkish	 immigrants,	 how	 this	 impacts	 the	 peace	 processes	 and	 how	 it	
relates	 to	Turkish-Cypriots’	 anxieties	about	 their	 current	 situation	and	 future.	 The	empirical	
evidence	presented	demonstrates	four	interesting	findings:	1)	Turkish-Cypriots	are	becoming	
more	Cypriot	and	 less	motherland	centric;	2)	Turkish-Cypriots’	 feelings	of	Cypriotness	and	
perceived	 levels	 of	 threat	 posed	 by	 Turkish	 immigrants	 have	 a	 positive	 relationship;	 3)	
Turkish-Cypriots	who	prioritise	their	Cyrpiotness	feel	higher	levels	of	threat	to	their	identity	
and	also	 feel	more	anxiety	about	their	current	situation;	4)	Higher	 levels	of	anxiety	about	
their	current	situation	intensifies	the	desires	for	a	comprehensive	settlement	but	does	not	
make	 compromise	 easier	 due	 to	 ontological	 dissonance.	 Thus,	 feelings	 and	 expression	 of	
Cypriotness,	 securitisation	 of	 Turkish	 immigrants	 as	 the	 other-other,	 Turkishness	 as	 the	
othered-self	and	anxiety	about	the	future	and	desire	for	a	solution	seem	to	go	hand	in	hand.	
However,	 when	 the	 primary	 other,	 that	 is	 the	 generalised	 Greek-Cypriot	 majority	 on	 the	
island,	is	added	to	the	equation,	we	can	observe	ontological	dissonance	as	accommodation	of	
Turkishness	and	Cypriotness	along	with	peace-anxieties	becomes	too	difficult	to	manage.		
The	chapter	first	maps	the	securitisation	of	Turkish	immigrants	and	the	growth	of	Cypriotism	
among	the	TCc	and	explores	how	Turkish-Cypriots	differentiate	themselves	from	people	from	
Turkey	 and	 how	 this	 translates	 into	 representations	 of	 fear	 and	 danger.	 The	 chapter	 then	
delves	 deeper	 into	 these	 expressions	 and	 feelings	 of	 fear	 and	 anxiety,	 and	 analyses	 the	
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reasons	 behind	 Turkish-Cypriots’	 prevalent	 concerns	 about	 existence	 and	 extinction	 by	
exploring	the	response	of	the	other(s)	and	the	concept	of	‘home’.	The	penultimate	section	of	
the	chapter	inserts	the	other-selves	into	the	analysis	in	addition	to	other-others	and	othered-
selves	and	scrutinises	the	inherent	fears	and	anxieties	by	drawing	parallels	between	Northern	
Ireland93	and	the	Åland	 Islands94.	Lastly,	 suggesting	 that	 the	exclusion	of	Turkish	 immigrants	
from	 the	peace	process	 and	 their	 securitisation	 creates	ontological	 dissonance,	 the	 chapter	
concludes	 that	 institutionalised	desecuritisation	 strategies	of	Turkishness	 can	provide	a	way	
out	of	the	vicious	cycle.	Moreover	it	suggests	that	such	a	move	will	allow	Turkish-Cypriots	to	
find	 comfort	 in	 their	 in-betweenness	 and	 escape	 the	 limbo	 where	 they	 simultaneously	
securitise	 the	part	of	 their	 identity	 that	 legitimises	 their	 claims	 for	 their	desired	 future,	and	
hence	facilitate	transformative	peace.		
	 	
																																																								
93	The	 Good	 Friday	 Agreement	 can	 be	 considered	 as	 one	 of	 the	 rare	 success	 stories	 in	 peacebuilding	 literature.	 An	
interesting	parallel	can	be	drawn	between	varying	and	shifting	identity	narratives	in	Northern	Ireland	and	Cyprus,	where	
the	peacebuilding	framework	has	inadvertently	created	gatekeepers	and	dissidents	of	peace.		
94	The	Åland	Islands	consists	of	an	archipelago	at	the	entrance	to	the	Gulf	of	Bothnia	in	the	Baltic	Sea.	It	is	autonomous,	
demilitarised	 and	 is	 the	 only	monolingually	 Swedish-speaking	 region	 in	 Finland.	 The	 Åland	 crisis	was	 one	 of	 the	 first	
issues	 put	 up	 for	 arbitration	 by	 the	 League	 of	 Nations	 when	 the	 Swedish	 speaking	 Ålandars	 demanded	 self-
determination	 in	 1921.	 However,	 sovereignty	 over	 the	 islands	 was	 retained	 by	 Finland	 but	 international	 guarantees	
were	given	to	allow	the	population	to	pursue	its	own	culture	to	address	the	perceived	threat	of	forced	assimilation	by	
Finnish	culture.	The	case	of	Ålandars,	their	desires	for	unification	with	Sweden	and	their	association	and	distinctiveness	
with	Finland	has	parallels	with	the	case	of	Cyprus.		
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7.2	Motherland	No	More:	The	self	
The	arrival	of	Turkish	 settlers	and	migrants	 to	north	Cyprus	began	 in	1974.	 In	1974,	Turkey	
and	 the	 Turkish-Cypriot	 administration	 entered	 into	 an	 agreement	 called	 the	 Agricultural	
Labour	Force	Agreement	 (ITEM)	to	 facilitate	the	settlement	of	approximately	30,000	people	
from	 rural	 Turkey	 to	 recreate	 the	 economy	 of	 the	 island	 and	 Turkify	 the	 demographics	 as	
Turkish-Cypriots	 ended	up	with	 37%	of	 the	 territories	when	 their	 population	was	 only	 18%	
after	 the	division	of	 the	 island	 (Hatay	2008).	Those	 immigrants	who	were	part	of	 this	policy	
received	 empty	 Greek-Cypriot	 properties	 and	 citizenship	 in	 the	 new	 Turkish-Cypriot	 ‘state’	
almost	upon	arrival	(ITEM	1977).	This	facilitated	the	migration	of	people	from	Turkey	until	the	
late	 1970s,	 and	 it	 is	 this	 group	 that	 is	 mainly	 referred	 to	 as	 the	 ‘settlers’.	 Migrants	 who	
continued	to	arrive	after	the	ITEM	agreement	mainly	came	in	search	of	a	better	life	without	
specific	 incentives,	 or	 included	 groups	 such	 as	 Kurds	 and	 Shi’as	 running	 away	 from	
persecution	in	Turkey.		
Up	until	the	late	1990s	Turkish-Cypriots’	identity	was	mainly	defined	along	ethnic	and	national	
lines	emphasising	their	cultural	and	historical	links	with	Turkey	and	Turkishness.	The	emphasis	
on	 their	 Turkishness	 legitimised	 their	 claims	 to	 political	 equality,	 self-determination	 and	
autonomy	on	the	island	and	justified	their	resistance	against	Greek-Cypriots.	Turkishness	was	
the	part	of	their	identity	that	linked	them	to	a	much	stronger	large-group	that	could	defend	
them	against	the	 ‘aggressive’	Greek-Cypriot	majority.	 It	was	the	 involvement	and	protection	
of	 Turkey,	 and	 Cyprus’	 perceived	 political,	 historical	 and	 geographic	 tie	 and	 significance	 to	
Anatolia	 that	 elevated	 their	 minority	 status	 to	 that	 of	 an	 equal	 partner	 on	 the	 island.	
However,	 the	 initial	 honeymoon	 period	 with	 Turkey	 proved	 to	 be	 ephemeral.	 After	
experiencing	an	initial	boost	of	‘we-ness’,	fuelled	by	nationalistic	feelings	and	excitement	over	
‘being	 free’,	 splits	began	 to	appear	 clearly	 in	north	Cyprus	during	 the	years	 following	1974.	
The	 rural	 background,	 clothing	 and	 lack	 of	 education	 of	 the	 migrants	 provided	 the	 host	
community	with	grounds	for	prejudice	and	discrimination,	who	had	developed	a	culture	that	
was	distinct	from	the	‘mainlanders’	as	a	result	of	their	intermingling	with	Greek-Cypriots	and	
accustomed	way	of	living	under	the	British	Empire.	As	their	frustration	with	isolation	and	non-
recognition	grew	and	with	the	Europeanisation	of	the	conflict	in	late	1990s,	the	prospect	of	a	
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large-group	 European	 identity	 seemed	 not	 only	 more	 achievable	 but	 also	 more	 desirable.	
Turkishness	 was	 no	 longer	 a	 large-group	 that	 could	 provide	 them	 safety	 and	 security;	 so,	
Turkish-Cypriots	moved	closer	to	the	Cypriot	part	of	their	identity.		
The	securitisation	of	Turkish	immigrants	can	be	traced	back	to	late	1980s	and	early	1990s,	but	
this	was	mainly	a	marginalised	effort	 limited	 to	 (far)	 left-wing	 individuals	and	activists,	who	
were	 easily	 labelled	 as	 traitors,	 as	 ‘Greek-seeds95’	 or	 as	 communists;	 while	 some	 were	
assassinated,	 the	 others’	 voice	was	 drowned	 out	 by	 the	 dominant	mainstream	motherland	
nationalism	of	 the	political	 elite.	 Every	 time	 the	opposition	 leaders,	poets	and	writers	were	
attacked	and	branded	as	‘traitors’	by	the	nationalists,	they	became	more	Cypriot	because	they	
saw	 these	 attacks	 as	 either	 initiated	 or	 supported	 by	 Turkey	 (Hatay	 2008).	 Consequently,	
anything	 that	 appeared	 to	 praise	 Turkey	 and	 almost	 anything	 Turkish	 became	 an	 object	 of	
hostility	and	a	 symbol	of	oppression.	The	 left-leaning	groups	mobilised	 in	opposition	 to	 the	
right-wing,	 or	 in	 opposition	 to	 Taksim	 or	 ‘TRNC’,	 but	 they	 were	 also	 united	 by	 a	 sense	 of	
difference	 from	 the	 Turkish	 settlers	 (Hatay	 2008).	 Despite	 the	 mainstream	 nationalist	
narrative	that	positioned	‘Turks	of	Cyprus’	in	opposition	to	‘Greeks	of	Cyprus’	and	dominated	
the	discourse	especially	until	the	early	2000s	(until	the	demise	of	Denktaş),	the	securitisation	
process	 that	 initially	 started	 among	 the	 left-leaning	 Turkish-Cypriots,	 gradually	 spread	
horizontally	 and	 bottom-up	 across	 the	 populace.	 Today,	 despite	 the	 acknowledgment	 of	
kinship,	the	comparison	of	the	fieldwork	data	carried	out	in	2014	to	the	Cyprus-2015-Initiative	
surveys 96 	shows	 that	 Turkish-Cypriots	 are	 moving	 away	 from	 motherland-centrism	 and	
increasingly	prioritising	their	Cypriotness	over	their	Turkishness	(Cyprus-2015	Initiative	2009,	
2010,	2011,	QTS:2014).	As	such,	while	over	96%	of	Turkish-Cypriots	stated	that	they	consider	
Cyprus	as	their	motherland,	those	who	consider	Turkey	as	their	motherland	decreased	from	
78%	to	69%	in	the	past	6	years.			
95	A	derogatory	phrase	indicating	that	they	have	Greek	DNA	in	them,	and	that	they	are	not	Turkish	enough	and	implying	
that	their	mothers	had	bed	with	the	enemy.		
96	Cyprus-2015-Initiative	 survey	 sample	was	based	on	 stratified	 random	sampling	of	 1000	Turkish-Cypriot	with	 ‘TRNC’	
citizenship.	Thesis	fieldwork	survey	sample	was	based	on	stratified	random	sampling	of	500	Turkish-Cypriots	with	‘TRNC’	
citizenship.	The	survey	company	that	carried	out	both	surveys	was	the	same,	thus	these	datasets	are	highly	compatible	
for	comparative	analysis.		
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	Chart	No	1:	Turkish-Cypriot	perceptions	of	motherland	
Chart	No	2:	Temporal	comparison	of	Turkish-Cypriot	perceptions	of	motherland97	
Furthermore,	 a	 growing	 sense	 of	 Cypriotism	 in	 the	 TCc	 is	 clearly	 visible	 from	 the	 temporal	
analysis	of	the	quantitative	data,	whereby	those	who	identified	themselves	as	only/mostly	a	
Turk	significantly	dropped	from	24%	to	8%	and	those	who	identified	as	only/mostly	a	Cypriot	
increased	from	20%	to	28%	(Cyprus-2015	Initiative	2009,	2010,	2011,	QTS:2014).		
97	The	slight	increase	in	the	expression	of	ethnic	identities	and	motherland	centrism	between	2009	and	2011	can	also	be	
observed	in	the	Greek-Cypriot	community.	Looking	at	the	timeline	of	events,	this	increase	can	be	explained	by	three	key	
factors:	1)	The	confrontation	between	the	RoC	and	Turkey	over	the	natural	gas	excursions	and	Turkish-Cypriots’	claim	
that	any	natural	 resources	 found	 in	 the	EEZ	of	Cyprus	belonged	to	both	communities;	2)	The	return	of	 the	right-wing	
government	in	the	Turkish	Cypriot	community	and	the	pessimism	pertaining	to	the	Track	1	level	negotiations;	and	3)	The	
global	economic	crisis.	
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Chart	No	3:	Temporal	Comparison	of	Turkish-Cypriot	perceptions	of	identity	
	
	
As	 the	number	of	 the	migrants	 increased	over	 the	years,	Turkish-Cypriot	 identity	 felt	under	
attack	 reinforcing	 a	 feeling	 of	 security-as-survival	 and	 ontological	 insecurity	 regarding	 their	
biographical	continuity	as	a	distinct	identity.	It	is	important	to	note	that	this	securitisation	of	
Turkish	 immigrants	 is	different	than	the	blatant	xenophobia	against	migrants	 in	general	that	
can	be	observed	in	other	parts	of	Europe	(see	Huysmans	2000).	The	securitisation	is	not	only	
economic	(about	cheap	labour	and	infrastructure),	or	social	(about	social	cohesion	and	a	fear	
of	different	ethnicities/religions),	but	 it	 is	also	political	 (about	Turkish-Cypriots	own	political	
will	and	empowerment	linked	to	past	traumas	about	being	a	minority)	and	existential	(about	
their	 biographical	 continuity	 and	 oblivion/extinction).	 For	 example,	 56%	 of	 civil	 society	
representatives	disagreed	with	the	statement	that	“People	from	Turkey	are	no	different	than	
other	migrants	in	Cyprus”	(CSOS-TCc:2014).	While	trying	to	balance	their	opinions	and	feelings	
with	 a	 more	 humanistic	 attitude	 toward	 immigrants	 in	 general,	 many	 civil	 society	
representatives	 elaborated	 that	 the	 social	 and	 cultural	 differences	 with	 the	 Turkish	
immigrants	 posed	 a	 threat	 to	 their	 society	 and	 identity,	 and	 that	 they	 were	 scared	 of	
assimilation,	often	choosing	the	word	‘extinction’	to	express	their	feelings.	They	also	strongly	
differentiated98	themselves	from	the	category	of	‘mainland	Turk’	(CSOS-TCc:2014).	
																																																								
98	20	out	of	60	respondents	stated	that	they	perceived	more	identity	similarities	with	Greek-Cypriots	than	Turks	and	23	
emphasised	 their	 differences	 compared	 to	 Turks,	 while	 27	 acknowledged	 both	 their	 differences	 and	 similarities	
compared	to	both	groups.	
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“Even	 though	Turkish-Cypriots	have	historical,	 linguistic	and	cultural	 ties	with	
Turkey,	 they	 have	 cultivated	 a	 distinct	 community	 for	 themselves.	 They	
adopted	 a	 more	 tolerant	 and	 open	 lifestyle,	 and	 welcomed	 modernisation	
movements	without	 a	 conservative	 reaction	 [like	 in	 Turkey].	 This	more	 open	
and	 tolerant	 approach	 allowed	different	 religious	 identities	 to	 coexist	 on	 the	
island.	 We	 share	 the	 same	 geography	 and	 hence	 same	 geographical	
characteristics	with	Greek-Cypriots.	 Although	we	 have	 religious	 and	 linguistic	
differences,	our	genetics	and	DNA	analysis	would	show	more	familial	ties.	Plus,	
we	 both	 carry	 Mediterranean	 characteristics	 and	 a	 common	 cultural	
identity99.”	(Anonymous,	Cyprus	Turkish	Teachers	Union)	
In	addition	to	emphasising	distinctiveness	based	on	lifestyle	and	culture,	Turkish-Cypriots	also	
emphasise	 their	 somewhat	 agnostic	 approach	 to	 religion	 as	 an	 important	 element	 in	 their	
self-image.	Ali	 Erel100,	 voiced	his	 ambivalence	of	 being	 a	 Turkish-Cypriot	 during	 an	 informal	
communication	 in	November	2013;	 “Turkish-Cypriots	are	under	more	pressure	 than	ever	 to	
become	better	Turks	and	most	of	all,	better	Muslims”.	Similar	opinions	about	 religion	were	
also	raised	by	civil	society	representatives	(CSOS-TCc:2014):		
“Culture	wise	I	feel	different	from	Turkey	and	with	Erdoğan's	politics	I	feel	that	
in	the	future	I	might	feel	completely	different	in	every	aspect.	I	perceive	myself	
more	 familiar	 to	 Greek-Cypriots	 but	 religion	 is	 creating	 a	 huge	 gap.”	 (Nilay	
Bilsel,	 The	 International	 Network	 for	 Traditional	 Building,	 Architecture	 &	
Urbanism)	
Considering	 the	 paternal	 relationship	 and	 dependence	 on	 Turkey,	 the	 processes	 of	
securitisation	that	is	prevalent	among	civil	society	and	the	general	public	is	neither	translated	
into	the	official	discourse	of	the	government	in	north	Cyprus	or	into	emergency	measures,	nor	
is	it	negotiated	into	the	mandates	of	the	security	professionals	(i.e.	stricter	migration	control	
and	regulations,	more	border	policing	or	a	shift	in	entrance/visa	requirements	for	people	from	
Turkey).	Hence,	the	bottom-up	securitisation	attempts	of	civil	society	and	the	general	public	
99	Author’s	own	translation.	
100	Ali	Erel	is	the	former	chair	of	the	Cyprus	Turkish	Chamber	of	Commerce,	former	president	of	Cyprus	EU	Association	
and	the	former	president	of	the	Solution	and	EU	Party	(ÇAP).	
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who	express	fears	about	their	existence	and	anxiety	about	their	future	move	horizontally	from	
civil	 society	 to	 the	 general	 public	 and	 vice	 versa	with	 increased	pessimism	and	desperation	
about	 their	current	conditions.	This	shows	 itself	 in	 increased	discrimination	and	xenophobia	
toward	people	 from	Turkey	and	 the	bottom-up	and	horizontal	 reproduction	of	 the	sense	of	
insecurity	 and	 victimhood.	 In	 their	 extensive	 research	 on	 experiences	 of	 the	 Turkish	
immigrants	 in	 north	 Cyprus,	 Kurtuluş	 and	 Purkis	 confirm	 that	 Turkish-Cypriots’	 discontent	
about	 their	 present	 situation,	 their	 self-victimisation	 as	 a	 small	 vulnerable	 community	 that	
was	 first	 oppressed	 by	 Greek-Cypriots	 and	 now	 by	 Turkey,	 is	 reflected	 in	 the	 increased	
marginalisation	of	the	Turkish	migrants	(Kurtulus	and	Purkis	2012).	The	perceived	differences	
between	 Turkish-Cypriots	 and	 Turkish	 immigrants	 that	 are	 translated	 into	 a	 securitised	
relationship	 of	 othering	 are	 also	 corroborated	 by	 the	 focus	 group	 participants.	 Neşe101,	 a	
guidance	 teacher	 at	 a	 public	 high	 school,	 who	 was	 born	 in	 Cyprus	 to	 Turkish	 immigrant	
parents,	gave	vivid	examples	of	discrimination	in	education	institutions	(FG2-N:2015):	
	“…	I	work	in	a	public	school,	and	we	have	very	few	dual	citizens,	the	majority	
of	the	students	are	from	Turkey.	And	when	Cypriots	come	to	enrol	their	kids,	
they	 request	 [from	 teachers	 and	 the	 school	 administration]	 their	 kids	 to	 be	
assigned	to	an	all-Cypriot	classroom.	…	We	have	purely	Cypriot	classrooms	with	
some	dual	 citizens,	and	purely	Turkish	classrooms.	…We	end	up	with	 ‘iPhone	
classrooms’	[Cypriots]	and	‘nothing	classrooms’	[migrant	students].102”	
	
Similarly,	Ahmet,	a	high	school	teacher,	who	came	to	Cyprus	in	1975	voiced	his	exasperation	
on	 the	 indifference	of	 the	political	 leaders	 to	 recognise	 increased	polarisation	between	 the	
two	groups	(FG1-F:2015):		
“Politicians	don’t	address	societal	marginalisation	and	discrimination,	they	deny	
it.	 In	 order	 to	 address	 it,	 they	 have	 to	 accept	 that	 it	 exists...	 Just	 like	 Turkey	
denied	 the	Kurdish	problem	and	considered	 it	 solely	economic,	 they	deny	 that	
there	is	a	problem	between	Cypriots	and	Turkish	people…	103”	
	
																																																								
101	Please	note	that	the	participant	names	have	been	changed	for	anonymity.		
102	Author’s	own	translation	of	the	focus	group	transcripts.	
103	Author’s	own	translation	of	the	focus	group	transcripts.	
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Many	focus	group	participants	also	highlighted	their	amplified	sense	of	marginalisation	due	to	
not	 being	 able	 to	 cross	 to	 the	 southern	 part	 of	 the	 island.	 For	 example,	 Demir,	 a	
businessperson	 married	 to	 a	 Turkish-Cypriot,	 who	 came	 to	 Cyprus	 in	 1996,	 expressed	 his	
anger	and	anxiety	about	the	opening	of	the	check-points,	despite	the	fact	that	he,	himself	can	
cross	with	his	marriage	certificate:		
“It	 makes	 me	 anxious.	 A	 Russian,	 a	 Bulgarian,	 a	 Greek	 [repeating	 the	 word	
‘Greek’	with	a	slightly	detestable	emphasis],	can	cross	really	nicely,	they	also	fly	
to	 Turkey	 from	 the	 north.	 Because	 the	 Republic	 of	 Cyprus	 is	 a	 smart	
government	and	ours	is	stupid.	That	is	why	our	youth	got	snobbish	[referring	to	
Turkish-Cypriots	who	can	cross].	…	Once,	the	son	of	this	patisserie	that	I	always	
go	 to	 looked	me	 in	 the	eye…	and	 told	me	 ‘you	will	 leave	 from	this	 island	 ‘be	
fellah104’’.	I	said	‘what	did	you	do	for	this	country	to	have	the	right	to	kick	me	
out?	…	 I	am	from	here,	my	children,	my	wife	is	from	here,	my	future	is	here’.	
When	 the	 check-points	 were	 opened,	 when	 CTP	 came	 to	 power,	 they	
negotiated	on	us	at	the	table.	When	they	received	a	‘higher’	status	[referring	to	
RoC	 citizenship],	 they	 said	 that	 we	 had	 to	 leave.	 …We	 will	 face	 more	
discrimination	and	nationalism	[Cypriotism]	after	a	solution,	but	 I	 still	 respect	
CTP’s	pro-solution	stance,	they	are	defending	their	own	land.	105”	
In	their	study	titled	“Cypriot	Perceptions	of	Turkey”,	Bryant	and	Yakinthou	explore	the	nature	
of	 the	 increasingly	 tense	 relations	 between	 Turkey	 and	 the	 Turkish-Cypriots.	 Noting	 that	
Turkish-Cypriots	came	to	know	Turkey	more	closely	after	1974,	they	contend	that	the	Turkey	
with	 whose	 fate	 Turkish-Cypriots	 were	 now	 entangled	 was	 not	 the	 Turkey	 of	 their	
imaginations,	“…pushing	them	into	further	reliance	on	a	state	whose	behaviour	towards	the	
island	seemed	increasingly	to	blur	the	boundaries	of	protectorate	and	province”	(Bryant	and	
Yakinthou	 2012:10).	 The	 Cyprus	 Problem	 itself,	 neither	 achieving	 recognition	 nor	 realising	
their	demonstrated	political	will	for	a	federation	in	the	2004	referendum	left	Turkish-Cypriots	
in	 an	 ontological	 limbo	 as	 the	 ambiguities	 about	 identity,	 the	 future,	 and	 their	 sense	 of	
104	‘Be’	in	Turkish	and	‘Re’	in	Greek	is	a	slang	sound	used	to	call	or	refer	to	people	without	using	their	name,	similar	to	
‘Oi’.	 ‘Fellah’	directly	translates	as	peasant	but	 is	exclusively	used	for	people	from	Turkey	that	scorns	their	appearance	
and	clothing.	
105	Author’s	own	translation	of	the	focus	group	transcripts	from	Turkish	to	English.	Emphasis	added.	
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belonging,	 and	 frustrations	 about	 their	 control	 over	 their	 own	 fate	has	 created	anxieties	 at	
multiple	fronts.	As	a	result,	the	relationship	that	many	Turkish-Cypriots	have	long	described	as	
‘familial’	 and	 ‘organic’,	 and	 the	 image	 of	 Turkey	 as	 the	 ‘saviour’	 has	 increasingly	 begun	 to	
seem	paternalistic	and	colonial.		
Comparably,	 Kurtuluş	 and	 Purkis	 confirm	 this	 generalised	 imprecise	 categorisation	 of	 the	
‘Turkish	 immigrant’	 as	 the	 agents	 of	 the	 ‘coloniser’	 who	 are	 taking	 away	 Turkish-Cypriots’	
future,	 culture,	 political	 will	 and	 their	 distinct	 identity	 (Kurtulus	 and	 Purkis	 2012).	 Turkish-
Cypriots	 often	 define	 this	 relationship	 and	 their	 anxiety	 with	 words	 and	 phrases	 such	 as	
‘incest’,	 ‘assimilation’,	 ‘cultural	 erosion’,	 ‘demographic	 engineering’,	 ‘demographic	 danger’	
and	‘extinction’	(see	Bryant	and	Yakinthou	2012).	A	survey	carried	out	by	Hüseyin	Çakal	at	the	
University	 of	 Oxford	 confirms	 that	 Turkish-Cypriots	 perceive	 threats	 from	 two	 main	 out-
groups,	Turks	and	Greek-Cypriots	(Cakal	2013).	According	to	the	study,	Turkish-Cypriots	report	
higher	 levels	 of	 threat	 posed	 by	 Turks	 than	 by	 Greek-Cypriots	 to	 their	 political	 power	 and	
economic	 resources	 as	 well	 as	 social	 values,	 traditions	 and	 cultural	 practices	 (Cakal	 2013).	
Accordingly,	 both	 quantitative	 survey	 results	 and	 civil	 society	 survey	 responses	 show	 that	
Turkish-Cypriots	place	Turkish	immigrants	at	the	centre	of	the	Cyprus	Problem	and	see	them	
as	a	threat	to	their	Cypriotness.	
Empirical	 evidence	 suggests	 that	 securitisation	 of	 Turkish	 immigrants	 and	 Turkishness	
intensifies	the	desires	for	a	comprehensive	settlement	for	Turkish-Cypriots	by	reinforcing	and	
reproducing	 their	 distinct	 Cypriot	 identity.	 Those	 who	 emphasise	 the	 Cypriot	 part	 of	 their	
identity	 express	 more	 fears	 about	 their	 existence	 and	 feel	 more	 anxiety	 about	 their	
biographical	 continuity;	 and	 those	 who	 perceive	 more	 threats	 from	 Turks	 evaluate	 their	
current	 situation	more	 negatively	 and	 express	more	 anxiety	 about	 the	 status	 quo.	 Overall,	
respondents	express	higher	levels	of	anxiety	about	their	current	situation	and	the	prospect	of	
being	 stuck	 in	 a	 stalemate	 scenario,	 compared	 to	 anxiety	 about	 reaching	 a	 comprehensive	
settlement.	 For	example,	 civil	 society	 representatives	 clearly	articulate	 their	anxieties	about	
their	current	situation	(CSOS-TCc:2014):	
“The	uncertainty	of	the	future	makes	it	uneasy	to	live.	The	plans	you	make	seem	
irrelevant.”	(Aris	Denis	Terziyan,	North	Cyprus	Hoteliers	Association)	
233	
“My	biggest	 fear	 is	 the	 formal	division	of	 the	 island	and	 the	annexation	of	 the	
northern	 part	 to	 Turkey.	Needless	 to	 say,	my	 only	 hope	 is	 a	 settlement	 and	 a	
democratic,	 multicultural,	 tolerant	 country.	 …	 The	 possibility	 of	 no	 solution	
makes	me	anxious	for	two	reasons:	Firstly	I	don't	think	the	non-recognised	state	
of	 ours	 is	 sustainable,	 …the	 only	 way	 out	 of	 this	 mess	 is	 to	 be	 in	 an	
internationally	recognised	body.	Secondly,	living	in	such	a	small	country	with	so	
many	armies	and	arms	is	unacceptable	for	me.”	(Derya	Beyatlı,	KAB	and	CMIRS)		
“Possibility	of	no	 solution	makes	me	anxious	 in	all	ways...	Without	a	 solution	 I	
don't	 beleive	 I	 have	 a	 future	 in	 Cyprus.”	 (Kani	 Kanol,	 HASDER	 Folk	 Art	
Foundation)	
	“…	With	no	solution	we	face	a	myriad	of	problems	including	the	very	real	threat	
of	 assimilation	 with	 Turkey,	 job	 insecurities	 and	 losing	 what	 is	 left	 of	
Cypriotness.”	(Anonymous,	Cyprus	Community	Media	Centre	(CCMC))	
The	quantitative	data	corroborates	that	the	feelings	of	anxiety	voiced	by	civil	society	is	shared	
across	the	community.	The	first	table	below	shows	the	relationship	between	Cypriotness	and	
perception	 of	 existential	 threats,	 illustrating	 that	 the	more	Cypriot	 Turkish-Cypriots	 identify	
themselves	 the	 more	 insecure	 they	 feel	 about	 their	 identity.	 The	 second	 table	 shows	 the	
relationship	between	anxieties	about	no-solution	and	fears	about	extinction,	illustrating	that	
those	who	perceive	more	threats	from	people	from	Turkey	also	feel	more	anxiety	about	the	
status	quo.	To	confirm	the	dependence	between	both	values,	the	chi-square	test	is	used.	The	
chi-square	test	statistically	assesses	the	goodness	of	fit	between	a	set	of	observed	values.	A	
chi	value	that	is	less	than	0,5%	confirms	a	meaningful	relationship	for	the	observed	values	and	
theoretical	 assumptions.	 The	 chi-values	 calculated	 below	 confirm	 this	 positive	 relationship	
and	dependence	between	the	two	statements.	As	such,	59%	of	those	who	express	fears	about	
‘extinction’	identified	themselves	as	Cypriot	and	Turkish	to	the	same	degree	compared	to	only	
6%	who	 identified	 themselves	 as	mostly	 Turk	 or	 only	 Turk;	 and	 83%	 of	 those	who	 express	
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anxiety	 about	 the	 current	 status	 quo	 expressed	 fears	 about	 ‘extinction’	 due	 to	 growing	
numbers	of	Turkish	immigrants	(QTS:2014).			
Table	No	7:	Cross-tabulation	between	Turkish-Cypriot	fears	about	extinction	and	self-identity	
Table	No	8:	Cross-tabulation	between	Turkish-Cypriot	fears	about	extinction	and	anxieties	
about	the	status	quo	
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Nevertheless,	 securitisation	 of	 Turkish	 immigrants	 that	 intensify	 the	 desires	 for	 a	 solution	
does	not	make	compromise	any	easier.	On	the	one	had,	Turkish-Cypriots,	who	perceive	higher	
levels	of	threat	from	Greek-Cypriots	tend	to	evaluate	Turks	more	positively,	but	perception	of	
threats	from	Turks	do	not	necessarily	influence	their	evaluations	of	Greek-Cypriots,	especially	
for	those	who	have	right-wing	convictions	(Cakal	2013).		On	the	other	hand,	Turkish-Cypriots	
need	their	Turkishness	 for	political	 legitimacy	and	claims	on	the	negotiation	 table,	and	they	
demand	Turkey’s	guarantorship	and	military	presence	 to	address	 their	 insecurities	among	a	
Greek-Cypriot	majority.	 It	 is	 interesting	 to	note	 that	Turkish	Cypriots’	 responses	about	 their	
Turkishness	and	Cypriotness	vary	depending	on	whether	the	same	question106	is	asked	within	
the	context	of	the	Cyprus	Problem	or	disconnected	from	it.	For	 instance,	the	same	question	
asked	 by	 the	 New	 Cyprus	 Association	 survey,	 disconnected	 from	 the	 Cyprus	 Problem	
demonstrates	 a	 steep	 increase	 in	 the	 number	 of	 people	 identifying	 themselves	 as	 only	
Cypriot,	where	they	heavily	underplay	their	ethnic	identity107.	When	asked	within	the	context	
of	 the	 Cyprus	 Problem,	 respondents	 tend	 to	 resort	 to	 ‘official’	 categorisations	 that	 provide	
legitimacy	for	their	political	claims	(Pollis	1996).		
106	How	you	identify	yourself?	Mostly	Turkish,	Only	Turkish,	Equally	Turkish	and	Cypriot,	Mostly	Cypriot,	Only	Cypriot.	
107	The	same	trend	can	be	observed	among	the	Greek-Cypriot	community	to	a	 lesser	extent.	This	 is	mainly	due	to	the	
fact	that	Greek-Cypriots	do	not	have	legitimacy	and	recognition	concerns	pertaining	to	their	Cypriotness	as	they	are	the	
legitimate,	recognised	representatives	of	the	RoC.	While	the	expression	of	Cypriotness	(mostly/only	Cypriot)	rises	from	
28%	to	88%	among	 the	Turkish-Cypriot	community	when	 the	question	 is	disconnected	 from	the	Cyprus	Problem,	 this	
increase	is	less	drastic	among	the	Greek-Cypriot	community,	where	the	rise	is	from	41%	to	57%	(QTS:2014)	
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Chart	No	4:	Temporal	Comparison	of	Turkish-Cypriot	perceptions	of	identity	
	
	
Consequently,	the	securitisation	of	Turkishness	that	contradicts	their	identity	narratives	based	
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continuity	and	the	future,	and	what	they	are	willing	to	compromise	to	get	to	that	desired	end	
creates	 dissonance.	 As	 such,	while	 Turkish-Cypriots	 perceive	 a	 comprehensive	 settlement	 a	
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on	 Turkey	 and	 their	 Turkishness	 to	 secure	 their	 political	 equality	 and	 maintain	 their	
distinctiveness	 from	 majority	 Greek-Cypriots.	 Civil	 society	 representatives	 express	 their	
anxieties	about	both	solution	and	no-solution	scenarios	(CSOS-TCc:2014):	
“Both	 make	 me	 anxious.	 No	 solution	 means	 more	 tension	 and	 more	 unclear	
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strategies.”	(Anonymous,	Gender	and	Minorities	Institute)	
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“The	 prospect	 of	 a	 solution	 makes	 me	 anxious	 because	 I'm	 afraid	 that	 the	
agreement	will	not	be	along	the	lines	of	a	win-win	situation,	but	one	where	one	
side	will	lose	out.	...The	possibility	of	no	solution	is	even	scarier	as	the	way	things	
are	 now	 did	 not	 and	will	 not	work	 for	 the	 local	 community,	 another	win-lose	
situation.”	(Anonymous,	MAGEM	–	Famagusta	Youth	Centre)	
We	can	observe	this	discrepancy	in	the	Turkish-Cypriots’	trust	towards	the	Turkish	military	as	
well.	Even	though	they	see	Turkish	immigrants	as	a	danger	to	their	distinct	identity	and	as	an	
obstacle	to	their	desired	future,	they	continue	to	rationalise	their	need	for	the	Turkish	military	
and	 cultivate	 trust	 for	 this	 institution.	 Insisting	 on	 Turkey’s	 guarantorship	 or	 rejecting	 the	
withdrawal	of	 the	Turkish	military	after	 a	 solution	 is	one	of	 the	major	 issues	 that	draw	 the	
negotiations	to	an	impasse,	which	subsequently	exacerbates	Turkish-Cypriots’	anxieties	about	
their	 current	 situation	 and	 the	 future.	 According	 to	 the	 Democracy	 Index	 Report	 of	 2011	
published	by	the	CMIRS,	a	think-tank	established	in	the	northern	part	of	Nicosia,	when	asked	
about	 their	 trust	 towards	 different	 institutions108,	 86%	 of	 Turkish-Cypriots	 stated	 that	 they	
trust	the	military	(Elmas	11	March	2012).	This	data	 is	consistent	both	with	the	Cyprus-2015-
Initiative	survey,	where	90%	asserted	that	they	trust	the	armed	forces	and	the	fieldwork	data,	
where	 Turkish	 military	 comes	 on	 top	 as	 the	 most	 trustworthy	 institution	 (Cyprus-2015-
Initiative	2011).		
Chart	No	5:	Levels	of	trust	in	institutions	(QTS:2014)	
108	Such	as	the	police,	judiciary,	government,	military,	media,	parliament,	political	parties,	civil	society	and	the	president.	
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Furthermore,	the	fieldwork	data	shows	that	48%	of	Turkish-Cypriots	agree	with	the	statement	
that	 the	 prospect	 of	 living	 next	 to	 a	 Greek-Cypriot	 makes	 them	 anxious,	 which	 can	 be	
attributed	 to	 their	minority	 complex.	However,	 compared	 to	71%,	who	voice	 anxiety	 about	
being	stuck	in	a	stalemate	with	regards	to	the	Cyprus	Problem,	only	39%	of	Turkish-Cypriots	
voice	 anxiety	 about	 reaching	 a	 comprehensive	 settlement109 	(QTS:2014).	 Yet,	 this	 is	 not	
making	 compromise	 any	 easier	 in	 terms	 of	 accommodating	 Greek-Cypriots’	 insecurities	
pertaining	to	the	Turkish	immigrants	and	the	military.	According	to	the	Cyprus-2015-Initiative	
survey	regarding	the	specifics	of	any	potential	agreement,	the	57%	of	Turkish-Cypriots	found	
the	statement	“the	rights	of	 intervention	by	Turkey	or	Greece	should	be	abolished”	entirely	
unacceptable	(Cyprus-2015-Initiative	2011).	In	response	to	the	same	question,	53%	of	Turkish-
Cypriots	thought	exclusion	of	military	intervention	from	the	right	of	intervention	by	Turkey	or	
Greece	was	entirely	unacceptable.	Nonetheless,	the	table	below	shows	that	Turkish-Cypriots	
are	most	anxious	about	the	current	stalemate	situation110,	and	even	though	they	also	express	
anxiety	about	living	next	to	Greek-Cypriots,	looking	at	their	relative	peace-anxieties	and	their	
increased	 emphasis	 on	 Cypriotness,	 it	 can	 be	 argued	 that	 the	 urgency	 and	 desire	 for	 a	
negotiated	settlement	is	high	among	the	TCc.		
	
Chart	No	6:	Turkish-Cypriot	anxieties	(QTS:2014)	
 
	
Turkish-Cypriots’	ontological	dissonance	arises	 from	 the	 fact	 that	 the	potential	measures	 to	
protect	their	distinct	Cypriot	identity	challenges	their	historical	narratives	and	simultaneously																																																									
109	The	39%,	who	express	peace-anxieties	are	in	line	with	the	35%	of	Turkish-Cypriots	who	said	‘no’	to	the	Annan	Plan	
referendum.		
110	Compared	to	61%,	who	said	they	were	not	content	with	the	status	quo,	only	24%	of	Turkish-Cypriots	stated	that	they	
were.	
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triggers	insecurity-as-survival.	For	instance	measures	that	could	facilitate	a	peace	agreement	
and	 hence	 help	 reinforce	 their	 Cypriotness	 such	 as	 severing	 ties	 with	 Turkey,	 accepting	
repatriation	of	 the	Turkish	 immigrants	back	 to	Turkey	or	ending	Turkey’s	guarantorship	and	
military	presence	simultaneously	challenge	their	sense	of	physical	security	among	the	Greek-
Cypriot	majority	 and	 their	 historical	 narrative	 emphasising	 that	 “they	would	 have	 perished	
without	the	presence	of	the	United	Nations	Peace-keeping	force	and	without	the	political	and	
military	interference	of	Turkey”	(Volkan	2008:97).	
	
Therefore,	 we	 can	 see	 the	 more	 Cypriot	 Turkish-Cypriots	 become,	 the	 more	 they	 perceive	
Turkish	immigrants	and	Turkishness	as	a	threat	to	their	identity,	and	the	more	they	securitise	
Turkish	immigrants	the	more	anxious	they	feel	about	their	current	situation.	Europeanisation	
of	 the	Cyprus	 Problem	and	 the	opening	of	 the	 check-points	 intensified	 the	 securitisation	of	
this	group	by	 reinforcing	and	 reproducing	Turkish-Cypriots	European	and	Cypriot	 identity111.	
Hence,	 securitisation	 of	 this	 group	 cannot	 be	 separated	 from	 the	 Cyprus	 Problem	 and	 the	
peace	 process.	 It	 needs	 to	 be	 understood	 both	 within	 the	 historical	 context	 and	 people’s	
vision	and	desires	about	the	future	and	analysed	within	both	security-as-survival	and	security-
as-being	perspectives.	As	such,	anxieties	about	existence	and	extinction,	fears	about	becoming	
a	minority	and	losing	control	over	their	own	political	will	and	destiny,	and	fears	and	anxieties	
about	a	potential	settlement	are	all	interwoven	delicately	and	equivocally	in	Turkish-Cypriots	
narratives	 as	well	 as	 their	 daily	 interactions	 and	 routines.	 Thus,	 Turkish-Cypriots	 are	 finding	
their	 limbo	between	Cypriotness,	Turkishness,	Muslimness,	Europeaness	very	uncomfortable	
to	accommodate	 in	 their	 self-image.	 Irem,	a	high	school	 teacher,	articulates	her	view	of	 the	
Turkish-Cypriots’	identity	limbo	rather	well	(FG1-F:2015):		
“Turkish-Cypriots	did	not	have	to	fight	for	a	distinct	identity	like	Kurds,	they	are	
not	 simply	 Turkish	 like	 us,	 they	 have	 a	 big	 identity	 dilemma.	 What	 will	 they	
become	after	a	solution?	They	don’t	know	where	they	belong,	they	don’t	know	
who	they	are…	I	think	this	is	a	big	problem.”112	
		 																																																									
111	Almost	 30%	 of	 Turkish-Cypriots	 who	 participated	 in	 the	 quantitative	 survey	 asserted	 that	 they	 either	 feel	 more	
Cypriot	or	more	European,	while	65%	said	they	feel	the	same.	
112	Author’s	own	translation	of	the	focus	group	transcripts	from	Turkish	to	English.	
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7.3	Home,	Hospitality	and	Extinction:	The	other-others		
Empirical	 data	 explicitly	 illustrates	 Turkish-Cypriots’	 heightened	 feelings	 about	 being	
overwhelmed	 by	 the	 people	 from	 Turkey.	 According	 to	 the	 quantitative	 survey,	 89%	 of	
Turkish-Cypriots	think	that	there	are	too	many	people	from	Turkey,	and	37%	believe	that	they	
pose	an	obstacle	to	reaching	a	settlement113	(QTS:2014).	This	data	is	consistent	with	the	civil	
society	representative	survey	and	the	past	surveys	carried	out	by	different	organisations.	For	
example,	compared	 to	 the	Cyprus-2015-Initiative	survey,	where	75%	of	 the	Turkish-Cypriots	
stated	there	are	too	many	people	from	Turkey,	we	can	see	a	14%	increase	in	people	who	are	
feeling	 overwhelmed	 by	 the	 number	 of	 Turkish	 migrants	 (Cyprus-2015-Initiative	 2011).	
Similarly,	a	majority	of	the	civil	society	representatives	also	shared	the	belief	that	there	were	
too	many	people	from	Turkey	in	north	Cyprus	(80%)	(CSOS-TCc:2014).	In	addition,	the	Cyprus	
CIVICUS	 survey	 reported	 that	 when	 asked	 about	 who	 they	 would	 not	 like	 to	 have	 as	
neighbours	 29%	 of	 the	 Turkish-Cypriot	 respondents	 stated	 immigrants	 or	 workers	 from	
Turkey,	and	the	crime	and	identity	survey	carried	out	by	CMIRS114	found	that	70%	of	Turkish-
Cypriots	blame	people	from	Turkey	for	rising	crime	rates	(CIVICUS	2011:99,	Yücel	2011).		
 
Chart	No	7:	Perceptions	about	Turkish	immigrants	(QTS:2014)	
 																																																								
113	53%	 of	 Turkish-Cypriots	 do	 not	 agree	with	 the	 statement	 that	 ‘people	 from	 Turkey	 are	 an	 obstacle	 to	 reaching	 a	
comprehensive	settlement’	on	the	island	and	9.6%	noted	their	ambivalence	towards	the	question.	
114	The	Center	for	Migration,	Identity	and	Rights	Studies.	Face	to	face	questionnaires	with	1500	people.		
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Perhaps	the	strongest	expression	of	anxiety	is	demonstrated	by	the	fact	that	55%	of	Turkish-
Cypriots	agreed	with	the	statement	that	“Turkish-Cypriot	identity	is	becoming	extinct	due	to	
the	growing	numbers	of	people	from	Turkey”	(QTS:2014).		
	
Chart	No	8:	Anxieties	about	extinction	(QTS:2014)	
	
	
The	word	 ‘extinction’	 is	 ultimately	 linked	with	 fears	 about	 survival,	 existence	 and	 anxieties	
about	 biographical	 continuity,	 which	 were	 repeatedly	 voiced	 by	 the	 civil	 society	
representatives	as	well	(CSOS-TCc:2014):		
“First	of	all,	I	feel	culturally	and	socially	threatened.	Not	in	terms	of	traditional	
food	and	other	elements	that	make	up	culture	as	a	whole	but	in	a	way	that	has	
something	 to	do	with	 the	 freedom	that	we	used	 to	enjoy	as	Turkish	Cypriots	
are	somewhat	being	threatened	with	the	new	'regime'	in	Turkey.	As	a	Turkish	
Cypriot	who	 lived	 in	Turkey	 for	20	years,	 I	 can	assure	you	 that	 the	culture	of	
personal	 freedom	 and	 rights	 is	much	 evolved	 in	 Cyprus	 than	 in	 Turkey.	 And	
thus,	for	me	Turkey	poses	a	threat	to	my	existence	as	a	human	being	in	Cyprus	
and	 in	 the	 world. 115 ”	 (A	 Respondent	 from	 Association	 for	 Sustainable	
Development)	
	
																																																								
115	Emphasis	added.	
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“We	don’t	have	the	luxury	to	wait	any	longer.	The	biggest	problem	for	Turkish	
Cypriots	 is	Turkey	 that	 threatens	our	existence	 and	benefits	 from	the	current	
deadlock116.”	(A	Respondent	from	Cyprus	Turkish	Teachers	Union)	
	
Comparably,	 Cypriots’	 Voice,	 a	 bi-communal	 think-tank	 that	 endeavours	 to	 contribute	 to	 a	
comprehensive	settlement	on	the	island,	has	repeatedly	emphasised	the	danger	of	extinction	
Turkish-Cypriots	face	in	their	communiqués:	
“The	stalemate	 in	 the	settlement	process	 is	 threatening	 the	very	existence	of	
the	 Turkish-Cypriot	 Community	 who	 are	 part	 and	 parcel	 of	 the	 Cypriot	
people117.”	(Cypriots'-Voice	September	2012)	
	
“The	Cypriot's	Voice,	further	expresses	its	deep	concern	about	the	contingence	
of	annihilation	facing	the	Turkish-Cypriot	community,	which	is	the	direct	result	
of	 the	 policy	 of	 population	 transfer	 from	 Turkey	 into	 Cyprus118.”	 (Cypriots'-
Voice	July	2011)”	
	
The	reasons	of	the	persistent	declarations	of	existence	on	the	part	of	Turkish-Cypriots	is	two-
fold:	 The	 first	 is	 linked	 to	 their	 feelings	 of	 fear	 and	 anxiety	 about	 their	 existence	 and	
biographical	 continuity	 that	 is	 underpinned	by	 their	 low	 self-esteem	and	minority	 complex;	
and	the	second	to	their	lack	of	acknowledgement	regarding	their	existence	and	distinctiveness	
that	 is	 underpinned	 by	 the	 response	 of	 the	 other(s)	 in	 terms	 of	 recognition/resistance	 and	
(dis)association119.	 Firstly,	 just	 as	 Greek-Cypriots	 hold	 on	 to	 their	 vivid	 memories	 of	 1974,	
which	 is	 the	 main	 reason	 why	 they	 securitise	 Turkey	 and	 the	 Turkish	 community	 in	 north	
Cyprus	 as	 a	 threat,	 Broome	 suggests	 that	 Turkish-Cypriots	 have	not	 let	 go	of	 the	 feeling	of	
being	 treated	as	 second-class	 citizens,	or	 the	 trauma	of	 living	 in	enclaves	during	1963-1974	
(Broome	 2005).	 As	 they	 securitise	 their	 past	 where	 their	 past	 is	 perceived	 as	 a	 vulnerable	
minority	 denied	 equal	 status,	 any	 situation	 that	 comes	 close	 to	 reminiscing	 this	 securitised	
past	is	a	threat.	Persistence	on	political	equality	under	a	peace	agreement	and	securitisation																																																									
116	Author’s	own	translation,	emphasis	added.	
117	Emphasis	added.	
118	Emphasis	added.	
119	see	Table	No	1:	Ontological	security	matrix			
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of	the	Turkish	immigrants	as	a	‘demographic	danger’	partly	stems	from	this	historical	trauma.	
Even	 though	 they	 need	 Turkey	 for	 protection	 and	 economic	 survival,	 however	 rational	 this	
perceived	need	may	be,	 they	 also	despise	 the	 Turkish	 immigrants	 for	 diluting	 their	 identity	
and	taking	the	political	will	away	from	Turkish-Cypriots	and	they	despise	Turkey	for	interfering	
into	their	domestic	politics.	Nilay	Bilsel120	voices	her	anxiety	over	the	probability	that	one	day	
north	Cyprus	could	become	part	of	Turkey,	“I	do	not	want	to	wake	up	one	day	and	see	Cyprus	
as	Turkey's	province”	(CSOS-TCc:2014).	Similarly,	another	respondent	from	Hands	Across	the	
Divide,	 a	 bi-communal	women’s	 organisation,	 states	 “I	 fear	 for	my	 children's	 future	 due	 to	
lack	 of	 recognition	 and	 a	 deterioration	 of	 traditional	 values/customs	 as	 we	 become	 more	
mainstreamed	with	the	mainland	Turkish	culture”	(CSOS-TCc:2014). 
	
Hatay	 confirms	 that	 Turkish-Cypriots	 prevalently	 believe	 that	 the	 generalised	 category	 of		
‘Türkiyeliler’,	 irrespective	of	 their	 status	on	 the	 island,	 always	 follow	 the	will	 of	 Turkey	 and	
hence	 impede	 the	political	will	of	Cypriots	 (Hatay	2008).	The	view	 that	Turkish-Cypriots	are	
losing	 their	 identity	 is	 widespread	 in	 the	 literature	 about	 Cyprus,	 among	 CSOs	 and	 many	
Turkish-Cypriots.	For	example,	Ker-Lindsay,	in	his	book	“The	Cyprus	Problem:	What	everyone	
needs	to	know”	notes	that,	“The	pace	of	immigration—both	in	terms	of	those	who	are	given	
citizenship	 by	 the	 Turkish	 Republic	 of	 Northern	 Cyprus	 (TRNC)	 and	 those	 who	 are	 simply	
temporary	workers—is	 such	 that	 there	 is	 a	 real	danger	 that	 the	Turkish-Cypriot	 community	
will	be	swamped	and	may	eventually	disappear	altogether”	(Ker-Lindsay	2011:6).	
	
Secondly,	 as	 Tuğrul	 İlter	 puts	 it,	 Turkish-Cypriots	 “are	 surrounded	 by	 denials	 of	 their	
independent	existence”	 (İlter	2015:25).	 This	denial	 in	 itself	has	 three	 roots:	 a)	 the	denial	of	
distinctiveness	by	Turkey/Turks;	b)	the	denial	of	Cypriotness	and	Europeanness	by	the	EU	and	
Greek-Cypriots,	 and	 c)	 the	 denial	 of	 legitimacy	 by	 the	 international	 community.	Where	 the	
official	rhetoric	 in	Turkey	denies	a	distinct	Turkish-Cypriot	 identity	and	sees	Turkish-Cypriots	
as	one	and	the	same	as	the	greater	Turkish	nation,	Greek-Cypriot	narratives	as	well	as	the	‘no’	
vote	in	the	referendum	denies	their	inherent	Cypriotness	and	being	left	out	of	the	EU	despite	
their	 ‘yes’	 vote,	 denies	 their	 Europeanness.	 Finally,	 lack	 of	 international	 recognition	 and																																																									
120	A	civil	society	a	respondent	from	INTBAU–Cyprus	(The	International	Network	for	Traditional	Building,	Architecture	&	
Urbanism)	
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isolation	 denies	 the	 legitimacy	 of	 Turkish-Cypriots’	 communal	 existence.	 These	 denials	 of	
existence	are	ultimately	about	 the	response	of	 the	other.	Rumelili	explains	 that	 the	 identity	
and	difference	nexus	 is	performatively	constituted	both	by	the	self	and	the	other,	thus	how	
the	other	responds	to	the	construction	of	this	identity	is	a	very	important	dimension	(Rumelili	
2004).	 She	notes	 that	 the	conceptualisation	of	 the	 response	of	 the	other	 can	vary	between	
recognition	 and	 resistance,	 where	 recognition	 reinforces	 the	 identity	 of	 the	 self	 and	
confidence	 in	 its	 continuity,	and	 resistance	undermines	 the	 self-identity	as	 it	 challenges	 the	
difference	attributed	 to	 the	other.	 Comparably,	Browning	and	 Joenniemi	note	 that	 it	 is	 not	
uncommon	for	actors	lacking	a	strong	sense	of	self	to	lash	out,	especially	when	they	feel	their	
boundaries	 are	 being	 transgressed,	 undermining	 the	 actors’	 sense	 of	 distinct	 selfhood	
(Browning	and	Joenniemi	2013).		
	
Turkish-Cypriots	 differentiate	 themselves	 from	 the	 ‘mainland’	 Turks	 to	 reproduce	 their	
identity	as	distinct.	However,	 their	self-image	and	self-esteem	 is	challenged	when	the	other	
does	 not	 recognise	 their	 distinctiveness	 but	 reproduces	 an	 official	 rhetoric	 that	 narrates	
Turkish-Cypriots	as	Turks	who	happen	to	live	in	Cyprus.	For	example,	mainstream	media	and	
politicians	 in	 Turkey	 are,	 at	 best,	 indifferent	 to	 the	 distinctiveness	 of	 the	 Turkish-Cypriot	
identity	 and	 mostly	 refer	 to	 Turkish-Cypriots	 as	 ‘Cypriot	 Turks’121	(Kıbrıs	 Türkü),	 or	 as	 ‘our	
compatriots	in	Cyprus’,	which	undermines	and	circumstantialises	their	Cypriotness.	They	also	
refer	to	north	Cyprus	as	‘babyland’	(yavruvatan)122,	implying	a	sense	of	ownership	over	north	
Cyprus	and	Turkish-Cypriots.	In	reaction	to	the	rhetoric	that	relies	on	Turkishness	as	a	strong	
commonality	and	underplays	Cypriotness,	left-wing	journalists	such	as	Sevgül	Uludağ	and	Arif	
Hasan	 Tahsin,	 choose	 to	 use	 new	 terms	 to	 define	 Turkish-Cypriots	 that	 underplays	
Turkishness.	 For	 instance,	 Uludağ	 uses	 the	 term	 ‘Kıbrıslıtürk’	 instead	 of	 ‘Kıbrıslı	 Türk’,	 to	
deemphasise	 the	 Turkish	 component	 of	 the	 identity,	 and	 Tahsin	 uses	 the	 term	 ‘Turkish																																																									
121	Abdullah	Gül:	“Kıbrıs	Türk	halkı	bugün	kendi	devletinin	çatısı	altında	özgürlüğü	solumaktadır”	(Abdullah	Gül:	“Today,	
Cypriot	Turks	breath	freedom	under	the	roof	of	their	own	state”)	(Kıbrıs	Ada	Haber	15	November	2013).	TBMM	Kıbrıs	
Dostluk	 Grubu	 Başkanı	 ve	 AK	 Parti	 Malatya	 Milletvekili	 Ömer	 Faruk	 Öz:	 “Tayyip	 Erdoğan	 Kıbrıs	 meselesine,	 Kıbrıs	
Türk'üne	sahip.	Türk	halkının	yaşam	kalitesini	artırmak	için	her	türlü	imkanı	seferber	etti”	(The	Chair	of	Grand	National	
Assembly	of	Turkey	Friends	of	Cyprus	Commision	and	Justice	and	Development	Party’s	MP	for	Malatya	Ömer	Faruk	Öz:	
“Tayyip	 Erdogan,	 owns	 the	 Cyprus	 issue	 and	 Cypriot	 Turks.	 He	 mobilised	 every	 possible	 resource	 to	 improve	 life	
standards	of	the	Turkish	people”)	(Haber	Kıbrıs	1	February	2012).	
122	AK	Parti	Dış	Politikadan	Sorumlu	Genel	Başkan	Yardımcısı	Mevlüt	Çavuşoğlu:	“Kıbrıs	bizim	yavru	vatanımız.	Kıbrıs'ın	
meselesi	bizim	için	doğrudan	Türkiye'nin	meselesidir”	(AK	Party	Foreign	Policy	Deputy	Chair	Mevlüt	Çavuşoğlu:	“Cyprus	
is	our	babyland.	For	us,	Cyprus’	affairs	are	Turkey’s	affairs”	(Vatan	Gazetesi	30	November	2013).		
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speaking	Cypriot’	(see	Loizides	2015).	The	denial	of	the	other	triggers	ontological	insecurity	by	
blurring	the	perceived	identity	differences	between	people	from	Turkey	and	Turkish-Cypriots.		
As	such,	Turkish-Cypriots	resort	to	securitisation	as	an	ontological	security	seeking	strategy	to	
reinforce	and	 reproduce	 their	distinctiveness,	which	 shows	 itself	 in	behavioural	practices	of	
‘othering’	marked	by	representations	of	threat	and	danger.		
	
Calling	it	‘the	narcissism	of	minor	differences’,	Freud	wrote:	“it	is	precisely	communities	with	
adjoining	 territories	 and	 related	 to	 each	 other	 in	 other	 ways	 as	 well	 who	 are	 engaged	 in	
constant	 feuds…”	 (Freud	2001).	 For	 Freud,	hostility	between	 such	groups	derives	over	 time	
from	the	effect	the	proximity	of	one	group	has	upon	the	way	the	members	of	another	group	
feel	 about	 themselves.	 In	 relation	 to	 Freud’s	 analysis,	 Gregory	 Rochlin,	writes	 that	 hostility	
arises	not	only	when	the	survival	of	the	self	is	threatened,	but	also	when	a	person	or	a	group	
is	seen	threatening	the	worth	of	the	self	 (Rochlin	1973).	Analogously,	Simon	Harrison	talked	
about	 ‘a	 justificatory	 rhetoric’	 that	 rationalises	 difference,	 which	 can	 deny	 the	 most	 self-
evident	similarities	(Harrison	2002:212).	For	Harrison,	groups	that	strive	to	be	different,	often	
have	more	in	common	than	what	is	anticipated,	or	what	they	are	ready	to	accept.	In	addition,	
social	 theory	 too	 offers	 important	 insights	 to	 the	 biased	 cognitive	 appreciation	 of	 the	
differences	 between	 and	within	 groups;	 while	 the	 first	 is	 exaggerated,	 the	 latter	 is	 usually	
minimised.	 As	 such,	 phenomena	 such	 as	 ingroup	 bias,	 stereotyping,	 and	 outgroup	
discrimination	in	social	theory	are	described	as	operations	of	categorisation	that	play	a	critical	
role	 in	 the	 formation	of	 individual	and	collective	 identities	 (Austin	and	Worchel	1979,	Tajfel	
2010).	 The	 concept	 of	 proximity	 in	 relation	 to	 narcissism	 of	minor	 differences	 for	 Turkish-
Cypriots	is	not	only	geographic	or	ancestral.	Turkey	is	not	only	deeply	involved	in	the	conflict	
as	 a	 guarantor	 of	 the	 RoC,	 or	merely	 because	 of	 its	 ethnic	 and	 historical	 ties	with	 Turkish-
Cypriots;	considering	that	creation	of	‘TRNC’	would	not	have	been	possible	without	Turkey’s	
backing,	 the	 northern	 part	 of	 the	 island	 has	 effectively	 become	 the	 subordinate	 local	
administration	of	Turkey	 (ECHR	1995)	and	Turkish-Cypriots	are	highly	dependent	on	Turkey,	
politically,	militarily	and	especially	economically.	Subsequently,	the	concept	of	proximity	also	
becomes	about	political,	 economic	and	 social	dependence,	which	makes	 it	more	difficult	 to	
reproduce	and	sustain	a	sense	of	difference.		
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Furthermore,	 Turkish-Cypriots,	 who	 lack	 international	 recognition	 and	 suffer	 international	
isolation,	 live	 in	a	 ‘pseudo’	state	with	the	 ‘pseudo’	prefix	attached	to	their	existence,	where	
their	 daily	 lives	 are	 caught	 between	 a	 state	 of	 ‘de	 facto’	 and	 ‘de	 jure’.	 As	 such,	 all	 public	
institutions	 and	 people	 with	 institutional	 titles	 in	 north	 Cyprus	 are	 presented	 in	 inverted	
commas	 (i.e.	 “TRNC”,	 “the	 Mayor”,	 “the	 Ministry	 of	 Education”	 etc.).	 Even	 their	 Cypriot	
identity,	which	only	became	available	to	them	in	practice	 in	April	2003	after	 the	opening	of	
the	check-points,	cannot	provide	them	the	political	and	communal	representation	outside	of	
the	peacebuilding	arena	under	the	auspices	of	the	UN.	İlter	emphasises	that	the	implications	
of	 this	 designation	 are	 not	 only	 limited	 to	 particular	 legal	 considerations	 but	 also	 have	
ontological	significance	for	the	Turkish-Cypriots	(İlter	2015).		
	
This	hostage	situation	between	‘de	facto’	and	‘de	jure’	and	‘existence’	vs.	‘extinction’	extends	
to	 daily	 routines	 and	 practicalities.	 For	 example,	 there	 are	 no	 country	 codes	 or	 postcodes	
specific	to	north	Cyprus.	Since	the	‘TRNC’	is	internationally	unrecognised,	all	international	mail	
and	phone	calls	are	routed	through	Turkey.	The	‘TRNC’	uses	the	country	code	of	Turkey	(+90)	
and	 the	 last	 line	 of	 address	 on	 an	 international	mail	 reads	 ‘Mersin	 10,	 Turkey’.	 Hence,	 the	
more	theoretical	and	ontological	identity	limbo	also	becomes	a	‘de	facto’	vs	‘de	jure’	dilemma	
of	home,	citizenship,	where	we	are,	who	we	are	and	which	box	do	we	tick	when	we	are	filling	
an	application/petition	form?	Dupuis	and	Thorns	explain	that	our	understanding	of	‘home’	as	
a	 bearer	 of	 security	 is	 based	 on	 its	 ability	 to	 link	 together	 a	 material	 environment	 with	 a	
deeply	 emotional	 set	 of	 meanings	 that	 is	 grounded	 upon	 our	 need	 of	 permanence	 and	
continuity	(Dupuis	and	Thorns	1998).	Building	on	this,	Kinnvall	asserts	that	ontological	security	
is	 sustained	when	 home	 is	 able	 to	 provide	 a	 sense	 of	 constancy	 in	 the	 social	 and	material	
environment,	providing	a	spatial	context	for	daily	routines	of	human	existence	(Kinnvall	2004).	
Considering	the	 ‘pseudo’	status	of	 the	 ‘TRNC’,	 it	can	neither	provide	Turkish-Cypriots	with	a	
sense	of	constancy	nor	legitimacy.	This	lack	of	reliability	and	permanence	translates	into	lack	
of	faith	in	their	future	and	lack	of	basic	trust	in	their	social	and	material	environment	that	can	
maintain	 their	 biographical	 continuity.	 Hence,	 it	 could	 be	 argued	 the	 main	 source	 of	
ontological	insecurity	for	Turkish-Cypriots	is	‘extinction’	as	a	distinct	identity,	which	links	the	
two	reasons	of	the	persistent	declarations	of	existence	together	under	the	concept	of	home.	
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The	‘de	facto’	vs	‘de	jure’	dilemma	of	home	and	existence	is	 in	parallel	with	the	‘geographic	
actuality’	discussion	based	on	Volkan’s	work	in	the	previous	chapter	and	with	the	concept	of	
hospitality	 expertly	 articulated	 by	 Derrida.	 Volkan	 links	 self-esteem	 to	 collectives’	 ties	with	
their	geographic	actuality,	and	argues	that	those	who	cannot	give	geographic	actuality	to	their	
definition	of	a	nation	live	in	a	constant	condition	of	injured	self-regard	and	inner	rage	(Volkan	
1980).	 This	 geographic	 actuality	 can	 be	 extended	 to	 include	 a	 sense	 of	 home;	 where	 the	
ambiguous	geographic	actuality	of	the	‘TRNC’	combined	with	the	Cyprus	Problem	is	making	it	
hard	 for	 Turkish-Cypriots	 to	 imagine	 a	 wholesome	 sense	 of	 home.	 Banners,	 cartoons	 and	
slogans	 used	 by	 different	 demonstrators,	 CSOs	 or	 left-leaning	 media	 can	 also	 illustrate	
Turkish-Cypriots’	concerns	that	are	underpinned	by	denial	of	their	legitimate	existence	and	a	
sense	of	disempowerment	with	regards	to	the	concept	of	‘home’.	
	
Figure	4.	Denial	of	existence	 		
	
	
	
*Left:	“When	a	Cypriot	dies,	the	population	does	not	decrease”,	cartoon	published	in	Afrika	newspaper	(11	
September,	2009).	
*Middle:	“We	want	to	be	master	of	our	own	home!”,	in	Yenidüzen	newspaper	(6	September	2012).	
*Right:	Turkish	Cypriots	citizens	hold	placards	during	a	demonstration	in	Brussels,	Belgium,	(27	June	2012).		
	
Exploring	the	connections	between	the	native	and	the	foreigner,	the	host	and	the	guest,	and	
ultimately	 self	 and	 other,	 Derrida	 links	 the	 concept	 of	 home	 to	 the	 concept	 of	 hospitality	
(Derrida	and	Dufourmantelle	2000).	 For	Derrida,	hospitality’s	 core	 is	 that	of	home	 (familial,	
communal,	national,	socio-political	etc.),	and	 is	based	on	a	sense	of	control	and	power	over	
one's	 home.	 This	 power	 provides	 the	 host	 with	 the	 choice	 of	 hospitality	 or	 hostility,	 that	
relates	closely	 to	 the	Turkish-Cypriots’	belief	 that	 their	political	will	 is	 taken	 from	them	and	
that	they	lack	control	over	their	own	destiny.	For	Rosello,	without	hospitality	home	is	merely	
an	 address	 that	 lacks	 geographical	 actuality	 and	 hence	 the	 host	 lacks	 self-esteem	 and	
ontological	 security	 (Rosello	2001).	Consequently,	as	 İlter	points	out,	Turkish-Cypriots	 fail	 to	
offer	hospitality	to	people	from	Turkey	because	they	are	not	the	‘masters	of	their	home’	but	
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rather,	 they	 believe	 that	 the	 ‘guests’	 perceive	 themselves	 as	 the	master	 due	 to	 the	 hosts’	
dependence	on	Turkey	 (İlter	 2015).	Derrida	 explains	 that	 lack	of	 such	power	would	 lead	 to	
xenophobia:		
“…	 one	 can	become	 virtually	 xenophobic	 in	 order	 to	 protect,	 or	 claim	 to	
protect,	one's	own	hospitality,	 the	own	home	that	makes	possible	one's	own	
hospitality.	 I	want	 to	be	master	at	home	…	to	be	able	 to	receive	whomever	 I	
like	 there.	 Anyone	who	 encroaches	 on	my	 "at	 home",	 on	my	 ipseity,	 on	my	
power	 of	 hospitality,	 on	 my	 sovereignty	 as	 host,	 I	 start	 to	 regard	 as	 an	
undesirable	foreigner	and	virtually	as	an	enemy.	The	other	becomes	a	hostile	
subject	 and	 I	 run	 the	 risk	 of	 becoming	 their	 hostage.”(Derrida	 and	
Dufourmantelle	2000:53-55)	
	
As	 previously	 discussed,	 securitisation	 is	 a	 common	 tool	 to	 reinforce	 a	 sense	 of	 stable	 self	
when	actors	feel	ontologically	insecure.	The	civil	society	representative	survey	can	add	depth	
to	the	perception	of	threat	and	its	layers	that	are	intertwined	with	anxieties	pertaining	to	lack	
of	 a	 geographic	 actuality	 and	 a	 sense	of	 home.	As	 such,	 a	majority	 of	 the	 respondents	 link	
their	 existential	 fears	 and	 anxieties	 to	 disempowerment,	 disenfranchisement,	 control	 and	
power	over	one’s	sense	of	home	and	destiny	(CSOS-TCc:2014).	
“Due	 to	 the	 growing	 number	 of	 Turkish	 originated	 TRNC	 citizens,	 who	
outnumber	the	Cypriots	 (Cypriots	being	the	people,	who	have	 lived	 in	Cyprus	
quite	a	while	now	and	have	a	certain	Cyprus	lifestyle,	values,	etc.),	I	personally	
see	 this	 as	 a	 threat	 on	 political	 and	 social	 life.	 This	 could	 be	 associated	with	
many	 aspects	 of	 life,	 but	most	 importantly	 in	 democracy	 and	 in	 the	 right	 of	
Cypriots	 to	 be	 able	 to	 make	 decisions	 solely	 based	 on	 their	 own	 will.	123”	
(Mehmet	 Yıldırım,	 the	 deputy	 chair	 of	 the	 Cyprus	 Turkish	 Investment	
Development	Agency)	
	
“…prospect	 of	 a	 solution	 does	 not	 make	 me	 anxious,	 the	 possibility	 of	 no	
solution	however	does.	This	 'system',	or	should	 I	say	 lack	of	one,	 is	completely	
under	the	control	of	Turkey.	They	can	change	everything	with	a	blink	of	an	eye,																																																									
123	Emphasis	added.	
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be	 it	 the	wages	of	employees	or	 the	number	of	migrants	 living	 in	 the	north	or	
the	 amount	 of	 and	 cost	 of	water	 coming	 through	 our	 faucets.	 A	 solution	will,	
hopefully,	enable	us	to	build	a	 future	as	opposed	to	thinking	merely	about	the	
present	day...”	(Anonymous,	CCMC)	
	
In	 line	 with	 the	 above	 anecdotes,	 a	 press	 release	 signed	 by	 five	 big	 trade	 unions 124	
unequivocally	emphasises	that	Turkey	and	Turkish	immigrants	are	at	the	root	of	fears	about	
extinction:	
“Recep	Tayyip	Erdoğan,	AKP	and	their	local	collaborators	are	bringing	Turkish-
Cypriots	to	the	verge	of	extinction	with	systematic	assimilation	policies,	such	as	
encouraging	 population	 transfer	 and	 settling	 100	 thousands	 of	migrants	 and	
colonising	 the	 northern	Cyprus,	 building	 192	new	mosques	 compared	 to	 162	
schools,	 cutting	 funds	 for	education	while	providing	more	 funds	 for	mosques	
and	 religious	 education	 institutions,	 and	 promoting	 Sunni	 Islam	 propaganda	
and	Kur’an	classes.	…	The	assimilatory	approach	attempts	to	annihilate	Turkish-
Cypriots,	make	them	 identity-less,	character-less	and	keep	them	hostage	as	a	
bargaining	 chip.	…AKP	 fascism	 that	 came	 to	 the	 forefront	 with	 Istanbul	 Gezi	
Park	demonstrations,	is	a	reality	that	Turkish-Cypriots	have	been	enduring	for	a	
long	time125.”	(KTOEOS,	KTOS	et	al.	9	July	2013)	
	
Based	on	the	above	analysis	and	empirical	data,	it	is	clear	that	Turkish-Cypriots	express	
prevalent	concerns	about	their	existence,	and	they	direct	their	concerns	at	Turkey	and	
the	Turkish	immigrants,	placing	them	at	the	root	of	their	fears	about	their	biographical	
continuity.	 Immigrants	 are	 not	 only	 perceived	 as	 a	 threat	 due	 to	 their	 numbers	 but	
also	because	they	may	impede	Cypriots’	political	will.	Lacking	a	geographical	actuality	
for	their	more	‘European’	and	more	‘Western’	collective	identity	and	sense	of	control	
over	their	‘home’	and	destiny,	Turkish-Cypriots	translate	their	existential	anxieties	into	
behavioural	othering.		
	 																																																									
124	Cyprus	Turkish	Teachers	Union,	Cyprus	Turkish	Secondary	School	Teachers	Union,	Cyprus	Turkish	Civil	Servants	
Union,	Eastern	Mediterranean	Workers	Union,	Cyprus	Turkish	Doctors	Union.	
125	Author’s	own	translation,	emphasis	added.	
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7.4	Peace-ing	Othered-selves	and	Other-selves	Together	
	
Being	a	‘Turkish-Cypriot’	has	become	an	existential	limbo.	The	identity	dilemma	lies	in	the	fact	
that	 the	 Sunni	 identity	 attached	 to	being	Turkish	does	not	have	a	 reflection	 in	 the	Turkish-
Cypriot	identity;	that	they	are	neither	part	of	Turkey	nor	the	RoC;	that	their	political	equality	
claims	under	a	unified	Cyprus	are	disproportionate	to	their	numbers;	that	they	have	remained	
internationally	unrecognised	not	having	their	identity	acknowledged	by	others;	that	rejection	
of	 the	 Annan	 Plan	 by	 Greek-Cypriots	 was	 taken	 personally	 by	 many	 Turkish-Cypriots	 as	 a	
denial	 of	 their	 Cypriotness	 and	 Europeanness;	 and	 that	 they	 take	 pride	 in	 being	 more	
‘European’	than	mainland	Turks	but	in	practice	do	not	enjoy	those	‘European’	privileges	they	
desire	(See	Volkan	2008,	Beyatli,	Papadopoulou	et	al.	2011).		
	
As	a	result,	Turkish-Cypriots	are	caught	between	a	rock	and	a	hard	place	with	regards	to	their	
identity;	 they	 realise	 their	 distinctness	 from	 mainland	 Turks	 but	 have	 failed	 to	 be	 simply	
Cypriots	on	their	divided	island.	Their	fears	about	their	existence,	political	will	and	biographic	
continuity,	 tied	 to	 their	 traumas	 about	 being	 a	 minority	 are	 felt	 on	 both	 fronts	 (majority	
Greek-Cypriots	 and	 growing	 number	 of	 Turkish	 immigrants).	 Even	 being	 a	 Turkish-Cypriot	
does	 not	 come	 comfortably	 as	 their	 break	 away	 administration	 is	 neither	 independent	 nor	
self-sufficient	(see	Ergü	2005,	Turan	2014).	Lack	of	 international	recognition	reaches	beyond	
economic,	political	 and	 social	 isolations.	 It	 also	means	 lack	of	 acknowledgement	of	Turkish-
Cypriots’	suffering,	resistance	and	existence,	which	shows	itself	 in	a	fragile	sense	of	self	and	
self-esteem.		
	
Looking	 at	 the	 identity	 perceptions	 linked	with	 expressions	of	minor	narcissistic	 differences	
translated	 into	 fear	 in	 the	 previous	 sections,	 we	 can	 see	 that	 Turkish-Cypriots	 are	
uncomfortable	 about	 the	 ambiguity	 of	 their	 identity.	 They	 recognise	 their	 similarities	 and	
differences	 compared	 to	 both	 Greek-Cypriots	 and	 Turks,	 and	 simultaneously	 experience	
victimisation	 from	both	 groups.	 Even	 though	 they	 do	 not	 deny	 the	 self-evident	 similarities,	
they	 justify	 their	 securitisation	 and	 othering	 by	 rationalising	 difference	 and	 by	 locating	
securitisation	 and	 discrimination	 into	 ‘resistance’.	 In	 his	 article	 titled	 “Problem	 of	 Pigeons:	
Orientalism,	Xenophobia	and	the	Rhetoric	of	 the	 ‘Local’	 in	North	Cyprus”,	Hatay	claims	that	
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Turkish-Cypriots	conveniently	confuse	their	concerns	about	cultural	and	political	‘colonisation’	
by	the	Turkish	state	with	labour	migration	from	Anatolia	(Hatay	2008).	Hatay	argues	that	the	
effects	 of	 this	 confusion	 is	 discriminatory	 attitudes	 and	 practices	 painted	with	 political	 and	
social	resistance	rhetoric	to	an	extent	that	“even	parties	and	organisations	that	claim	to	work	
for	equality	and	human	rights	do	not	include	the	immigrant	labour	force	in	the	scope	of	their	
struggle,	and	indeed	often	cast	those	immigrants	as	a	group	that	they	must	struggle	against”	
(Hatay	2008:147).	
	
However,	the	perceptions	of	self	and	other	are	not	a	given	and	they	are	not	distant	entities,	
nor	are	they	timeless	conceptualisations.	In	İlter’s	words,	“Difference	thus	persists	throughout	
continuity	and	sameness”	 (İlter	2015:33).	As	 such,	Turkish-Cypriots	can	 feel	more	Cypriot	 in	
their	 interactions	 and	 relationships	with	 people	 from	 Turkey	 and	 in	 their	 daily	 politics	 and	
routines.	 Comparatively,	when	 their	 identity	 is	 negotiated	within	 the	 context	 of	 the	Cyprus	
Problem	 in	 relation	 to	 Greek-Cypriots,	 their	 Turkishness	 may	 receive	 more	 emphasis.	 This	
varied	expression	of	 self	 in	 itself	 is	by	no	means	problematic.	 In	 fact,	 it	 is	 rather	natural,	as	
identity	 is	 subjectively	 negotiated	 temporally,	 spatially	 and	 with	 the	 other.	 It	 becomes	
problematic	when	the	enemy	becomes	part	of	self,	and	when	subjective	identity	expressions	
and	narratives	create	othered-selves.	 In	the	case	of	Turkish-Cypriots,	self	and	other	exists	 in	
one,	simultaneously	and	uncomfortably,	creating	anxiety	and	insecurity.	Where	the	Turk	can	
become	self	in	the	context	of	the	Cyprus	Problem	and	in	relation	with	Greek-Cypriots,	it	can	
become	the	other	disconnected	from	it.	Consequently,	securitised	‘Turkishness’	can	become	
the	othered-self	for	Turkish-Cypriots.	
	
We	can	draw	a	parallel	between	the	case	of	the	Åland	Islands	presented	by	Pertti	Joenniemi,	
Freud’s	narcissism	of	minor	differences	and	 the	case	of	Cyprus.	 Joenniemi	writes	about	 the	
Ålandars,	who	are	part	of	Finland	as	a	state,	which	has	become	an	acceptable	similarity,	but	at	
the	same	time,	they	seek	to	maintain	some	space	for	dissimilarity	to	simultaneously	remain	
part	Swedish	(Joenniemi	2015).	In	Joenniemi’s	analysis,	“Efforts	to	impose	full	similarity,	such	
as	 denying	 or	 diminishing	 their	 autonomy,	 distinctiveness,	 and	 ‘exceptional	 features’	 are	
bound	 to	be	met	by	profound	 resistance	as	 such	efforts	would	endanger	and	challenge	 the	
differences	 that	 form	 the	backbone	of	Aland’s	 very	being”	 (Joenniemi	2015:139).	Although,	
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Ålandars	 do	 not	 fear	 the	 threat	 of	 ‘demographic	 re-engineering’	 of	 their	 society	 posed	 by	
Finland	 (i.e.	 to	make	 them	more	 Finnish)	 and	 their	 uncontested	 autonomy	 allows	 them	 to	
construct	 a	 geographical	 actuality	 for	 their	 collective	 identity,	 it	 could	 be	 argued	 that	 the	
relationship	with	their	Finnishness	or	Finland	is	maintained,	at	least	partly,	based	on	the	ideal	
state	of	security-as-being	and	asecurity-as-survival	because	their	distinctness	is	recognised	by	
the	other.	Comparably,	the	empirical	data	suggests	that	Turkish-Cypriots	accept	and	narrate	
an	 ethnic	 ancestral	 kinship	 with	 the	mainland	 Turks	 that	 focuses	 on	 language,	 cuisine	 and	
folklore,	 but	 it	 is	 crucial	 for	 them	 to	 maintain	 a	 distinctiveness	 and	 dissimilarity	 as	 well.	
However,	 lacking	 geographic	 actuality,	 a	 sense	 of	 home	 and	 recognition	 by	 the	 other,	 they	
reproduce	this	dissimilarity	by	resorting	to	securitisation.		
	
Joenniemi	 explores	 how	 the	 in-betweenness	 of	 Ålandars	 is	 perceived	 both	 as	 a	 power	 and	
vulnerability,	but	is	generally	regarded	as	an	advantage.	Their	in-between	position,	that	is	an	
amalgamation	of	Swedishnes,	Finnishness,	Westernness,	Europeanness	and	Easternness	all	at	
once,	 is	 narrated	 rather	 comfortably	 and	 had	 become	 part	 of	 their	 ‘essence’	 (Joenniemi	
2015:142).	 “…	 [Ålandars]	 were	 denied	 the	 option126	of	 acquiring	 identity-related	 safety	 by	
seeking	 shelter	 and	purity	 [under	 Sweden]	as	 a	 local	 and	non-sovereign	entity	…	What	was	
initially	resisted	[the	Ruling	of	the	League	of	Nations],	depicted	as	a	betrayal	and	viewed	as	a	
move	 undermining	 Aland’s	 ‘real’	 being	 has	 gradually	 turned	 into	 the	 bedrock	 of	 Alandish	
identity”	 (Joenniemi	 2015:150).	 Extrapolating	 this	 to	 the	 Turkish-Cypriot	 case,	who	 too	 first	
failed	to	achieve	Taksim	with	Turkey,	then	to	be	recognised	or	to	be	independent	in	their	own	
state,	and	finally	were	refused	their	European	membership	dreams,	I	argue	that	they	can	only	
amalgamate	their	Cypriotness,	Turkishness	and	Europeanness	comfortably	all	in	one	through	
desecuritising	 their	 Turkishness,	 which	 is	 in	 conflict	 with	 the	 other	 layers	 of	 their	 identity.	
Desecuritisation	 of	 Turkishness	 could	 help	 them	 to	 find	 comfort	 in	 their	 ambiguity	without	
feeling	 forced	 to	 make	 a	 choice	 between	 their	 Turkishness	 and	 Cypriotness	 and	 finding	
comfort	 in	 that	 ambiguity	 will	 go	 hand	 in	 hand	 with	 the	 adaptation	 of	 historic	 identity	
narratives	established	in	opposition	to	Greek-Cypriots.		
																																																									
126	After	World	War	2,	the	League	of	Nations	ruled	that	the	Aland	Islands	should	remain	part	of	Finland	with	significant	
autonomy	despites	 the	overwhelming	majority	of	 the	 islanders	wanted	to	be	part	of	Sweden	and	considered	Sweden	
their	motherland.		
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Another	 parallel	 could	 be	 drawn	 with	 the	 more	 familiar	 case	 of	 Linobambakoi,	 which	
represents	a	comfortable	case	of	ambiguity	 in	 religious	 identity	 that	provided	security	 in	 its	
uniqueness	 in	 Cyprus.	 Although	 Turkish-Cypriots	 are	 technically	 Muslims,	 they	 are	 mainly	
agnostic	 and	 do	 not	 prioritise	 their	 religious	 identity	 in	 their	 collective	 self-image;	 in	 fact,	
Turkish	 immigrants’	 Sunni	 identity	 is	highlighted	as	an	element	of	difference	and	 symbol	of	
orientalism.	 The	 case	 of	 Linobambakoi	 demonstrates	 that	 religious	 identities	 that	 are	 often	
narrated	based	on	exclusivity	can	in	effect	be	amalgamated.	Linobambakoi	were	Cypriots	with	
hybrid	 religious	 beliefs,	 who	 mixed	 and	 matched	 Christian	 Orthodox	 and	 Muslim	 religious	
practices	in	their	daily	lives.	As	Costa	Constantinou	explains:	
“These	 people	 participated	 in	 each	 other’s	 religious	 rituals	 and	 festivities,	
partook	 in	 the	 surrounding	 spiritual	 menu,	 without	 necessarily	 or	 consciously	
becoming	‘Muslims’	or	‘Christians’,	or	even	Linobambakoi,	which	in	any	case	was	
rarely	 a	 self-designation.	 Associating	 religion	 with	 exclusivist	 ethnic	 identity	
rendered	strange	such	theological	hospitality”	(Constantinou	2007:252).	
	
Constantinou	writes	about	 the	 illuminating	 case	of	 Fatma	Usta	 from	 the	village	of	Potamia,	
noting	that	“she	very	consciously	transversed	ethno-religious	boundaries	and	fully	embraced	a	
hybrid	 culture”	 (Constantinou	 2007:264).	 Usta,	 a	 Turkish-Cypriot	 who	 had	 remained	 in	 the	
RoC	after	1974	until	her	death,	was	a	Muslim,	who	also	wore	the	typical	black	attire	of	Greek-
Orthodox	widows.		
“She	 had	 not	 been	 baptized,	 but	 she	 crossed	 herself,	 smoked	 the	 house	 in	
Christian	 fashion	 and	 occasionally	 joined	 mass.	 She	 also	 tried	 to	 receive	
communion,	 though	 this	was	denied	 to	her.	 She	 still	 visited	 the	mosque	when	
she	went	to	the	North	and	has	been	buried	in	the	Turkish	cemetery	of	Potamia.	
In	 her	 single-room	 house,	 three	 pictures	were	 prominent	 and	 quite	 revealing:	
Archbishop	Makarios,	Kemal	Atatürk	and	King	George”	(Constantinou	2007).		
	
In	 his	 article	 titled	 “Aporias	 of	 Identity”,	 Costas	 Constantinou,	 borrowing	 from	 postcolonial	
literature,	 talks	 about	 ‘strategic	 essentialism’	 in	 Cyprus,	 where	 communities	 like	
Linobambakoi	strategically	utilised	performed	aspects	of	identity	to	work	power	structures	in	
their	 favour	 and	 quickly	 and	 comfortably	 moved	 across	 different	 aspects	 of	 their	 identity	
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depending	 on	 the	 circumstances,	 policies	 or	 power	 shifts	 (Constantinou	 2007:226).	
Nevertheless,	neither	the	case	of	Linobambakoi,	nor	the	case	of	Ålandars	can	be	reduced	to	
strategic	 essentialism.	 Constantinou,	 who	 points	 to	 a	 cosmopolitan	 spirituality	 in	 identity	
expressions	 of	 the	 Linobanbakoi,	 agrees	 that	 there	 is	more	 to	 Linobambakoi	 than	 strategic	
essentialism.	Thus,	besides	strategic	essentialism	that	happens	on	the	level	of	consciousness	
to	avoid	religious	persecution,	military	conscription	or	taxes,	it	seems	that	the	Linobambakoi	
were	 also	 a	 “genuinely	 syncretistic”	 community	 (Constantinou	 2007:252).	 It	 is	 this	 genuine	
syncretistic	 notion	 that	 made	 Linobambakoi	 comfortable	 in	 their	 flexible	 and	 ambiguous	
identity	narratives,	as	their	sense	of	belonging	to	both	Christianity	and	Islam,	and	hence	both	
to	the	Hellenic	world	and	the	Turkic/Ottoman	world	was	not	simply	because	they	devised	a	
strategy	 to	 deal	 with	 and	 circumvent	 power	 structures	 and	 oppression,	 but	 because	 their	
distinctiveness	was	based	on	 their	 in-betweenness	and	 fluid	 identity	narratives,	where	 they	
comfortably	accommodated	both	differences	and	similarities	in	two	religions.	
	
Even	 though	 the	 case	of	 Linobambakoi	 has	been	excluded	 from	 the	historiographies	 across	
the	 island,	 it	 shows	that,	along	with	 the	case	of	Ålandars,	 identities	 that	are	assumed	to	be	
mutually	 exclusive,	 can	 be	 and	 have	 been	 adapted	 and	 merged	 comfortably	 into	 one.	
Desecuritisation	 of	 Turkishness	 may	 allow	 Turkish-Cypriots	 to	 be	 comfortable	 in	 their	 own	
skin,	so	to	say,	without	essentialising	or	securitising	one	part	of	their	identity.	Desecuritisation	
through	 reconfiguration	 of	 identity	 narratives	 would	 facilitate	 reconciliation	 by	 allowing	
Cypriots	to	feel	secure	in	and	with	Turkishness,	and	from	Derrida’s	perspective,	allow	them	to	
extend	hospitality	to	people	from	Turkey	and	to	each	other.	As	a	result,	being	Cypriot	would	
not	necessarily	mean	to	securitise	Turkish	immigrants	as	an	obstacle	for	a	better	Cyprus	and	
as	 spoilers	 of	 an	 idealised	 state	 of	 ‘peace’;	 and	 being	 a	 Turk	 would	 not	 necessarily	 mean	
embodying	the	enemy	for	Greek-Cypriots,	or	to	be	backward	and	non-European.	Similarly,	for	
Greek-Cypriots,	making	peace	and	living	side	by	side	with	Turkish-Cypriots	will	not	mean	that	
they	legitimised	all	wrong-doing	and	injustices	inflicted	by	Turkey	and	Turks.		
	
According	to	İlter,	difference	does	not	have	an	undivided	point	of	origin,	“Our	individual	and	
collective	 identities	 are	 thus	 formed	 ‘in-between,’	 or	 in	 excess	of,	 the	 sum	of	 the	 ‘parts’	 of	
difference”	 (İlter	2015:22).	However,	complexity	and	alterity	of	difference	both	 internal	and	
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external	 to	 the	 self,	 confuses	 the	 binary	 oppositional	 logic	 of	 bicommunality	 in	 Cyprus	 and	
undermines	 peacebuilding.	 With	 Turkishness	 desecuritised,	 making	 peace	 with	 Turkish-
Cypriots,	 will	 no	 longer	 be	 a	 concession,	 a	 tolerated	 state	 of	 affairs	 for	 some	 political	 or	
economic	 gain,	 but	 it	 will	 be	 a	 reconciled	 state	 of	 affairs	 that	 can	 allow	 more	 room	 for	
compromise	and	pave	the	way	for	transformative	peace;	which	is	concerned	with	altering	the	
entire	structure	of	a	polity,	rather	than	merely	ending	violence	or	signing	an	‘agreement’	(see	
Mitchell	2014).	Consequently,	by	desecuritising	Turkishness,	we	can	reformulate	Cypriotness	
to	 accommodate	 hyphenated	 identities	 comfortably	 under	 a	 broader	 common	 narrative,	
rather	 than	 limiting	 it	 to	 bicommunality	 along	 ethnic	 lines,	 which	 as	 proven	 highly	
problematic.	
	
Yet,	 in	addition	to	other-others	(Turkish	immigrants)	and	othered-selves	(Turkishness),	there	
is	 another	 layer	 that	 needs	 to	be	 added	 to	 the	equation,	which	 is	 the	 ‘other-selves’.	 Those	
Turkish-Cypriots	 who	 emphasise	 their	 Cypriotness	 and	 the	 desire	 for	 a	 comprehensive	
settlement	 on	 the	 island,	 equate	 a	 potential	 peace	 agreement	 to	 the	 idealised	 state	 of	
‘peace’.	This	 strong	association	between	Cypriotness	and	peace	 is	based	on	 the	assumption	
that	 ‘real’	 Cypriots	want	 peace	 and	 those	who	 are	 not	 Cypriot	 enough	 (Turkish	 immigrants	
and	 those	 who	 prioritise	 their	 Turkishness	 over	 their	 Cypriotness)	 are	 obstacles	 to	 peace.	
‘Real’	Cypriots	desire	peace	because	without	it	they	cannot	continue	to	exist	as	who	they	are.	
This	view	does	not	differentiate	between	 ‘peace’	as	a	concept	that	defines	an	 idealistic	end	
and	 the	concept	 that	 refers	 to	 the	process	of	 transforming	a	conflict.	Within	 the	context	of	
peacebuilding,	peace	should	be	understood	as	an	ongoing	process,	and	a	subjective	feeling	of	
security	and	continuity	where	actors	can	manage	anxieties,	rather	than	an	objective	end,	an	
idealised	 heaven	 or	 a	 ‘perfect	 solution’	 that	 can	make	 all	 anxieties	 disappear.	 As	 fears	 and	
anxieties	about	the	future	are	anchored	in	the	Cyprus	Problem	and	lined	with	the	worst	case	
scenarios	revolving	around	Turkey,	Turkification,	assimilation,	colonisation	and	extinction,	it	is	
not	surprising	to	see	that	the	perceived	salvation	 is	 locked	 in	the	vision	of	a	comprehensive	
settlement.	Serdar	Atai,	a	 respondent	 from	Famagusta	 Initiative	and	Famagusta	Walled	City	
Association,	illustrates	this	idealised	idea	of	peace	very	aptly:	“I	think	our	fears	and	anxieties	
will	all	evaporate	once	we	start	working	and	living	together.	And	if	[we]	manage	to	keep	the	
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Turkish	settlers’	population	at	a	moderate	level	we'll	overcome	most	of	the	existing	obstacles”	
(CSOS-TCc:2014).	
	
With	this	idealised	view	of	‘peace’,	anyone	who	does	not	support	a	comprehensive	settlement	
for	 whatever	 reason	 becomes	 a	 spoiler	 of	 ‘peace’,	 which	 creates	 other-selves	 who	 are	
dissents,	 or	 who	 are	 not	 self	 enough.	 Consequently,	 the	 peacebuilding	 process	 in	 Cyprus	
inadvertently	 creates	 gatekeepers	 that	 comfortably	 fit	 the	 peacebuilding	 framework,	 and	
those	who	are	left	out	are	regarded	as	not	Cypriot	enough,	as	collaborators	of	the	colonialist	
imperial	powers,	as	the	puppets	of	Turkey	or	right-wing	fascists.	In	response	to	the	question	
“which	 groups	 need	 to	 be	 involved	 in	 reconciliation	 efforts?”,	 Cyprus	 Academic	 Dialogue	
board	 member	 Demetrios	 Nicolaides	 talks	 about	 the	 ‘other-selves’	 among	 the	 GCc	 in	 the	
same	way	(CSOS-GCc:2014):		
“Greek	Cypriots	see	Turks	as	the	most	significant	‘other’.	It	is	highly	necessary	
to	 have	 reconciliation	 activities	 between	 Greek	 Cypriots	 and	 Turks.	 Turkish	
Cypriots	 and	 Greeks	 also	 require	 reconciliation,	 which	 will	 help	 broader	
reconciliation	 between	 Greeks	 and	 Turks.	 I	 have	 also	 noted,	 [reconciliation	
between]	 Greek	 Cypriots	 &	 Greek	 Cypriots.	 There	 are	 many	 ‘others’	 in	 the	
Cyprus	dynamic	and	(for	the	Greek	Cypriots)	I	find	that	the	biggest	obstacle	to	
reunification	 and	 peace	 is	 themselves.	 Intra-group	 differences	 are	 highly	
divisive	and	require	their	own	reconciliation127.”	
	
Mitchell	writes	about	the	multiple	selves	and	others	in	Northern	Ireland	and	how	those,	who	
were	 excluded	 by	 the	 peacebuilding	 process	 because	 they	 did	 not	 fit	 the	 framework,	were	
labelled	as	the	‘spoilers’	(Mitchell	2015).	Mitchell	argues	that,	although	the	Belfast	Agreement	
is	heralded	as	 the	one	of	 the	most	 successful	peace	processes,	 the	peace	process	 itself	 can	
become	a	source	of	threat	that	magnifies	violence,	or	even	a	source	of	indirect	violence	itself.	
In	 line	 with	 the	 criticism	 in	 this	 thesis	 regarding	 the	 narrow	 dual-ethnic	 approach	 to	 the																																																									
127	Similarly,	Loizides	and	Sandal	underlines	how	the	center-right	parties	and	their	constituents	have	been	left	out	of	the	
picture.	Loizides	suggests	that	an	open	elite	socialisation	process	that	shifts	the	focus	on	‘logic	of	consequences’	to	‘logic	
of	appropriateness’	within	the	norms	of	socialising	community	can	bring	the	centre-right	on	board	to	play	a	constructive	
role	 in	 peace	 process.	 Desecuritisation	 of	 Turkishness	 and	 socialisation	 at	 the	 civil	 society	 level	 can	 open	 the	 peace	
process	to	those	who	are	left	out	of	the	current	narrow	framework	Sandal,	N.	and	Loizides	G.	N.	(2013).					
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Cyprus	 Problem,	 Mitchell	 argues	 that	 conflict	 resolution	 does	 not	 account	 for	 dynamics	
outside	of	 the	primary	self/other	dyad	 (Mitchell	2015).	With	 the	addition	of	othered-selves,	
Mitchell’s	analysis	that	focuses	on	the	dynamics	between	other-selves	and	other-others	bears	
resemblance	to	the	case	of	Turkish-Cypriots.	These	nuances	are	not	necessarily	external	to	the	
primary	self/other	relationships;	on	the	contrary,	how	other-selves,	other-others	and	othered-
selves	(or	enemy-selves)	can	shape	the	primary	self/other	relationship	and	the	peace	process	
is	crucial	for	successful	and	sustainable	peacebuilding	processes.		
	
Mitchell	elaborates	on	how	a	broad	range	of	republicans	who	did	not	agree	with	the	Belfast	
Agreement	were	framed	as	spoilers,	and	were	censored	and	excluded	from	the	process,	which	
had	 social	 repercussions	 as	 they	were	 also	ostracised	 in	 their	 communities	 (Mitchell	 2015).	
The	 peace	 process	 framework	 that	 decided	 on	who	 is	 included	 or	 excluded	 based	 on	 their	
‘malleable’	 identity	 narratives,	 turned	 Provisional	 Irish	 Republican	 Army	 (PIRA)	 leaders	 into	
gatekeepers	of	both	the	peace	process	and	peace	funding.	Those	who	were	included	became	
the	peaceful	selves	and	those	who	were	excluded	were	securitised	as	a	risk	and	a	threat	 to	
the	process.	Mitchell	argues	 that	 their	exclusion	hindered	the	achievement	of	a	wholesome	
transformative	 peace	 and	 eventually	 led	 to	 violence	 and	 confrontation	 (Mitchell	 2015).	
Consequently,	while	 the	peace	process	desecuritised	 the	primary	 self/other	 relationships,	 it	
resulted	in	the	securitisation	of	‘other-selves’.	That	is	not	to	say	that	peace	processes	can	only	
succeed	if	they	have	‘everyone’	on	board.	There	is	no	perfect	peace	that	matches	everyone’s	
expectations	 and	desires.	Nonetheless,	 the	 key	point	 is	 that	 taking	ontological	 security	 into	
consideration	and	having	a	more	nuanced	understanding	of	identity	can	allow	peacebuilding	
to	 become	 more	 inclusive	 and	 effective	 in	 its	 outreach	 and	 in	 building	 a	 constituency	 for	
peace,	 which	 could	 facilitate	 transformative	 peace	 and	 prevent	 resecuritisation	 of	 old	
relationships	or	securitsation	of	new	groups.	And,	 in	the	case	of	Cyprus,	 it	can	help	Turkish-
Cypriots	escape	the	limbo	of	embodying	enemy	and	self	in	one.		
	
The	peace	process	 in	Cyprus	 too	provides	a	 framework	 too	narrow,	where	other-selves	and	
other-others	are	left	out	by	the	gatekeepers,	who	are	‘more’	Cypriot.	The	gatekeepers	in	the	
case	of	Cyprus	are	those	civil	society	people	 involved	 in	bicommunal	efforts,	who	can	speak	
English	fluently,	who	can	write	project	proposals,	who	have	RoC	passports	to	travel	freely	and	
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who	emphasise	their	Cypriotness	over	their	ethnic	identity,	and	to	a	certain	extent,	those	who	
are	 based	 in	 the	 capital	 where	majority	 of	 the	 peacebuilding	 activities	 take	 place.	 In	 their	
comprehensive	 analysis	 of	 island-wide	 peacebuilding	 activities	 in	 Cyprus,	 Hadjipavlou	 and	
Kanol	 confirm	 that	 the	majority	 of	 participants	 in	 peacebuilding	 workshops	 and	mediation	
training	come	from	educated	groups	who	can	speak	English128	(Hadjipavlou	and	Kanol	2008).	
As	a	result,	despite	having	inspiring	outcomes	and	creating	a	pool	of	highly	skilled	individuals	
equipped	to	contribute	to	the	peace	process,	the	process	itself	becomes	strictly	academic	and	
elitist,	and	exclusivist	towards	those	that	do	not	fit	the	framework.	Participation	in	the	peace	
process	 is	even	more	difficult	 for	people	 from	Turkey,	as	 they	are	effectively	excluded	from	
the	definition	of	 reconciliation	due	to	the	strictly	dual-ethnic	approach	of	 the	peacebuilding	
framework	on	the	island.		
	
This	narrow	understanding	of	reconciliation	 is	especially	 true	for	peace	funding	because	the	
donors,	specifically	the	UNDP	and	the	EU	limit	reconciliation	funding	to	those	projects	that	are	
between	 Turkish-Cypriots	 and	 Greek-Cypriots,	 and	 those	 initiatives	 that	 fall	 outside	 of	 this	
definition	 of	 reconciliation	 cannot	 receive	 funding.	 The	 eligibility	 criteria	 set	 for	 project	
applicants	 can	 illustrate	 this	 narrow	 dual-ethnic	 approach.	 For	 example,	 the	 European	
Commission’s	 ‘Cypriot	 Civil	 Society	 in	 Action’	 grant	 programmes129	launched	 respectively	 in	
2007,	 2008,	 2009,	 2013	 and	 2015	 all	 specify	 eligible	 reconciliation	 and	 confidence	 building	
initiatives	to	those	between	Greek-Cypriots	and	Turkish-Cypriots.	The	Guidelines	 for	 the	call	
for	proposals130	state	that		“To	promote	the	role	of	civil	society	in	the	northern	part	of	Cyprus	
in	 the	 development	 of	 trust,	 dialogue,	 cooperation	 and	 reconciliation	 between	 the	 Turkish	
Cypriot	and	Greek	Cypriot	communities	as	an	important	step	towards	a	solution	of	the	Cyprus	
Problem”.	This	constricted	perception	that	boxes	Cyprus	into	the	language	of	‘ethnic	conflict’	
limited	to	Greek-Cypriots	and	Turkish-Cypriots	results	in	the	creation	of	gatekeepers	and	the	
exclusion	of	Turkish	 immigrants	 from	 the	 reconciliation	and	peacebuilding	efforts.	 The	Civic	
Mapping	 of	 the	 Mahallae	 Initiative,	 which	 charts	 the	 goals	 and	 impact	 of	 civil	 society	
contributions	 to	 peacebuilding	 in	 Cyprus	 from	 1980	 to	 2013	 can	 help	 clarify	 the	 above																																																									
128	English	is	the	common	language	used	in	bi-communal	initiatives	in	Cyprus.	
129	Overall	 budget	 allocated	 for	 reconciliation	 and	 confidence	 building	 activities	 under	 the	 said	 aid	 programmes	 was	
5,885,000€.	
130	The	Guidelines	are	published	on:	
	https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/europeaid/online-services/index.cfm?do=publi.welcome&userlanguage=en	
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argument	further.	As	such,	out	of	681	civil	society	projects	logged	by	the	Mahallae	Initiative,	
only	7	included	people	from	Turkey	in	one	way	or	another	in	their	efforts131	(Mahallae	2013).		
	
The	identities	and	groups	that	are	excluded	and	marginalised	by	peace	processes	can	become	
reproduced,	 reinforced,	 defensive	 or	 even	 radicalised.	 While	 conformists	 assume	 moral	
superiority	 because	 they	 want	 ‘peace’,	 all	 non-conformists	 become	 generalised	 and	
categorised	 as	 not	 wanting	 peace,	 as	 other-selves.	 Mitchell	 suggests	 that	 resurgence	 of	
violence	in	conflict	environments	or	post-conflict	scenarios	do	not	necessarily	mean	that	the	
traditional	 conflict	 based	 on	 the	 essentialised	 primary	 self/other	 is	 back	 or	 remains	
unresolved,	but	it	may	mean	that	the	transformative	peace	process	was	incomplete	in	making	
sure	 that	 it	 included	 other-selves	 and	 other-others	 (Mitchell	 2015).	 Transformative	 peace	
processes	 promise	 to	 provide	 physical	 and	 ontological	 security	 for	 those	who	 are	 included	
through	 reconciliation.	 However,	 as	 peace	 processes	 may	 fragment,	 shift,	 multiply	 and	 re-
define	 selves,	 others,	 other-selves	 and	 othered-selves,	 actors	 who	 are	 not/cannot	 be	
integrated	into	the	process	may	become	marginalised	and	more	insecure.	Recognising	other-
others,	other-selves	and	othered-selves	helps	us	better	understand	protracted	conflicts	and	
violence	 that	 does/may	 erupt	 even	 after	 a	 successful	 peace	 agreement	 is	 reached.	 It	 also	
justifies	 the	 need	 for	 a	 more	 inclusive	 peace	 process	 beyond	 a	 normative	 humanitarian	
commitment,	because	 recognising	 the	 importance	of	ontological	 security	 for	 transformative	
peace	can	help	us	devise	more	inclusive	and	effective	desecuritisation	strategies.		
	
131	Three	 out	 of	 seven	 projects’	 involvement	 of	 people	 from	 Turkey	was	within	 the	 scope	 of	 building	 closer	 relationships	
between	 Turkey	 and	Greece	without	 broadening	 the	 ‘dual-ethnic’	 lens	 on	 the	 Cyprus	 Problem	 (e.g.	 Seeds	 of	 Peace	 youth	
camps).	The	 remaining	were;	 (1)	Two	academic	 initiatives	with	 the	participation	of	Turkish-Cypriot,	Greek-Cypriot,	Turkish,	
and	Greek	participants,	one	focused	on	textbook	and	curriculum	analysis	and	the	other	on	cooperation	between	universities	
across	the	divide;	(2)	A	documentary	called	Akamas	that	focused	on	the	personal	stories	of	individuals	from	different	ethnic	
backgrounds;	and	(3)	A	youth	camp	with	the	participation	of	Greek-Cypriot,	Turkish-Cypriot,	Greek	and	Turkish	youth.	Apart	
from	these	isolated	civil	society	activities,	other	efforts	that	involved	people	from	Turkey	remained	limited	to	charity	work	for	
underprivileged	families	and	were	not	bicommunal	in	their	nature.	
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7.5	Conclusion	
	
This	chapter	unpacked	the	empirical	findings	with	regards	to	Turkish-Cypriots’	perceptions	of	
identity,	threat	and	anxiety	of	as	well	as	their	attitudes	towards	a	potential	solution	and	the	
role	 of	 Turkishness	 and	 Turkish	 immigrants	 in	 that	 solution	 scenario.	 Based	 on	 empirical	
evidence,	 the	 chapter	 argued	 that	 Turkish-Cypriots	 are	 increasingly	 prioritising	 their	
Cypriotness	over	their	Turkishness	and	are	becoming	 less	motherland-centric.	This	shift	 that	
underplays	their	ethnic	signifiers	is	also	exacerbating	the	securitisation	of	Turkish	immigrants,	
who	 are	perceived	 as	 oriental,	 backward	 and	non-European.	As	 such,	 empirical	 data	 shows	
that	 feelings	 of	 Cypriotness	 and	 perceptions	 of	 threat	 posed	 by	 Turkish	 immigrants	 have	 a	
positive	 relationship.	 Although	 those	 Turkish-Cypriots	 who	 prioritise	 their	 Cyrpiotness	 feel	
more	 anxiety	 about	 their	 current	 situation,	 which	 intensifies	 their	 sense	 of	 urgency	 and	
desires	 for	 a	 comprehensive	 settlement,	 it	 does	 not	 make	 compromise	 easier	 due	 to	
ontological	 dissonance.	 Failing	 to	 reconcile	 their	more	 European	 Cypriot	 identity	with	 their	
Turkishness,	 Turkish-Cypriots	 find	 themselves	 in	 an	 identity	 dilemma	 latent	 with	 anxieties	
about	 their	 biographical	 continuity	 and	 the	 future.	 When	 the	 primary	 other,	 that	 is	 the	
generalised	 Greek-Cypriot	 majority	 on	 the	 island,	 is	 added	 to	 this	 equation,	 we	 observe	
ontological	 dissonance,	 where	 attempts	 to	 manage	 anxieties	 at	 one	 level	 of	 their	 identity	
exacerbate	the	anxieties	at	another	level.		
	
Drawing	from	Derrida’s	concept	of	home	and	hospitality	and	Volkan’s	concept	of	geographical	
actuality,	 the	 chapter	 argues	 that	 Turkish-Cypriots,	 who	 lack	 a	 sense	 of	 home,	 who	 feel	
disempowered	 and	 disenfranchised	 and	 who	 failed	 to	 provide	 a	 geographical	 actuality	 for	
their	identity	narratives,	cannot	extend	hospitality	to	Turkish	immigrants.	Turkish	immigrants,	
who	 are	 differentiated	 from	 other	migrants	 and	 seen	 as	 agents	 of	 Turkey,	 who	 are	 taking	
away	 Turkish-Cypriots	 political	 will	 and	 control	 over	 their	 own	 destiny,	 are	 integral	 to	 the	
peace	process	in	Cyprus.	Consequently,	as	the	securitisation	of	this	group	cannot	be	separated	
from	 the	 peace	 process,	 desecuritisation	 strategies	 need	 to	 be	 integrated	 within	 the	
peacebuilding	 efforts	 as	 well.	 Considering	 that	 the	 securitisation	 of	 this	 group	 is	
institutionalised,	bottom-up	and	horizontal,	desecuritisation	strategies	aimed	at	reconfiguring	
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identity	narratives	need	to	account	for	ontological	security	implications	to	provide	actors	with	
the	tools	to	manage	resulting	anxieties	and	to	reflexively	adapt	their	routines.	
	
It	is	important	that	these	desecuritisation	attempts	are	focused	at	the	societal	level	and	that	
they	 reformulate	 the	 narratives	 bottom-up	 as	 well	 as	 top	 down	 in	 order	 to	 facilitate	
reconfiguration	of	 routines	 and	daily	 lives,	 rather	 than	 ‘fermenting’	 at	 a	political	 level	 for	 a	
long	time	without	much	societal	resonance.	Considering	that	 institutionalised	securitisations	
create	 a	 cognitive	 and	 behavioural	 change	 among	 the	 audience,	 failing	 to	 institutionalise	
desecuritisation	 strategies	 is	 likely	 to	 prove	 ineffective	 in	 reconfiguring	 identity	 narratives.	
Desecuritisation	strategies	that	do	not	take	ontological	security	into	account,	that	do	not	have	
a	more	nuanced	understanding	of	 identity	and	that	are	not	 inclusive	and	holistic	can	create	
existential	 anxieties	 that	 result	 in	 compulsive	 attachment	 to	 routines,	 resecuritisation	 and	
conflict	producing	routines.		
	
For	 example,	 the	 attempt	 to	 revise	 the	 history	 textbooks	 to	 reformulate	 friend-enemy	
narratives	 was	 a	 very	 significant	 step	 that	 combined	 both	 political	 will	 and	 societal	
implications,	but	it	was	a	leap	too	far	into	the	unknown	that	existentially	challenged	identity	
narratives	 and	 hence	 saw	 the	 return	 of	 the	 old	 textbooks	 in	 the	 TCc	 and	 rejection	 of	 the	
revision	attempts	all	together	in	the	GCc.	Revision	of	the	history	textbooks	could	be	facilitated	
if	 complimented	 by	 desecuritisation	 of	 Turkishness,	 such	 as	 their	 inclusion	 in	 reconciliation	
efforts	by	breaking	free	from	the	dual-ethnic	approach	in	peacebuilding.		
	
While	hyphenated	identities	have	often	been	seen	as	what	binds	America	together,	in	Cyprus	
they	manifest	as	a	major	problem	and	key	dividing	factor.	The	growing	sense	of	Cypriotism	on	
the	 island	 failed	 to	 become	 an	 inclusive	 narrative	 that	 can	 comfortably	 accommodate	
Greekness	 and	 Turkishness	 with	 Cypriotness.	 Reformulating	what	 it	means	 to	 be	 a	 Cypriot	
more	 inclusively	and	allowing	 for	ambiguity,	 like	 the	 case	of	 Linobambakoi,	 can	be	 the	way	
forward	 to	 facilitating	 a	 comprehensive	 settlement.	 To	 that	 end,	 the	 chapter	 calls	 for	 the	
inclusion	 of	 Turkish	 immigrants	 in	 the	 peace	 process	 to	 desecuritise	 their	 relationship	with	
Cypriots,	 and	 Cypriots’	 relationship	 with	 Turkishness.	 Based	 on	 the	 argument	 that	
securitisation	 of	 Turkish	 immigrants	 and	 Turkishness	 creates	 ontological	 dissonance,	 the	
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chapter	suggests	that	institutionalised	desecuritisation	strategies	can	help	escape	the	vicious	
cycle	 and	 the	 identity	 dilemma,	 where	 Turkish-Cypriots	 while	 desiring	 a	 comprehensive	
settlement	 to	 maintain	 their	 biographical	 continuity	 as	 a	 distinct	 identity,	 simultaneously	
securitise	 the	 part	 of	 their	 identity	 that	 legitimises	 their	 claims	 for	 that	 desired	 future.	
Desecuritisation	of	Turkishness	can	help	Turkish-Cypriots	find	comfort	in	their	in-betweenness	
and	ambiguity,	and	hence	facilitate	transformative	peace	on	the	island.		
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Chapter	 8.	 The	 Securitisation	Dynamics	 and	 Identity	Narratives	 in	 the	Greek-
Cypriot	Community	
8.1	Introduction	
	
In	1971	President	Archbishop	Makarios	declared,	“Cyprus	has	been	Greek	since	the	dawn	of	
her	 history	 and	will	 remain	 Greek.	 Greek	 and	 undivided	we	 have	 inherited	 her.	 Greek	 and	
undivided	we	 shall	 keep	 her,	 and	Greek	 and	 undivided	we	 shall	 hand	 her	 over”	 (quoted	 in	
Dodd	 2010:96).	 According	 to	 Peter	 Loizos,	 the	 prevalence	 of	 motherland	 centric	 identity	
narratives	and	 the	ultimate	goal	of	Enosis	hindered	 the	 construction	of	an	 inclusive	Cypriot	
identity	 (Loizos	 1975).	 The	 desires	 for	 Enosis	were	 very	much	 alive	 in	 the	GCc	 up	 until	 the	
Greek	 junta	 and	 the	 Turkish	 invasion.	 However,	 the	 consequences	 of	 1974	 not	 only	
reconfigured	the	Greek-Cypriot	consciousness,	but	also	their	goals	for	Enosis.	Many	scholars	
including	Neophytos	Loizides	and	Michalis	Michael	argue	the	feelings	of	betrayal	due	to	the	
Greek	 junta,	who	 led	to	the	 invasion	and	then	 ‘abandoned’	 the	 island	to	the	Turks,	and	the	
trauma	 of	 1974	 accelerated	 the	 growth	 of	 Cypriotism	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 Greek	 ethno-
nationalism	(Loizides	2007,	Michael	2011).	
	
Even	though	nationalism	and	ethnic	identity	was	effectively	identified	with	Enosis	pre-1974,	in	
the	post-1974	period	many	scholars	document	a	growing	sense	of	Cypriotism	that	emphasises	
territorial	and	civil	 loyalties	to	Cyprus	rather	than	Greece	(Stamatakis	1991,	Mavratsas	1997,	
Papadakis,	 Peristianis	 et	 al.	 2006).	 Cypriotism,	 adopted	 by	 left-wing	 circles,	 coexisted	
uncomfortably	 with	 ethno-nationalism	 after	 independence	 in	 1960;	 but	 once	 Enosis	 was	
abandoned,	 Cypriotism,	 underpinned	 by	 historic	 amnesia,	 was	 actively	 promoted	 with	 the	
distinct	 purpose	 of	 safeguarding	 Cyprus’s	 independence.	 Mavratsas	 and	 Loizides	 note	 that	
motherland-centric	ethnic	identity	narratives	made	a	comeback	in	the	1980s	when	the	junta	
was	dismantled	 in	Greece	and	democracy	was	 restored,	but	 loyalty	 to	 the	RoC	did	not	 lose	
ground	to	Enosis	 (Mavratsas	1999,	Loizides	2015).	As	Turkey	was	condemned	for	 its	actions	
and	 as	 the	 Turkish-Cypriots	 remained	 the	 illegitimate	 secessionist	 community,	 the	 RoC	
became	 the	 source	 of	 legitimacy	 and	 self-esteem	 for	 Greek-Cypriots.	 However,	 despite	
growing	 Cypriotism,	 reunification	 of	 the	 island	 has	 proven	 very	 elusive	 and	 the	 general	
category	of	the	Turk	remains	the	primary	enemy	other	in	Greek-Cypriot	narratives.	
264	
The	 empirical	 evidence	 corroborates	 the	 argument	 that	 Greek-Cypriots	 perceive	 existential	
threats	to	their	identity	and	desired	future	posed	by	Turkey	and	Turkish	immigrants.	Following	
the	 logic	 of	 the	 previous	 chapter,	 Chapter	 8	 of	 this	 thesis	 focuses	 on	 the	 growing	 sense	 of	
Cypriotism,	perceptions	of	threat	and	feelings	of	anxiety	in	the	GCc.	Drawing	on	the	fieldwork	
data	that	was	carried	out	in	2014-2015	and	enriching	it	with	secondary	data	sets	that	stretch	
back	to	2008,	this	chapter	unpacks	the	securitisation	dynamics	and	their	implications	for	the	
peace	process	and	demonstrates	four	interesting	findings:	1)	A	sense	of	Cypriotism	is	growing	
in	the	GCc;	2)	Compared	to	Turkish-Cypriots’	relations	with	Turkey,	Greek-Cypriots	consider	
Greece	 their	 motherland	 to	 a	 lesser	 extent;	 3)	 Greek-Cypriots,	 who	 distinguish	 between	
Turkish-Cypriots	and	people	from	Turkey,	perceive	greater	levels	of	threat	posed	by	people	
from	 Turkey;	 and	 4)	 Securitisation	 of	 Turkish	 immigrants	 and	 Turkishness	 creates	
unmanageable	 peace-anxieties	 for	 Greek-Cypriots,	 as	 perceptions	 of	 threat	 and	 peace-
anxieties	have	a	positive	relationship.	
The	 second	 section	 of	 the	 chapter	 that	 follows	 this	 introduction	 explores	 the	 growing	
Cypriotist	narrative	on	a	temporal	 timeline	and	discusses	declining	attachment	to	Greece	as	
the	 motherland.	 Borrowing	 from	 anthropology	 and	 psychoanalysis	 and	 engaging	 with	 the	
concepts	of	‘hollow	categories’	and	‘chosen	traumas’,	the	section	analyses	the	way	Turks	and	
Turkishness	 is	 securitised	 in	 Greek-Cypriot	 narratives.	 The	 third	 section	 of	 the	 chapter	
explores	 Greek-Cypriots’	 peace-anxieties,	 the	 ways	 they	 differentiate	 Turkish-Cypriots	 from	
people	from	Turkey	and	draws	parallels	with	Lupovici’s	analysis	of	ontological	dissonance	and	
the	 Israeli	example.	Lastly,	based	on	 the	argument	 that	 the	exclusion	of	Turkish	 immigrants	
from	the	peace	process	and	their	securitisation	creates	ontological	insecurity	and	dissonance,	
the	 chapter	 suggests	 that	 institutionalised	 desecuritisation	 strategies	 of	 Turkishness	 can	
provide	 a	 way	 out	 of	 the	 vicious	 cycle	 and	 present	 an	 opportunity	 for	 frequent	 revelatory	
incidents	 that	 can	 challenge	 the	 engrained	 identity	 narratives	 based	 on	 enmity,	 and	 hence	
facilitate	transformative	peace.		
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8.2	Cypriotism	and	the	Primordial	Enemy	Other	
	
The	 growing	 sense	 of	 Cypriotism	 in	 the	 post-1974	 period	 did	 not	 necessarily	 mean	
reconfiguration	 of	 the	 friend-enemy	 distinction	 that	 has	 Turkey	 and	 Turkishness	 at	 its	
epicentre,	 nor	 did	 it	 necessarily	 include	 the	 Turkish-Cypriots	 in	 its	 narratives.	 While	 some	
Cypriotist	 accounts	 promote	 a	 shared	 Cypriot	 identity	 and	 focus	 on	 territorial	 and	 civic	
commonalities	 as	a	unifying	 factor,	others	 see	 the	RoC	as	essentially	 a	Greek-Cypriot	entity	
independent	from	Greece	(see	Mavratsas	1999,	Peristianis	2006).	Trimikliniotis	calls	the	latter	
‘Hellenised	Cypriotism’.	He	maintains	that	Cypriotism	still	has	ethnicity	as	the	element	of	unity	
at	 its	 base	 that	 promotes	 the	 perceived	 links	 with	 Hellenism	 (Trimikliniotis	 2007:151).	
Maintaining	the	Hellenic	elements	in	Cypriotism	grounds	Greek-Cypriot	identity	narratives	in	
the	classical	tradition	of	an	ancient	civilisation,	which	provides	a	source	of	esteem,	pride	and	
prestige	 that	 establishes	 Cyprus	 in	 the	 heart	 of	 the	Western	 world.	 Compared	 to	 Turkish-
Cypriots,	whose	presence	on	the	 island	 is	much	more	recent,	 links	with	the	ancient	Hellenic	
civilisation	also	strengthens	their	claims	on	the	island.		
	
Michael	notes	that	“Greek-Cypriots	had	always	been	uneasy	with	the	concept	of	‘equality’,	on	
the	basis	of	their	numerical	superiority	but	also	because	of	their	sense	of	being	the	indigenous	
inhabitants	of	Cyprus”	 (Michael	2011:183).	Especially	 following	their	 rapid	economic	growth	
post-1974	 and	 their	 changing	 social-economic	 status,	 Greek-Cypriots	 unsurprisingly	
questioned	 the	 benefit	 of	 federalism	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 political	 equality	 rather	 than	minority	
status.	 It	 is	 not	 uncommon	 to	 hear	 criticisms	 about	 the	 ‘irrationality’	 of	 political	 equality	
among	 Greek-Cypriots,	 where	 to	 some,	 Turkish-Cypriots	 want	 both	 ‘to	 be	 partners	 in	 the	
Republic	and	masters	 in	 the	north’.	Makriyianni	and	Psaltis	note	 that,	 the	 ‘majoritarianistic’	
discourse,	which	dictates	that	Greek-Cypriots	should	be	the	main	decision	makers	and	“have	
the	 first	 and	 last	word	 on	 the	 governance	 of	 Cyprus”	 is	 premised	 on	 the	 same	 dialectic	 of	
intolerance	(Makriyianni	and	Psaltis	2007:60).		
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This	is	also	demonstrated	in	the	New	Cyprus	Association	survey132	(NCA	2015).	Greek-Cypriots	
express	particularly	more	negative	sentiments	about	having	a	Turkish-Cypriot	president	(70%)	
compared	to	Turkish-Cypriots’	 feelings	about	having	a	Greek-Cypriot	president	 (49%),	which	
can	be	explained	by	the	difficulty	Greek-Cypriots	have	with	the	notion	of	political	equality	as	
the	 majority.	 Despite	 their	 strong	 desires	 for	 a	 solution,	 due	 to	 their	 minority	 complex	
Turkish-Cypriots	express	more	concerns	about	Greek-Cypriots	when	it	comes	to	daily	life,	such	
as	 having	 neighbours,	 friends,	 business	 partners	 and	 bosses.	 However,	 when	 it	 comes	 to	
marriage,	Greek-Cypriots	 tend	 to	 express	more	 concerns	 (72%),	which	 is	most	 likely	due	 to	
their	religious	convictions	to	Orthodox	Christianity,	whereas	Turkish-Cypriots	religiosity	is	not	
only	low,	they	only	get	married	through	civil	ceremonies.		
 
Chart	No	9:	Comparative	concerns	of	Greek-Cypriot	and	Turkish-Cypriots		
	
	
History	 education	 in	 both	 communities	 reproduces	 Cyprus	 as	 rightfully	 Turkish	 or	 rightfully	
Greek	 and	 the	 other	 community	 as	 the	 invader,	 occupier,	 or	 the	 greedy,	 barbaric	 other																																																									
132 	It	 should	 be	 noted	 that	 compared	 to	 the	 quantitative	 survey	 carried	 out	 in	 September	 2014,	 New	 Cyprus	
Association’s	 survey	 carried	 out	 in	 November	 2014,	 reports	 more	 positive	 attitudes	 towards	 having	 friends	 and	
neighbours	from	the	other	community.	For	instance,	according	to	QTS:2014,	59%	and	61%	of	Greek-Cypriots	would	be	
open	 to	 having	 Turkish-Cypriot	 friends	 and	neighbours	 respectively;	whereas,	New	Cyprus	Association	 survey	 reports	
that	 82%	 and	 81%	 of	 Greek-Cypriots	 would	 feel	 positive	 about	 having	 Turkish-Cypriot	 friends	 and	 neighbours	
respectively.	In	addition	to	the	fact	that	the	questions	are	posed	differently,	the	main	reason	behind	this	difference	in	
the	two	surveys	that	were	conducted	only	a	couple	of	months	apart	is	due	to	the	fact	that	while	QTS:2014	provided	6	
answer	options	ranging	from	strongly	agree	to	strongly	disagree	including	neutral	and	I	don’t	know	options,	New	Cyprus	
Association	survey	only	provided	4	answer	options	ranging	 from	very	positive	 to	very	negative.	 If	we	were	to	assume	
that	all	‘neutral’	and	‘I	don’t	know’	responses	from	the	QTS:2014	would	be	more	positive	leaning	if	not	given	alternative	
options,	then	we	would	get	71%	and	76%	respectively.		
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(Papadakis	1998,	Hadjipavlou	2002,	Kızılyürek	2002,	Papadakis	2008,	Tamcelik	2009).	Looking	
at	the	role	of	history	textbooks	in	perceptions	and	identity	narratives,	Makriyianni	and	Psaltis	
write	 that	 the	 RoC	 Ministry	 of	 Education	 unilaterally	 catered	 for	 Greek-Cypriots’	 needs,	
excluded	 Turkish-Cypriots	 from	 the	 history,	 geography	 and	 decision	making	 processes,	 and	
promoted	 that	 they	were	Hellenes	who	happened	 to	 live	 in	Cyprus	 (Makriyianni	and	Psaltis	
2007).	 The	Greek-Cypriot	 textbooks	 systematically	 ignore	multi-ethnic	or	multicultural	pasts	
and	 establish	 an	 unbroken	Hellenic	 continuity	 on	 the	 island	 constructed	 from	12	BC	 to	 the	
present	day	(Hadjipavlou	2002,	Kızılyürek	2002).	Consequently,	a	potential	settlement	that	is	
based	 on	 a	 bicommunal	 and	 bizonal	 federation	 challenges	 the	 Greek-Cypriots’	 ontological	
security	as	their	identity	narratives	rely	on	the	island’s	Hellenic	heritage	and	their	sovereignty	
over	the	whole	of	Cyprus.		
	
In	general,	both	Greek-Cypriot	and	Greek	identity	narratives,	perceive	Turkey	as	the	complete	 
opposite	of	Greece.	The	Cyprus	Problem	is	solely	appropriated	to	the	expansionist	occupier	 
Turkey,	 the	 history	 of	 inter-communal	 strife	 is	 ignored	 and	 the	 pre-1974	 era	 idealised	 
(Makriyianni	and	Psaltis	2007).	As	the	eternal	enemy,	Turks	lack	both	in	history	(because	it	is	 
of	 recent	 origins	 compared	 to	 ancient	 Greece)	 and	 in	 civilisation	 (because	 they	 are	 tribal,	 
barbarous	and	oriental)	(Bryant	2006).	The	Turkish	invasion	in	1974	is	read	from	this	analysis	 
and	 thus,	 is	 seen	 as	 a	 logical	 expression	 of	 the	 enemy’s	 violent	 and	 expansionist	 essence	 
compared	 to	 the	 goodness	 and	 innocence	 of	 the	 collective	 self	 (Papadakis,	 Peristianis	 et	 al.	 
2006).	Even	though	the	1974	rupture	coincided	with	education	reforms	based	on	the	principle	 
of	 ‘democratisation’	 with	 a	 growing	 focus	 on	 Cypriotism,	 they	 still	 placed	 Cyprus	 as	 the	 
‘outpost	 of	 Hellenism	 (Makriyianni	 and	 Psaltis	 2007:53).	 Despite	 the	 reconciliation	 and	 
peacebuilding	 efforts	 of	 the	 last	 5	 decades,	 this	 assumption	 remained	 largely	 unchallenged	 
especially	among	public	education	institutions.		
	
Yet,	irrespective	of	the	varying	degrees	of	motherland-centrism	and	ethnic	identification,	we	
can	talk	about	a	growing	sense	of	Cypriotism	in	the	GCc	with	certainty.	Despite	acknowledging	
close	 ties	and	kinship	with	Greece,	a	 temporal	 comparison	of	 the	 fieldwork	data	 from	2014	
with	the	Cyprus-2015-Initiative	surveys	show	Greek-Cypriots	prioritise	their	Cypriotness	over	
their	Greekness.	As	such,	although	92%	consider	having	Greek	cultural	roots,	only	7%	consider	
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themselves	as	mostly/only	Greek	compared	to	51%	who	identify	as	Greek	and	Cypriot	to	the	
same	 degree	 and	 41%	 who	 identify	 as	 mostly/only	 Cypriot133	(Cyprus-2015-Initiative	 2009,	
2010,	2011,	QTS:2014).		
Chart	No	10:	Greek-Cypriot	identity	narratives	
Chart	No	11:	Temporal	comparison	of	Greek-Cypriot	perceptions	of	identity	
	
Similar	to	Turkish-Cypriots,	we	can	observe	a	gradual	decrease	in	Greek-Cypriots’	attachment	
to	 Greece	 as	 their	 motherland	 where	 48%	 of	 Greek-Cypriots	 considered	 Greece	 as	 their	
motherland	 in	 2014	 compared	 to	 52%	 in	 2008	 (Cyprus-2015-Initiative	 2009,	 2010,	 2011,	
133	These	values	are	88%,	8%,	63%	and	28%	for	Turkish-Cypriots	respectively.	
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QTS:2014).	Yet,	compared	to	Turkish-Cypriots’	relations	with	Turkey	and	their	attachment	to	
Cyprus,	 Greek-Cypriots	 consider	 both	 Greece	 and	 Cyprus	 as	 their	 motherland	 to	 a	 lesser	
extent	(QTS:2014)134.	
Chart	No	12:	Temporal	Comparison	of	Greek-Cypriot	perceptions	of	motherland	
Chart	No	13:	Comparison	of	perceptions	of	motherland	between	Greek-Cypriots	and	
Turkish-Cypriots	(QTS:2014)
134	The	visible	drop	in	attachment	to	Greece	as	the	motherland	also	owes	much	to	the	financial	crisis	in	this	period	as	it	
reinforced	feelings	of	betrayal	and	blame	similar	to	the	feelings	from	1974.	The	same	can	be	said	for	Turkish-Cypriots,	
who	are	 increasingly	disassociating	themselves	 from	Turkey,	due	to	the	more	 Islamic	and	 less	secular	direction	of	 the	
country	 under	 the	AKP	 government.	 This	 demonstrates	 that	 shifts	 in	 identity	 narratives	 are	 highly	 dependent	 on	 the	
dynamics	of	the	respective	motherlands	in	particular	as	the	self-identity	narratives	have	an	inter-subjective	relationship	
with	self’s	significant	others.			
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Although	Greeks	 and	Greekness	 is	 not	 securitised	 as	 a	 threat	 to	Greek-Cypriot	 identity	 like	
Turks	and	Turkishness	is	in	the	TCc,	Mavratsas	recognises	the	identity	dilemma	in	the	Greek-
Cypriot	identity	narratives,	where	they	call	the	Greeks	“kalamarades”,	who	are	deceitful,	who	
talk	 a	 lot	 and	 are	 inferior,	 but	 simultaneously	 maintain	 a	 more	 idealised	 form	 of	 Greek	
ancestry	 that	 is	 inseparable	 from	 their	 Cypriotness	 (Mavratsas	 1999).	 This	 dilemma	 shows	
itself	in	an	inherent	tension	in	the	social	construction	of	Greek-Cypriotness	and	on	the	level	of	
individual	 consciousness,	 where	 it	 polarises	 Greek-Cypriot	 society	 between	 ‘Hellenic/Greek	
ethno-centrists’	 and	 ‘Cypriotists’.	 Mavratsas	 argues	 that	 while	 ethno-centrism	 sets	 the	
parameters	 of	 ideological	 orthodoxy	 and	 is	 the	 mainstream	 political	 and	 theoretical	
consciousness,	 Cypriotism	 occupies	 Greek-Cypriots	 on	 the	 level	 of	 everyday	 consciousness	
(Mavratsas	 1999).	 Yet,	 despite	 the	 declining	 appeal	 of	 ethnic	 identity	 narratives	 and	
motherland-centrism,	people	from	Turkey	are	securitised	as	a	threat	across	the	spectrum.			
	
A	 civil	 society	 representative	 from	 the	 political	 party	 EDEK	 (The	 Movement	 for	 Social	
Democracy)	 corroborates	 this	 perception	 of	 threat;	 “People	 from	 Turkey	 are	 illegal,	 and	
colonisation	 is	 a	 crime	 against	 humanity.	 They	 should	 leave	 the	 island.	 …[However],	 what	
about	 those	 that	 are	 from	mixed	marriage?	 I	 can	 accept	 those,	 but	 the	 general	 rule	 is	 the	
above.	My	biggest	fear	is	Turkish	imperialism.	For	me	[it]	is	clear	that	Turkey	wants	to	control	
the	whole	island,	and	this	is	something	that	really	scares	me”	(CSOS-GCc:2014).	Consequently,	
the	ontological	security	of	Greek-Cypriots	is	further	challenged	by	the	presence	of	the	Turkish	
immigrants	 in	north	Cyprus	and	that	any	settlement	 for	a	unified	Cyprus	would	 include	and	
legitimise	 their	 existence	 regardless	 of	 the	 numbers	 that	 are	 allowed	 to	 stay	 after	 a	
settlement135.	 In	conflicts,	ontological	security	of	 the	dominant	self	 rests	on	the	assumption	
that	the	minority	other	is	not	legitimate	(Zarakol	2010,	Celik	2013),	and	in	the	case	of	Cyprus,	
the	Greek-Cypriot	narrative	maintains	that	the	illegitimacy	of	‘Turkishness’	on	the	island	stems	
from	 the	 illegality	 of	 the	 administration	 in	 the	 north	 and	 the	 Turkish	 invasion	 of	 1974.	
Accordingly,	a	great	majority	of	Greek-Cypriots	(80%)	demand	their	repatriation	to	Turkey	in	a	
post-settlement	scenario.	
135	According	 to	 the	 UN	 sanctioned	 comprehensive	 peace	 settlement	 known	 as	 the	 Annan	 Plan	 of	 2004	 capped	 the	
number	of	persons	of	Turkish	origin	who	would	become	citizens	of	the	united	Cyprus	as	45,000	(See	Hatay	2007,	Dodd	
2006).	
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Chart	No	14:	Greek-Cypriot	preferences	in	a	post-settlement	scenario	(QTS:2014) 
 
	
Alecos	Tringides,	co-founder	of	IKME	(Socio-political	Studies	Institute)	and	the	Greek-Cypriot	
chair	 of	 the	 Cypriots’	 Voice	 think-tank,	 explains	 that	 the	 reason	 for	 his	 involvement	 in	 bi-
communal	 initiatives	 is	 based	on	his	 guilt	 because	 the	older	 people	 are	 responsible	 for	 the	
current	 situation.	 He	 stresses	 the	 difficulty	 of	 talking	 to	 people	 about	 issues	 that	 are	
particularly	 ‘demonised’	and	are	 sources	of	hostility136.	Although	Tringides	 states	 that	 there	
are	“too	many	people	from	Turkey	in	the	northern	part	of	Cyprus”,	he	strongly	supports	their	
integration	 in	 society	 and	 their	 involvement	 in	 the	 reconciliation	 efforts.	 While	 Tringides	
adopts	 a	 highly	 tolerant	 attitude	 towards	 citizenship	 issues	 in	 a	 post-settlement	 scenario	
where	 he	 believes	 “All	 people	 in	 the	 north	 are	 citizens	 of	 the	 future	 northern	 constituent	
state,	 thus	 all	 should	 be	 allowed	 to	 remain”,	 he	 simultaneously	 thinks	 “they	 pose	 security	
concern	 for	 political	 and	 social	 life.	 They	 participate	 in	 elections	 so	 they	 can	 swing	 the	
developments	accordingly.	With	 their	dependence	on	 religion	 they	 contaminate	 the	 society	
with	 backward	 turning	 obstacles”	 (CSOS-GCc:2014).	 Fittingly,	 fieldwork	 findings	 show	
perceived	threat	levels	posed	by	people	from	Turkey	is	alarmingly	high	among	the	GCc,	where	
78%	agree	with	the	statement	that	Turkish	immigrants	threaten	their	Cypriot	identity	and	83%	
think	that	there	are	too	many	people	from	Turkey	in	north	Cyprus	(QTS:2014).		
	
																																																								
136	A	4	minute	short	interview	with	Tringides	can	be	found	here:	http://www.ikme.eu/index.php/en/	
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Chart	15:	Greek-Cypriot	perceptions	of	threat	to	their	identity	(QTS:2014)	
Chart	16:	Greek-Cypriot	perceptions	of	Turkish	immigrants	(QTS:2014)	
Theodossopoulos	 writes	 that	 the	 Greeks	 are	 obsessed	 with	 the	 imprecise,	 all-inclusive,	
generalised	 category	 of	 the	 Turk,	 where	 the	 undifferentiated	 Turk	 is	 presented		as	 the	
indispensable	 ingredient	 of	 nation	 building	 both	 in	 Greece	 and	 Cyprus.	 This	 presentation	 is	 
one	 of	 the	 most	 representative	 examples	 of	 a	 ‘national	 other’	 used	 as	 a	 key	 anchor	 for	 
imagining	 the	 ‘national	 self’	 (Theodossopoulos	 2007).	 In	 parallel	 with	 the	 concepts	 of	 
‘justificatory	 rhetoric’	 and	 ‘minor	 narcissistic	 differences’,	 Theodossopoulos	 provides	 a	 
comprehensive	attempt	to	study	the	inconsistencies	and	paradoxes	of	the	perceptions	of	self	 
and	 other	 from	 an	 anthropological	 perspective	 using	 the	 concept	 of	 ‘hollow	 categories’.	 
Drawing	 on	 Adener	 and	 Chapman,	 Theodossopoulos	 describes	 ‘hollow	 categories’	 as	 the	
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forever	incomplete	and	malleable	ways	of	seeing	the	world,	which	can	be	supplemented	with	
additional	meaning	at	any	base	and	time	to	mould	it	 into	something	that	can	accommodate	
the	 paradoxes	 of	 change	 (see	 Ardener	 and	 Chapman	 1989,	 Theodossopoulos	 2007).	
Hollowness	 in	 the	 concept	 is	 not	 a	 value	 judgement	 on	 validity	 or	 on	 importance	 of	 the	
categorisations,	 but	 reflects	 the	 subjectivity	 and	 externality	 of	 the	 image	 produced	 for	 the	
other.	It	denotes	the	image	of	an	out-group	that	is	reinvented	and	reproduced	by	the	self,	or	
other-selves	 that	are	 in	 some	way	 in	close	proximity	 to	 the	out-group.	These	meanings	and	
distinctions	that	are	externally	produced	are	then	imposed	upon	the	out-group	as	 ‘real’	and	
‘valid’	and	are	not	only	reflected	in	self-narratives	but	also	in	relationships	and	routines.		
	
Evidence	 of	 difference	 that	 justifies	 the	 self-narrative	 as	 distinct	 from	 the	 generalised	
categorisation	 of	 the	 Turk	 is	 abundant	 in	 what	 Theodossopoulos	 calls	 the	 ‘Greek	 political	
cosmology’	(Theodossopoulos	2007:6).	This	difference	is	unchallenged	by	the	response	of	the	
‘other’,	 as	 the	 political	 cosmology	 of	 the	 Turks	 also	 differentiates	 the	 generalised	
categorisation	of	the	Greeks,	hence	reinforcing	the	identity	of	the	self.	For	Theodossopoulos,	
“The	 Turks,	 in	 whatever	 capacity	 they	 are	 discussed,	 inspire	 the	 moral	 and	 national	
imagination	of	many	people	in	mainland	Greece	and	the	island	of	Cyprus.	And	in	this	respect	
the	Greeks	appear	to	be	preoccupied	with	the	all-inclusive,	generalised	category	of	the	Turk”	
(Theodossopoulos	 2007:2).	 This	 hollow	 categorisation	 facilitates	 ‘common	 sense’	
interpretation	 of	 old	 and	 new	 realities,	 which	 are	 in	 turn	 reproduced	 as	 primordial	 and	
inescapable	categorisations	that	are	taken	for	granted;	the	self	then	reads	and	interprets	all	
events	and	relationships	from	this	‘external’	window.		
	
We	can	find	evidence	of	this	in	political	psychology	as	well.	Volkan	explains,	“chosen	trauma	is	
a	large	group’s	mental	representation	of	a	historic	event	that	resulted	in	collective	feelings	of	
helplessness,	 victimisation,	 shame,	 and	 humiliation	 at	 the	 hands	 of	 others,	 and	 typically	
involves	 drastic	 losses	 of	 people,	 land,	 prestige	 and	 dignity”	 (Volkan	 2006:173).	 Hence,	 the	
chosen	trauma	is	located	in	the	sense	of	‘we-ness’	and	becomes	a	symbol	of	‘who	we	are’.	It	is	
subsequently	 inherited	by	 the	next	generations	and	deposited	 into	 the	developing	selves	of	
children,	who	are	expected	to	reverse	the	helplessness	and	humiliation.	Examining	the	case	of	
Georgia,	Volkan	studies	how	perceived	threats	can	reactivate	chosen	mythologised	traumas;	
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just	 like	 Rumelili’s	 peace-anxieties	 that	 can	 reproduce	 conflicts,	 Volkan	 explains	 how	
reactivation	of	chosen	traumas	can	manifest	into	a	stubborn	resistance	to	peaceful	resolution	
of	conflicts	(Volkan	2006).		
	
Within	 the	 context	 of	 the	 Cyprus	 Problem,	 this	 chosen	 trauma	 for	 Greek-Cypriots	 is	 the	
Turkish	invasion,	where	everything	before	it	is	idealised	as	good	and	peaceful,	and	everything	
after	it	is	presented	as	chaos,	loss	and	deprivation.	Underpinned	by	the	trauma	of	the	1974,	
both	civil	society	representatives	and	the	general	population	perceive	Turkish	 immigrants	as	
an	 obstacle	 to	 their	 desired	 future.	 According	 to	 the	 quantitative	 surveys,	 68%	 of	 Greek-
Cypriots	agree	with	the	statement	that	people	from	Turkey	are	a	major	obstacle	to	reaching	a	
comprehensive	settlement	on	the	island	(QTS:2014).	
	
Chart	17.	Greek-Cypriot	perceptions	of	Turkish	immigrants	in	relation	to	a	settlement	
(QTS:2014)	
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Minor	Catastrophe	of	1922.	Considering	that	their	EU	membership	was	unconditional	and	that	
Turkey	and	people	from	Turkey	were	still	part	of	the	equation137	in	a	potential	comprehensive	
settlement,	 with	 lack	 of	 alternative	 narratives	 to	 challenge	 the	 perception	 of	 the	 enemy,	
Greek-Cypriots	read	the	Annan	Plan	from	the	windows	tinted	by	their	chosen	trauma.	Michael	
writes	 how	 2004	 triggered	 the	 memories	 of	 1974,	 which	 “perpetuated	 the	 image	 of	 the	
‘unspeakable’	 Turk	 as	 Orthodox	 Hellenism’s	 eternal	 enemy,	 out	 to	 expel	 them	 from	 their	
ancestral	homeland,	in	a	melancholic	fatalism	coloured	by	betrayal,	defeat,	and	loss”	(Michael	
2011:33).		
	
Thus,	securitisation	of	Turkey,	people	from	Turkey	and	Turkishness	is	rooted	in	the	historical	
narratives	 of	 Greek-Cypriots	 and	 is	 reproduced	 with	 the	 memory	 of	 the	 trauma	 of	 1974.	
Consequently,	 while	 Turkey	 is	 seen	 as	 the	 sole	 responsible	 actor	 for	 the	 Cyprus	 Problem,	
people	from	Turkey	and	by	extension	Turkishness	is	seen	as	an	obstacle	to	peace.	As	a	result,	
despite	their	desires	for	peace,	accepting	a	potential	peace	agreement	that	 includes	Turkish	
immigrants	 and	 Turkey’s	 guarantorship	 creates	 peace-anxieties	 for	 Greek-Cypriots	 as	 it	
challenges	 their	 disassociation138	from	 Turkey	 as	 a	 strategy	 to	 manage	 their	 anxieties	 that	
stem	from	1974.	Without	the	involvement	of	people	from	Turkey	in	reconciliation	efforts	and	
desecuritisation	of	Turkishness,	the	events	of	1974	will	continue	to	aggravate	Greek-Cypriots’	
peace-anxieties	and	haunt	their	decision-making	throughout	the	peace	process.	
		 	
																																																								
137	Be	it	the	issues	about	guarantors,	number	of	settlers	that	were	to	remain,	property	and	return	of	IDPs	or	the	Turkish	
military.	
138	Such	as	not	allowing	Turkish	 immigrants	to	cross	to	the	RoC	or	not	having	economic	and	political	relationship	with	
Turkey.		
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8.3	Perceptions	of	Difference	and	Peace	Anxieties	
	
Spyros	Spyrou’s	work	on	ethnic	identity	of	Greek-Cypriot	children	demonstrates	that	despite	
declining	motherland-centrism	among	 the	GCc,	Cypriotness	 is	 still	 founded	upon	Hellenism,	
makes	 imagining	 the	 ‘Turkish-Cypriot’	 difficult	 (Spyrou	 2001,	 2006,	 2007).	 Spyrou	 discusses	
how	Greek-Cypriot	school	children	do	not	know	where	to	place	Turkish-Cypriots;	when	asked	
about	Turkish-Cypriots,	Greek-Cypriot	children	provide	answers	like	“they	are	our	own	people,	
but	 they	are	being	held	by	 the	Turks”	or	 that	 “their	mother	or	 father	was	Greek”,	because	
they	find	it	difficult	to	denote	Cypriotness	without	implying	Greekness	(Spyrou	2006:129).	This	
illustrates	 how	 the	 difference	 inside	 the	 self	 confuses	 the	 binary	 and	 oppositional	 logic	 of	
ethno-centrist	 identity	 narratives	 that	 do	 not	 leave	 room	 for	 complexity	 and	 ambiguity.	
Spyrou	highlights	 a	 structural	 ambiguity	 in	 the	 category	of	 ‘Turkish-Cypriot’,	where	 the	 first	
part	designates	them	as	complete	others,	as	 ‘Turks’	who	are	their	barbaric	nemesis	and	the	
second	part	designates	them	as	part	of	the	self,	leading	him	to	conclude	that	'Turkish-Cypriot'	
is	a	“contradiction	in	terms”	(Spyrou	2006).	
	
Nevertheless,	 the	 perception	 that	 Turkish-Cypriots	 are	 part-self	 is	 demonstrated	 in	 the	
tendencies	 of	 Greek-Cypriots	 to	 differentiate	 between	 Turkish-Cypriots	 and	 Turkish	
immigrants.	This	differentiation	is	not	dissimilar	to	the	Turkish-Cypriots’	own	perception	that	
is	 based	 on	 modernity,	 Europeanness	 and	 superiority.	 Like	 Turkish-Cypriot	 civil	 society	
representatives,	 Greek-Cypriot	 civil	 society	 representatives	 cite	 religion,	 backwardness,	
orientalism	 and	 opposing	 political	 interest	 as	 the	 key	 elements	 in	 their	 reasoning.	 For	
example,	 George	 Pachis139	argues	 that	 it	 is	 highly	 desirable	 for	 all	 people	 who	 came	 from	
Turkey	 after	 1974,	 including	 their	 descendants,	 to	 return	 to	 Turkey	 except	 for	 those	 who	
intermarried	 [with	 Turkish-Cypriots].	 He	 also	 adds	 that	 Turkish	 immigrants	 “are	 completely	
different	 to	 the	 Turkish	 Cypriots	 in	 all	 aspects”	 (CSOS-GCc:2014).	 Similarly,	 Joseph	 Bayada	
from	 New	 Cyprus	 Association,	 who	 defines	 himself	 as	 “only	 Cypriot	 and	 not	 at	 all	 Greek”,	
strongly	disagrees	with	 the	 statement	 that	 ‘people	 from	Turkey	are	no	different	 than	other	
139	George	Pachis	is	an	active	member	in	Estia	(Focus)	Cultural	Group,	SMMK	(Cyprus	Mechanical	Engineers	Association),	
ETEK	 (The	 Cyprus	 Scientific	 and	 Technical	 Chamber,	 an	 umbrella	 Chamber	 for	 all	 engineers)	 and	 the	 Cypriots’	 Voice	
think-tank.	
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migrants	 in	Cyprus’.	Bayada	highlights	 the	differences	between	Turkish-Cypriots	and	Turkish	
immigrants,	and	between	Greek-Cypriots	and	Greeks:	
“They	pose	a	threat	both	in	political	and	social	terms,	so	long	as	their	allegiance	
is	 with	 Turkey	 rather	 than	 Cyprus.	Moreover,	 because	 of	 their	 different	 and	
lower	cultural	niveau140	compared	to	Turkish-Cypriots,	[they	are]	downgrading	
our	society	as	a	whole.	…	I	think	that	mentality	wise	we	are	different	to	Greeks,	
we	are	 less	religious,	 less	deceitful,	 less	distrustful	and	[more]	naive.	Save	for	
the	 language,	 we	 are	 closer	 to	 Turkish-Cypriots,	 mentality	 wise,	 sharing	 the	
same	values	but	[we	are]	more	religious	unfortunately.”		
	
The	uncertainty	about	the	numbers	of	Turkish	immigrants	in	the	north,	the	dependency	of	the	
Turkish-Cypriots	 on	 Turkey	 and	 the	 perceived	 threats	 posed	 by	 Turkish	 immigrants	 are	
effectively	 used	 as	 a	 ‘stick’	 to	 create	 a	 sense	 of	 urgency	 around	 reaching	 a	 comprehensive	
settlement	on	the	 island.	The	RoC	and	Greek-Cypriots,	use	of	the	term	settler	to	refer	to	all	
Turkish	nationals	present	on	the	island	creates	the	appearance	that	all	of	these	persons	have	
citizenship,	voting	rights,	and	so	the	ability	to	influence	elections	and	politics	in	the	north.	The	
RoC	estimates	130,000-	160,000	‘settlers’	and	85,000	indigenous	Turkish-Cypriots,	suggesting	
that	 almost	 two-thirds	 of	 the	 Turkish	 Cypriot	 electorate	 is	 now	 of	 Turkish	mainland	 origin	
(Hatay	2007).	These	figures,	which	are	mainly	calculated	based	on	entries	and	exists	from	the	
ports	are	highly	problematic	because	they	 include	those	Turkish-Cypriots	who	hold	Republic	
of	 Turkey	 passports	 as	well,	 exacerbate	 the	 securitisation	 of	 Turkish	 immigrants	 and	 hence	
Greek-Cypriots’	peace-anxieties.	The	suggestion	that	Turkish-Cypriots	are	‘outnumbered’	and	
the	 ‘TRNC’	 being	 so	 dependent	 on	 Turkey	might	 gradually	 come	 to	 be	 a	 Turkish	 province,	
implies	 that	Greek-Cypriots	 and	 the	RoC	would	 then	not	 have	 the	 Turkish-Cypriots	 and	 the	
‘TRNC’,	 but	 Turkey	 as	 their	 neighbour141,	 which	 is	 ‘of	 course’	 less	 desirable	 than	 Turkish-
Cypriots,	who	are	at	 least	more	European	and	part-self	(see	Morgan	2002).	Similarly,	Greek-
Cypriot	civil	society	representatives,	who	argue	that	 immigrants	outnumber	Turkish-Cypriots	
140	A	level	or	plateau	(as	of	existence	or	achievement)	especially	in	a	progression	(i.e.	cultural	niveau/level	and	religious	
niveau/level.	
141	Akıncı	used	the	same	‘stick’	to	create	a	sense	of	urgency	around	reaching	a	comprehensive	settlement	and	said:	“if	no	
deal,	Greek	Cypriots	could	find	themselves	‘neighbours	with	Turkey’”	(CyprusMail,	19	September	2016).	
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in	 north	 Cyprus,	 actively	 voice	 their	 concerns	 for	 the	 ‘endangered’	 Turkish-Cypriot	 identity	
(CSOS-GCc:2014):		
“…I	think	they	pose	a	social	concern	to	Turkish	Cypriots,	who	may	soon	
be	a	minority	in	their	own	country.”	(Anonymous,	Cans	for	Kids)	
	
“They	 are	multiplying	 in	 a	way	 that	 in	 a	 few	 years	 Cypriots,	Greek	 and	
Turkish	Cypriots	will	be	a	minority”	(Anonymous,	Peace	Centre)	
	
“…	 since	 the	 TRNC	 is	 not	 internationally	 recognised,	 the	 Turkish	
immigrants	 live	 in	 a	 gilded	 cage,	 outnumbering	 native	 Turkish	 Cypriots	
and	 distorting	 the	 political	 and	 social	 situation.”	 (Anonymous,	 ACCEPT	
and	Cyprus	Family	Planning	Association)	
	
Furthermore,	 fieldwork	 data	 also	 shows	 that	 Greek-Cypriots,	 who	 securitise	 people	 from	
Turkey	 significantly	 more	 than	 Turkish-Cypriots	 and	 feel	 less	 victimisation	 from	 Turkish-
Cypriots,	 are	 more	 willing	 to	 engage	 in	 social	 and	 professional	 relationships	 with	 Turkish-
Cypriots	 compared	 to	Turkish	 immigrants.	 For	example,	while	59%	of	Greek-Cypriots	 stated	
they	would	be	open	to	making	Turkish-Cypriot	friends,	only	29%	were	open	to	making	Turkish	
friends;	and	while	65%	of	Greek-Cypriots	do	not	want	Turkish	neighbours,	 this	value	 is	only	
24%	when	it	comes	to	Turkish-Cypriots	(QTS:2014).		
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Chart	No	18:	Greek-Cypriot	perceptions	victimisation	and	threat	(QTS:2014)	
In	addition	 to	 the	perception	 that	Turkish-Cypriots	are	half-self,	 this	 stark	difference	Greek-
Cypriots	draw	between	Turkish-Cypriots	and	Turkish	immigrants	can	also	be	attributed	to	the	
success	 of	 reconciliation	 and	 confidence	 building	 efforts.	 Over	 the	 last	 5	 decades,	 Turkish-
Cypriots	and	Greek-Cypriots	moved	from	a	polarised	point	where	they	saw	themselves	as	the	
continuation	 of	 their	motherlands	 and	where	 their	 desires	 about	 the	 future	were	mutually	
exclusive,	to	a	point	where	they	recognise	their	similarities	and	loyalties	to	Cyprus	rather	than	
to	the	‘motherlands’.	Yet,	the	Cyprus	Problem	is	still	ongoing	and	reaching	a	comprehensive	
settlement	 on	 the	 island	 had	 proven	 elusive. Despite	 the	 peacebuilding	 efforts	 and	 the	
shifting	 identity	 narratives,	 Turkish-Cypriots	 still	 remain	 part	 compatriot,	 part-enemy	 and	
mainly	 the	 minority	 who	 is	 not	 Cypriot	 enough	 in	 Greek-Cypriots’	 narratives.	 This	
contradiction	raises	the	question	if	Turkish-Cypriots	are	part-self,	then	are	people	from	Turkey	
part-self	 or	 are	 they	 the	 enemy	 other	 for	 Greek-Cypriots?	 Thus,	 securitisation	 of	 Turkish	
immigrants	 and	Turkishness	 is	 creating	peace-anxieties	 for	Greek-Cypriots	not	only	because	
accepting	 a	 solution	 means	 accepting	 to	 live	 with	 the	 enemy-other	 as	 Turkey	 and	 Turkish	
immigrants	 are	 part	 of	 the	 reality	 in	 Cyprus,	 but	 also	 because	 the	 ambiguity	 of	 the	 term	
‘Turkish-Cypriot’	challenges	their	ontological	security	and	creates	dissonance.		
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The	quantitative	data	corroborates	that	the	feelings	of	anxiety	voiced	by	civil	society	is	shared	
across	the	community.	The	first	chart	below	confirms	that	Greek-Cypriots’	anxiety	about	the	
prospect	 of	 reaching	 a	 settlement	 (47%)	 is	 higher	 that	 their	 anxiety	 about	 living	 next	 to	 a	
Turkish-Cypriot	(37%),	and	Greek-Cypriots	voice	highest	levels	of	anxiety	about	living	next	to	a	
Turk	 (62%).	 The	 second	 table	 shows	 the	 relationship	 between	 anxieties	 about	 a	 potential	
settlement	 and	 perceived	 levels	 of	 threat	 to	 their	 Cypriot	 identity142,	 illustrating	 that	 those	
who	 perceive	 more	 threats	 from	 people	 from	 Turkey	 also	 feel	 more	 peace-anxieties.	 To	
confirm	the	dependence	between	both	values,	a	chi-square	test	is	used,	which	confirms	this	
positive	 relationship	 and	 dependence	 between	 the	 two	 statements.	 As	 such,	 51%	 of	 those	
who	stated	that	the	prospect	of	reaching	a	settlement	makes	them	anxious	feel	threatened	by	
people	from	Turkey	(QTS:2014).		
Chart	No	19:	Greek-Cypriot	feelings	of	anxiety	(QTS:2014)	
142	The	questionnaire	did	not	 ask	 the	 respondents	 about	 their	perceived	 levels	of	 ‘physical	 threat’.	 Thus,	 it	 should	be	
noted	 that	 that	 the	 relationship	 between	 anxieties	 about	 a	 potential	 settlement	 and	 perceived	 levels	 of	 threat	 only	
pertains	 to	 perceived	 threats	 to	 Greek-Cypriots’	 Cypriotness	 and	 not	 to	 their	 perceived	 physical	 threats,	 such	 as	
pertaining	to	the	Turkish	military	or	living	next	to	a	Turk.	The	first	chart	clearly	demonstrates	that	62%	of	Greek-Cypriots	
feel	anxious	about	living	next	to	a	Turk.	
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Table	No	9:	Cross-tabulation	between	Greek-Cypriot	fears	and	anxieties	about	a	settlement	
	
	
The	 civil	 society	 questionnaires	 and	 the	 quantitative	 survey	 data	 demonstrate	 that	 Greek-
Cypriots	 peace-anxieties	 are	 underpinned	 by	 the	 securitisation	 of	 Turkishness	 as	 a	 threat,	
which	 highlights	 the	 need	 for	 desecuritisation	 strategies	 to	 help	 manage	 these	 peace-
anxieties.	Focusing	only	on	the	relationship	between	Greek-Cypriots	and	Turkish-Cypriots,	the	
peacebuilding	 efforts	 on	 the	 island	 has	 been	 unsuccessful	 (or	 unaware)	 in	 addressing	 the	
multiplicity	of	identities,	tug-of-war	between	ethnic	and	civic/cultural	expressions	of	identity	
and	 ‘secondary’	 self-other	 relationships.	As	previously	discussed,	 in	addition	 to	accepting	 to	
live	side	by	side	with	their	enemy	other,	Greek-Cypriots	also	feel	anxiety	about	a	potential	no-
solution	 or	 partition	 scenario	 that	 challenges	 their	 identity-narratives	 founded	 upon	 the	
Hellenic	 heritage	 and	 unity	 of	 the	 island.	 Similar	 to	 the	 Turkish-Cypriots	 ontological	
dissonance143,	competing	anxieties	and	fears	of	Greek-Cypriots	also	create	dissonance	where	
addressing	one	exacerbates	the	other.	An	important	parallel	can	be	drawn	between	Lupovici’s	
analysis	of	the	ontological	dissonance	that	stem	from	the	multiplicity	of	Israeli	identities	and	
the	 inability	 of	 the	 peace	 process	 to	 simultaneously	 address	 them,	 and	 the	 case	 of	 Cyprus	
(Lupovici	2015).		
143	Turkish-Cypriots’	 anxieties	 about	 being	 stuck	 in	 a	 stalemate	 and	 their	 biographical	 continuity	 as	 adistinct	 identity	
among	 the	growing	number	of	 Turkish	 immigrants	 and	dependence	on	Turkey	 contradicts	 their	 identity-narratives	as	
ethnically	Turkish,	as	Turks	who	 live	 in	Cyprus	and	as	Turks	of	Cyprus	who	were	saved	by	Turkey.	Their	 insistence	on	
Turkey’s	 guarantorship	 and	military	 presence	 on	 the	 island	 as	 part	 of	 a	 settlement	 scenario	 in	 turn	 exacerbate	 their	
anxieties	by	being	one	of	the	major	issues	that	draw	the	negotiations	to	an	impasse.		
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Lupovici’s	argument	that	the	Israeli	policy	based	on	encouraging	a	separation	between	Fatah	
and	Hamas	provides	a	way	to	deal	with	this	dissonance	resembles	the	differentiation	Greek-
Cypriots	make	between	Turks	and	Turkish-Cypriot	(Lupovici	2015).	The	Turkish-Cypriot	is	the	
better	 version	 of	 the	 Turk,	 like	 Fatah	 is	 the	 better,	 less	 threatening	 version	 of	 Hamas;	 the	
Turkish-Cypriot	 is	 also	 a	 victim	of	 the	 Turk,	 just	 like	 Fatah.	Although	 still	 the	other	 and	 still	
uncomfortable,	 the	 Turkish-Cypriot	 is	more	 familiar,	more	 self,	 and	 less	 enemy,	 and	 hence	
generates	less	anxiety	than	the	Turk.	Simultaneously,	reconfiguring	Turkish-Cypriots	as	friends	
and	 compatriots	may	exacerbate	 feelings	of	 insecurity	pertaining	 to	people	 from	Turkey	by	
bringing	the	 ‘enemy’	closer	to	the	definition	of	the	self/friend.	This	splits	the	 identity	of	the	
other	 and	means	 that	 a	 Turkish-Cypriot	 needs	 to	primarily	 be	Cypriot	 to	be	 a	 friend	 to	 the	
Greek-Cypriot.	
For	 Lupovici,	 the	 presentation	 of	 the	 conflict	 with	 Hamas	 enables	 Israel	 to	 alleviate	 some	
anxieties	 while	 engagement	 in	 conflict	 resolution	 with	 Fatah	 appeases	 others.	 Similarly,	
institutionalised	 securitisation	 dynamics	 that	 define	 Turkey	 and	 Turkishness	 as	 unruly,	
aggressive,	 expansionist	 and	 non-European	 preserve	 the	 national	 identity	 narratives	 for	
Greek-Cypriots.	 Simultaneously,	 maintaining	 their	 commitment	 to	 the	 peace	 process	 with	
Turkish-Cypriots	 by	 engaging	 in	 negotiations	 appeases	 anxieties	 about	 partition	 and	 about	
losing	half	of	their	home/land	to	Turkey,	and	preserves	the	narrative	that	if	not	for	the	Turkish	
invasion,	 Cypriots	 would	 have	 lived	 peacefully.	 The	 differentiation	 between	 the	 Turkish-
Cypriot	and	the	Turk	also	allows	Greek-Cypriots	to	shift	the	blame	to	Turkey	and	maintain	the	
myth	of	return	and	the	myth	of	a	peaceful	ancient	island	of	Aphrodite.	Lupovici	suggests	that	
while	 this	 helps	 to	 contain	 the	 contradictions	 in	 Israeli	 identity	 and	 manage	 some	 of	 the	
anxieties	 in	 dissonance,	 it	 thwarts	 meaningful	 and	 comprehensive	 resolution	 attempts	
(Lupovici	 2015).	 Similarly	 in	 Cyprus,	 dissonance	 and	 lack	 of	 desecuritisation	 of	 Turkishness	
shows	itself	as	a	crucial	element	that	is	missing	from	the	peace	process.	As	such,	it	contributes	
to	a	deadlock	about	practical	issues	at	the	negotiation	table	such	as	citizenship,	repatriation	of	
Turkish	migrants,	limitations	upon	the	return	of	Greek-Cypriot	IDPs	and	Turkey’s	guarantees,	
and	undermines	meaningful	reconciliation	among	those	that	do	not	fit	the	narrow	dual-ethnic	
approach.
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Lupovici	explains	that	for	Israelis	while	the	burden	of	moving	to	peace	is	too	heavy	given	the	
ensuing	anxieties	stemming	from	the	challenges	to	self/other	narratives;	not	moving	towards	
peace	brings	moral	questions	and	anxieties	based	on	condemnation	as	well	as	the	insecurities	
of	an	unpeaceful	 situation	 (Lupovici	2015).	Faced	with	ontological	dissonance,	a	new	reality	
can	 be	 constructed	 based	 on	 elements	 of	 both	 peace	 and	 conflict,	 where	 the	 conflict	 is	
maintained	 but	 there	 is	 a	 constant	 effort	 towards	 peace.	 Subsequently,	 conflicts	 become	
protracted because	the	conflict	itself	becomes	a	source	of	ontological	security,	a	way	to	deal	
with	the	insecurities	created	by	reaching	the	either	end	of	the	spectrum,	peace	settlement	vs.	
partition/giving	 up	 on	 ‘peace’.	 Such	 an	 in-between	 reality	 also	 creates	 peace	 fatigue	 and	
frustration	 about	 the	 process,	 fuelling	 indifference	 or	 the	 spoilers	 of	 ‘peace’	 that	 paint	 the	
other	as	uncompromising.
However	the	contradiction	that	Turkish-Cypriots	are	part-enemy	and	part-self	offers	hope	and	
opportunity	 for	 desecuritisation	 of	 Turkishness.	 Theodossopoulos	 explains	 that	 ‘revelatory	
incidents’	are	very	important	for	hollow	categories	of	threatening	others	as	their	hollowness	
allows	 for	 reconfiguration	 based	 on	 experience.	 He	 argues	 that	 on	 top	 of	 already	 available	
existing	 information	 about	 ‘the	 others’,	 there	 is	 hollow	 capacity	 to	 add	 new	 data	 and	 new	
experiences	 to	 customise	 the	 political	 cosmologies	 that	 are	 inherited	 and	 passed	 down	
through	 official	 narratives,	 history	 and	 myths.	 For	 example,	 encounters	 can	 create	 new	
routines	 and	 new	 experiences,	 and	 challenge	 and	 radically	 transform	 the	 generalised	
categories	 of	 the	 other.	 In	 Theodossopolous’	 words	 “Such	 is	 the	 hollowness	 of	 political	
cosmologies	 that	 it	 allows	 for	 the	 incorporation	 of	 the	 unexpected:	 accidental	 encounters	
with	 the	 Other,	 ‘revelatory	 incidents’	 …	 charged	 with	 the	 meaningfulness	 of	 social	
relationships”	 (Theodossopoulos	 2007:6).	 In	 order	 for	 revelatory	 incidents	 to	 not	 only	
challenge	 the	 hollow	 category	 but	 also	 help	 reformulate	 it,	 they	 need	 to	 be	 inclusive	 and	
frequent	 enough	 to	 create	 an	 impetus.	 This	 bares	 similarity	 with	 the	 (de)securitisation	
framework.	 Institutionalised	 securitisation	 practices	 that	 are	 interpreted	 from	 the	 tinted	
window	 of	 the	 hollow	 categories,	 also	 reinforce	 the	 hollow	 categories	 by	 adding	 more	
meaning.	 Thus,	 revelatory	 incidents	 that	 challenge	 these	 also	 need	 to	 be	 institutionalised	
enough	 to	 result	 in	 reconfiguration	of	 the	hollow	category	 from	one	 that	 is	 latent	with	 the	
perceptions	 of	 enmity	 to	 one	 where	 difference	 is	 not	 translated	 into	 threat	 and	 danger.	
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Therefore,	 I	 argue	 that	 the	 failure	 to	 include	 Turkish	 immigrants	 in	 reconciliation	 efforts	 to	
desecuritise	 Turkishness	 and	 to	 take	 ontological	 security	 implications	 into	 consideration	
creates	significant	peace-anxieties	for	Greek-Cypriots	and	thwarts	peacebuilding.	 
	
The	generalised	categorisations	that	reproduce	the	self	 in	opposition	to	an	enemy	other	can	
be	challenged	and	reconfigured	through	confidence	building	and	reconciliation	initiatives	that	
can	act	as	revelatory	 incidents;	but	these	not	only	challenge	the	identity	of	the	self	but	also	
the	routines	and	relationships	that	are	taken	for	granted.	Mitzen	explains	a	critical	situation	
that	causes	ontological	insecurity	may	arise	from	deep	uncertainty,	such	as	a	sudden	change	
in	identity	definitions	(Mitzen	2006).	A	potential	peace	agreement	is	an	example	of	a	critical	
situation	that	generates	uncertainty,	because	it	essentially	reconfigures	the	enemy,	creating	a	
sudden	 change	 in	 identity	 definitions.	 Faced	 with	 critical	 situations	 that	 create	 peace-
anxieties,	such	as	the	2004	referenda,	the	self	is	tempted	to	fortify	the	borders	of	its	identity,	
more	often	than	not	by	turning	to	exclusivist	rhetoric	to	differentiate	between	members	and	
non-members.	If	actors	cannot	adapt	their	routines	reflexively	and	are	not	given	the	tools	to	
manage	 the	 anxieties	 effectively,	 they	 resort	 to	 xenophobic,	 fundamentalist	 and	 populist	
accounts	of	nationalism,	ethnicity	and	religion	to	remedy	the	fractures	in	their	self-narratives	
as	an	ontological	security	seeking	strategy	(Kinnvall	2004).	
	
This	 argument	 can	 be	 supported	 by	 the	 accounts	 of	 Greek-Cypriot	 civil	 society	
representatives,	who	underline	their	desires	for	peace	but	also	voice	their	anxieties	about	a	
comprehensive	settlement	(CSOS-GCc:2014):	
“It	 [prospect	 of	 a	 solution]	 makes	 me	 a	 bit	 anxious	 because	 the	 prospect	 of	
armed	conflict	and	political	 stagnation	 is	always	 looming	over	 the	 island.	…No-
solution	 does	 not	make	me	 anxious	 since	 it	 is	 the	 status	 quo	 I	 grew	 up	with.	
Anxiety	is	usually	the	product	of	thinking	of	the	unknown	and	the	dividing	line	is	
not	 unknown.	 No	 solution	 makes	 me	 feel	 miserable,	 disappointed	 and	 sad.	
(Anonymous,	AHDR	(Association	for	Historical	Dialogue	and	Research),	KISA	(The	
Movement	 for	 Equality,	 Support,	 Anti-Racism),	 Transparency	 Cyprus,	 NGO	
Support	Centre)	
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“A	 prospect	 of	 a	 solution	makes	me	 anxious	 because	 it	will	 be	 a	 new	 system,	
very	much	different	to	the	one	we	both	have	now,	and	I'm	not	certain	how	our	
politicians	 but	 also	 fellow	 citizens	 will	 react	 to	 it,	 even	 if	 they	 vote	 for	 it.	
However,	 if	 there's	 a	 high	 percentage	 of	 people	 from	 both	 communities	 in	
favour	 of	 a	 solution,	 …	 I	 believe	 I	 will	 be	 less	 anxious.	 A	 possibility	 of	 a	 no	
solution	doesn't	make	me	very	anxious,	because	this	 is	the	environment	I	grew	
up	 in…	If	things	radically	change,	 in	terms	of	a	decision	being	taken	to	re-unite	
the	 island	or	officially	 decide	 to	 endorse,	 in	 some	way,	 the	 current	 status	quo	
then,	I	would	be	anxious	on	how	people	in	the	'extreme'	part	of	the	society	may	
react.”	(Anonymous,	UNDP-Action	for	Cooperation	and	Trust)	
	
Linking	ontological	security	to	conflict	resolution,	Rumelili	argues,	if	we	do	not	address	these	
peace-anxieties	that	challenge	the	self-other	narratives,	we	create	a	distrustful	environment	
conducive	 to	 political	 manipulation,	 which	 acts	 to	 re-channel	 this	 anxiety	 into	 specific	 and	
habituated	 fears	 (Rumelili	2015).	As	a	 result,	parties	 in	 conflict	may	elevate	minor	 issues	 to	
existential	ones;	find	outstanding	aspects	of	the	negotiations	too	difficult	to	compromise	on;	
or	 generate	 new	 issues	 of	 discord	 to	 reinforce	 their	 positions	 and	 self-image.	 Rumelili	 and	
Mitchell	also	argue	that	ontological	insecurity,	if	not	addressed,	would	also	empower	spoilers	
of	the	peace	processes	both	during	or	after	a	settlement	 is	reached	(Mitchell	2015,	Rumelili	
2015).	This	points	to	a	gaping	hole	in	the	mainstream	approach	to	peacebuilding,	where	not	
considering	ontological	 (in)securities	and	excluding	Turkish	 immigrants	 limits	our	capacity	to	
deal	with	the	affective,	emotional,	and	perceptual	realm	of	peacebuilding.		
	
Stories	 and	 revelatory	 incidents	 that	 unsettle	 the	 compulsive,	 exclusive	 narratives	 that	
reinforce	 the	 sense	 of	 distinction	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 the	 other	 can	 provide	 alternative	
narratives.	These	can	be	effective	tools	of	desecuritisation	as	part	of	a	bigger,	more	inclusive	
and	nuanced	peacebuilding.	As	a	result,	the	two	‘polar’	stories	create	a	spectrum	that	can	be	
filled	 with	 other	 alternative	 narratives	 about	 other-selves	 and	 other-others	 who	 are	 both	
distinct	but	similar,	without	imposing	an	all-inclusive	similarity	like	the	‘babyland’	rhetoric	or	
an	all-inclusive	difference	 like	the	 ‘Turk	as	 the	primordial	enemy’	or	an	exclusive	Cypriotism	
that	 transcends	 difference	 and	 essentialises	 Cypriotness.	 Providing	 alternative	 self-other	
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narratives	 would	 also	 provide	 uncertainty	 and	 ambiguity,	 but	 coupled	 with	 holistic	 and	
institutionalised	desecuritisation	strategies144	I	argue	the	self	can	find	comfort	this	ambiguity.		
 
Comparable	to	the	case	of	Linobambakoi,	and	to	the	case	of	Ålandars	in	terms	of	ambigious	
self-identities,	 Ilay	Romain	Örs	provides	an	anthropological	study	of	Greek	Istanbulians,	who	
she	calls	Rum	Polites.	She	describes	the	ways	in	which	Rum	Polites,	who	were	initially	exempt	
from	the	population	exchange	of	1920s	but	were	gradually	‘expatriated’	to	Athens,	speak	of	
the	‘homeland’	they	long	for	(Örs	2007).	In	her	analysis,	the	‘homeland’	for	Rum	Polites	is	not	
Athens	of	Greece,	but	is	Istanbul/Constantinople	of	Turkey;	where	they	think	the	city	belongs	
to	them	and	they	belong	to	the	city	as	the	true	natives	along	with	other	true	Istanbulians,	be	
it	Turks	or	Armenians	(Örs	2007).	Anatolian	Turks	are	not	part	of	‘self’	and	Athenian	‘Greeks’	
are	 different	 to	 self	 too.	 It	 is	 the	 city	 and	 the	 natives	 of	 the	 city	 that	 is	 within	 their	 self-
narrative.	 They	 are	 a	 non-Muslim	 minority	 in	 the	 Turkish	 narratives	 and	 a	 diaspora	 who	
‘returned’	 in	 the	Greek	narratives;	but	 for	Rum	Polites	 themselves,	 they	are	not	at	home	 in	
Athens,	but	in	fact,	away.	Rum	Polites,	who	acknowledge	the	kinship	with	Greece	but	do	not	
consider	themselves	Greek	because	they	do	not	have	a	‘pure	bloodline’,	base	their	ontological	
security	 in	 their	 ambiguous	 in-betweenness	 like	 Ålandars.	 Örs’	 emotive	 analysis	 of	 Rum	
Polites,	 unsettles	 the	 distinctions	 ethnic	 and	 religious	 categorisations	 prescribe,	 where	 the	
polarised	 self-other	 distinctions	 of	 Greekness	 and	 Turkishness	 exist	 in	 one	 narrative;	 the	
loyalty	is	not	to	their	ethnicity	or	religion	but	it	is	to	The	City	(i	Poli)	itself.	Unlike	Rum	Polites	
that	have	found	comfort	on	the	Greek-Turkish	spectrum	or	like	the	Ålandars	that	found	theirs	
on	 the	 Finnish-Swedish	 spectrum	 without	 resorting	 to	 securitisation,	 due	 to	 a	 securitised	
relationship	with	Turkishness,	Turkish-Cypriots	are	yet	 to	comfortably	exist	on	their	Cypriot-
Turkish	 spectrum.	 This	 creates	peace-anxieties	 that	 prove	hard	 to	 accommodate	 for	Greek-
Cypriots	and	ontological	dissonance	for	Turkish-Cypriots.	 	 	
																																																								
144	Such	 as	 collaborative	 civil	 society	 initiatives	 that	 include	 Turkish	 immigrants	 in	 their	 efforts,	 school	 initiatives	 that	
increase	 interaction	 and	 socialisation	 between	 Cypriots	 and	 Turkish	 immigrants,	 alternative	 media	 platforms	 that	
challenge	misinformation.	
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8.4	Conclusion	
	
This	 chapter	 explored	growing	Cypriotism	among	 the	GCc	on	a	 temporal	 timeline	 and	 their	
declining	attachment	to	Greece	as	the	motherland.	The	chapter	analyses	the	way	Turks	and	
Turkishness	 is	securitised	 in	Greek-Cypriots’	narratives	by	borrowing	 from	anthropology	and	
psychoanalysis	and	engaging	with	concepts	such	as	‘hollow	categories’	and	‘chosen	traumas’,	
which	 are	 highly	 relevant	 for	 the	 ontological	 security	 framework	 as	 they	 are	 integral	 to	
identity	narratives	and	the	conception	of	the	self.	These	concepts	outside	of	the	IR	literature	
enrich	 the	analysis	and	help	us	unpack	 the	concept	of	 identity.	They	also	help	demonstrate	
the	 inter-subjective	 nature	 of	 self-identity	 narratives,	 which	 allows	 for	 reconfiguration	 and	
adaptation	 through	 desecuritisation	 (i.e.	 challenging	 chosen	 traumas	 with	 alternative	
accounts	or	adding	meaning	to	hollow	categories	with	revelatory	 incidents).	 	Demonstrating	
that	 Greek-Cypriots	 differentiate	 Turkish-Cypriots	 from	 Turks	 and	 that	 they	 perceive	 more	
victimisation	and	threat	posed	by	Turks	than	Turkish-Cypriots,	the	chapter	argues	that	despite	
this	differentiation,	securitisation	of	Turkishness	turns	Turkish-Cypriots	into	a	contradiction	in	
terms	 and	 creates	 peace-anxieties	 for	 Greek-Cypriots.	 These	 peace-anxieties	 are	 further	
exacerbated	by	 the	presence	of	Turkish	 immigrants	 in	north	Cyprus	and	 the	 involvement	of	
Turkey	and	the	Turkish	military	in	the	Cyprus	Problem.		
	
The	 evidence	 suggests	 that	 securitisation	 of	 people	 from	Turkey	 has	 a	 positive	 relationship	
with	peace-anxieties.	 Thus,	 desecuritisation	of	 Turkishness	 can	help	Greek-Cypriots	manage	
their	 existential	 peace-anxieties	 without	 translating	 difference	 into	 exclusive	 identity	
categories	 and	 behavioural	 othering	 and	 facilitate	 transformative	 peace	 on	 the	 island.	
Accordingly,	 the	 chapter	 suggests	 that	 inclusion	of	Turkish	 immigrants	 in	 the	peace	process	
can	 present	 an	 opportunity	 for	 frequent	 and	 diverse	 ‘revelatory	 incidents’	 that	 can	 help	
mould	 hollow	 categorisations	 and	 reconfigure	 the	 engrained	 identity	 narratives	 based	 on	
enmity.	 Although	 this	 sounds	 like	 a	 simple	 “Add	 Turks	 and	 stir”	 suggestion,	 its	 ontological	
implications	are	more	nuanced.	 If	not	diverse	and	 frequent	enough	or	not	 institutionalised,	
the	 revelatory	 incidents	 can	 be	 interpreted	 as	 odd	 experiences	 disconnected	 from	 daily	
routines	and	moulded	to	fit	around	the	mainstream	generalised	category	like	an	exception	to	
the	 rule.	 Or,	 simply	 adding	 people	 from	 Turkey	 to	 the	 peace	 process	 without	 ontological	
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security	considerations	could	result	in	incapacitating	anxieties	rather	than	revelatory	incidents	
that	 prompt	 self-reflexivity,	 and	 in	 turn	 trigger	 compulsive	 attachment	 to	 routines	 or	
resecuritisation	as	an	ontological	 security	 seeking	practice.	These	desecuritisation	 strategies	
should	be	devised	and	 timed	carefully,	 ideally	with	 the	participation	and	 integration	of	 civil	
society	both	in	the	design	and	implementation	phases.	 
	
Desecuritisations	that	bridge	the	political	level	with	the	societal	level	do	not	need	to	reinvent	
the	 wheel	 of	 peacebuilding.	 However,	 in	 order	 to	 achieve	 transformative	 peace	 in	 Cyprus,	
different	layers	of	‘otherness’,	beyond	the	primary	self/other	approach,	need	to	be	taken	into	
account	to	 include	other-selves,	other-others	and	othered-selves	and	to	open	up	alternative	
understandings	of	Greekness,	Cypriotness,	Turkishness	and	Europeanness.	CMBs	that	helped	
shift	 the	 identity	narratives	of	Cypriots	 can	be	expanded	 to	 include	Turkish	 immigrants	and	
Turkishness145.	The	CBMs	that	receive	the	highest	support	 from	Turkish-Cypriots	and	Greek-
Cypriots	 include	 measures	 such	 as	 restoration	 of	 cultural	 and	 historical	 sites	 and	 mutual	
official	 apologies	 for	 past	 mistakes	 and	 hurts	 (Cyprus-2015-Initiative	 2011).	 However,	 the	
design	and	 implementation	of	CBMs	as	well	 as	 the	public	opinion	polls	 regarding	 the	CBMs	
only	 focus	on	Turkish-Cypriots	and	Greek-Cypriots.	 Inclusion	of	Turkish	 immigrants	 in	public	
opinion	 surveys	 to	 gauge	 their	 support	 and	 willingness	 towards	 certain	 CBMs	 and	 their	
inclusion	 in	 the	 design	 and	 implementation	 of	 some	 CBMs	 can	 be	 a	way	 to	 institutionalise	
desecuritisation	 strategies.	 For	 example,	 complimenting	 the	 efforts	 on	 missing	 people	 in	
Cyprus,	 which	 can	 reinforce	 the	 cruelty	 of	 the	 other	 and	 the	 victimhood	 of	 the	 self,	 with	
stories	about	 intermarriages	can	provide	an	alternative	narrative	that	adds	ambiguity	to	the	
image	 of	 the	 other	 in	 a	 positive	way.	 Challenging	 the	 exclusive	 identity	 narratives	 through	
revelatory	incidents	and	adding	ambiguity	can	provide	more	room	for	reconfiguration	of	the	
image	 of	 the	 enemy-other	 along	 the	 lines	 of	 different-other,	 where	 both	 differences	 and	
similarities	are	acknowledged	and	celebrated.		
 
From	 a	 psychological	 perspective,	 Volkan	 argues	 that	 large	 group	 identities	 by	 default	
necessitate	enemies	and	allies	(Volkan	2006).	As	previously	discussed,	this	approach	is	similar																																																									
145	For	 example,	 Emel	 Akcali	 reports	 the	 environmental	 confidence	 building	measures	 based	 on	 civic	 participation	 in	
Cyprus	were	among	the	most	effective	(Akçalı	and	Antonsich	2009).	
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to	the	one	Behnke	and	Roe	takes,	where	difference	is	translated	into	a	discourse	of	security.	
For	example,	while	Behnke,	argues	that	‘inclusion	and	community	can	only	be	had	at	the	price	
of	exclusion	and	adversity’	(Behnke	2006:65);	Roe,	arguing	that	desecuritisation	of	minorities	
would	 undermine	 their	 distinctiveness,	 reads	 identity	 configurations	 from	 an	 essentially	
‘securitised’	lens	(Roe	2006).	Conversely,	Rumelili,	who	argues	that	what	identities	necessitate	
is	 difference	 not	 a	 securitised	 relation	 based	 on	 survival,	 suggests	 that	 desecuritisation	 of	
minority	rights	would	not	necessarily	undermine	their	collective	distinctiveness,	but	it	can	end	
the	reproduction	of	this	distinctiveness	through	the	representation	of	the	majority	as	a	threat	
(Rumelili	2004,	Rumelili	2013).	Thus	desecuritisation	of	the	‘other(s)’	in	the	case	of	Cyprus	to	
foster	an	inclusive	large-group	identity	for	a	long-lasting	peace	settlement	on	the	island	would	
not	 necessarily	minimise	 and	 diminish	 the	 existing	 variant	 identities	 (ethnic,	 religious	 etc.).	
Instead,	it	may	mean	more	ontological	security	as	it	will	reinforce	their	sense	of	biographical	
continuity	and	their	faith	in	the	future.	
	
Exploring	what	we	are	not	helps	us	define	what	we	are,	and	identity	narratives	draw	borders	
and	boundaries	 that	by	default	 leave	 some	out	 and	keep	 some	 in.	However,	 identity	 is	not	
singular	 or	 absolute,	 nor	 is	 it	 ‘complete’;	 it	 can	 find	 comfort	 in	 ambiguity.	 Agreeing	 with	
Rumelili,	 and	 Browning	 and	 Joenniemi,	 I	 too	 argue	 that	 difference	 is	 simply	 difference	 and	
does	not	have	 to	 translate	 into	 a	black	 and	white	 representation	of	 enemy	and	 friend	 (see	
Rumelili	2004,	Browning	and	Joenniemi	2013).	Although	making	peace	with	an	enemy-other	is	
bound	 to	 challenge	 actors’	 comfort	 zones	 and	 create	 anxieties	 by	 associating	 the	 self	 with	
what	is	‘outside’	of	the	identity	narratives	that	is	rationalised	and	engrained	as	dangerous	and	
threatening,	 peacebuilding	would	 be	most	 effective	 if	 it	 reconfigures	 relationships	with	 the	
nuances	of	difference	as	well	as	similarity.	 In	other	words,	bringing	salient	parties	 in	conflict	
based	 on	 an	 imposition	 of	 sameness	 underestimates	 nuances	 of	 identity	 and	 ontological	
security. Therefore,	growing	Cypriotism	if	not	imagined	in	inclusive	and	ambiguous	terms	that	
allow	 for	 hyphenation	 and	 variance,	 challenges	 actors’	 ontological	 security	 by	 imposing	
sameness,	which	makes	Turkish-Cypriots	 insecure	due	 to	 their	 fears	about	assimilation,	and	
makes	Greek-Cypriots	insecure	by	adding	Turkishness	into	Cypriotness.	As	such,	reconciliation	
efforts	 that	 emphasise	 sameness	 by	 underplaying	 other	 identity	 signifiers	 such	 as	 ethnicity	
and	do	not	acknowledge	and	celebrate	nuances	of	 identity,	not	only	 create	gatekeepers	by	
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excluding	 those	who	prioritise	 their	ethnic	 identities	but	also	exacerbate	peace-anxieties	by	
‘resisting’	perceived	differences. 
 
Constantinou	 links	 the	essentialism	 in	Cypriot	 identity	narratives	 that	 reify	difference	to	 the	
advent	 of	 modern	 governmentality,	 which	 sought	 to	 divide,	 classify	 and	 categorise	 the	
population	 on	 the	 island,	 and	 reify	 fluid	 and	 ambiguous	 ethno-religious	 boundaries	 that	
existed,	 like	 in	the	case	of	Linobambakoi	 (Constantinou	2007).	For	Constantinou,	the	Cyprus	
Problem	“progressively	abnormalised	or	exoticised”	the	hybrid	communities	that	complicated	
and	 transgressed	 the	 binary	 framework	 of	 modern	 governmentality	 and	 essentialised	
classifications	(Constantinou	2007:247).	Subsequently,	bicommunalism	became	the	dominant	
form	of	 thinking	about	 the	destiny	of	 collectivities	 in	Cyprus	and	 in	Constantinou’s	 terms	 it	
“has	 been	 entrenched	 to	 such	 an	 extent	 that,	 realistically,	 it	 can	 no	 longer	 be	 challenged	
directly”	(Constantinou	2007:265).	Nevertheless,	the	empirical	evidence	suggests	Cypriots	are	
growing	more	Cypriot,	away	from	their	ethno-centrists	identity	narratives.	Although	this	shift	
provides	 an	 opportunity	 to	 cultivate	 a	 more	 flexible	 and	 ambiguous	 sense	 of	 Cypriotness,	
without	 desecuritisation	 of	 people	 from	 Turkey	 and	 Turkishness,	 it	 may	 simply	 become	
another	essentialised	Cypriotist	narrative	that	becomes	perceived	as	the	road	to	a	solution	by	
uniting	 Turkish-Cypriots	 and	 Greek-Cypriots	 against	 a	 common	 enemy	 without	 effectively	
reconciling	identities	and	facilitating	transformative	peace	on	the	island.		 	
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Chapter	9.	Comparative	Analysis:	Room	for	Convergence	and	the	Way	Forward	
9.1	Introduction		
	
This	 short	 chapter	 builds	 on	 the	 previous	 two	 chapters	 by	 comparatively	 illustrating	 the	
ontological	 dissonance	 and	 peace-anxieties	 of	 the	 two	main	 communities	 on	 the	 island	 to	
search	for	an	intervention	point	where	we	can	break	the	vicious	cycle	that	had	contributed	to	
the	protractedness	of	the	Cyprus	Problem.	The	chapter	then	scrutinises	Cypriots’	willingness	
to	include	Turkish	immigrants	in	the	peace	process	and	the	Turkish-immigrants’	willingness	to	
be	 included.	 Although	 the	 quantitative	 data	 shows	 that	 there	 is	 very	 little	 room	 for	
compromise	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 the	 status	 of	 the	 Turkish	 immigrants	 after	 a	 potential	
settlement	due	to	strong	peace-anxieties	and	feelings	of	fear	that	portrays	Turkish	immigrants	
and	 Turkishness	 as	 the	 primordial	 enemy	 of	 Greeks/Greek-Cypriots,	 it	 also	 illustrates	 the	
significant	need	for	desecuritisation	strategies.	Subsequently,	 the	chapter	explores	points	of	
convergence	 by	 looking	 at	 what	 is	 tolerable	 and	 desirable	 about	 different	 settlement	
scenarios	pertaining	to	the	status	of	the	Turkish	immigrants	and	citizenship	in	order	to	suggest	
a	way	forward	for	peacebuilding	efforts.	As	such,	according	to	the	civil	society	surveys,	both	
Turkish-Cypriot	 and	 Greek-Cypriot	 civil	 society	 representatives	 demonstrate	 tolerance	 and	
willingness	to	compromise	on	the	issue	of	Turkey	immigrants	and	explicit	readiness	to	include	
them	in	the	peace	process.	This	can	provide	a	starting	point	 for	desecuritisation	as	 it	shows	
that	there	is	room	to	include	Turkish	immigrants	in	the	peacebuilding	efforts	if	we	are	willing	
break	free	of	the	dual-ethnic	approach.			
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9.2	Comparative	Mapping	of	Dissonance	
	
The	empirical	data	 illustrates	a	case	of	ontological	dissonance	 for	both	Turkish-Cypriots	and	
Greek-Cypriots,	 and	 peace-anxieties	 particularly	 for	 Greek-Cypriots.	 Based	 on	 the	 analysis	
presented	 in	Chapters	8	and	9,	 addressing	Turkish-Cypriots’	 fears	about	 losing	 their	distinct	
identity	 among	growing	numbers	of	people	 from	Turkey	by,	 for	 instance,	 rejecting	Turkey’s	
role	as	a	guarantor	or	by	damaging	ties	with	Turkey,	would	increase	their	feelings	of	insecurity	
as	a	minority	compared	to	Greek-Cypriots.	Furthermore,	rejecting	and	distancing	themselves	
from	 the	 Turkish	 part	 of	 their	 identity	 to	 reproduce	 their	 Cypriotness	 and	 Europeanness	
undermines	 their	 legitimacy	 and	 claims	 to	 political	 equality	 under	 a	 bicommunal,	 bizonal	
federation	at	the	negotiation	table.	Considering	that	bizonality	and	bicommunality	is	a	crucial	
element	 in	 negotiations	 that	 ‘protects’	 the	 TCc	 from	 the	 majority	 GCc,	 this	 dissonance	
becomes	 even	 more	 apparent.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 addressing	 Greek-Cypriot	 insecurities	
about	 Turkey/Turkishness	 by,	 for	 instance,	 rejecting	 a	 plan	 where	 Turkey	 maintains	 its	
guarantorship	in	Cyprus	increases	their	insecurities	about	partition.	Similarly,	considering	that	
their	identity	narratives	are	anchored	upon	the	unity	of	Cyprus	and	the	temporary	nature	of	
the	division,	the	prospect	of	partition	challenges	the	very	foundation	of	this	narrative.	Equally,	
saying	yes	to	a	comprehensive	settlement	based	on	bizonality	and	bicommunality	legitimises	
the	enemy,	turns	the	enemy	into	a	partner	at	‘home’	and	challenges	the	Hellenic	heritage	of	
Cyprus.	 Thus,	 peace	 negotiations	 that	 rely	 on	 the	 reunification	 of	 Cyprus	 based	 on	 a	
bicommunal,	 bizonal	 federation	 based	 on	 political	 equality,	 single	 sovereignty	 and	 single	
citizenship,	by	default,	challenge	the	self-narrative	and	consequently	the	ontological	security	
of	both	Greek-Cypriots	and	Turkish-Cypriots.	
	
However,	 my	 aim	 is	 not	 to	 challenge	 the	 foundations	 of	 peacebuilding	 based	 on	
bicommunality	 and	 bizonality,	 or	 to	 argue	 that	 the	 movement	 on	 the	 ontological	 security	
spectrum	 towards	 the	more	 secure	 end	 is	 easy	 and	 fast	 (that	 it	 can	 be	 achieved	 simply	 by	
changing	 the	 historical	 textbooks	 or	 changing	 the	 constitution).	 Rather,	 my	 aim	 is	 to	
emphasise	 that	 understanding	 and	 analysing	 the	 role	 of	 ontological	 security,	 exploring	 and	
investigating	 different	 sources	 of	 ontological	 security,	 and	 considering	 anxiety-generating	
practices	that	come	with	peacebuilding	is	crucial	for	finding	a	comprehensive	and	sustainable	
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settlement	in	Cyprus.	Failing	to	understand	and	consider	the	nuances	of	identity,	its	link	with	
ontological	security	and	the	latter’s	link	with	peacebuilding	has	kept	the	Cyprus	Problem	in	a	
deadlock	 for	 over	 four	 decades.	 It	 is	 time	 to	 broaden	 our	 understanding	 of	 the	 Cyprus	
Problem	 and	 what	 it	 means	 for	 variant	 identities	 rather	 than	 reducing	 it	 to	 merely	 a	
negotiation	 between	 Greek-Cypriots	 and	 Turkish-Cypriots.	 It	 is	 also	 time	 to	 include	 people	
from	Turkey	in	our	understanding	of	peacebuilding	not	only	for	righteous	humanistic	purposes	
but	also	because	of	the	vital	role	they	play	in	the	stability	and	continuity	of	self-narratives	and	
ontological	 security	 of	 Cypriots.	 The	 prospect	 of	 peace	 ought	 to	 challenge	 the	 fears,	
deprivations	 and	 isolations	 of	 groups	 in	 conflict,	 which	 consequently	 challenges	 the	
ontological	 security	 of	 the	 actors	 involved	 by	 reconfiguring	 the	 representation	 of	 and	 the	
relationship	with	the	other.	The	anxieties	stemming	from	these	challenges,	if	not	managed	or	
challenged	constructively,	would	result	 in	an	intensified	state	of	ontological	 insecurity	which	
would	in	turn	deem	desecuritisation	of	identities	and	peacebuilding	unsustainable;	or	it	would	
result	in	the	re-securitisation	of	the	other	to	reinforce	and	reproduce	the	identity	of	the	self.		
	
The	process	of	peacebuilding	does/needs	to	entail	practices	that	challenge	the	narratives	of,	
feelings	towards,	and	understandings	of	the	other.	However,	peacebuilding	efforts	in	Cyprus	
has	 strictly	 focused	 on	 the	 ‘other’	 Cypriot	 community	 and	 disregarded	 the	 role	
Turks/Turkishness	play	in	the	Cypriots’	identity	narratives	and	consequently	their	ontological	
security.	As	a	result,	both	communities	find	themselves	in	self-perpetuating	(in)security	cycles	
resulting	in	dissonance	as	they	do	not	know	where	to	place	Turkey,	people	from	Turkey	and	
the	“Turkishness”	of	Turkish-Cypriots.	According	to	Rumelili,	the	success	and	sustainability	of	
desecuritisation	processes	depend	on	whether	they	are	able	to	construct	an	altered	state	of	
ontological	 security	 in	order	 to	maintain	 and/or	 re-establish	 the	 certainty	 and	 continuity	of	
being	for	the	actors	 involved	(Rumelili	2013:14).	For	example,	 in	order	for	Greek-Cypriots	to	
accept	Turkey’s	 guarantorship	or	 that	Turkish	 immigrants	are	now	part	of	 the	 reality	 in	 the	
Cyprus	 Problem	 and	 their	 repatriation	 to	 Turkey	 en	 masse	 is	 an	 expectation/desire	 that	
cannot	 be	 realised,	 desecuritisation	 strategies	 need	 to	 include	 reconfiguration	 of	 identity	
narratives	 pertaining	 to	 Turkishness	 instead	 of	 limiting	 reconciliation	 between	 the	 two	
‘Cypriots’	 by	 relying	on	 the	differentiation	between	 the	Turkish-Cypriot	 and	 the	Turk.	 Thus,	
desecuritisation	 of	 Turkishness	 and	 inclusion	 of	 people	 from	 Turkey	 in	 the	 peacebuilding	
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efforts	would	 facilitate	 a	 solution	 by	 addressing	 ontological	 dissonance	 and	peace-anxieties	
and	contribute	to	the	implementation	and	sustainability	of	a	peace	settlement	by	reinforcing	
ontological	security	of	Cypriots.	The	table	below	summarises	the	fears,	anxieties,	response	of	
the	other	and	suggests	that	desecuritisation	of	Turkishness	is	the	way	forward	to	address	the	
ontological	dissonance	for	both	communities.	
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Table	No	10:	Comparison	of	ontological	dissonance	
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9.3	Convergence	and	Potential	for	Desecuritisation	
The	 argument	 that	 people	 from	 Turkey	 and	 Turkishness	 needs	 to	 be	 desecuritised	 has	
been	 reiterated	 throughout	 the	 thesis	 and	 supported	 with	 literature	 and	 empirical	
evidence.	Nonetheless,	the	thesis	refrained	from	making	specific	policy	recommendations	
about	desecuritisation	strategies	as	such	a	delicate	issue	necessitates	further	research	and	
preferably	comparative	analysis	of	different	conflict	environments.	Yet,	before	calling	for	
further	 research	 to	 formulate	 specific	 desecuritisation	 strategies,	 it	 is	 also	 crucial	 to	
establish	 that	 in	 addition	 to	 the	 need	 for	 desecuritisation	 there	 is	 also	 some	 room	 and	
willingness	for	desecuritisation.	A	good	place	to	start	such	an	analysis	would	be	to	look	for	
convergence	points	within	civil	society	that	can	present	an	opportunity	for	collaboration.	
In	this	regard,	fieldwork	data	shows	that	there	is	a	clear	enthusiasm	on	the	part	of	Cypriot	
civil	 society	 to	 include	 Turkish	 immigrants	 in	 their	 efforts	 and	 on	 the	 part	 of	 Turkish	
immigrants	to	be	included.	Civil	society	representatives,	who	tend	to	distinguish	between	
threats	 posed	 by	 the	 government	 of	 Turkey	 and	 Turkish	 politics	 from	 those	 posed	 by	
individual	Turks	living	on	the	island,	recognise	the	current	discriminatory	environment	and	
adopt	an	open	attitude	towards	inclusion	and	desecuritisation	of	people	from	Turkey.	73%	
of	 Turkish-Cypriot	 and	55%	of	Greek-Cypriot	 civil	 society	 representatives	 agree,	 “people	
from	Turkey	are	discriminated	and	marginalised	 in	 the	society”.	Across	 the	divide,	many	
civil	 society	 representatives	 emphasise	 that	 the	 involvement	 of	 Turkish	 immigrants	 is	
crucial	for	the	sustainability	of	peacebuilding	efforts	and	a	comprehensive	settlement:		
“Whether	we	like	it	or	not,	the	Turks	from	Turkey	are	in	Cyprus	and	they	are	
here	 to	 stay.	We	have	 to	 include	 them	 in	 the	 reconciliation	 activities	 if	we	
want	 to	 reach	 a	 tolerant	 multicultural	 society.	 Otherwise,	 a	 settlement	
without	 involving	all	 relevant	parties	 in	 the	process	will	not	be	sustainable.	
First	 of	 all,	 these	 people,	 all	 three	 groups	 [Turkish-Cypriots,	Greek-Cypriots	
and	 Turks]	 should	 come	 together	 and	 start	 talking	 to	 each	 other.”	 (Derya	
Beyatlı,	KAB	and	CMIRS)		
“Many	 Turkish-Cypriots	 and	 Greek-Cypriots	 are	 racist	 against	 Turkish	
immigrants	and	they	refuse	to	acknowledge	their	human	rights.	There	needs	
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to	 be	 a	 re-humanisation	 process	 for	 these	 groups'	 perceptions	 of	
immigrants.”		(Anonymous,	Gender	and	Minorities	Institute)	
Fittingly,	 despite	 the	 general	 belief	 that	 Turkish	 immigrants	 are	 ‘shepherded’	 by	 the	
Turkish	embassy	and	that	 they	are	all	 right-wing	nationalists	who	are	against	a	solution,	
focus	group	findings	demonstrate	they	have	collective	and	individual	political	agency,	they	
want	 to	 be	 represented	 and	 they	 are	 not	 simply	 ‘shepherded’	 by	 the	 Turkish	 embassy.	
While	most	focus	group	participants	want	to	be	part	of	a	comprehensive	solution	on	the	
island	 and	 show	 no	 desire	 to	 return	 to	 Turkey,	 they	 also	 raised	 their	 concerns	 and	
uncertainty	about	their	status	in	a	post-settlement	scenario.	Especially	referring	to	the	cap	
set	under	the	Annan	Plan,	many	focus	group	participants	insisted	that	they	want	to	know	
who	 is	 on	 the	 ‘list’,	 and	 who	will	 be	 allowed	 to	 stay.	 All	 participants	 agreed	 that	 their	
biggest	anxiety	is	uncertainty	about	their	future,	not	knowing	if	they	are	on	‘the	list’	stops	
them	from	‘rooting’	and	halt	their	 lives	in	a	purgatory	where	they	can	not	even	invest	in	
their	 houses	 because	 they	 fear	 they	will	 be	 forced	out.	While	 some	participants	 do	not	
want	 to	 go	 back	 to	 Turkey	 under	 any	 conditions,	 some	 said	 that	 if	 they	 were	 not	
welcomed	 in	 Cyprus	 after	 a	 solution	 they	 would	 go	 back.	 Still,	 almost	 all	 participants	
implied	or	expressed	a	‘longing’	to	cross	to	the	south.	This	division	between	who	can	cross	
and	who	cannot	has	penetrated	families;	for	example,	creating	stark	differences	between	
immigrant	 siblings,	 where	 those	 who	 marry	 Turkish-Cypriots	 can	 cross	 and	 have	
‘European’	kids	and	 those	who	marry	other	migrants,	 cannot.	Considering	 the	economic	
status	of	the	majority	of	the	migrants,	and	that	it	is	hard	for	them	to	travel	to	Europe	due	
to	visa	restrictions,	they	consider	crossing	to	the	RoC	as	going	to	Europe	or	becoming	part	
of	 Europe,	 which	 is	 denied	 to	 them.	 Lastly,	 while	 some	 participants	 supported	 peace	
because	 they	 feel	 that	 it	 cannot	 get	worse	 than	 this,	 some	 voiced	 their	 concerns	 about	
being	marginalised	further	as	third,	and	fourth	class	citizens	(FG1-F;	FG2:N;	FG3-K:2014).		
“There	isn’t	anything	wrong	with	the	migrants	who	come	here,	they	aren’t	
bad,	or	controversial,	they	could	have	gone	anywhere	else	in	the	world.	...	
What	matters	is	to	live	like	a	human,	live	well	and	good.	It	doesn’t	matter	
where	 and	 with	 whom	 we	 live,	 what	 matters	 is	 that	 we	 learn	 to	 live	
together.	 …	 You	 get	 battered/beaten	 based	 on	 where	 you	 come	 from,	
based	 on	 your	 class,	 based	 on	 your	 occupation…	 or	 because	 they	 see	
themselves	as	the	rightful	owners,	rightful	citizens	[of	Cyprus]…	But	at	the	
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end	 of	 the	 day	 we	 are	 from	 here,	 I’m	 from	 here.	 We	 won’t	 become	
migrants	 again,	 so	we	 have	 to	 find	 a	 common	denominator.	 ...	We	 came	
here	 to	 live,	 not	 to	 discriminate	 [against	 Greek	 Cypriots].	 When	 we	 first	
came,	 we	 lived	 in	 Ziyamet146;	 we	 had	 both	 Greek-Cypriot	 and	 Turkish-
Cypriot	neighbours	and	my	mother	learned	Greek	from	them.	My	mom	was	
an	uneducated	lady,	a	primary	school	graduate,	if	she	could	live	with	Greek-
Cypriot	 neighbours…	 [then	 the	 rest	 of	 us	 can	 too].	 ...	 If	 they	 [TRNC]	 are	
going	 to	 continue	 to	 govern	 us	 this	 way,	 I	 rather	 have	 a	 solution	 under	
which	 Greek	 Cypriots	 govern	 us.”	 (Ahmet,	 a	 high	 school	 teacher	 in	
Famagusta,	who	came	to	Cyprus	in	1975)	
“Do	you	really	think,	people	of	Turkish	origin	will	really	be	able	to	cross	to	
the	other	side	after	a	solution?	No,	no	such	thing	will	happen.	For	example	
my	boss	is	a	pure	Cypriot,	they	have	really	good	close	friends	in	the	south...	
Solution	won’t	be	a	problem	for	them,	the	problem	will	be	for	us.	…	What	
will	we	become?	3rd	class	citizens?	4th	class	citizens?	 I	want	peace,	but	 I	
don’t	know	why	 I	want	peace.	For	 the	sake	of	peace,	 I	want	 it.	For	me	to	
support	 a	 solution,	 I	 need	 transparency	 and	 full	 information,	 I	 need	 the	
TRNC	government	to	be	certain,	to	be	open	and	honest	with	me	and	to	tell	
me	what	would	 happen	 to	me,	what	my	 status	 and	 rights	would	 be.	 ...	 I	
don’t	want	to	leave.	…	My	kids	were	born	here,	I	invested	here,	I	don’t	want	
to	be	forced	into	another	migration.	 I	would	never	support	that	solution.”	
(Necati,	a	shopkeeper	in	the	old	city	Nicosia,	who	came	to	Cyprus	in	2006)	
“I	would	leave	in	a	heartbeat	if	it	meant	peace	for	Cyprus.	I	think	being	pro-
solution	 should	 have	 more	 humane	 underlying	 reasons,	 not	 only	 about	
economic	gains	but	 for	brotherhood,	 for	humanity,	 for	peace	 itself.	When	
we	 look	 at	 our	 discussions	 we	 are	 assessing	 how	well	 the	 Euro	 is	 doing,	
which	 has	 become	 a	 benchmark	 to	 how	 we	 assess	 a	 peace-agreement,	
…based	on	interests	and	gains.	…I	want	a	solution	where	no	one	is	‘othered’
and	discriminated,	no	one	tries	to	change	each	other,	that	we	feel	part	of	
the	same	team.	…I	don’t	think	we	will	have	a	problem	with	Greek	Cypriots…	
146	A	village	in	the	north-east	Karpasia	region	where	mixed	villages	still	exist.	
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These	are	scaremongering	rumours,	…	these	are	people	‘demonising’	their	
neighbour,	indoctrinating	their	kids	about	the	‘enemy’,	when	the	kids	have	
no	 idea	 why	 and	 no	 reason	 to	 hate	 the	 ‘enemy’.	 (Hasan,	 a	 newspaper	
journalist	in	Nicosia,	who	came	to	Cyprus	in	1993)		
I	 want	 peace	 and	 I	 support	 an	 agreement.	 All	 my	 Cypriot	 friends	 want	
union.	Since	1964,	they	always	had	the	question	mark	of	‘what	would	have	
happened	 if	Turkey	didn’t	save	us?,	“what	would	have	happened	 if	Green	
Line	 was	 not	 drawn?”.	 …	 They	 think	 they	 lost	 their	 roots	 and	 their	
ancestry…	 that	 is	 why	 they	 see	 people	 from	 Turkey	 as	 a	 threat.	 If	 I	 put	
myself	 if	 their	 shoes,	 I’m	 baffled	 by	 the	 same	 question	 too.	 This	 is	 an	
unsolved	 puzzle,	 a	 pandoras	 box	 for	 them.	 So	 I	 say	 lets	 open	 the	 box...	
(Aycan,	 a	 lawyer	 married	 to	 a	 Turkish-Cypriot	 in	 Nicosia,	 who	 came	 to	
Cyprus	in	2004)			
It	 is	possible	to	deduce	from	the	above	anecdotes	that	migrants	are	a	diverse	group	and	
they	 are	 not	 collectively	 against	 a	 bicommunal,	 bizonal	 settlement.	 Considering	 their	
concerns	 as	well	 as	 Cypriots’	 concerns,	 their	 involvement	 in	 the	 process	 can	 effectively	
help	all	parties	to	be	more	in	favour	of	a	solution	by	addressing	anxieties.	Fieldwork	data	
also	 shows	 Turkish-Cypriots’	 explicit	 support	 for	 desecuritisation	 of	 Turkishness	 and	
involvement	 of	 Turkish	 immigrants	 in	 the	 peace	 process.	While	 63%	of	 Turkish-Cypriots	
think	people	from	Turkey	need	to	be	integrated	into	society,	72%	agree	that	they	should	
be	 involved	 in	 the	 reconciliation	 efforts.	 Similarly,	 Greek-Cypriot	 civil	 society	 supports	
Turkish	 immigrants’	 integration	 into	society	 (63%)	and	 involvement	 in	the	peace	process	
(79%).	 However,	 we	 can	 see	 that	 neither	 the	 integration	 of	 this	 group	 (14%)	 or	
involvement	(22%)	is	supported	among	the	GCc.		
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Chart	No	20:	Convergence	between	Greek-Cypriots	and	Turkish-Cypriots	(inclusion)	
(QTS:2014,	CSOS-TCc:2014,	CSOS-GCc:2014)	
Comparably,	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 negotiating	 the	 issue	 of	 citizenship	 with	 regards	 to	 the	
Cyprus	 Problem,	 we	 can	 observe	 that	 the	 two	 communities	 are	 highly	 divided	 on	 the	
future	of	the	Turkish	immigrants	and	there	is	very	little	room	for	compromise.	Yet,	there	is	
significant	 convergence	 particularly	 at	 the	 civil	 society	 level,	 where	 Turkish-Cypriot	 civil	
society	 representatives	 are	 more	 willing	 to	 accept	 harsher	 ‘compromises’	 about	 the	
Turkish	 immigrants,	 and	 Greek-Cypriot	 civil	 society	 is	 willing	 to	 tolerate	 less	 strict	
scenarios.	In	fact,	it	is	interesting	to	note	that	there	is	more	divergence	between	the	civil	
society	representatives	and	their	communities	than	the	civil	society	representatives	across	
the	 communities.	 Compared	 to	 the	 Turkish-Cypriot	 general	 population,	 even	 though	
Turkish-Cypriot	civil	 society	 is	eager	 to	 integrate	and	 include	the	Turkish	migrants	 in	 the	
reconciliation	efforts,	they	are	more	concerned	about	the	number	of	Turkish	migrants	that	
are	allowed	to	stay	following	a	comprehensive	settlement	and	more	open	to	compromise	
on	 their	 repatriation.	 For	 example,	 the	 second	 most	 unacceptable	 option	 for	 Turkish-
Cypriot	 civil	 society	 representatives	 is	 interestingly,	 for	 all	 people	 in	 north	 Cyprus,	 to	
become	the	citizens	of	 the	 future	northern	constituent	state;	on	 the	contrary	 this	 is	 the	
second	most	supported	option	by	the	Turkish-Cypriot	general	public,	when	it	comes	to	the	
issue	of	citizenship.		
Hence,	it	can	be	argued	that	the	levels	of	securitisation	of	people	from	Turkey	as	a	threat	
to	 their	 desired	 future	 is	 higher	 among	 Turkish-Cypriot	 civil	 society	 compared	 to	 the	
Turkish-Cypriot	 general	 population,	 which	 supports	 the	 horizontal	 securitisation	 thesis.	
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This	 trend	 is	 reversed	 when	 we	 look	 at	 the	 Greek-Cypriot	 respondents,	 where	 Greek-
Cypriot	 civil	 society	 seems	 to	adopt	a	more	 tolerant	approach	 towards	 the	people	 from	
Turkey	 compared	 to	 the	 Greek-Cypriot	 general	 population147 .	 We	 can	 unpack	 these	
inverse	tendencies	from	the	perspective	of	peace	desires.	Across	the	island,	even	though	
there	are	anti-Turk/Greek	civil	society	organisations	as	well,	civil	society	 is	more	likely	to	
be	politicised	and	to	participate	in	bicommunal	events,	which	means	the	Cyprus	Problem	
is	 a	 bigger	 part	 of	 their	 lives	 and	 daily	 routines,	 and	 their	 exposure	 to	 the	 ‘other’	 is	
increased.	Thus,	 they	also	tend	to	support	and	desire	a	comprehensive	settlement	more	
than	the	general	population.	Consequently,	on	the	issue	of	Turkish	immigrants	civil	society	
representatives	 are	more	 open	 to	 tolerate	 the	 sensitivities	 of	 the	 ‘other’	 to	 facilitate	 a	
compromise.	While	Turkish-Cypriot	 representatives	are	ready	to	 tolerate	stricter	policies	
on	Turkish	immigrants	after	a	settlement	compared	to	the	rest	of	the	TCc,	Greek-Cypriot	
representatives	are	ready	to	tolerate	more	open	policies	compared	to	the	rest	of	the	GCc.	
For	example,	the	most	desirable	option	with	high	convergence	among	the	Turkish-Cypriot	
respondents	seems	to	be	for	‘those	people	from	Turkey	who	have	already	lived	in	Cyprus	
for	many	 decades	 with	 their	 families	 to	 be	 allowed	 to	 remain	 after	 a	 settlement’.	 This	
option	 received	 support	 76%	 support	 from	 Turkish-Cypriot	 civil	 society,	 and	 81%	 from	
Turkish-Cypriot	 general	 population;	 it	 is	 also	 supported	 by	 73%	 of	 Greek-Cypriot	 civil	
society,	but	by	only	20%	of	the	Greek-Cypriot	general	population.		
	
147	Researcher	bias	with	regards	to	the	Greek-Cypriot	civil	society	survey	needs	to	be	acknowledged	here.	It	could	
be	 argued	 that	 those	 Greek-Cypriot	 civil	 society	 representatives	 who	 agreed	 to	 participate	 in	 the	 questionnaire	
prepared	by	a	Turkish-Cypriot	researcher	in	English	may	be	inherently	more	pro-solution	and	thus	more	willing	to	
engage	in	a	discussion	about	the	Cyprus	Problem	and	people	from	Turkey.	However,	the	ethnicity	of	the	researcher	
was	 not	 revealed,	 although	 could	 have	 been	 guessed	 from	 the	 name	 considering	 the	 respondents	 received	 the	
questionnaire	link	via	email.	All	respondents	were	given	the	option	to	respond	in	their	mother	tongue.		
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Chart	No	21:	Convergence	between	Greek-Cypriot	and	Turkish-Cypriot	civil	society	
(citizenship)	
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Chart	No	22:	Convergence	between	Greek-Cypriot	and	Turkish-Cypriot	communities	
(citizenship)		
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Unfortunately,	 the	 empirical	 analysis	 above	 shows	 that	 compromise	 between	 Greek-
Cypriots	 and	 Turkish-Cypriots	 on	 the	 issue	 of	 Turkish	 immigrants	 will	 continue	 to	 be	
chronically	arduous;	as	the	most	desirable	option	for	the	Greek-Cypriot	general	population	
seems	to	be	the	most	unacceptable	option	for	the	Turkish-Cypriot	general	population148.	
Yet,	 we	 can	 turn	 to	 desecuritisation	 as	 a	 facilitating	 tool	 for	 reconciliation,	 both	 at	 the	
societal	 level	 to	 manage	 insecurities	 and	 anxieties	 and	 at	 the	 political	 level	 to	 support	
																																																								
148	“All	 people	 from	 Turkey	 since	 1974	 including	 their	 descendants	 should	 return	 to	 Turkey	 after	 a	 settlement	
except	those	people	who	have	intermarried	and	their	offspring.”		
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compromise	at	the	negotiation	table.	The	desecuritisation	of	Turkishness	and	people	from	
Turkey	would	facilitate	a	compromise	and	create	more	convergence	among	and	between	
Cypriot	 communities	 by	 addressing	 the	 perceptions	 of	 threat	 posed	 by	 this	 group	 and	
reformulating	the	friend/enemy	narratives.	And	seeing	that	there	is	room	for	convergence	
and	 collaboration	 as	 well	 as	 willingness	 to	 include	 people	 from	 Turkey	 in	 the	 peace	
process,	we	can	start	with	civil	society.			
Volkan	 claims	 that	 the	official	 and	unofficial	 policy	 of	 the	 international	 community	with	
regards	 to	 the	Cyprus	Problem	was	centred	around	the	 ‘creation’	of	a	 ‘new’	 large-group	
identity	 (Cypriot),	 which	 aimed	 at	 minimising	 the	 existing	 ethnic	 identities	 of	 being	 a	
Turkish	or	a	Greek-Cypriot	(Volkan	2008:100).	For	Volkan,	this	approach	has	failed	because	
there	has	never	been	a	Cypriot	ethnicity	or	nationality.	I	essentially	disagree	with	Volkan	
that	 there	 has	 never	 been	 a	 ‘Cypriot’	 ethnicity	 or	 nationality	 on	 the	 basis	 that	 this	 is	 a	
deterministic	and	an	essentialist	approach	to	identity.	This	view	conceptualises	identity	as	
homogeneous,	 unchanging	 and	 historically	 determined	 rather	 than	 as	 internally	 diverse	
and	dynamic.	 As	 the	 evidence	 suggests,	 there	 is	 a	 distinct	 Cypriot	 identity	 beyond	 legal	
terms	 (that	 there	 is	 an	 internationally	 recognised	 Cypriot	 nationality),	 despite	 the	
religious,	 linguistic	 and	 ethnic	 differences.	 It	 is	 evident	 that	 both	 Greek-Cypriots	 and	
Turkish-Cypriots	 differentiate	 themselves	 from	 Greeks	 and	 Turks,	 though	 to	 varying	
degrees,	and	link	their	understanding	of	home	to	the	island	of	Cyprus.		
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9.4	Conclusion	
	
One	of	the	key	empirical	questions	this	thesis	is	interested	in	beyond	a	general	interest	in	
identity	and	in	exploring	the	role	of	Turkish	immigrants	in	the	Cyprus	Problem	and	Cypriot	
identity	narratives,	was	to	 investigate	whether	their	securitisation	by	Greek-Cypriots	and	
Turkish-Cypriots	 as	 an	 existential	 threat	 would	 facilitate	 a	 solution	 by	 bringing	 the	 two	
communities	 in	 Cyprus	 closer	 together	 against	 a	 common	 enemy;	 or	 whether	 their	
desecuritisation	can	have	a	transformative	effect	on	peacebuilding.	The	belief	that	Turkey	
is	encouraging	immigration	from	Turkey	to	change	the	demographic	balance	on	the	island,	
and	 to	distort	 the	democratic	will	 of	 the	 ‘indigenous’	 ‘real’	 Turkish-Cypriots	 is	 prevalent	
among	both	the	Turkish-Cypriots	and	Greek-Cypriots	(see	Hatay	2005,	Loizides	2011).	The	
increasingly	authoritarian	and	Islamicised	direction	of	the	Republic	of	Turkey	is	intensifying	
the	delicacy	of	this	demographic	balance,	and	existential	fears	and	anxieties	attached	to	it.	
Even	though	their	securitisation	by	the	GCc	does	not	come	as	a	surprise	considering	the	
history	of	the	island	and	the	history	of	Greece-Turkey	relations	where	similar	enemy-other	
constructions	can	be	found,	it	is	particularly	interesting	to	explore	the	securitisation	of	this	
group	 by	 Turkish-Cypriots	 despite	 their	 shared	 ethnicity,	 language	 and	 religion.	
Notwithstanding	 the	 morality	 of	 the	 empirical	 question	 regarding	 the	 vilification	 of	 a	
collective	 identity	as	a	way	 to	 facilitate	 ‘peace’	on	 the	 island;	exploration	of	 the	case	of	
Cyprus	and	Cypriot	identity	narratives	within	the	framework	of	ontological	security,	and	its	
relationship	with	peacebuilding	reveals	that	is	not	the	case.	Thus,	securitisation	of	Turkish	
immigrants	 and	 Turkishness	 on	 the	 island	 does	 not	 facilitate	 peacebuilding	 and	
reconciliation	by	bringing	the	two	communities	closer	together	against	a	common	enemy.	
Instead	 it	 creates	 ontological	 dissonance	 and	 incapacitating	 peace-anxieties	 both	 for	
Greek-Cypriots	and	Turkish-Cypriots.		
	
Consequently,	 despite	 reconciliation	 and	 peacebuilding	 efforts	 that	 have	 succeeded	 in	
bringing	 Turkish-Cypriots	 and	 Greek-Cypriots	who	 identify	 as	 only/mostly	 Cypriot	 closer	
together	 and	 reformulating	 friend-enemy	 distinctions	 to	 an	 extent,	 they	 have	 failed	 to	
provide	a	more	nuanced	understanding	of	 identity,	 security	and	self/other	 relationships,	
and	 hence,	 not	 only	 remained	 limited	 in	 their	 outreach	 but	 also,	 inadvertently	 created	
gatekeepers	 and	 dissidents/spoilers	 of	 peace.	 This	 failure	 and	 lack	 of	 a	 more	 nuanced	
approach	thwarted	the	effectiveness	of	efforts	in	facilitating	a	comprehensive	settlement	
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on	 the	 island,	 created	 a	 discrepancy	 between	what	 is	 feasible	 and	what	 is	 desirable	 in	
relation	 to	 the	 potential	 outcome	 of	 the	 peace	 negotiations,	 and	 contributed	 to	 deep	
anxieties	about	the	future	and	self-identity	of	Turkish-Cypriots	and	strong	fears	directed	at	
the	Turkish	immigrants	in	north	Cyprus.		
	
The	group	is	so	generalised	and	essentialised	that	at	a	first	glance	it	may	look	like	blatant	
xenophobia	 towards	 migrants	 that	 is	 observable	 all	 across	 Europe	 (Huysmans	 2000,	
Huysmans	 2006).	 However,	 under	 closer	 examination,	 it	 becomes	 certain	 that	 Cypriots	
distinguish	 ‘Turkiyeliler’	 from	 other	 migrants	 and	 perceive	 significantly	 higher	 levels	 of	
victimisation,	 fear	 and	 anxiety	 posed	 by	 this	 group.	 For	 example,	 research	 shows	 that	
Greek-Cypriots	 are	more	willing	 to	 cohabit	with	 Turkish-Cypriots	 than	with	 people	 from	
Turkey,	have	more	negative	attitudes	 toward	people	 from	Turkey,	perceive	more	social-
identity	 differences	 between	 themselves	 and	 people	 from	 Turkey	 and	 perceive	 more	
victimisation	 from	 people	 from	 Turkey	 than	 from	 Turkish-Cypriots	 (see	 Danielidou	 and	
Horvath	 2006).	 Similarly,	 according	 to	 the	 research	 conducted	 by	 the	 Cyprus-2015-
Initiative,	when	Greek-Cypriots	were	asked	about	their	main	concerns	regarding	return	to	
their	properties	under	the	Turkish-Cypriot	administration,	61.7%	stated	that	not	wanting	
to	live	next	to	settlers	is	a	major	issue,	while	only	21.3%	of	Greek-Cypriots	cited	the	same	
reason	when	they	were	asked	about	 living	next	 to	native	Turkish-Cypriots	 (Cyprus-2015-
Initiative	2011).	The	thesis	empirical	data	supports	these	findings	and	shows	that	Greek-
Cypriots	 express	 higher	 feelings	 of	 anxiety	 towards	 people	 from	 Turkey	 than	 Turkish-
Cypriots,	and	they	explicitly	differentiate	between	the	two	groups.		
	
Taking	a	closer	look,	the	empirical	data	suggests	that	Cypriots	are	becoming	more	Cypriot,	
meaning	their	 identity	narratives	are	moving	away	from	organic	ties	to	the	 ‘motherland’	
and	motherland	nationalism.	Even	though	the	securitisation	of	the	Turkish	immigrants	as	a	
common	 threat	 to	 those	 who	 emphasise	 their	 Cypriotness	 is	 creating	 a	 common	
denominator,	securitisation	and	exclusion	of	Turkish	 immigrants	and	Turkishness	hinders	
the	 peacebuilding	 process	 by;	 a)	 locking	 our	 understanding	 of	 identity	 in	 essentialised	
dichotomies	and	inflexible	exclusive	categorisations;	b)	allowing	for	the	reproduction	and	
maintenance	of	an	existential	threat	that	cannot	be	fully	eliminated	in	a	post-settlement	
scenario	 hence	 remaining	 as	 a	 source	 of	 insecurity;	 c)	 creating	 an	 essentialised	 identity	
dilemma	and	contradiction	for	the	‘Turkish-Cypriot’	by	uncomfortably	conflating	both	‘the	
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enemy’	(Turk)	and	‘the	self’	(Cypriot)	and	hence	increasing	the	intensity	of	peace-anxieties	
for	Greek-Cypriots	and	creating	ontological	dissonance	mainly	for	Turkish-Cypriots	but	also	
for	Greek-Cypriots.	Consequently,	this	does	not	leave	any	room	for	ambiguity	and	fluidity	
in	the	identity	narratives	of	Cypriots,	as	Turkish-Cypriots	become	both	self	and	enemy	in	
one,	 Turkish	 immigrants	 become	 other-others	 for	 Cypriots	 and	 the	 Turkishness	 of	 the	
Turkish-Cypriot	identity	becomes	the	othered-self.		
	
As	Rumelili	argues,	desecuritisation	can	be	used	as	a	tool	to	manage	peace-anxieties	in	a	
conflict-in-resolution	 and	 post-settlement	 scenario,	 and	 thus	 desecuritisation	 of	 people	
from	Turkey	and	 their	 inclusion	 in	 reconciliation	efforts	would	 contribute	 to	achieving	a	
state	of	physical	asecurity,	and	to	address	the	ontological	security	challenges	arising	from	
the	peace	negotiations	(Rumelili	2015).	However,	despite	the	fact	that	the	‘settler	issue’,	
or	 rather	 the	 ‘Türkiyeliler’	 issue	 has	 been	 on	 the	 agenda	 of	 inter-communal	 peace	
negotiations	 since	 1974,	 the	 debate	 remained	 limited	 to	 a	 negotiation	 about	 their	
numbers.	Thus,	we	need	to	open	our	analysis	beyond	a	dual-ethnic	focus	on	the	primary	
self/other	narratives	 to	 include	multiple	 identity	narratives	of	other-others,	 other-selves	
and	 othered-selves.	 This	 is	 particularly	 crucial	 considering	 that	 Turkey,	 Turkish	migrants	
and	 Turkishness	 is	 integral	 to	 conflict	 resolution	 on	 the	 island,	 and	 they	will	 essentially	
remain	a	part	of	the	new	reality	in	a	post-settlement	scenario.		
	
Peace	 research	 as	 a	 field	 of	 study	 should	 be	 cross-pollinated	with	 other	 disciplines	 and	
literature,	particularly	with	ontological	security.	Current	theories	of	peace	research	seem	
to	rest	on	the	assumptions	supported	by	John	Rawls	and	Wallensteen,	that	discord	among	
humans	can	be	settled	by	means	of	a	 fair	allocation	of	 limited	set	of	available	resources	
and	seem	to	be	grounded	in	the	idea	that	people	in	liberal	societies	‘have	nothing	to	go	to	
war	 about’	 once	 their	 basic	 needs	 and	 fundamental	 interests	 are	 satisfied	 (Rawls	 2001,	
Wallensteen	 2011).	 However,	 as	 Roberto	 Farneti	 argues,	 this	 notion	 of	 ‘peace	 by	
satisfaction’	 is	 problematic	 as	 it	 reduces	 conflict	 and	 hence	 peace	 to	 objective	 and	
measurable	desires	of	contenders	that	can	be	satisfied	by	negotiations	moderated	by	third	
parties	 who	 are	 disinterested	 in	 the	 contested	 resources	 (Farneti	 2009).	 Classical	
approaches	 to	conflict	 resolution	 fail	 to	address	ontological	 security	needs	of	 individuals	
and	 collectives	 in	 conflict,	 and	 hence	 disregard	 the	 fluidity	 of	 identities	 and	 peace-
anxieties.	Consequently,	they	fail	to	account	for	deep-rooted	psychological	habits	that	are	
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intertwined	with	collective	self-image	and	self-esteem,	and	conflict	 reproducing	routines	
ingrained	 in	 representations	 of	 history	 and	 historical	 narratives	 of	 the	 self	 (see	 Farneti	
2009).	 Cross-pollination	 of	 conflict	 resolution	 with	 ontological	 security	 shifts	 the	 focus	
away	 from	 the	 issues	 and	 resources	 at	 stake	 to	 the	 underlying	 processes	 of	 conflicts,	
narratives,	 habits	 and	 the	 routines	 that	 shape	 the	 practical	 consciousness	 of	 actors	 in	
conflict	 (Rumelili	 2015).	 It	 provides	a	more	 reflective	and	normative	 rather	 than	natural	
and	material	 approach	 to	 conflict	 resolution,	where	 the	 aim	 is	more	 towards	 achieving	
transformative	peace	rather	than	a	political	settlement	at	a	political	level.		
	
According	to	Rumelili,	the	state	of	ontological	security	and	physical	asecurity	 is	the	most	
attractive	 state	 of	 security	 from	 a	 normative	 point	 of	 view	 and	 “although	 securitisation	
does	generate	ontological	 security,	 the	 latter	 is	not	dependent	on	 the	 former”	 (Rumelili	
2013:63).	Security	communities	 in	 international	 relations,	such	as	 the	Nordic	community	
constitute	 the	 best	 examples	 of	 such	 a	 normative	 state	 of	 security;	 where	 a	 collective	
large-group	 identity	 discourse	 makes	 it	 possible	 to	 maintain	 the	 us/them	 distinctions	
while	acknowledging	similarities,	which	are	necessary	for	the	certainty	and	stability	of	
being,	while	 remaining	 in	a	state	of	physical	asecurity	vis-à-vis	one	another	 (Browning	
and	 Joenniemi	2013).	 Therefore,	desecuritising	Turkishness	would	not	only	help	achieve	
humanitarian	 normative	 ends	 by	 addressing	 xenophobia,	 discrimination	 and	
marginalisation,	 but	 it	 would	 also	 facilitate	 a	 comprehensive	 settlement	 and	
transformative	peace	by	opening	up	 room	 for	 compromise	on	 the	negotiations	 table	by	
creating	a	more	inclusive	and	functional	platform.	As	the	empirical	evidence	presented	in	
this	 chapter	 shows,	 convergence	 and	 willingness	 of	 civil	 society	 to	 include	 Turkish	
immigrants	 in	 their	 efforts	 across	 the	 divide	 presents	 us	 with	 a	 vital	 window	 of	
opportunity	to	formulate	inclusive	desecuritisation	strategies	with	the	help	of	ontological	
security	literature.			 	
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Conclusion	
	
This	thesis	adopts	the	problematique	that	is	based	on	the	lack	of	success	stories	in	conflict	
resolution	 and	 peacebuilding	 studies	 and	 the	 narrow	 dual-ethnic	 approach	 of	
peacebuilding	efforts	in	Cyprus	as	its	departure	point.	In	order	to	critically	engage	with	this	
problematique,	the	thesis	unpacks	the	relationship	between	(de)securitisation,	ontological	
security	 and	 identity	 in	 protracted	 conflict	 environments.	 Looking	 at	 the	 implications	 of	
securitisation	of	identities	on	ontological	security	and	on	peacebuilding,	the	thesis	builds	a	
theoretical	 framework	 that	 amalgamates	 the	 Copenhagen	 and	 Paris	 Schools	 of	 security	
and	 enriches	 it	 with	 the	 ontological	 security	 literature.	 Overall,	 the	 theoretical	 and	
empirical	 analysis	 embraces	 a	 normative	 position	 both	 for	 desecuritisation	 and	 for	
reaching	a	comprehensive	settlement	in	Cyprus.		
	
In	this	concluding	section	of	the	thesis,	I	will	first	discuss	reiterate	the	primary	theoretical	
and	 empirical	 thesis	 contributions	 before	 discussing	 and	 summarising	 my	 underlying	
theoretical	 and	 empirical	 arguments.	 I	 will	 then	 consider	 the	 empirical	 implications	 for	
Cyprus	in	terms	of	desecuritisation	strategies	and	make	some	recommendations	to	inform	
peacebuilding	efforts.	Lastly,	I	will	consider	the	broader	empirical	and	theoretical	research	
implications	 and	 reflect	 on	 possible	 future	 research	 agendas	 and	 research	 questions	
emananting	from	this	thesis.	
	
Theoretical	and	Empirical	Contributions		
The	primary	contributions	of	this	thesis	include	three	domains	of	research:	critical	security	
studies,	 peace	 research	 and	 the	 case	 of	 Cyprus.	 Firstly,	 the	 thesis	 bridges	
(de)/(in)securitisation	 with	 ontological	 security,	 adds	 flesh	 to	 institutionalised	
securitisations,	and	contributes	to	the	increasingly	popular	ontological	security	literature.	
In	 this	 regard,	 the	 thesis	 contributes	 to	 the	 debates	 about	 desecuritisation	 and	
institutionalised	 securitisations	 by	 providing	 a	 more	 nuanced	 understanding	 of	 identity	
with	the	help	of	ontological	security	and	empirically	contributes	to	the	ontological	security	
literature	 by	 employing	 mixed-methods	 analysis.	 Exploration	 of	 the	 (de)securitisation,	
ontological	 security	 and	 peacebuilding	 nexus	 through	 a	 mixed-methods	 analysis	 also	
provides	 a	 base	 for	 further	 research	 in	 this	 area	 that	 could	 be	 adapted	 and	 applied	 in	
other	 non-violent	 protracted	 conflicts.	 Hence,	 the	 thesis	 has	 an	 added-empirical	 and	
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methodological	 value	 for	 both	 for	 peacebuilding	 and	 ontological	 security	 literatures.	
Secondly,	the	thesis	contributes	to	peace	research	by	using	Cyprus	as	a	case	study	to	apply	
the	 theoretical	 framework	 that	 builds	 a	 nexus	 between	 ontological	 security,	
desecuritisation	 and	 peacebuilding.	 Lastly,	 by	 challenging	 the	 dual-ethnic	 approach	 of	
peacebuilding	 in	 Cyprus,	 by	 expanding	 its	 analysis	 to	 include	 other-others,	 other-selves	
and	 othered	 selves,	 and	 by	 adopting	 a	 normative	 preference	 for	 desecuritisation,	 the	
thesis	 contributes	 to	 empirical	 research	 on	 Cyprus	 with	 the	 aim	 of	 informing	 and	
supporting	peacebuilding	and	reconciliation	efforts	on	the	island.		
	
The	case	of	Cyprus	has	a	dual	function	for	the	thesis:	The	first	one	is	to	provide	a	strong	
and	a	 coherent	 case	 for	application	of	 the	 theoretical	 framework	built	upon	 two	pillars,	
namely	 (de)/(in)securitisation	 and	 ontological	 security,	 which	 are	 studied	 in	 relation	 to	
reconciliation	and	peacebuilding.	The	non-violent	and	the	protracted	nature	of	the	conflict	
make	Cyprus	 a	 good	 case	 study	 for	 this	 purpose	because;	 a)	 lack	of	 immediate	physical	
threats	 and	 violence	provides	 a	 favourable	 and	an	enabling	environment	 to	explore	 the	
ontological	 security,	 (de)securitisation	 and	 reconciliation	 nexus149;	 b)	 reconciliation	 and	
peacebuilding	 is	 very	 conducive	 in	 violent	 conflicts,	 where	 the	 main	 concern	 is	
peacemaking;	 and	 c)	 protracted	 conflicts	 provide	 a	 fertile	 ground	 for	 institutionalised	
securitisations,	 where	 securitisation	 becomes	 a	 tool	 for	 reproducing	 and	 reinforcing	
identity	 narratives	 and	hence	ontological	 security	 and,	 becomes	 as	 performative	 as	 it	 is	
discursive.	In	other	words,	it	is	the	non-violent	and	protracted	nature	of	the	case	that	calls	
for	a	marriage	between	Copenhagen	and	Paris	Schools	to	better	theorise	institutionalised	
securitisations,	and	for	a	marriage	between	ontological	security	and	(de)securitisation	to	
explore	the	potential	of	desecuritisation	as	a	facilitating	tool	for	transformative	peace.	The	
second	function	of	the	case	study	is	normative,	which	is	underpinned	by	personal	research	
motivations	 pertaining	 to	 desecuritisation,	 inclusivity	 and	 a	 reflexive	 understanding	 of	
identity.	 As	 such,	 the	 normative	 commitment	 for	 the	 case	 of	 Cyprus	 is	 to	 provide	
theoretical	and	empirical	support	for	moving	away	from	a	strictly	bicommunal	and	binary	
understanding	of	 the	Cyprus	Problem,	which	aims	to	break	the	vicious	cycle	by	breaking	
free	of	the	dual-ethnic	analysis.																																																										
149	Lack	 of	 violence	 provides	 a	 favourable	 and	 an	 enabling	 ground	 because:	 1)	 it	 is	 easier	 for	 individuals	 and	
collectives	 to	 establish	 daily	 routines	 and	 a	 sense	 of	 normality	 in	 non-violent	 environments;	 2)	 ingroup	 and	
outgroup	 consolidation	 in	 the	 face	 of	 physical	 threats	 and	 fear	 about	 survival	 reifies	 exclusive	 identities	 and	
positions	 at	 the	 extremes,	 making	 it	 even	 harder	 to	 for	 desecuritisation	 and	 reconfiguratin	 of	 friend/enemy	
relationships;	 3)	 in	 violent	 conflicts,	 it	 is	 usually	 not	 possible	 to	 pursue	 reconciliation	 and	 peacebuilding	 before	
ending	the	violence	and	achieving	peacemaking.	
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Summary	of	Underlying	Arguments		
Part	 1	 of	 the	 thesis	 establishes	 the	 theoretical	 framework	 that	 builds	 a	 nexus	 between	
(in)/(de)securitisation,	ontological	security	and	peacebuilding.	Amalgamating	Copenhagen	
and	Paris	 Schools	of	 security,	 I	 theorise	 ‘institutional	 securitisations’	 as	a	process	 that	 is	
located	 both	 within	 discursive	 practices	 of	 actors	 and	 within	 routinised	 acts	 or	
performances.	The	first	main	underlying	argument	is	that	institutionalised	can	escape	the	
security	 discourse	 and	 performatives	 of	 the	 power	 holders/security	 professionals	 and	
become	multi-directional	(horizontal	and	bottom-up),	multi-actored	(with	the	involvement	
of	 media,	 civil	 society,	 and	 individuals)	 and	 multi-layered	 (discursive,	 performative	 and	
routinised).	As	 such,	 they	are	 inter-subjective	and	negotiated,	 and	 their	 institutionalised	
nature	 that	 narrates	 enemies	means	 they	 have	 an	 intricate	 relationship	 with	 collective	
identities.	 Subsequently,	 the	 second	 underlying	 argument	 in	 Part	 1	 is	 based	 on	 the	
problematique	 that	 conflates	 difference	 with	 danger	 and	 security	 with	 survival.	
Maintaining	 that	 the	 discourses	 of	 security	 are	 not	 necessarily	 an	 inescapable	 tool	 for	
(re)producing	identity	narratives,	I	argue	that	relationships	do	not	have	to	be	locked	into	a	
friend-enemy	 dichotomy.	 Theorisation	 of	 the	 distinction	 between	 security-as-being	 and	
security-as-survival	helps	us	better	analyse	the	 identity-security	nexus,	and	 it	also	makes	
desecuritisation	in	the	‘societal	sector’	normatively	desirable.		By	establishing	and	arguing	
for	 this	 distinction,	 I	 discuss	 the	 concept	 of	 peace-anxieties	 that	 illustrate	 the	 delicate	
relationship	between	(de)securitisation	and	ontological	security,	which	can	turn	peace	into	
an	insecure	experience	(Rumelili	2011:8).			
	
Part	2	of	the	thesis	that	provides	a	contextual	background	for	the	case	study	illustrates	the	
dynamic	and	kaleidoscopic	nature	of	Cypriot	identity	based	on	historical	analysis.	Mapping	
the	 shifting	 identity	 narratives	 on	 a	 chronological	 timeline	 organised	 around	 major	
milestones	 that	 have	 (re)shaped	and	 (re)configured	 the	 two	main	 identity	 narratives	on	
the	 island,	 I	 unpack	 the	 varying	 sense	 of	 Cypriotness	 across	 the	 island.	 The	 underlying	
arguments	 in	 Part	 2	 are	 based	 on	 the	 problematique	 that	 peace	 efforts	 in	 Cyprus	 have	
locked	 the	 conflict	 into	 one	of	 ethnicity.	 In	 order	 to	 break	 free	of	 this	 essentialist	 dual-
ethnic	approach,	 I	 look	at	 the	perceptions	towards	people	 from	Turkey	and	Turkishness,	
and	 introduce	 ‘other-others’,	 ‘other-selves’	and	 ‘othered-selves’	 to	the	historical	analysis	
of	identity	narratives.	Accordingly,	the	main	original	contribution	of	Part	2	is	the	adoption	
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of	 a	 broader	 and	 more	 nuanced	 lens	 that	 includes	 Turkish	 immigrants	 and	 ontological	
security	considerations	to	our	understanding	of	identity	narratives	in	Cyprus.		
	
Part	 3	 of	 the	 thesis	 that	 follows	 the	 theoretical	 and	 contextual	 parts,	 analyses	 the	
empirical	 data	 collected	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	extensive	 fieldwork	based	on	mixed-methods	
that	included	quantitative	surveys,	focus	groups	and	online	questionnaires.	The	empirical	
data	 clearly	 corroborates	 the	 prevalent	 perception	 that	 Turkish	 immigrants	 in	 north	
Cyprus	 pose	 a	 threat	 to	 Cypriots,	 Cypriot	 identity	 and	 to	 their	 desired	 future.	 Their	
presence	 is	 a	 constant	 reminder	 of	 the	 Greek-Cypriot	 traumas	 of	 1974,	 the	 Turkish	
invasion	 and	 the	 illegality	 of	 the	 administration	 in	 the	 north	 that	 is	 the	 cause	 of	 their	
victimisation.	On	the	other	hand,	Turkish-Cypriots	see	this	group	as	inferior,	oriental	and	
non-European	 and	 voice	 their	 anxieities	 about	 ‘extinction’	 that	 are	 tied	 to	 their	
frustrations	about	the	status	quo	and	their	paternalistic	relationship	with	Turkey.	As	such,	
the	‘agents	of	the	coloniser’	perception	is	shared	across	the	border.	The	empirical	findings	
presented	in	Part	2	can	be	summarised	as	follows:		
	
Table	11:	Underlying	empirical	arguments	
	
The	underlying	empirical	argument	in	Part	3	is	focused	on	peace-anxieties	and	ontological	
dissonance	 that	 is	 intertwined	with	 the	 peace	 process	 on	 the	 island.	Unpacking	 Turkish	
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Cypriots’	 concerns	 about	 existence	 and	 extinction	 and	 adding	 the	 primary	 other	 (the	
generalised	 Greek-Cypriot	 majority	 on	 the	 island)	 to	 this	 equation,	 we	 observe	 that	
Turkish-Cypriots	 need	 their	 Turkishness	 to	 claim	 legitimacy	 in	 the	 peace	 process	 and	 to	
maintain	 their	 distinctiveness	 from	 the	majority	 Greek-Cypriots,	 but	 coupled	 with	 their	
orientalised	 and	 securitised	 relationship	 with	 people	 from	 Turkey	 and	 Turkishness,	 this	
identity	 dilemma	 creates	 ontological	 dissonance.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 although	 Greek-
Cypriots	 differentiate	 Turkish-Cypriots	 from	people	 from	Turkey,	 Turkishness	 of	 Turkish-
Cypriots,	 the	 presence	 of	 Turkish	 immigrants	 in	 north	 Cyprus	 and	 the	 involvement	 of	
Turkey	 and	 the	 Turkish	 military	 in	 the	 Cyprus	 Problem	 creates	 unmanageable	 peace-
anxieties	 and	 ontological	 dissonance.	 In	 order	 to	 break	 the	 vicious	 cycle	 that	 had	
contributed	 to	 the	 protractedness	 of	 the	 Cyprus	 Problem,	 and	 the	 potential	 for	
desecuritisation,	I	investigate	points	of	convergence	pertaining	to	the	to	the	status	of	the	
Turkish	 immigrants	 after	 a	 potential	 settlement.	 Although	 there	 is	 very	 little	 room	 for	
compromise,	strong	peace-anxieties	and	feelings	of	fear	that	portrays	Turkish	immigrants	
and	 Turkishness	 as	 the	 primordial	 enemy	 of	 Greeks/Greek-Cypriots	 and	 as	 threats	 to	
Turkish-Cypriots	 biographical	 continuity	 also	 illustrate	 the	 significant	 need	 for	
desecuritisation	 strategies.	 	 Thus,	 the	 overall	 argument	 of	 the	 thesis	 that	 ties	 in	 all	 the	
underlying	arguments	 in	all	 three	parts	 is	 suggests	 that	desecuritisation	Turkishness	and	
people	from	Turkey	would	act	as	a	facilitating	tool	for	transformative	peace	on	the	island.	
	
Findings,	Observations	and	Implications		
One	 of	 the	 key	 empirical	 questions	 this	 thesis	 sought	 to	 explore	 was	 whether	 the	
securitisation	of	the	Turkish	 immigrants	would	bring	Greek-Cypriots	and	Turkish-Cypriots	
closer	together	against	a	common	enemy	and	produce	a	sense	of	urgency	for	reaching	a	
comprehensive	 settlement	 on	 the	 island;	 or	 whether	 their	 desecuritisation	 can	 have	 a	
transformative	effect	on	peacebuilding.	The	empirical	chapters	 in	Part	3	overwhelmingly	
illustrate	that	although	securitisation	of	Turkish	immigrants	and	Turkishness	on	the	island	
may	seem	to	be	bringing	the	two	Cypriot	communities	closer	together	against	a	common	
enemy,	 it	 does	 not	 facilitate	 peacebuilding	 efforts.	 Instead	 it	 creates	 ontological	
dissonance	 and	 incapacitating	 peace-anxieties	 and	 hence	 hinders	 the	 peacebuilding	
process	 by;	 a)	 locking	 our	 understanding	 of	 identity	 in	 essentialised	 dichotomies	 and	
inflexible	 exclusive	 categorisations;	 b)	 allowing	 for	 the	 reproduction	 of	 an	 existential	
threat	that	cannot	be	fully	eliminated	in	a	post-settlement	scenario	hence	remaining	as	a	
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source	 of	 insecurity;	 c)	 creating	 an	 identity	 dilemma	 and	 contradiction	 for	 the	 ‘Turkish-
Cypriot’	by	uncomfortably	conflating	both	 ‘the	enemy’	(Turk)	and	 ‘the	self’	 (Cypriot)	and	
hence	increasing	the	intensity	of	peace-anxieties	and	creating	ontological	dissonance.		
	
Even	 though	peacemaking	might	be	 achieved	at	 the	 ‘state’	 level	 once	an	agreement	on	
governance	 is	 reached	among	elites,	 the	ontological	 foundations	of	 the	conflict	 requires	
reconciliation	at	the	micro	level	to	reconfigure	relationships	and	reflexively	adapt	identity	
narratives	(Bulent	and	Dagli	2016).	A	signed	agreement	can	only	ever	be	a	small	part	of	a	
wider,	 inclusive	 and	 deliberative	 process	 of	 social	 reconciliation	 towards	 transformative	
peace	(see	Jarraud	2012,	Kay	2012).	Whether	or	not	a	political	agreement	will	produce	an	
environment	of	insecurity	and	fear	by	asking	people	to	live	with	those	they	believed	were	
their	 existential	 enemies	 depends	 on	whether	 peacebuilding	 at	 the	 grassroots	 level	 has	
managed	 to	 reconfigure	 all	 ‘self’	 and	 ‘enemy-other’	 dynamics	 through	 practices	 of	
confidence	building	and	reconciliation.		
	
The	empirical	evidence	suggests	desecuritisation	of	people	from	Turkey	and	their	inclusion	
in	reconciliation	efforts	would	contribute	to	achieving	a	state	of	physical	asecurity,	and	to	
address	the	ontological	security	challenges	arising	from	the	peace	negotiations.	However,	
despite	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 issue	 of	 the	 Turkish	 immigrants	 has	 been	 integral	 to	 inter-
communal	peace	negotiations	since	1974,	despite	the	securitisation	of	people	from	Turkey	
and	 Turkishness	 by	 both	 Turkish-Cypriots	 and	 Greek-Cypriots,	 and	 despite	 the	 fact	 that	
Turkish	 immigrants	will	essentially	 remain	a	part	of	 the	new	reality	 in	a	post-settlement	
scenario,	this	group	has	been	excluded	from	the	reconciliation	efforts	and	the	debate	has	
been	 limited	 to	a	negotiation	about	 their	numbers.	 Thus,	we	need	 to	open	our	analysis	
beyond	 a	 dual-ethnic	 focus	 on	 the	 primary	 self/other	 narratives	 to	 include	 multiple	
identity	narratives	of	other-others,	other-selves	and	othered-selves.		
	
As	 such,	 the	 overall	 thesis	 argument	 is	 based	 on	 both	 an	 empirical	 and	 normative	
preference	for	desecuritisation	of	the	Turkish	immigrants	and	Turkishness.	This	would	not	
only	help	achieve	humanitarian	normative	ends	by	addressing	xenophobia,	discrimination	
and	 marginalisation,	 but	 it	 would	 also	 facilitate	 a	 comprehensive	 settlement	 and	
transformative	 peace	 by	 opening	 up	 room	 for	 compromise	 on	 the	 negotiation	 table	 by	
creating	 a	 more	 inclusive	 and	 functional	 platform.	 As	 the	 empirical	 evidence	 shows,	
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Turkish-Cypriot	and	Greek-Cypriot	civil	 society	representatives	demonstrate	convergence	
and	willingness	to	compromise	on	the	issue	of	people	from	Turkey	and	explicit	readiness	
to	include	Turkish	immigrants	in	peace	efforts	across	the	divide.	The	quantitative	opinion	
polls	 also	 point	 to	 a	 need	 in	 this	 regard,	 which	 presents	 us	 with	 a	 vital	 window	 of	
opportunity	 as	 it	 shows	 that	 there	 is	 room	 to	 include	 Turkish	 immigrants	 in	 the	
peacebuilding	efforts	if	we	are	willing	break	free	of	the	dual-ethnic	approach.		
	
Critically	analysing	the	mainstream	discourses	on	settlers	and	colonisation	in	the	context	
of	 Cyprus,	 Loizides	 argues	 that	 ethnopolitical	 frames	 are	 strategically	 important	 for	
identity	 narratives	 because	 they	 legitimise	 subsequent	 courses	 of	 action	 by	 combining	
past–present–future	 and	 suggests	 that	 novel	 institutional	 arrangements150	can	 facilitate	
reaching	 a	 comprehensive	 settlement	 on	 the	 island	 (Loizides	 2011).	 Furthermore,	
antagonistic	frames	that	portray	Turkish	immigrants	as	inherently	threatening	can	create	
self-fulfilling	 prophecies	 by	 instigating	 actions	 that	 transform	 the	 external	 environment	
and	 initiate	 cycles	 of	 confrontation	 (Loizides	 2015).	 We	 can	 observe	 this	 self-fulfilling	
prophecy	in	the	way	demography	in	north	Cyprus	is	used	as	a	tool	by	politicians	across	the	
divide	to	foster	their	agendas,	with	head-counts	serving	as	ammunition	in	public	debates,	
and	 in	 the	 lack	 of	 convergence	 in	 the	 peace	 negotiations	 on	 the	 issue	 of	 the	 Turkish	
settlers	(Hatay	2005,	Lordos,	Kaymak	et	al.	2009,	Loizides	2011).		
	
Those	commited	to	peace	on	the	island,	including	civil	society	and	politicians,	repeatedly	
frame	 the	 presence	 of	 Turkish	 immigrants	 and	 their	 growing	 numbers	 as	 a	 reason	 to	
create	 a	 sense	 of	 urgency.	 Looking	 back	 to	 the	 Annan	 Plan,	 and	 in	 line	with	 the	 thesis	
argument	 that	 Greek-Cypriots’	 peace-anxieties	were	 partly	 the	 reason	 behind	 their	 ‘no’	
vote,	 Loizides	 argues	 that	 the	 provisions	 about	 citizenship	 and	 the	 status	 of	 the	
settlers/immigrants	were	framed	not	only	“as	unfair	but	also	as	dysfunctional,	limiting	the	
potential	 for	 a	 compromise”	 (Loizides	 2015:181).	 Thus,	 desecuritisation	 of	 Turkish	
immigrants	and	Turkishness	would	facilitate	and	support	the	formulation	and	legitimation	
of	 these	 novel	 institutional	 arrangements	 by	 addressing	 peace-anxieties	 and	 ontological	
security	and	in	turn	creating	room	for	cooperation	and	compromise.		
	
																																																								
150	Such	as	asymmetrical	citizenship,	alternative	compensation	schemes	and	reserved	territories	for	natives.	
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Desecuritisation	strategies	that	do	not	take	ontological	security	into	account,	that	do	not	
have	a	more	nuanced	understanding	of	identity	and	that	are	not	inclusive	and	holistic	can	
create	 existential	 anxieties	 that	 result	 in	 compulsive	 attachment	 to	 routines,	
resecuritisation	 and	 conflict	 producing	 routines.	 Institutionalised	 securitisations	 need	
institutionalised	 desecuritisation	 strategies 151 	to	 reconfigure	 engrained	 relationships	
defined	by	perceptions	of	threat,	fear	and	danger.	Although	making	peace	with	an	enemy-
other	 is	 bound	 to	 challenge	 actors’	 comfort	 zones	 and	 create	 anxieties,	 peacebuilding	
would	be	most	effective	if	 it	reconfigures	relationships	with	the	nuances	of	difference	as	
well	 as	 similarity.	 Reconciliation	 on	 a	 societal	 level	 means	 dealing	 with	 a	 history	 of	
relationships,	 perpetrators,	 victims,	 and	 beneficiaries	 (Bar‐Tal	 2000).	 In	 protracted	
conflicts	 these	 relationships	 are	 securitised,	 institutionalised	 and	 engrained	 in	 identity	
narratives.	 Challenging	 the	 dual-ethnic	 approach	 to	 the	 Cyprus	 Problem	 where	
reconciliation	 efforts	 singularly	 adopt	 a	 dual-ethnic	 approach	 and	 focus	 on	 imposing	 a	
sense	of	similarity	at	the	expense	of	ontological	security	(and	inadvertently	at	the	expense	
of	Turkish	immigrants)	could	be	the	key	to	understanding	the	potential	of	desecuritisation	
for	transformative	peace. 
	
A	 Cypriotist	 narrative	 based	 on	 sameness	makes	 Turkish-Cypriots	 insecure	 due	 to	 their	
fears	about	assimilation	and	becoming	a	minority,	and	makes	Greek-Cypriots	insecure	by	
adding	Turkishness	into	Cypriotness.	Considering	that	the	growing	sense	of	Cypriotism	on	
the	 island	 failed	 to	 become	 an	 inclusive	 narrative	 that	 can	 comfortably	 accommodate	
Greekness	 and	 Turkishness	 with	 Cypriotness,	 we	 need	 a	 collective	 non-essentialised	
narrative	 for	 a	 larger	 Cypriot	 identity	 that	 neither	 reduces	 Cypriotness	 to	 ethnicity	
adopted	from	the	respective	motherlands	nor	one	that	seeks	a	pure	‘Cypriot’	 identity	by	
turning	 ethnicity	 into	 an	 enemy.	 A	 more	 inclusive	 and	 fluid	 Cypriotness	 that	
simultaneously	celebrates	similarities	as	well	as	the	differences	of	people	who	call	Cyprus	
home	 can	 be	 the	 way	 forward	 for	 achieving	 certainty	 and	 stability	 of	 being,	 while	
remaining	in	a	state	of	physical	asecurity	vis-à-vis	one	another.	The	inclusion	of	Turkish	
immigrants	 in	 the	 peace	 process	 to	 desecuritise	 their	 relationship	with	 Turkishness	 can	
present	an	opportunity	for	frequent	revelatory	incidents	that	can	challenge	the	engrained	
identity	 narratives	 based	 on	 enmity	 and	 can	 be	 step	 in	 the	 right	 direction	 in	 terms	 of	
reconfiguring	a	more	inclusive	and	accommodating	Cypriot	identity	narrative.																																																											
151	Such	 as	 more	 inclusive	 peacebuilding	 efforts,	 CBMs,	 sustainable	 civil	 society	 initiatives	 that	 bring	 Turkish-
Cypriots,	Greek-Cypriots	and	people	from	Turkey	together.	
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Desecuritisation:	What	does	it	look	like?	What’s	next	for	this	research?	
This	thesis	argues	that	desecuritisation	of	Turkish	immigrants	and	Turkishness	is	desirable	
to	facilitate	a	comprehensive	solution	and	to	achieve	transformative	peace	on	the	island	
but	does	not	go	as	far	as	to	devise	desecuritisation	strategies	and	mechanisms	specific	for	
the	 case	 of	 Cyprus.	 Even	 though	 this	 sounds	 like	 an	 “add	 Turkishness	 and	 Turkish	
immigrants	and	stir”	strategy,	 it	 is	needs	to	be	more	nuanced	and	carefully	devised	than	
that.	We	need	to	formulate	strategies	that	can	provide	opportunities	for	institutionalised	
revelatory	 incidents	that	can	create	a	favourable	room	for	self-reflexivity	and	adaptation	
in	order	 to	preserve	ontological	 security	while	 reconfiguring	 friend/enemy	 relationships.	
Revelatory	 incidents	 that	 are	 not	 institutionalised	 can	 prove	 to	 be	 ineffective	
desecuritisation	 strategies	 as	 they	 can	 be	 dismissed	 as	 ‘exception	 to	 the	 rule’	 or	
insufficient	in	amply	challenging	the	mainstream	perceptions	and	narratives.	On	the	other	
hand,	sudden	isolated	actions152,	such	as	a	drastic	revision	of	history	books	that	removes	
the	enemy	other	from	consolidated	identity	narratives,	can	destabilise	the	sense	of	self.	In	
Giddens’	 terms,	 they	 can	 create	 critical	 situations,	 which	 challenge	 self-identity	 by	
imperilling	 the	 sense	 of	 basic	 trust	 and	 elicit	 incapacitating	 anxieties	 (Giddens	 1991).	
Without	 successful	 desecuritisation	 strategies	 that	 can	preserve	ontological	 security,	we	
risk	resecuritisation	and	compulsive	attachment	to	routines	as	a	means	to	reproduce	self-
identity.	 Peacebuilding	 efforts	 that	 recognise	 the	 role	 of	 ontological	 security	 for	
reconciliation	and	include	other-selves	and	other-others	can	help	build	trust	and	facilitate	
reconfiguration	of	identity	narratives.		
	
Nonetheless,	 we	 do	 not	 need	 to	 reinvent	 the	 wheel	 of	 peacebuilding	 for	 the	 case	 of	
Cyprus.	 Rather,	 we	 can	 broaden	 the	 existing	 peacebuilding	 efforts	 and	 projects	 to	 add	
ontological	security	considerations	to	their	approach	and	to	 include	people	from	Turkey.	
As	 a	 result,	 we	 can	 institutionalise	 desecuritisation	 of	 Turkishness	 and	 increase	 the	
intensity	of	the	revelatory	incidents	independent	of	the	Track	1	level	political	negotiations	
to	 reconfigure	 identity	 narratives.	 For	 example,	 some	 broad	 recommendations	 could	
include	the	following	initiatives:	
	
• The	 CBMs	 that	 receive	 the	 highest	 support	 from	 Turkish-Cypriots	 and	 Greek-
Cypriots	 include	measures	 such	as	 restoration	of	 cultural	and	historical	 sites	and																																																									
152	Isolated	actions	refer	to	those	that	are	not	part	of	a	more	coordinated	and	holistic	peacebuilding	strategy.		
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mutual	official	apologies	for	past	mistakes	and	hurts	(Cyprus-2015-Initiative	2011).	
However,	the	design	and	 implementation	of	CBMs	as	well	as	public	opinion	polls	
regarding	 the	 CBMs	 only	 focus	 on	 Turkish-Cypriots’	 and	 Greek-Cypriots’	
perceptions.	 CBMs,	 by	 default	 need	 to	 engage	 all	 groups	 that	 need	 confidence	
building	instead	of	only	focusing	on	the	primary	self/other	relationships.	Inclusion	
of	 Turkish	 immigrants	 in	 public	 opinion	 surveys	 to	 gauge	 their	 support	 and	
willingness	 towards	 certain	 CBMs	 and	 their	 inclusion	 in	 the	 design	 and	
implementation	 of	 CBMs	 can	 be	 a	 way	 to	 institutionalise	 desecuritisation	
strategies	and	create	room	for	cooperation	and	collaboration.	
• ‘ENGAGE-Do	 your	 part	 for	 Peace’	 project’s	 Active	 Dialogue	 Networks	 that	
conducted	 numerous	 bicommunal	 and	 monocommunal	 workshops	 report	 that	
both	 Greek-Cypriots	 and	 Turkish-Cypriots	 support	 “translation	 of	 all	 formal	
documents	and	signs	related	to	central	and	local	government	offices	 into	Turkish	
and	 translation	 of	 all	 road	 signs	 into	 three	 languages	 (TR/GR/ENG)”	 as	 a	
confidence	building	priority	(Bulent	and	Dagli	2016).	Realisation	of	this	CBM	would	
not	 only	 create	 a	 stronger	 sense	 of	 a	 multilingual	 society	 and	 diminish	 the	
difficulties	 created	by	 language	barriers,	 but	 considering	 the	 strong	 visibility	 and	
audience	 base	 of	 such	 an	 action,	 it	 would	 also	 serve	 as	 an	 institutionalised	
desecuritisation	 strategy	 that	 routinises	 Turkish	 language	 as	 part	 of	 daily	 life.	
“Ontological	security	is	an	emotive	identification	and	not	always	an	overt	cognitive	
experience”	(Noble	2005)	as	it	is	about	the	trust	we	have	in	the	continuity	of	our	
self-identity	 and	 in	 our	 social	 and	 material	 environments	 (Giddens	 1990).)	 By	
changing	 road	 signs	 and	 official	 documents,	 we	 can,	 in	 part,	 transform	 daily	
routines	that	reinforce	and	reproduce	our	ontological	security	by	 inserting	a	part	
of	the	‘other’s’	identity	into	those	routines	and	material	environments.
• 	In	 line	 with	 the	 above	 recommendation,	 making	 learning	 the	 ‘other’	 language 
(Greek	and	Turkish)	accessible	and	affordable,	such	as	organising	free	and	mobile	 
language	classes	island-wide	and	subsidising	simultaneous	translation	services	for	   
reconciliation	 and	 peacebuilding	 efforts	 would	 facilitate	 cooperation	 and	 
constructive	dialogue,	and	increase	the	feasibility	and	practicality	of	peacebuilding	 
and	 reconciliation	 efforts	 that	 are	 almost	 exclusively	 limited	 to	 those	 who	 are	
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fluent	 in	 English.	 In	 their	 comprehensive	 analysis	 of	 island-wide	 peace-building	
activities	in	Cyprus,	Hadjipavlou	and	Kanol	confirm	that	the	majority	of	participants	
in	 conflict	 resolution	 workshops	 and	 mediation	 trainings	 came	 from	 educated	
groups	 who	 could	 speak	 English	 (Hadjipavlou	 and	 Kanol	 2008).	 This	 almost	
automatically	 exclude	 majority	 of	 people	 from	 Turkey 153 	and	 prompts	 the	
prevalent	criticism	among	the	public	 that	peacebuilding	efforts	are	too	academic	
and	elitist.
	
• Complimenting	the	efforts	of	the	Committee	of	Missing	Persons154	(CMP)	in	Cyprus	
with	positive	stories,	which	would	provide	an	alternative	narrative	that	challenges	
victimhood	of	 the	self	and	the	perception	that	 the	other	 is	 ‘cruel’	and	 ‘barbaric’.	
Although	CMP	is	a	strong	and	effective	CBM	as	it	provides	closure	for	the	families	
of	the	missing	persons	as	well	as	acknowledgement	that	suffering	and	loss	 is	not	
limited	to	the	one	side,	it	also	reminds	people	of	their	suffering	and	victimisation	
at	the	hands	of	the	other.	Thus,	complimenting	the	efforts	of	the	CMP	with	stories	
such	 as	 oral	 histories	 about	 inter-marriages	 or	 acts	 of	 good	will	 in	 times	 of	 dire	
situations	can	act	as	revelatory	narratives	to	challenge	the	barbaric,	uncivilised	or	
aggressive	 nature	 of	 the	 Turkish	 immigrants	 can	 be	 another	 desecuritisation	
strategy.		
	
• Creation	of	 counter	narratives	 to	 transform	 routines	 and	mainstream	narratives,	
and	to	increase	actors’	reflexive	capacities:		
a) Publication	and	creation	of	children	story	books,	cartoons,	puppet	shows,	
novels,	 theatre	 performances,	 TV	 shows,	 soaps,	 adverts	 and	movies	 that	
have	Greek,	Turkish	and	Cypriot	characters	as	the	main	protagonists;		
b) Creating	 open	 access	 platforms	 and	 alternative	 media	 platforms	 to	
challenge	 the	 misinformation	 regarding	 Turkish	 immigrants	 and	
propaganda	 such	 as	media	monitoring	 and	 fact-check	websites	 similar	 to	
http://factcheckeu.org.		
c) Creating	 and	 supporting	 strong	 access	 to	 information	 laws	 would	 also	
benefit	 what	 Brent	 Steele	 calls	 a	 “post-structural	 archaeology”	 by	 laying	
153 	Considering	 the	 economic	 and	 educational	 background	 of	 Turkish	 immigrants,	 they	 are	 less	 likely	 to	
communicate	in	English	compared	to	Turkish-Cypriots.		
154	http://www.cmp-cyprus.org	
320	
bare	 the	 self	 of	 a	 state,	 by	 facilitating	 self-reflexivity	 and	 by	 exposing	 
discrepancies	 between	 agents/state’s	 actions	 and	 their	 biographical	
narrative	 and	 in	 turn	 allowing	 us	 to	 experience	 shame	 (Steele	 2008:65).	 
Counter	 narratives	 expose	 shame,	 uncover	 processes	 and	 allow	 us	 to	
experience	shame	(i.e.	truth	and	reconciliation	committees,	accepting	and	 
apologising	 for	 war	 crimes,	 showing	 remorse	 and	 empathy).	 According	 to	
Steele,	 shame	 is	 crucial	 for	 reflexivity,	 just	 like	 anxiety;	 it	 is	 “a	 necessary	 
condition	 for	 the	 realisations	 of	 a	 new	 self”	 (Steele	 2008:68).	 Effective	 
access	to	information	mechanisms	can	also	help	increase	transparency	and	 
accountability	 of	 the	 peace	 process,	 and	 help	 challenge	 misinformation,	 
streotypes,	 myths	 and	 propaganda	 (i.e.	 such	 as	 challenging	 exaggerated	 
statistics	 about	 demography,	 criminality	 of	 immigrants)155.	 As	 such,	 they	 
can	help	reconfigure	narratives	and	approximate	the	social	reality.		
	
• Informing	and	lobbying	international	donors	(i.e.	the	EU	and	the	UNDP)	to	include	
Turkish	 immigrants	 in	 their	 reconciliation	 and	 peacebuilding	 grant	 guidelines	 in	
order	 to	 challenge	 the	 exclusively	 binary	 bicommunal	 approach	 of	 the	 grant	
programmes.	 This	would	 also	 allow	CSOs	 to	 formulate	bottom-up	 strategies	 and	
create	new	partnerships,	 thus	add	to	the	sustainability	and	 institutionalisation	of	
the	efforts.		
	
• Creating	 incentives,	 grants,	 awards	 and	 ‘peace	 loyalty	 schemes’	 for	 individuals,	
joint	 ventures	 and	 initiatives	 to	 encourage	 more	 institutionalised	 and	 sustained	
collaboration	among	Cypriots	and	people	from	Turkey.	A	similar	award	scheme	is	
organised	 by	 the	 Stelios	 Foundation	 annually	 since	 2009	 but	 is	 only	 limited	 to	
Turkish-Cypriot	and	Greek-Cypriot	entrepreneurs156.		
	
• Organising	inclusive	reconciliation	programmes	based	on	‘soft’	issues	that	address	
common	 concerns	 such	 as	 the	 environment	 and	 animal	 rights	 to	 contribute	 to	
155	UNESCO	initiatives	have	demonstrated	that	value	of	open	access	to	 information	empowers	citizens,	stimulates	
entrepreneurship	and	 fosters	 innovation.	 As	 such,	 UNESCO	 confirms	 that	 greater	 access	 to	 information	 and	
improved	communication	among	different	sectors	of	the	population	are	vital	for	building	a	culture	of	peace.	(	see	
http://en.unesco.org/themes/access-information).	 Access	 Info	 Cyprus	 project	 funded	 by	 the	 EU	 also	 reports	 that	
improved	 access	 to	 information	mechanisms	will	 not	 only	 increase	 transparency	 and	 accountability,	 but	 are	 also	
vital	for	a	healthy	civil	society	and	inter-communal	collaboration	including	the	public,	civic	and	private	sectors	(see	
http://www.access-info.org/wp-content/uploads/Open_Cyprus_Report_and_Recommendations.pdf.)	
156	http://stelios.org/stelios-award-cyprus/blog.html	
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collaboration	 between	Greek-Cypriots,	 Turkish-Cypriots	 and	 people	 from	Turkey.	
Emel	Akçalı	argues	that	the	UNDP	discourse	about	‘nature	knows	no	boundaries’	is	
most	effective	when	it	generates	solutions	that	are	perceived	to	be	beneficial	to	all	
parties	 involved,	 rather	 than	 when	 it	 uses	 the	 environment	 to	 discursively	
construct	 a	 common	 ‘patriotism’	 beyond	 ethnic	 identities.	 As	 such,	 these	 ‘soft	
issue’	 CBMs	 should	 be	 expanded	 to	 include	 people	 from	 Turkey	 to	 avoid	 the	
construction	 of	 a	 common	 Cypriotist	 patriotism	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 securitising	
other	groups	(Akcali	2009).	
	
• Organising	 inclusive	 public	 participation	 platforms	 and	 youth	 councils	 to	
encourage	civic	participation	of	Turkish-Cypriots	and	Turkish	immigrants.	This	will	
not	 only	 contribute	 to	 the	 empowerment	 of	 Turkish	 immigrant	 groups	 and	
recognise	 the	diversity	 of	 their	 needs,	 backgrounds,	 political	 positions	 but	 it	will	
also	address	 the	growing	polarisation	between	Turkish-Cypriots	and	people	 from	
Turkey.		
	
• Providing	 accessible	 and	 affordable	 occupational	 life	 long	 development	
programmes	 for	 teachers	 and	 journalists	 on	 topics	 such	 as	 peace	 education	 and	
peace	journalism.	
	
• Conducting	voluntary	DNA	tests	to	illustrate	that	ethnicity	signifiers	are	not	‘pure’	
and	 perceived	 differences	 and	 similarities	 are	 subjective,	 which	 would	 help	
participants	 to	 reflexively	 engage	 with	 their	 self-identity	 and	 past.	 A	 similar	
initiative	 was	 conducted	 with	 67	 participants	 by	 a	 Danish	 travel	 search	 site	
Momondo157 	and	 with	 8	 participants	 by	 Channel	 Four158 	that	 challenged	 their	
prejudices	 and	 ‘clear’	 perceptions	 about	 their	 pure	 ancestral	 origins.	 The	
Momondo	 initiative	 in	 particular	 garnered	 strong	 positive	 reactions	 from	 the	
participants,	 who	 voiced	 that	 the	 results	 have	 changed	 their	 perception	 of	 and	
attitudes	toward	the	other	and	was	extended	to	include	500	more	individuals.	This	
can	be	replicated	 in	Cyprus	 to	demonstrate	 that	both	diversity	and	similarity	are	
inherent	and	there	is	no	one	single	and	pure	way	of	being	a	Cypriot.		
157	http://aplus.com/a/dna-journey-momondo-shocking-reveal	
158	http://www.andrewgrahamdixon.com/archive/100-per-cent-english.html	
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• Creating	diversified	zones	of	reconciliation	similar	to	the	Home	for	Cooperation	in	
the	 Nicosia	 buffer-zone	 (i.e.	 in	 Lefka/Lefke	 and	 in	 Famagusta/Magusa	 buffer-
zones),	 which	 would	 not	 only	 facilitate	 communication	 and	 participation,	 but	
would	 also	 increase	 the	 feasibility	 and	 practicality	 of	 peacebuilding	 and	
reconciliation	efforts	mainly	take	place	in	Nicosia.	One	of	the	main	criticisms	of	the	
reconciliation	 efforts	 and	 bi-communal	 initiatives	 in	 Cyprus	 is	 that	 they	 fail	 to	
incorporate	 people	 and	 perspectives	 outside	 the	 capital.	 According	 to	 the	 civic	
map	 created	 by	 the	 Mahallae	 initiative,	 out	 of	 684	 bi-communal	 civil	 society	
projects	completed	between	1979	and	2013,	only	49	were	implemented	by	CSOs	
from	outside	of	Nicosia	or	had	branches	outside	the	capital	 (see	Mahallae	2013).	
This	makes	 the	 involvement	 of	 civil	 society	 outside	 of	 Nicosia	 is	 relatively	more	
difficult.	It	is	imperative	that	more	people	are	engaged	in	peace	and	reconciliation	
efforts	 and	 social	 reconciliation	 takes	 place	 not	 only	 in	 Nicosia	 but	 island-wide,	
with	 the	 involvement	 and	 participation	 of	 different	 groups	 and	 rural	
communities159.		
	
• Promoting	 intercommunal	 initiatives	 rather	 than	 bicommunal	 ones,	 and	 locating	
Cyprus	in	the	broader	regional	context	that	includes	Greece	and	Turkey	as	well	as	
other	Mediterranean	countries.		
	
• Creating	 opportunities	 and	 organising	 events	 that	 not	 only	 bring	 Greek-Cypriots	
and	 Turkish-Cypriots	 together	 but	 also	 people	 from	 Turkey,	 such	 as	 including	
Turkish	immigrant	children	and	students	in	peacebuilding	youth	camps	and	events,	
and	 integrating	 joint	volunteer	and	charity	work	 into	extra-curricular	activities	at	
schools	across	the	divide	and	organising	intercommunal	internships.		
	
• And	 finally,	 devising	 a	 political	 solution	 that	 enables	 Turkish	 immigrants	 with	
‘TRNC’	 citizenship	 to	 cross	 to	 the	 RoC.	 Although	 this	 cannot	 be	 achieved	
independent	of	the	Track	1	level	negotiations	and	calls	for	significant	political	will,	
it	would	significantly	 increase	‘friendly’	encounters	and	to	address	the	‘not	fit	for	
159	It	is	important	to	note	that	there	are	big	Turkish	settler	and	migrant	communities	particularly	in	Famagusta	and	
Kyrenia.		
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Europe/not	 European	 enough’	 stigma	 that	 adds	 to	 the	 discourse	 of	 polarisation	
and	othering.		
	
Broader	research	implications	and	future	research	directions	
The	research	has	broader	empirical	 implications	for	non-violent	protracted	conflicts	such	
as	Transnistria,	Abkhazia	and	South	Ossetia.	Similarly,	it	can	be	expanded	to	other	conflict	
environments	where	settlers	and	immigrant	groups	are	perceived	as	an	obstacle	for	peace	
such	as	Tibet	and	Western	Sahara	(see	Loizides	2015)	or	for	conflict	environments	where	
identities	are	highly	securitised	such	as	Crimea.	Moreover,	the	thesis	has	broader	research	
implications	for	peace	research	and	security	studies	as	well	as	migration	and	integration	as	
it	 unpacks	 the	 concepts	of	 identity	 and	nonmaterial	 needs	 in	policy	 actions,	where	 self-
identity	 rather	 than	 survival	 becomes	 an	 operative	 analytical	 concept	 for	 the	 future	 of	
security	 studies.	 It	 contributes	 to	multi-disciplinary	studies	 that	combine	psycho-political	
analysis,	 anthropology,	 sociology	 and	 IR,	 where	 concepts	 such	 as	 self-esteem,	 identity,	
trust	 and	 home	 can	 be	 cross-pollinated.	 It	 also	 has	 implications	 for	 ethics	 scholars	 and	
research	that	focus	on	concepts	of	honour,	just	war,	deliberation	and	moral	driven	action	
as	 it	 engages	 with	 concepts	 such	 as	 guilt,	 shame,	 fear,	 anxiety,	 and	 calls	 for	 increased	
reflexivity	and	self-interrogation	processes	in	analysing	and	developing	policies.		
	
On	the	state	and	collective	level,	self-awareness,	self-interrogation	and	reflexivity	is	crucial	
for	 adaptability	 and	 resilience.	 A	 reflexive	 society	 normatively	 makes	 a	 better	 world,	 a	
more	open	world	where	we	can	reflect	on	and	adapt	our	identities,	interests	and	security.	
Although	‘too	much’	self-reflexivity	and	 ‘digging	too	deep’	can	result	 in	dizziness,	 feeling	
lost	and	disembodied	identities	(see	Laing	1971,	Steele	2008),	 it	helps	us	understand	the	
meaning	we	attach	 to	security	beyond	survival	and	better	understand	 ‘who	we	are’	and	
‘who	 we	 want	 to	 be’.	 Self-reflexivity	 challenges	 the	 consolidated	 singular	 version	 of	
identity	 narratives	 and	 the	 status	 quo,	 and	 better	 equip	 us	 to	 scrutinise	 and	 adapt.		
Without	self-reflexion,	routines,	habits,	 identities	are	reified	within	a	perceived	narrative	
that	 is	made	static.	We	need	to	fight	the	temptation	to	 internalise	and	emotionalise	the	
prevailing	view	of	self-identity	and	the	temptation	to	silence	discourses	that	challenge	 it	
through	self-reflexivity.	As	Steele	puts	it,	“the	irony	of	self-interrogative	reflexivity	is	that	it	
may	disturb	before	 it	heals”	because	 it	disembeds	actors	from	comfortable	routines	and	
requires	them	to	question,	reflect	and	adapt	(Steele	2008:151).			
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As	 Giddens	 argues,	 a	 consistent	 biographical	 narrative	 can	 be	 transformed	 by	 being	
“altered	 and	 reflexively	 sustained”	 through	 “debates”	 and	 “contestations”	 (Giddens	
1991:215).	To	that	end,	Brent	Steele	makes	three	propositions	to	trigger	self-reflexivity:	1)	
Reflexive	discourse	(i.e.	counter	discourse	to	point	to	the	discrepancies	between	the	self	
narrative	 and	 actions);	 2)	 reflexive	 imaging	 (i.e.	 counter	 images	 to	 support	 counter	
discourse);	3)	confronting	meta-narratives	and	scholarly	self-interrogation	(i.e.	democratic	
peace,	 survival,	 nation-state)	 (Steele	 2008).	 More	 empirical	 research	 that	 collates	
reconciliation	 ideas	 directly	 from	 the	 audience	 and	 conducts	 comparative	 analysis	 that	
looks	into	evaluation	and	success	of	peacebuilding	strategies	and	programmes	in	different	
conflict	 environments	 is	 needed	 to	 formulate	 specific	 policy	 recommendations.	 More	
specifically,	the	thesis	could	lead	to	further	research	on	the	following	areas:	
	
• Comparative	empirical	analysis	using	the	same	methodology	and	adaptation	of	
research	questions	to	explore	the	role	of	other-others,	other-selves	and	othered-
selves	in	other	conflict	environments;	
	
• Empirical	research	on	potential	desecuritisation	strategies	and	their	reception	at	
the	audience	level	in	order	to	formulate	specific	desecuritisation	strategies	that	
include	other-others,	other-selves	and	othered-selves	for	the	case	of	Cyprus;		
	
• Empirical	research	with	the	Turkish	immigrant/settler	population	to	explore	their	
perceptions	of	fear,	threat	and	anxiety,	as	well	as	assessing	how	they	envision	their	
participation	in	the	peace	process	(i.e.	extension	of	the	quantitative	surveys	that	
focused	on	Greek-Cypriots	and	Turkish-Cypriots	due	to	research	limitations	to	
Turkish	immigrants);	
	
• Comparative	analysis	and	evaluation	of	peacebuilding	and	reconciliation	initiatives	
in	different	non-violent	conflict	environments	with	a	lens	that	distinguishes	
between	security-as-being	and	security-as-survival;	
	
• Impact	and	policy	based	research	and	recommendations	to	inform	donors,	policy	
makers,	civil	society	and	relevant	stakeholders	based	on	a	participatory	and	
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deliberative	approach	that	brings	together	CSOs,	mediation	scholars,	
peacebuilders,	researchers	and	migrant	groups.	
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